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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is concerned with exploring the nature of human-computer 
interaction. After examining how this is currently conceived within the 
field of Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) it suggests that it may be 
worthwhile utilising methodological and analytic frameworks drawn 
from the social sciences, rather than from psychology. In particular, it 
explores how work from an ethnomethodological orientation may be a 
resource for an analysis of the use of computational artefacts. This 
framework provides a foundation for a series of analyses of four different 
settings of human-computer interaction: an open-ended `experiment' of 
individuals using a computer application; the work of architects using a 
Computer-Aided Design package; the talk through a computer- 
supported phone system on a transport network; and the scheduling of 
trains through a system located in a control room. In each the details of 
the activities performed on or through the computer are examined. For 
the analysis particular innovations are made. These provide for an 
examination of how computer-based activities shape and are shaped by 
the interactions of participants in a setting. The thesis concludes with a 
consideration of the relationship between the analysis of activities in the 
workplace, particularly those centred on the use of technologies, and the 
design, development and deployment of novel systems. This discussion 
focuses on how detailed studies of workplace activities can inform the 
studies of human-computer interaction, collaborative work and 
processes for system design. Although it appears that specific and 
generic implications can be drawn from studies such as those 
undertaken here, it may be that the more important contribution of this 
work is with respect to the conceptions which underlie the analysis of 
computer-related activities, whether these be initially considered as 
collaborative or as interactions between computers and users. 
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Chapter 1 
Computers and 
Interaction 
a general introduction 
Some discouragement, some faintness of heart at the new real future 
which replaces the imaginary, is not unusual, and we do not expect people 
to be deeply moved by what is not unusual.. . If we had a keen vision and 
feeling of all ordinary human life it would be like hearing the grass grow 
and the squirrel's heart beat and we should die of that roar which lies on 
the other side of silence. 
George Eliot, Middlemarch, 1872, p. 189, Penguin. 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is concerned with exploring the details of the very ordinary 
activities surrounding the use of computers. Although this domain has 
been an area of considerable research interest with potentially wide- 
ranging practical implications, most studies have been constrained by the 
conceptions they adopt. This is particularly so for the principal field 
concerned with these studies: Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). 
Utilising conceptions drawn from psychology, particularly from Cognitive 
Science, researchers in this field principally consider the activity of using 
a computer in terms of the mental processing underpinning the 
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individual's `interaction' with the technology. In this thesis, drawing from 
resources from recent developments in the social sciences, the way in 
which individuals `interact' with computers is reconsidered. 
The studies reported in this thesis examine not only the nature of the 
activities surrounding an individual's use of a computer system in an 
experimental domain, but also how technologies are utilised to support 
activities in natural settings, in workplaces. Even in the analysis of an 
individual user carrying out a circumscribed task the current conceptions 
of the activity in HCI may to be too restrictive, and neglect qualities of the 
activity. When exploring the uses of technology in work settings, the focus 
of HCI appears to be more problematic. Individuals collaborate with 
colleagues on and through the technologies, and the systems become a 
resource for collaborative activities. Such uses have become the interest of 
the field of research called Computer-Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW). However, characterising the uses of a computational artefact as 
`collaborative' may be as vague and unclear as characterising these in 
terms of interactions. The principal concern of this thesis is in unpicking 
the ways in which individuals produce and render intelligible activities 
accomplished on and through computer systems. In doing this, it will 
address issues of concern to both the fields of CSCW and HCI. However, 
its principal focus is on details of the use of the computational artefacts, in 
other words, reconsidering the nature of `interactions' with computers, 
An objective of the analyses is to examine the nature of computer use 
within the domains under scrutiny. This requires the use of naturalistic 
materials, principally audio-visual recordings and field notes. Although 
materials such as video-recordings are frequently utilised in experimental 
and assessment work within HCI, their use in natural settings is 
potentially problematic. Indeed the analysis of activities in the workplace 
can be considered too messy, or too `noisy', to examine within existing 
methodological frameworks drawn from psychology and Cognitive Science. 
Whereas within the social sciences there has been a long-standing concern 
with the analysis of naturally occurring activities, particularly drawing on 
fieldwork carried out in work settings. However, even given recent 
developments concerning the analysis of talk and interaction, resources 
are not readily available to begin an analysis of naturally-occurring 
activities in general, let alone human-computer interactions. In 
undertaking analyses of computer-related activities analytic and 
methodological innovations are required. Constant concerns throughout 
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the studies reported here are the nature of the activities examined, the 
ways in which the analyses can be warranted and the methods through 
which these analyses are accomplished. 
A remaining concern of this thesis is the relationship between the 
analyses and the design, development and deployment of novel 
technologies. As is noted in the forthcoming chapters it is becoming 
recognised that the relationship between studies of human-computer 
interactions and design is far from straightforward. It may be that more 
fundamental innovations are required before a more systematic 
relationship can be developed. Such developments, including novel 
methods and approaches to design and deployment, will have to rest on an 
understanding of the ways technologies are used in practice. It is as a 
contribution to this understanding that the work in this thesis is primarily 
directed. 
1.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND: EMERGING PROBLEMS WITHIN STUDIES 
OF COMPUTER USE 
The fields of HCI and CSCW are multi-disciplinary, involving both 
academics and practitioners who are concerned with technical and 
theoretical matters. Although interests in human-computer interaction 
predate those in CSCW, and even, for some, subsume them, a division has 
emerged between the two fields: HCI being concerned with the individual 
computer user; and CSCW with computer systems for groups, or numbers, 
of individuals. 1 There are many overlaps between the two fields; each 
member of a group is also engaged in interacting with a computer, and 
individual computer use often occurs in a collaborative setting. 
Nevertheless, issues of principal concern to the two fields can be 
distinguished, HCI focuses on matters of the interface with the user and 
CSCW with problems such as how items are shared and displayed across 
various devices in different locations. One concern raised in this thesis is 
that the distinction between the two areas of interest may not be so 
straightforward. 
Amongst the broad interests of practitioners and researchers within 
the HCI community are not only those concerned with developing more 
1 For example, see the distinctions made in Dix, et al., (1993) where the two fields 
are also distinguished by the principal disciplines that inform them: psychology 
for HCI and sociology for CSCW (p. 423-4). 
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sophisticated interfaces and devices, but also of understanding the nature 
of human-computer interaction. 2 Indeed, it is often considered that the 
design of systems requires a scientific foundation (Barnard, 1991b; Card, 
et al., 1983). Although a wide range of analytic orientations are utilised 
within the field, the dominant one is drawn from psychology, and more 
particularly, Cognitive Science. This focuses on the empirical, where 
attention can be paid to how activities are accomplished on computer 
systems, principally through experiments. Cognitive Science also provides 
an analytic apparatus to consider the results of this empirical work, so 
that such phenomena as the motor activities of the user, the effects of 
displaying particular items on the screen in different ways and the use for 
different kinds of devices can be subjected to scrutiny. 
The interaction under consideration within HCI is that between the 
computer and the individual user. Unlike prior programmes of study 
concerned with computer use, such as Human Factors and that of the 
Man-Machine Interface, HCI explicitly aims to address the dynamics 
through which the system components influence, and are influenced by, 
the capabilities of the user. Researchers within HCI also attend to the 
details of computer use, the ways activities on systems are structured, and 
the ways in which the appearances on the screen and how devices can be 
manipulated, transform the activity at hand. The Cognitive Science 
orientation infuses these studies. The tasks an individual accomplishes 
through the technology are considered in terms of an individual's goals 
and mental processes, so that, for example a search for an item on the 
screen is related to an a priori goal; this goal being matched to the 
displayed objects through the application of particular kinds of knowledge. 
One objective is to map out the kinds of knowledge that a user has when 
interacting with a system. This knowledge, at least for the occasion of use, 
is considered as static and propositional. The resources relied on by users 
then are principally cognitive ones, specified with respect to mental 
processes. 
It is hoped that these studies will have a practical import, revealing 
implications for the design of new technologies, so that these systems may 
be, for example, easier or quicker to use or perhaps more importantly, the 
2 In the thesis the relationship `human-computer interaction' will be distinguished 
from the field of research called Human-Computer Interaction (or HCI) by the use 
of capital letters. 
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studies could suggest tools and techniques for system design. 3 However, it 
is unclear whether the research and proposed methods devised within HCI 
are having such an influence. Not only do novel computer systems and 
interfaces appear to have been developed with little attention being paid 
to studies by HCI practitioners, but HCI methods do not appear to be 
widely utilised by system designers (Bellotti, 1988). When analyses of 
particular human-computer interfaces are undertaken these often have 
little influence on the design of the technology, being performed too late 
within the development process or not yielding results which are of 
concern to designers (Barnard, 1991a). 
These problems may be due, as Barnard suggests, to the precise nature 
of the findings that are drawn from HCI studies, or it may be that the 
cognitive orientation circumscribes too narrowly the domain of study. 
Recently, several researchers have begun to question the analytic 
orientation underpinning HCI, suggesting that it should be extended in 
various ways (e. g. the collection of critiques and proposals in Carroll, 
1991a). One common suggestion is that studies in HCI are extended to 
take account of the social aspects of computer use, particularly the real- 
world contexts in which it takes place. 
A similar set of concerns have emerged from the more applied interests 
within computer science and software engineering. It is becoming 
increasingly recognised that there are limitations to current approaches 
and methods within the system design process, particularly in the early 
phases of design (see contributions to the collection edited by Jirotka and 
Goguen, 1994). Although it is essential to be able to implement a system 
which correctly meets a pre-defined specification, what is supplied in the 
specification and how this is derived is problematic. These difficulties 
have become the principal concern of the emerging field of Requirements 
Engineering. Here too, it appears important to explore the social context 
of a potential technology (e. g. Goguen, 1994). The current concerns of HCI 
may suggest some areas of concern for the requirements of computer 
3 Even when the achievements of applying psychological findings and approaches 
to human-computer interaction are examined critically, and alternatives are 
suggestions from within the discipline are proposed, these suggestions are often 
in terms of transformations to the kinds of relevant results that the approach can 
generate. For example, after questioning the relevance of particular studies of 
the use of interfaces and individual competencies for HCI, Barnard (1991a, 
1991b) proposes more indirect ways, through intermediary `bridging 
representations', by which psychological theories can inform design. 
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systems, like what can be appropriately presented on a screen, however 
these appear to be rather limited when the organisational setting in which 
a technology is to be deployed is considered. Hence, requirements 
engineers have looked to the possibility of utilising studies of naturalistic 
settings to inform system design (e. g. Randall, et al., 1994). 
There are immediate problems in attempting to extend the domain of 
interest within HCI to the social and the naturalistic. The analytic 
framework drawn from Cognitive Science focuses on the details of 
individual activities in circumscribed domains. It may be possible to 
gather quantitative data concerning naturally-occurring computer use 
(e. g. Gray, et al., 1993), and use these to verify theoretical analysis, but in 
doing this the details concerning the activity are lost. It is also unclear 
how the social nature of activities, rather than just the dynamic, can be 
commensurate with a framework drawn from Cognitive Science (cf. Vera 
and Simon, 1993a). Hence, several researchers have begun to explore 
possible developments to an individualistic and psychologistic orientation 
for HCI, drawing from innovations from Russian Psychology like Activity 
Theory (Nardi, 1996a) or from novel conceptions of cognition, such as those 
which have become known as Distributed Cognition, for example (Rogers, 
1992). What appears to be distinctive about these developments is their 
utilisation of fieldwork and ethnographies for exploring the use of 
artefacts in natural settings. 
These moves towards the `social' in general, and ethnographic 
approaches, in particular, have not only been due to practical and 
pragmatic difficulties with the application of findings of HCI. Recently, 
the conceptual underpinnings of the field, those drawn from Cognitive 
Science, have been subject to a series of critiques. The particular 
conceptions utilised within the field, such as those of planned and rational 
action, for example, have been called into question (Suchman, 1987; 
Winograd and Flores, 1986). These critiques have suggested that not only 
the scope of Cognitive Science is problematic, but also its theoretical 
framework. 
As a response to these critiques, and also because of the practical 
concerns already outlined, a body of work has emerged which focuses on 
the collaborative nature of activities with respect to the use of computers. 
Although there are other interests within the field, researchers within the 
field of CSCW have begun to draw on a range of studies of natural settings 
in order to suggest both the implications for technology and the ways in 
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which activities in complex technological domains are accomplished. 
These studies principally utilise ethnographic approaches. 
The studies outlined in this thesis seek to contribute to the growing 
corpus of work within CSCW. However, the focus of these studies remains 
on the details of computer-related activities, how these are accomplished 
in natural settings. This focus of interest raises a series of practical and 
conceptual problems for analysis. These are discussed in the remaining 
chapters and outlined in the following section. 
1.3 GENERAL THEMES AND ISSUES 
It hardly needs to be noted that the use of fieldwork for data collection and 
the adoption of an ethnographic orientation towards the analysis of 
materials have a long-standing tradition within the social sciences. These 
have been utilised to address a wide range of empirical concerns within 
the social sciences and their use has been discussed with respect to a 
range of theoretical and conceptual issues. Critical amongst these is the 
framework within which observations made are warranted as relevant for 
analysis. For researchers in CSCW there are additional problems 
concerned with how warranted observations can be seen to be relevant for 
the purpose of design. Needless to say, these problems have up to now 
been of little concern to social scientists. 
The studies in this thesis utilise an analytic orientation drawn from 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. Ethnomethodology takes as 
a topic the methods by which members accomplish and display their 
practical reasoning through their actions in social settings (Garfinkel, 
1967). As a consequence, the everyday talk and conversation through 
which members produce and render intelligible these accomplishment and 
which constitute these methods have been a concern of researchers 
adopting an ethnomethodological orientation. A body of work, 
conversation analysis, has emerged that explores the ways in which turns 
of talk are heard as, and accomplish, understandings through their 
production in conversation. Conversation Analysts have revealed how 
turns of talk are sequentially organised, displaying through their 
production an understanding of a prior turn, and providing resources for a 
next (Sacks, 1992). The preliminary studies in conversation analysis 
revealed organisations to naturally occurring talk, between particular 
adjacent turns of talk (Sacks, 1992), in openings and closings of 
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conversation (Schegloff, 1968) and in the management of turns (Sacks, et 
al., 1974). Through these sequential organisations participants display 
and recognise the appropriateness and relevance of a co-interactants' 
contributions. They provide a systematic resource for participants to 
analyse the conduct of co-participants in the conversation - members' own 
methods for displaying an understanding of social actions. These 
methods, through displayed and hearable talk, are also available to 
analysts and, hence, sequential analyses can provide a warrant for the 
relevance of observations concerning social actions in interaction. 
Recently, concern has been expressed about the trajectory of these 
studies and other work in ethnomethodology, because despite their 
interest in naturally occurring activities, these studies appear to be 
proposing context-free procedures, rules or methods (Lynch, 1993). They 
appear to neglect what Garfinkel calls the `unique adequacy requirement' 
- the indexical and indigenous qualities of particular activities (Garfinkel 
and Wieder, 1992). 
The limits of a too constrained focus on talk-in-conversation has also 
been a concern of many conversation, or interaction, analysts. Hence, 
following the early interests of activities in and through conversation, 
studies have emerged of a range of other domains, particularly in other 
institutional settings (Boden and Zimmerman, 1991; Drew and Heritage, 
1992b). Here, there has been a particular concern in exploring how the 
sequential organisations of talk-in-conversation permeate these other 
domains. There has also been an interest in developing analyses in 
settings where participants have available more than just hearable talk of 
their co-interactants - in so called face-to-face interaction, interaction 
where the participants are co-present, for example. Thus, Goodwin (1981) 
and Heath (1986) have begun to explore how, through the use of audio- 
visual materials, visual conduct - body orientations, gestures and the use 
of artefacts - is interwoven with the sequential organisation of talk. These 
are preliminary investigations in systematically considering a broader 
analysis of activities-in-interaction. 
In seeking to move away from too constrained a focus on talk, there are 
broadly similar concerns in the attempts to explore the uses of artefacts in 
interaction and analyses of the uniqueness of settings. There are no doubt 
other demands of the `unique adequacy requirements' of Garfinkel and the 
`post analytic ethnomethodology' of Lynch that would appear to be harder 
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to meet (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Lynch, 1993). 4 However, these 
arguments may suggest some directions of interest for studies of 
naturally-occurring activities in technological settings. 
Recent work within CSCW has begun to explore how activities are 
accomplished in a range of domains including: control centres of airports 
(Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996) urban transportation (Heath and Luff, 
1992a), general medical practices (Greatbatch, et al., 1993), financial 
dealing rooms (Heath, et al., 1994-5) and emergency call centres (Whalen, 
1995b). Although such studies have been concerned with the talk and 
interaction within these domains, they have also paid attention to how 
artefacts feature in the production of collaborative work, whether these 
are the public displays in transport control centres (Goodwin and 
Goodwin, 1996; Heath and Luff, 1992a), or the `tickets' recording deals 
done in dealing rooms (Heath, et al., 1994-5). These studies make use of 
audio-visual materials collected in the setting, supplemented by other 
ethnographic materials; field notes and other documentary materials. 
These provide an invaluable resource for subjecting to repeated scrutiny 
the moment-to-moment production of activities in the setting. 
Collaborative work in these settings rely on a set of tacit, seen but 
unnoticed practices through which activities are produced, and seen to be 
produced, by others. The audio-visual materials make these practices 
available to analysis. With such materials it is possible to begin to 
investigate whether participants' display and produce an analysis of the 
conduct with regard to the artefacts in the domain, and thus whether 
something akin to the sequential analysis of talk can be available for 
analysts. To explore this domain requires some innovations in the 
methodological orientation adopted. It is unclear, for example, in what 
ways, if any, some artefact-based activity can be said to display an 
understanding of another. By examining activities in relation to a range 
of technologies and in a variety of settings the empirical chapters in this 
thesis explore ways of developing such an analysis of the artefacts-in- 
interaction. 
These analyses draw on previous work investigating the sequential 
production of activities in technological settings, principally those outlined 
Particularly those concerning `ordinary language descriptions' (Lynch and Bogen, 
1996 p. 287), whether findings should address social scientific concerns (Lynch, 
1993) and the `just that' in a setting of particular activities (Garfinkel and 
Wieder, 1992). These concerns are considered in more detail in Chapter 7. 
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in Greatbatch, et al., (1993), Heath and Luff (1996a) and Whalen (1995b). 
For example, the study of the activities of members of staff in a London 
Underground Control Room reveals how the activities of another 
individual, although apparently distinct, can be recognised by others to be 
relevant and consequential to their own concerns, and thus can be made 
use of (Heath and Luff, 1996a). Moreover, participants through their next 
actions can display an understanding not only of a prior request, but also 
of the prior conduct of another individual, for example, in relation to the 
problems they are facing. Such analyses suggest a potential direction for 
an analysis of activities associated with the use of computers. 
In these complex environments, with a range of technologies available 
to the participants, it is at first surprising that the activities on the 
computer systems have not provided a domain for considering a sequential 
analysis of activities. However, in each there are particular asymmetries 
that make such an analysis problematic. In Whalen's (1995b) analysis of a 
Computer-Aided Dispatch system the remote caller has little access to the 
activities undertaken by the dispatcher on the computer; just, on 
occasions, the sound of typing. Similarly, patients in a medical surgery 
have little access to the screen of the doctors' computer, hence, they 
appear to coordinate particular activities with the doctors hand 
movements and typing on the keyboard (Greatbatch, et al., 1993). In the 
London Underground Control Room the information assistant and the 
controller have different responsibilities and different technologies 
available to them. Not only may it be difficult to see the details of the 
activities of another, it may be problematic to assess the consequences of 
the particular details. Hence, though attending to the details of the 
moment-to-moment use of technologies, in these studies the use of the 
computer system, particularly screen-based activities are not subjected to 
scrutiny. In Chapter 7, a particular domain is considered, the use of a 
scheduling system in the Docklands Light Railway Control Room, where a 
pair of controllers can both can operate and the view the same computer 
system. The extent to which this allows for a sequential analysis of 
activities is discussed. 
Although the studies in the thesis do not aim to satisfy the unique 
adequacy requirement of Garfinkel and his associates (Garfinkel and 
Wieder, 1992; Lynch, 1993; Lynch and Bogen, 1996), they do seek to 
explore the details of naturally occurring activities produced on and 
through computer systems. An ethnomethodological orientation can 
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provide useful resources for commencing an analysis of the materials 
relating to computer use. The domains considered vary quite widely with 
regard to the setting, the technologies under consideration and the 
contributions participants make with regard to those technologies. 
However, in all the settings an analytic orientation is adopted that 
considers the practices through which participants make sense of their 
own activities and the activities of others. These understandings are 
accomplishments and rely on everyday social competencies. As such, the 
socially displayed methods for common-sense understanding and practical 
reasoning are incommensurate with the private propositions of knowledge 
and mental processing within the Cognitive Science orientation. These 
conceptual distinctions are considered further in Chapter 2, in the light of 
recent developments in Cognitive Science and in Social Science. 
The analyses in Chapters 3,4,5, and 6 each consider a different set of 
resources through which participants produce and render intelligible 
activities in relation to computer systems. These include: 
" the readings of menus on the screen and the improvisatory 
development of courses of activities when individuals use a system 
in an open-ended exercise involving a computer application to 
construct presentations (Chapter 3); 
" the skilled practices through which architects navigate through and 
transform drawings using a Computer-Assisted Design Package 
(Chapter 4); 
" the ways in which, through talk and visual conduct, architects 
coordinate their own activities with those of their colleagues and the 
happenings on a screen in order to produce intelligible activities, 
and make sense of actions, with respect to changes being made to a 
building (Chapter 4); 
" how a controller of a transportation system and a party who is out 
on the network utilise interactional resources to make sense of the 
contributions of the other through a computer-supported radio 
phone system (Chapter 5); 
" how a pair of controllers make sense of the ongoing activities on the 
network, in the control room and of their colleagues with respect to 
the interactions to remote parties, the visual conduct of local 
participants and the activities on a `shared' computer system 
(Chapter 6). 
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These analyse explore naturally-occurring activities on and through 
computers as social actions, how they are shaped by the contributions of 
others and also are shaped by them. Through the studies the ways in 
which collaborative activities unfold are unpicked and subjected to 
detailed scrutiny. It would appear that such an analysis could have 
practical implications for developers of systems to support cooperative 
work. In Chapter 7 the various resources that the naturalistic analysis of 
the uses of technologies in workplaces could provide for different design 
activities are considered. The activities include the assessment of 
interfaces, the deployment of technologies, and the design of particular 
and generic systems. The studies undertaken in the thesis are utilised to 
illustrate these potential resources. It may be, however, that although 
such implications can be given, studies of the work practices surrounding 
technologies in natural settings may suggest more fundamental concerns 
for HCI and CSCW. These studies, and others that explore the details of 
workplace activities, suggest that certain key conceptions underpinning 
the study of computer use may need to be respecified. 
By focusing on the interaction between a computer and an individual 
studies in HCI can explore the activities surrounding the use of computers 
through empirical, and predominantly experimental, means. The focus on 
interaction suggests a dynamic nature to the relationship between 
individual and computer, and a conceptual framework drawn from 
Cognitive Science has provided methods for looking at the details of 
particular computer-based activities in particular circumstances. Despite 
the efforts of researchers seeking to develop the framework, it may be 
difficult for the orientation to provide resources for the consideration of the 
activities of individuals on and through computer systems in naturalistic 
settings. In the chapters that follow some suggestions are made 
concerning an approach that explores the social production of computer- 
based activities. These activities are irremediably social and collaborative. 
However, as well as contributing to the study of technology-related 
collaborative activities, it may be that an analytic orientation that seeks to 
reveal the order and organisation through which social actions are 
produced and recognised may also provide the foundation to a systematic 
study of human-computer interaction. 
12 
1.4 OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter 2 Technology Mirroring the Mind: the uses of Cognitive 
Science in the analyses of computer use 
This chapter explores the background to the Cognitive Science programme 
and why this orientation appears to be relevant to the analysis of human 
conduct on computer systems. Drawing upon discussions by Gilbert Ryle 
(1949) it argues that in using a framework developed with a Cognitive 
Science orientation, HCI characterises the use of artefacts, the knowledge 
how, in terms of mental processes, the knowledge that. For Ryle such a 
characterisation is a `category mistake'. This chapter outlines how this 
conception of knowledge and mental processes infuses much work within 
HCI and suggests how an alternative orientation of human activity could 
inform the analysis of activities in relation to computer systems. 
Cognitive Science utilises a conception of human activity as 
information processing, and thus has drawn from various work concerned 
with computation and Computer Science. These are briefly considered. 
Cognitive Scientists such as David Marr (1982) have distinguished their 
work from that in, say, Artificial Intelligence, by trying to divide a 
computational theory of human information processing from the 
representations and the algorithms that implement that processing. Work 
within HCI is considered in the light of these requirements. Particular 
attention is paid to the GOMS family of methods which examine in detail 
the conduct of individuals using a computer system. It is unclear how 
these meet Marr's requirements or, indeed, in what sense, in their 
implementation, they adopt a cognitive model of human conduct. 
Although limitations of GOMS methods have been discussed in the HCI 
literature, and several extensions have been proposed, the aim persists of 
drawing from a Cognitive Science framework to analyse the mental 
processing which underlies the use of computational artefacts. 
Recent work has sought to maintain Marr's requirements whilst 
extending the scope of study to naturally-occurring activities in 
organisational contexts. These motivations are typified by Ed Hutchins' 
(1995) radical proposals for a study of `distributed cognition'. In a range of 
studies, Hutchins and associated researchers have explored the use of 
artefacts in natural settings. It would appear that Distributed Cognition 
could be relevant as a framework within which to consider the use of 
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computers. Chapter 2 considers the proposals for a study of Distributed 
Cognition, both with respect to its original motivations and with regard to 
how analyses of social actions are accomplished. From this discussion, the 
conceptions of computation and cognition, utilised within the framework 
appear to be problematic. 
It may be that a more radical approach is required. Rather than 
extending Cognitive Science to take account of the social, orientations 
drawn from the social sciences could be utilised to explore human 
activities related to the use of artefacts. Indeed, drawing from 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis, several researchers such as 
Lucy Suchman (1987) have begun to suggest how such an orientation may 
be relevant to the analysis of `human-machine communication'. Social 
scientists, drawing from an ethnomethodological framework, and prior 
work concerned with the philosophy of the mind (Ryle, 1949; Wittgenstein, 
1953), have also explored the ways cognition and related notions are 
conceptualised in psychology, and Cognitive Science (Button, et al., 1995; 
Coulter, 1979; Coulter, 1989). These considerations may provide a way of 
respecifying some of the key conceptions within Cognitive Science and 
HCI. They also begin to outline how an alternative framework could be 
developed for the analysis of human-computer interaction in natural 
settings. 
The development of such a framework is considered in the central 
chapters of the thesis. These provide analyses of different kinds of uses of 
various technologies in several settings. Nevertheless, a common 
orientation to the resources utilised by participants in their uses of the 
technology is taken in these four chapters; one which seeks to unpick the 
practices through which computer-based activities are accomplished. 
In their examination of different technologies the four empirical 
chapters can be seen to address issues of concern to HCI and CSCW: 
Chapter 3, in what has many similarities to an experimental setting, 
explores the uses of a menus in a presentation application; Chapter 4 
looks at the uses of a Computer-Aided Design (CAD) application in an 
architectural practice; Chapter 5 considers a computer-supported radio 
phone system within a transportation control room; and Chapter 6 
analyses the use of a scheduling system by two controllers in the same 
control room. Hence, the chapters can be seen to move from the individual 
to the collaborative, from an individual user moving through the menus 
appearing on the screen to the interactions, gestures and other activities 
14 
through which a transportation system is managed within a control room. 
However, the issues that emerge may not be that distinct: the users of the 
presentation package and the CAD application make use of practical 
methods of reasoning and skills about what appears on the screen; the 
activities of controllers are shaped by what appears on the screens in front 
of them. The distinction between individual and collaborative, between 
the concerns of HCI and CSCW, may thus be hard to draw. 
Chapter 3 The Practicalities of Menu Use: improvisation in screen- 
based activity 
Chapter 3 considers a domain with many resonances with previous work 
in HCI - an open-ended exercise where an individual is asked to perform 
some circumscribed task on a computer system. It also looks at a screen- 
based activity which has been a topic of many studies within HCI - the use 
of menus. This chapter takes a distinctive approach to this analysis. 
Rather than stipulate categories of the conduct, such as in terms of 
searches, browses and goal satisfaction, instances of naturally-occurring 
menu use are considered. When examined, even in this constrained 
domain, these uses reveal a complexity that is ignored within current 
studies within HCI. To explore the nature of these activities, two 
resources are utilised: the development of a transcription system to 
support the analysis of the conduct; and a typology of menu uses. This 
typology is not intended as an account of different user behaviours, but 
rather to open up for analysis the ways in which individuals make use of 
the menus. Rather than the activity being characterised in terms of 
individuals using the menus to match a pre-specified goal, there appears 
to be a more improvisatory nature to the conduct. Thus, a `search' or a 
`browse' may gloss a range of practices engaged in by the participants. 
The chapter discusses this analysis in the light of previous studies of 
menu use, in particular, and those within HCI, in general. Although there 
have been innovatory attempts to recharacterise the knowledge utilised by 
the users of systems within HCI, considering these in terms of the 
knowledge that individuals possess and in terms of mental processing may 
ignore how these activities are accomplished within natural settings. 
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Chapter 4: Human-Computer `Interaction' in an Architecture Practice: 
observations on computer use and collaborative work in a 
workplace 
The analysis of the uses of menus outlines some of the resources that 
appear to be utilised by individuals when they `interact' with a computer 
system. Chapter 4 explores these in a natural setting - an architectural 
practice. It appears that architects utilise a range of resources in order to 
accomplish screen-based activities, including practical methods for making 
use of the objects and space on the screen, for timing an activity with the 
pace of the system, and for making use of the organisation of the building. 
If the focus is widened then screen-based activities can be seen to be 
immersed within the local interactional context. By analysing one 
particular instance in detail, a simple movement around the system by one 
architect, it can be seen that this is shaped by the operation of the 
technology, the architect's conduct with a colleague, and with his activity 
on other artefacts. The screen-based activity not only is shaped through 
an interaction between the participants, but also shapes this activity. 
Such an activity not only appears to be a case similar to those considered 
as human-computer interaction, it also appears to be a typical case of 
computer-supported cooperative work. Examining the in situ 
accomplishment of naturally-occurring screen-based activities appears to 
make the distinctions between HCI and CSCW problematic. 
In Chapters 5 and 6 attention is focused on activities that have been the 
concern of studies in CSCW: those which are distributed between 
individuals who are geographically dispersed and those where the 
individuals are co-located. These studies are undertaken within the 
domain of a control room of an urban transportation system, the 
Docklands Light Railway (DLR). 
Chapter 5 Distributed Collaborative Work: The use of the radio phone 
system in the Docklands Light Railway Control Room 
The phone system of the DLR may not be a typical technology considered 
within CSCW, but it is a technology through which social actions are 
accomplished in the setting, these activities being critical to the safe 
running of the service. This system is the focus of the analysis in Chapter 
5. When examined in detail the use of the phone system is not 
straightforward. The system appears to transform the resources utilised 
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by participants in other interactional domains. The communications 
technology introduces particular problems for the participants to be 
managed. These communications are mediated by a computer-supported 
radio phone system. This system provides additional resources to the 
participants, however it provides these asymmetrically: the controller 
being given information about who is calling, and also a choice of when to 
call the remote party back. The remote party does not have this 
information or this option. By utilising previous analyses of telephone 
conversations the activities undertaken through the radio phone 
conversations are examined in detail. These reveal a sensitivity to the 
resources available to the other and their circumstances. It also appears 
that through the delicate management of their talk, the pacing and 
features like the intonation of the voice, the participants can display this 
sensitivity. Hence, not only are collaborative activities achieved through 
the talk on the phone, but the organisation of the activity is managed 
through the self-same talk. The Chapter concludes with a brief discussion 
on how the organisation of such distributed collaborative activities may 
provide resources for those involved within CSCW. 
Chapter 6 The Collaborative Production of Computer Commands: the 
interrelationship between activities and talk in a natural 
setting 
The focus of Chapter 6 is on a locale which has been attended to in 
previous work within CSCW: the collaborative activities of individuals 
who are co-located in control rooms of various transportation systems (e. g. 
Filippi and Theureau, 1993; Goodwin, 1992b; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; 
Harper, et al., 1989; Heath and Luff, 1992a; Heath and Luff, 1996a; 
Hughes, et al., 1988; Suchman, 1996; Watts, et al., 1996). These studies 
have been particularly concerned with what has been called the informal 
work practices of participants in the settings on which their activities 
appear to rely. The studies have revealed a range of practices including: 
the peripheral participation in activities, the monitoring of a colleague's 
activities and the coordination between apparently disjoint activities. 
Chapter 6 considers such practices in some detail with particular interest 
in the use of computer systems as a resource for collaborative activity. It 
appears that the technology, particularly the phone system and the 
scheduler system displays, can be utilised to make sense of the activities of 
others, including the happenings on the phone. Moreover, the phone call 
can provide resources for making sense of what is on the displays. When 
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the activities of the pair of controllers are considered in more detail it 
appears that their uses of the various technologies and their interactions 
with each other and with parties both in the control room and outside may 
be tightly interrelated. In particular, it appears that the commands 
entered into the system by one controller are related to the talk and visual 
conduct of the other controller who is on the phone, and the specific 
happenings in the phone conversation. Analysis of instances of activities 
on the scheduler system reveal them to be closely tied to the happenings 
on the line and this coordination is relied upon by colleagues. Indeed, it is 
not just the typing that is coordinated, but the particular activity the 
command is accomplishing. It even appears in some cases that the 
moment-to-moment production of these commands can serve to shape the 
talk between the controller and remote party to a call. Hence, the talk to a 
remote party, the visual conduct within the control room and the activities 
on the computer system are interwoven; a critical resource to the 
participants' accomplishments being the sequential organisation of the 
turns of talk and the demands this places on activities to be produced by 
the controllers in the control room. Computer-based activities can be seen 
to be relevant to an ongoing course of action, they can also serve to display 
that a relevant and appropriate next activity is being attended to. 
Chapter 7 Resources for Technological Design: relationships between 
workplace studies and methods for system development 
The detailed analysis of the use of technologies in several domains suggest 
a range of implications for the design and deployment of new technologies. 
In Chapter 7 these are outlined with relation to particular activities in the 
design process. These implications are outlined in relation to other recent 
work within CSCW and allied fields of research which have sought to 
utilise ethnographic materials for design. It is argued that paying 
attention to the details of the organisation of social actions can reveal 
issues of interest relating to the design and assessment of specific 
technologies, generic design issues and the deployment of novel computer 
systems. Of particular utility appears to be the use of audio-visual 
materials to support an ethnographic orientation. Together these can 
provide a resource for a variety of activities within a design process. 
However, what appears to be of critical importance is the orientation 
through which observations and analyses are warranted. Although it 
remains to be seen whether an analytic orientation can provide a warrant 
for particular design ideas, it may be that by being concerned with the 
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status given to particular observations, issues of relevance to members in 
a setting can be raised. Audio-visual materials make talk and visual 
conduct available for analysis. A focus on the interactional 
accomplishment of these activities suggests a way in which a systematic 
analysis of particular workplace activities could begin to be undertaken, 
an analysis that could uncover some of the unique features of a setting. 
Although the thesis has not been directed towards design concerns, the 
resources that could be derived from such analyses could be relevant to 
particular design activities. To illustrate these some examples drawn 
from the materials are given. These suggest how specific design activities 
could be undertaken which make use of a distinctive approach to the 
analysis of activities in the workplace. The orientation through which 
these studies are accomplished also suggests some methodological 
resources for the analysis of computer-related activities. These resources 
could provide the foundation for a novel approach to design which is not 
encumbered by the constrained conceptions utilised within HCI or the 
broad notions adopted by researchers in CSCW. 
Chapter 8 The Social Organisation of Human-Computer Interaction: a 
brief discussion of experiences and possible directions of 
future work 
The thesis concludes with a few remarks concerning the approach taken to 
the materials and the problems which emerged when these materials were 
subjected to scrutiny. The work suggests several issues, both practical 
and academic, which arise from the analyses. These relate to how the 
data are collected, analysed and presented, particularly in relation to the 
techniques and technologies that are currently available. Consideration of 
these suggest some areas of future research, both with respect to the 
particular studies undertaken, and the ways in which the analyses were 
accomplished, and with regard to more general issues that relate the 
studies of workplaces activities to the design, development and 
deployment of new technologies. 
Appendix A Methodological Background: analytic concerns in the 
examination of naturally-occurring screen-based activities 
Given the complexity of the materials in the analysis of the use of the 
systems in the DLR Control Room, an appendix is provided that outlines 
some further background to the activities in the setting. In particular, to 
assist with a deeper understanding of the occurrences in the fragments of 
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naturally-occurring screen-based activity, a glossary of terms, a list of 
abbreviations and some more details concerning the operation of the 
service are given. In addition to these, two examples of ways in which the 
audio-visual materials have been analysed in order to provide an account 
of the happenings on the scheduler are outlined. These are illustrated by 
an example breakdown of the activities on the line in a fragment 
considered in Chapter 6. 
In sum, this thesis seeks to explore the social organisations underpinning 
human-computer interaction; the methods through which members make 
sense and display an understanding of the use of computational artefacts. 
Through detailed examination of particular instances of computer use it 
explores how these activities are thoroughly embedded within, and 
constitute, the context in which they emerge. Subjecting such activities to 
scrutiny forces a re-examination of how the uses of technologies are 
studied, in particular it offers an alternative way of considering how 
individuals interact with computers. 
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Chapter 2 
Technology mirroring 
the mind: 
the uses of Cognitive Science in the 
analyses of computer use 
The picture which holds traditional philosophy captive is that of the mind 
as a great mirror, containing various representations - some accurate, 
some not - and capable of being studied by pure, non empirical methods. 
(Rorty, 1980, p. 12) 
Mental models seem a pervasive property of humans. I believe that 
people form internal, mental models of themselves and of the things and 
people with whom they interact. These models provide predictive and 
explanatory power for understanding the interaction... These models are 
highly affected by the nature of the interaction, coupled with the person's 
prior knowledge and understanding. The models are neither complete or 
accurate..., but nonetheless they function to guide much human behavior. 
(Norman, 1986, p. 46) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Associated with recent innovations in computer technology, and their 
widespread deployment, have been a range of novel problems for system 
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designers. Although concerns that the developed systems match their 
specification, and that the systems' operations can be validated and 
verified, remain, attention has begun to focus on how to make the 
technology relevant and appropriate for its users. One particular field 
has emerged which has centred on these concerns. With the active 
involvement of academic and commercial participants, Human-Computer 
Interaction (HCI) has both sought to develop theories of computer use and 
to provide practical guidance for system design and evaluation. Under the 
rubric of HCI a large body of work has emerged by participants from many 
disciplines, exploring such disparate interests as the use of computers 
within organisations (March, 1991), the semiotics of computer interfaces 
(Keeler and Denning, 1991) and the mathematical specification of 
interaction with computers (e. g. Dix, 1995). However, psychology, and in 
particular, Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Science, has formed the 
foundation to most of the work in the field. 1 
It has been an objective of these studies of individual competencies to 
provide explanatory models of computer use from which procedures, 
methods, or guidelines for design could be drawn. Thus, considerable 
attention has been devoted to developing a cognitive framework for 
understanding human-computer interaction. Unfortunately, this 
approach has recently been subject to severe criticism, which has not only 
questioned the practical results it has offered designers (e. g. Carroll, 
1991a), but also its theoretical and methodological underpinnings (e. g. 
Suchman, 1987). Thus, it has become unclear how the field of HCI should 
develop, whether existing approaches should be enhanced or extended, for 
example, or whether a novel conceptual framework for the study is 
required. These difficulties have been exacerbated by further innovations 
in technology, the emergence of fields within system design exploring the 
relationship between individuals and technologies in differing ways, and 
the interest in alternative frameworks and methodologies for the study of 
computer-related activities. In particular, the approach drawn from 
There are other programmes of research that examine `technologies-in-use' which 
will not be considered in this chapter. These have been less concerned with the 
design of systems and more on exploring such aspects as the organisational 
change induced by the introduction of technology, the `discourses' in which 
technologies are part, and the various ways in which technology are `socially 
constructed'. For brief reviews of these diverse approaches to the study of 
computer systems see Cooper (1991), Cooper and Bowers (1995), Hine, et al. 
(1995), Murray and Woolgar (1991) and other contributions to Thomas (1995). 
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Cognitive Science has been criticised because it concentrates on the 
performance of a limited set of activities by individuals in experimental 
settings. This account of human-computer interaction has been 
considered to be unduly constraining. 
This chapter examines the cognitive foundations of the study of 
human-computer interaction, outlining why this approach appears to be 
appropriate for the study of computer-related activities, and relevant for 
the design of novel systems (section 2.2). For this, some background 
concerning the particular account of cognitive activities embodied within 
Cognitive Science is required (section 2.3). Drawing on the programme set 
out by Marr (1982), the `information-processing' model of human conduct 
is set out, where within different levels of analysis, the computational 
level is given primacy, for it provides the potential to provide explanatory 
theories of competence. 
The information-processing approach, and the symbol-processing 
approach, both take a particular account of mental processes; that these 
are inner processes which can be modelled principally by techniques 
developed first in mathematics and then in what became known as 
Computer Science. Though this view is attractive, it is not an 
uncontroversial account of the nature of mental processes. Within 
philosophy there have been long-standing debates concerning the nature 
of the mind and mental processes, and recently, social scientists have 
drawn upon these discussions to consider the analysis of social actions and 
human conduct. The consideration of models underpinning HCI in 
undertaken in the light of these concerns. 
In this chapter, the information processing approach is considered with 
respect to two widely regarded developments concerned, in different ways, 
with developing cognitive accounts of the use of artefacts. Both have 
attracted attention of those seeking to understand how individuals use 
computers within HCI and CSCW. The GOMS family of models within HCI 
seeks to explicitly model an individual's use of a computer system. 
Distributed Cognition aims to provide an account of cognitive behaviour 
as a social or group process, a particular focus being on communicative 
activities surrounding the use of artefacts. 
The GOMS family of models explicitly adopt a cognitive orientation to 
behaviour based on information processing. GOMS has evoked considerable 
interest within the HCI community as, for example, 
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the best established HCI user model, at least in terms of the body of 
supporting research and is illustrative of what can be done with user 
models 
(Brooks 1991, p. 55) 
and the most `notable example' of theoretical concepts being exploited 
within the HCI research community (Barnard 1991a, p. 103). 
Not only are the GOMS models examples of models developed within 
the Cognitive Science paradigm to HCI, but they continue to be focus of 
research. Hence, they are frequently utilised within HCI textbooks as 
examples of theories of human-computer interaction (e. g. Dix, et al., 1993; 
Schneiderman, 1992). Given their longevity within the HCI literature, it 
is not surprising that the GOMS models have also been subject to 
criticism, review and proposals for extensions (e. g. Carroll, 1991; Kieras, 
1988; Olson and Olson, 1990; Gray, et al., 1993). However, despite 
criticisms of their scope and how they utilise particular findings from 
Cognitive Science they continue to be regarded as a significant framework 
for considering computer use as a cognitive activity. In particular, they 
provide a way of circumscribing the tasks individuals accomplish on a 
computer system which allows for a mentalistic account of the activity. 
Section 2.4 considers the GOMS models suggesting some of the strengths 
and limits of the approach. Such modelling exercises allow for the detailed 
analysis of a computer user's conduct which has aided the evaluation of 
computer systems. However, in these exercises the extent to which the 
derived model can be claimed to be cognitive is unclear. By focusing on 
the observed activities of individuals, it is often unclear how their `mental' 
nature can be accounted for. The models, hence, fall short of being 
explanatory theories of competence -a requirement of Marr's models of 
information processing. 
Recent work has sought to address the problem of developing an 
explanatory theory of the competencies underpinning artefact use both by 
returning to the programme set out by Marr and by extending the domain 
of interest usually considered by Cognitive Scientists. Distributed 
Cognition, principally developed from the work of Hutchins (e. g. Hutchins, 
1995), aims to provide a computational, explanatory theory, but where 
cognition is conceived of as a social process. Because of these 
developments, Distributed Cognition has been of recent interest to those 
involved in the development of computer systems. It seems to offer a 
broader framework to conventional HCI approaches whilst maintaining a 
concern with individual cognitive processes. As it has attracted the 
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attention of researchers in both HCI and CSCW, its innovatory approach 
to the study of artefacts is considered in Section 2.5. 
Distributed Cognition, whilst being concerned with social and 
collaborative activities, and with understanding the cognitive properties of 
groups, maintains a conception of individual mental activity, or of 
individual `minds'. Distributed Cognition being a single framework for 
considering symbolic, and thus cognitive, manipulations both within and 
between minds. This places considerable emphasis on the nature of 
symbol processing embodied in the framework. Section 2.5 considers how 
the possibility of Distributed Cognition providing a framework for 
understanding the social organisation to the use of artefacts and whether 
social conceptions of cognition and the individual conceptions of mind can 
be reconciled in this way. 
In section 2.6, the account of cognition, and of individual `minds', which 
imbue Cognitive Science and also are maintained within Distributed 
Cognition are called into question. Utilising critiques of researchers from 
an ethnomethodological orientation, informed by the work of Wittgenstein 
and Ryle, the status of such a categorisation of activities as `mental 
processes' and `of the mind' is challenged. These general critiques of 
mentalism replace its conception of behaviour with one directed at the 
social organisation of human activity. Moreover, within these 
reconceptions specific explicit arguments have been made concerning the 
programme of Cognitive Science (e. g. Coulter, 1992) and also to the 
cognitive orientation to HCI (Suchman, 1987). 
This questioning of the cognitive approach is more acute than just a 
concern that activities other then the use of the computer, or different 
kinds of knowledge, or the participation of others, are not accounted for. 
The critiques challenge the status and nature of cognitive activities 
embodied within Cognitive Science, and suggest an alternative conception 
of mental activities: one which sees these in the ways they are used in 
practice: as accounts of social accomplishments. 
These criticisms have been influential, as they suggest an alternative 
domain of interest for those concerned with the nature of computer- 
centred activities: on the in situ accomplishment of social actions. Hence, 
a growing corpus of studies have emerged drawing on an 
ethnomethodological orientation, and utilising fieldwork and other 
naturalistic materials to reveal the organisation of everyday practices. 
These studies are forming one foundation to research in the developing 
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field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW), involving the 
detailed examination of the use of computer technologies within various 
settings. Studies of the accomplishment of artefact-centred activities are 
still in their preliminary stages. However, in section 2.7 some of the 
issues that are already beginning to emerge from these studies are 
discussed. These form the foundation to the analyses in the following 
chapters. 
2.2 PROBLEMS OF DESIGNING COMPUTERS FOR USE 
Amongst the multifarious problems facing developers of computer systems 
are those associated with designing a technology that is appropriate to the 
tasks, activities and work of the individuals who are going to use it. Over 
the past twenty five years or so, the nature of the activity to meet these 
requirements has been expressed in a variety of ways; in terms of how 
`easy' systems are to use, their acceptability, or their `user friendliness'. 
However, expressing the problem in these ways, offers little to assist 
developers of new technologies. At the very least, what is required are 
guidelines, procedures and methods for system design, and often 
developers appear to be demanding a more rigorous approach, something 
more akin to an engineering discipline, or a `science of design'. 2 The 
foundations of any such discipline rest on ways of conceiving the 
fundamental relationship between individuals and the activities they 
undertake on computer systems. 
There have been many proposals for a systematic way of conceiving of 
this relationship, including that of a dialogue between `man' and machine 
(Martin, 1967), as a conversation between human and computer 
(Nickerson, 1977; Reichman, 1986) or even as `man computer symbiosis' 
(Licklider, 1960). However, more recently the relationship has been 
considered more to be an interaction between human and computer (e. g. 
Card, et al., 1983; Monk, 1985). This may be because this term appears to 
place less emphasis on the linguistic aspects of computer use that 
dominated early systems, whilst still allowing for a consideration of the 
problems of both the computer and human side of the interface. The 
particular advantages and disadvantages of this term can be debated. 
2 Anderson et al. (1993) discuss the motivations for a Science of Design for 
computer systems in the light of Simon's (1969) suggestion of studying the world 
in terms of `the Sciences of the Artificial' 
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Nevertheless, a field has emerged called Human-Computer Interaction (or 
HCI) with dedicated journals, conferences, and other fora and academic 
courses and professional positions being devoted to its study and practical 
application. 
Perhaps naturally, the initial concerns of the study centred on 
assessing current technologies. Using a range of techniques based on 
ergonomics and human factors, it was possible to set up experiments and 
trials, or simply assess a system against some well-known findings (e. g. 
Cakir, et al., 1980; Rubenstein and Hersch, 1984). These could identify 
problems occurring with the use of particular systems, some of which were 
quite basic. For example, research could identify potential problems with 
the use of colours on computer displays and the nature of colour blindness. 
Experiments and trials could suggest where users appeared to be having 
difficulty accessing particular functionalities, or where there appeared to 
be confusing features of the interface. However, despite such evaluations 
becoming considered an essential part of the testing of the system, several 
concerns began to emerge with the `human factors' approach to the study 
of human-computer interaction. First, the findings were often too specific 
to the system under scrutiny; identifying particular problems with a 
particular interface. Second, although some recommendations for 
changing the system could be made from the evaluation, it could be 
difficult to provide a strong warrant for these. A correction might be 
made, but this could interfere with other previously unnoticed factors. 
Third, and related, it was difficult for the evaluation exercises to have any 
significant influence on the development of the system. Once the system 
has been developed to the extent of being possible to test, the nature of the 
changes that could be made in response to the evaluation were unduly 
constrained. 
In the light of these clearly identifiable problems, several proposals for 
alternative ways of designing systems emerged. Not least amongst these 
are changes in the design process itself. With a more iterative approach, 
rather then the step-wise progression through various stages, there would 
be more opportunities for the assessment of prototype systems and thus 
more possibilities for influence the emerging design. However, changing 
the design process would not be sufficient. For there to be a genuine 
interest in usability from the outset of the development of a computer 
system, a more generic approach to the analysis of the activities associated 
with the use of computers is required. 
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One way of addressing this is to provide general prescriptions and 
guidelines. Some of these are very general: for computer systems to `fit 
the user' or for designers of systems to `know the user' (Hansen, 1971). 
Effectively, such prescriptions are conceived in individualistic terms. 
Thus, attempts at analysing computer use have involved the examination 
of such features as the readability of text on a display, the motor skills 
required to enter information using various devices and the syntactic 
structure of computer commands (e. g. Card, et al., 1978; Hammond and 
Barnard, 1985; Marcus, 1982). Although from such studies it has 
appeared possible to derive precise recommendations for designers, their 
general applicability to other tasks, systems and devices is unclear, and 
the nature of principles, guidelines and heuristics to be given to designers 
being the subject of regular debate (Barnard, 1991a; Gould and Lewis, 
1985; Norman, 1986). A methodological requirement has emerged; it is 
not only necessary to evaluate the various guidelines and procedures, but 
also to provide some warrant for the claims made on behalf of these 
prescriptions for design. This requires a general framework with which to 
consider the relationship between individuals and computer systems. 
From this analytic framework it should be possible to warrant methods for 
studying the use of computers and determine relevant criteria with which 
to evaluate the use of systems. The framework should also provide a 
foundation for considering the human activities which could be supported 
by a new technology, thus providing resources for the analysis of 
requirements and the design of systems. Hence, a science of design is 
being proposed, against which a system's appropriateness, relevance and 
usability is considered throughout the design process. This applied 
programme has been known as `User Centered System Design' (or UCSD, 
Norman and Draper, 1986), `User Centered Design' (Landauer, 1995), or 
even more simply `User Science' (Moran, 1985-1997). 
Given mottoes, programmatics and terminologies, extant in the various 
fields of computer system design, it is perhaps not surprising that an 
appropriate foundation for an analytic framework should be sought in 
Cognitive Science. Such a framework would provide for analyses of an 
individual's use of a computer system in terms of mental processes. Once 
these processes were explicated, in terms of findings from experiments, 
models or theories, then, in some way, this `knowledge of the user' could be 
utilised for system design. Although the precise nature of the 
interrelationship between studies of the use of computer and system 
28 
design has been the subject of debate (e. g. Barnard, 1991a; Carroll, 1990). 
Cognitive Science offers the possibility that recommendations, guidelines 
or designs could be both empirically and theoretically grounded. 
One formulation of this relationship is in terms of the development of a 
design model of a system that is informed by, is consistent with, or reflects 
a `user model' (a mental model of the user, Norman, 1986). Given this 
formulation, the preliminary exercise for students of HCI is to determine a 
model of computer use utilising the understanding of mental activity and 
mental processes current in Cognitive Science. The problem of designing 
usable systems is then mapping tasks performed on the interface to 
mental processes in the head. Hence, much research in HCI has moved 
away from the direct concerns of design and towards developing a 
cognitive framework for analysing computer-based activities; a framework 
that has a scientific basis (Barnard, 1991b). 
As a straightforward explication of the relationship between an 
individual's actions and the computer system, Norman conceives of the use 
of a system in terms of two gulfs: the gulf of execution and the gulf of 
evaluation (Norman and Draper, 1986). These are gulfs between the goals 
of the user and his or her physical activities, and between the production 
of actions and their interpretation, respectively. Norman breaks down 
intermediate mental processes which can be assumed to be undertaken 
within these gulfs (see figure 2.1). These include generating 
interpretations of perceptions and specifying productions for action from 
intentions. 
Intentions go so Evaluation 
10, Q 
Action 
Specification Interpretation 
0 Q 
Execution Mental Activity Perception 
Physical Activity 
Figure 2.1 Human-computer interaction (after Norman, 1986, p. 42) 
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So this is a model of a cycle of activities: users interpret what is on the 
display with respect to their expectations and goals, and generate 
specifications of actions in order to perform commands on the interface, 
thus, changing what is on the display. Through the repeated cycling 
through of this combination of physical and mental activities an 
interaction with the computer system emerges. One aim of HCI then is to 
refine this model, particularly breaking apart what happens when a user 
is interpreting what is perceived on the system and specifying what 
actions to carry out next. These problems are seen as cognitive problems 
requiring an analysis of the knowledge and mental processing of users. If 
a better understanding of these activities is achieved, particularly of the 
user's understanding of computer systems then it should be possible to 
inform aspects of systems design. Norman refers to this relationship in 
terms of interwoven and embedded relationships between various models 
of the system; an understanding of the user's model of the system 
informing the designer's model of the system, which either explicitly or 
implicitly includes a model of the user. 3 The general aim of designers then 
should be develop systems which reflect or resonate with the users' 
cognitive processing. Borrowing Rorty's (1980) ocular metaphor, these 
studies of HCI are attempts at revealing the mind as a `mirror of the 
technology'. 4 
There is no doubt that examining human-computer interaction in this 
way adopts a particularly constrained view of the activity; focusing on an 
individual user tied into a continuous activity with a machine. But, it is 
hoped that this focus will allow for a consideration of the critical aspects of 
computer use. It moves away from previous concerns with the interface, 
what and how objects are presented, and towards addressing the 
3 Norman (1983) describes the project more formally. The study relates the use of 
a technology (t) in terms of the user's mental model of the technology, M(t), to a 
researcher's conception of that model, C(M(t)). 
4 It has been suggested that the constraints of technological design may also 
provide a focus for studies of cognition. The relationship between studies in HCI 
and Cognitive Science is not just conceived as one of applying existing analyses 
and findings. The use of a computer also offers a complex domain of study for 
activities considered to be cognitive. Indeed, one of the limitations of work taking 
a Cognitive Science orientation has been the limited nature and relevance of 
findings from the current state of research in the field (Carroll, 1991b). Hence, 
HCI has also been seen as a suitable application domain where Cognitive Science 
can be extended (Card, et al., 1980). 
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interaction with a computer. 5 This is conceived not only in temporal 
terms, as a shift to examining sequences of computer-based activities, but 
more importantly, in terms of the cognitive resources individuals utilise 
for operating a computer. Thus, research in HCI that draws on a cognitive 
analytic orientation seeks to reveal the types of knowledge required by 
users, the relationships between their goals and actions, the constraints of 
their capacities to remember and their capabilities to accomplish such 
activities as searching, problem solving and deciding what to do next. 
What Cognitive Science provides to the analysis is a common model for 
such diverse resources, capacities and activities: an information processing 
model of human conduct. Some of the key features of this model are given 
in the next section. As Norman's model suggests these concerns are with 
the hidden and private world of the user. The cognitive capabilities are 
only being revealed through a careful categorisation of particular 
behaviours, most commonly by experimentation and studies of highly 
constrained activities. This relies on being able to break apart the 
cognitive domain. It also rests on the general conception of activity in 
such terms as knowledge, memory, goals and information as being 
unproblematic; an issue returned to in section 2.6. 
2.3 THE COGNITIVE CONCEPTION OF ACTIVITY 
The single most influence on psychologists' ideas about cognitive 
processes at present is the nexus of concepts which has developed around 
computer programming. (Dodwell, 1971, p. 370) 
The goal of cognitive science is to explain how the mind works. Part of 
the power of the discipline resides in the theory of computability. If an 
explanation is computable, then prima facie it is coherent, and does not 
take too much for granted. (Johnson-Laird, 1988 [1993], p. 26) 
The tools of cognitive science consist of a set of analysis techniques and a 
set of theoretical formalisms. The analysis techniques include such 
things as protocol analysis, discourse analysis, and a variety of 
experimental techniques developed by cognitive psychologists in recent 
years. The theoretical formalisms include such notions as means-end 
analysis, discrimination nets, semantic nets, goal-oriented languages, 
production systems, ATN grammars, frames etc. (Collins, 1975) 
Grudin (1990) gives a broad critique on taking too narrow a focus on the interface 
between a user and a system. Some of his concerns with wider issues related to 
interfaces between computers and organisations and groups of individuals will be 
returned to later in this thesis (particularly chapter 7). 
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Cognitive Science is a multi-disciplinary research programme, drawing 
mainly from Cognitive Psychology and Artificial Intelligence, but also 
involving researchers from other subjects such as linguistics, philosophy, 
biology, computer science and engineering. The one feature that can be 
seen to unify this research programme is an information processing model 
of human action where mental processes are modelled in computational 
terms. As Marr (1982) states this is not to say that the brain is a 
computer, but to view the brain in terms of `information processing 
devices' (p. 361). Although Cognitive Scientists vary with respect to the 
strength of the relationship they propose between computers and the 
mind, whether, for example, information processing can be seen as a 
metaphorical or a scientific explanation, there are some basic and common 
features in this programme. 
First, the interests of Cognitive Scientists centre on aspects of human 
conduct that can be considered as mental processing. They also suggest 
that this processing can be broken down into a set of individual modules, 
tasks or theories. The number, nature and interrelationship between 
these processes vary between researchers. So in one categorisation there 
are such `central processes' as memory, learning, problem solving, decision 
making, attention, search, scanning and the perception of time. 6 In 
another the `mind's main tasks' are perception, learning, memory, motor 
action, deduction, creation, communication, and the creation of feelings, 
intentions and self-awareness. 7 There are doubtless interrelationships 
between the various processes, but for analysis, particular kinds of mental 
activity can be a focus of examination. 
Second, following Chomsky's (1965) distinctions, Cognitive Scientists 
do not necessarily seek a performative explanation of human conduct, but 
rather aim to account for competencies (e. g. Marr, 1982). It may be that 
models of mental processing could be developed into computer programs, 
as in the case of artificial intelligence, however, what is required are not 
programs displaying particular solutions to problems, but more general 
theories and explanations. 
6A list derived from Ergonomic Abstracts (from Schneiderman, 1992, p.. 24) 
7 From Johnson-Laird, 1988 [1993], p. 27. 
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A cognitive theory should be like a computer program. That is, it should 
be a precise specification of the behavior, but offered in terms sufficiently 
abstract to provide a conceptually tractable framework for understanding 
the phenomenon. (Anderson, 1980 p. 11) 
Third, and perhaps the most distinctive feature of the work of 
Cognitive Scientists, is the nature of these explanations. The accounts 
that they give are in terms of computational models; 
A central tenet is that there exists a level of description of intelligent 
systems at which the organisation and use of knowledge is described 
functionally in computational or information-processing terms 
independently of the physical implementation of the system. 
(Bersen, 1988) 
Although there is an emphasis in much of the work in Cognitive 
Science on the inputs, outputs and symbolic representations required in 
the processing, there has also been a concern with adopting a deeper 
model of computation, one which utilises the original conceptions from 
computer science (e. g. Johnson-Laird, 1988 [1993]; Marr, 1982). Hence, it 
is worth very briefly reviewing the account of computation developed 
within mathematics utilised for the development of computer systems, 
particularly Turing's work on `Universal Machines'. 
2.3.1 Turing's Model of Computation as the Foundation to 
Computational Models of the Mind 
Computer systems developed from efforts to define general procedures for 
solving mathematical problems and generating mathematical truths. In 
particular, it was the insights of Turing (1937) that led to the conception of 
an abstract machine to undertake these procedures. 8 The `Turing 
Machine' is a notional machine used as a way of outlining a general theory 
of computation. Its exposition provides a way of conceiving of computable 
problems by means of a universal computational machine. The machine is 
a device that `reads' and `writes' marks onto an infinitely large external 
storage medium. Turing suggested that this storage medium could be 
considered as an infinitely long piece of tape that is moved backwards and 
forwards through the reading and marking device. General computations 
could be performed by reading instructions and data from, and writing 
results out to, the relevant places in the tape. The state of the machine is 
8 The precise nature of the influence of Turing's theory of computable functions on 
the development and construction of digital computers has been called into 
question (Wang, 1957). 
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defined by the marks and the current positioning of the tape. Because the 
tape is infinitely long, the Turing Machine can be in an infinite number of 
states. Furthermore, conceiving the device as a very simple reading and 
marking machine means that no distinction is necessary between 
instructions on the one hand and inputs and outputs, data and results on 
the other: marks written as data can themselves be read later as 
instructions. This simple, but powerful, conception formed the foundation 
to a general theory of computation, on which was built the later 
development of computer systems; with storage, reading and writing 
implemented as hardware; and input, output and instructions instantiated 
in various levels of data and software. 
That the conception of a general computational machine could also be a 
way of conceiving of the mind and mental processes was suggested by 
Turing (1950) himself, and this suggestion forms the basis of Cognitive 
Science and allied work within Artificial Intelligence. This account of 
computation provides resources for models of cognition; for new 
distinctions which could inform the study of mind, for ways of conceiving 
how mental processing was accomplished and for bypassing long-standing 
debates in the philosophy of mind. 
First, there is a distinction between the device and the symbols, later 
implemented as the hardware and software, the computer and the 
computer program. This offers an analogy to that between mind and body, 
or more accurately the mind and the brain. Software, or at least 
algorithms, can be considered separable from the physical devices for 
which they are devised. Thus, a `new reaction to dualism' could emerge 
which considered the relationship between mind and body as analogous to 
computer and program (Johnson-Laird, 1988 [1993]). 9 
Second, the possibility that output from the computer can also be its 
instructions leads to the description of computation at different levels. 
Marks, `symbols' and programs can each be read off as data and processed. 
A single model of computation can then be utilised to instantiate 
descriptions of a range of capabilities, for example: aspects of visual 
perception can be accounted for in terms of processing arrays of marks; 
recognition of objects as the processing of symbols; and comprehension and 
understanding as the processing of rules. This has lead to the emphasis 
In Cartesian terms, the hardware appears to be an analogy to the extended 
mental `substance' where consciousness, a series of events, takes place (cf. Rorty, 
1980). 
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on the processing of symbols within Cognitive Science. Although there are 
departures concerning whether explicit symbol processing has to be 
accounted for (Agre, 1988; Chapman, 1991), work in Cognitive Science 
pays considerable attention to the ways the information being processed is 
represented. 
Third, the simple mechanical processor of the Turing Machine, that 
reads marks from the tape, moves the tape and then writes further marks, 
offers an analogy to the `Inner Eye' or the `eye of the mind' postulated by 
earlier philosophers before which pass thoughts and pains. 10 However, 
that conception was always prone to arguments of infinite regress; if an 
inner eye is required, what watches over and controls it. The 
implementation of devices which were instantiations of the Turing 
Machine suggested a way of avoiding this problem. For some 
psychologists, computational models and computational devices offered 
ways by which mental objects and mental processes could be revealed 
without prior postulation of epistemological distinctions about the nature 
of mind. It would be on the findings, models and simulations that their 
programme would be assessed. The programme of research, Cognitive 
Science, would involve an empirical study of human conduct utilising the 
analogy of a computer. This research would generate findings that would 
address long-standing epistemological concerns. 
Let's build and test empirical theories in the best tradition of science. 
Let's get out of the armchair and into the laboratory or the field. Let's 
permit the tested science to shape philosophy (as it has done, e. g. in 
evolutionary theory, cosmology, relativity, quantum theory, and even, in 
recent years, epistemology) instead of asking the tail of philosophy to wag 
the dog of cognitive science. 
(Vera and Simon, 1993b, p. 132) 
10 Rorty (1980) provides an incisive analytical historical perspective on the 
emergence of these `ocular metaphors' for the nature of mind. Rorty notes several 
reconceptions of prior notions relating to philosophy: Descartes extending the 
notion of `thoughts' to cover a range of things including doubts, refusals, 
imaginings, and also feelings (Rorty, 1980, p. 47); Locke using `idea"to cover both 
sense-data and concepts' (Bennett, 1971, p. 25); and "Sensation" being introduced 
to make it possible to speak of a conscious state without commitment to the 
nature of external stimuli (Matson, 1966, p. 101). These reformulations allowed 
for the `mind', `mental objects' and `mental processes' to be separated out as 
resources for a new domain of enquiry. Rorty sees these moves as providing the 
foundations for philosophy to become analytic. They are also a pre-requisite for 
the conceptual foundations of Cognitive Science. 
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2.3.2 The Development of a Computational Model of the Mind 
With the emergence of a general theory of computation and with its 
implementation in actual computer systems, it is not surprising that 
considerable attention has been paid over the last forty years to following 
Turing's (1950) suggestions to explore the possibility of devising systems 
that simulate human intelligence. These attempts at Artificial 
Intelligence (Al), either as `strong' AI, where the goal is to specify 
technologies that have mental processes corresponding directly to human 
ones, or as `weak' AI where the aim is just to produce human-like 
behaviour, have a complex interrelationship with psychological work 
within Cognitive Science. The motivations behind the psychological and 
the Al approaches towards Cognitive Science could be considered 
distinct. 11 However, it would appear that efforts to build computational 
devices that simulate intelligence on the one hand, and the utilisation of 
the computational metaphor to study the mind, on the other are symbiotic. 
The former provides novel resources for models of cognition whilst being 
informed of the empirical findings of the latter. Any gaps between the two 
projects can then be seen in terms of their differing requirements, for 
model building in AI and for developing theoretical frameworks in 
cognitive psychology (Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1977). 
However, although cognitive psychology has indeed drawn on notions 
of plans, scripts, schemata, production rules and, latterly, neural 
networks, it is more difficult to find instances of the reverse relationship. 
Novel work in AI appears to derive from ingenuity and unguided intuition. 
Whether the systems and programs work serves as the warrant for their 
efficacy. Some cognitive psychologists are uneasy with such an approach, 
pointing out that observable external behaviours could be described by an 
indefinite number of different computational processes (Anderson, 1980). 
Furthermore, the warrant for the particular choices of capabilities 
researchers in AI have identified as intelligent have been questioned. 
These appear to exclude common-sense, the tacit and the emotional 
11 Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) relate the motivations of Cognitive Science to 
the motivations of cognitive psychology, that is, as a response to Behaviourism. 
However, they note that practitioners of Al have no such motivations, aiming `to 
develop programs capable of solving complicated problems by any means that 
happened to work' (p. 8). These differing aims and, also different methodological 
approaches, appear to result in confusions between the two strands of 
practitioners in Cognitive Science. 
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(Dreyfus, 1992 [1972]; Weizenbaum, 1976). As noted in many criticisms of 
AT, following an apparent success in developing systems to cope with 
small, circumscribed problems, further research became hampered by the 
limited scope of the enquiry (Dreyfus, 1992 [19721). 12 
Research from the psychological perspective has sought more to 
develop explanatory models of human competence. These models are 
based on ideas concerning computation. So, in Marr's (1982) extensive 
analysis of the visual process he suggests how from previous studies and 
experiment, visual processing can be achieved through several levels; from 
deriving information about light intensity, through the development of 
primal and 21/2-D sketches and to representations of shapes in three 
dimensions. At each of these levels appropriate representations are 
utilised for the processing. Moreover, the processing is broken into 
modules, so that shapes are dealt with distinctly from surface textures 
and motion. The warrant for this sub-division comes from experimental 
studies. Marr emphasises his aim of studying a working visual system, 
calling his overall information-processing model the `human visual 
processor' (p. 99). 
Marr distinguishes his model both from work in AI such as that of 
Winograd (1972) and from other information-processing approaches 
(Norman and Rumelhart, 1974). It is neither too particular to a specific 
problem nor so general so as to be `devoid of theoretical substance'. 
Instead, he emphasises the focus on computational theories of competence, 
which are distinct from the representations, algorithms, and particularly, 
the implementation of the model. Rather, the computational theories 
contain arguments for what is computed and why, and the constraints any 
operations have to satisfy. It is left to later analysis to outline how these 
constraints are satisfied. 
Marr's analysis of vision has been seen to be a prototype for 
information processing models: the separation into levels, modules and 
theories being warranted by psychological research and allowing for 
different representations, algorithms and implementations to be 
considered. However, it has been less clear how this approach can be 
12 For some AI researchers developing a corpus of more general knowledge remains 
a continuing research programme. Some have attempted to address these issues 
by increasing the scale of their projects, most notably Lenat and his colleagues' 
(1986) grand efforts at documenting vast arrays of `common sense' and 
encyclopaedic knowledge. 
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applied to other domains of Cognitive Science. As Marr noted, it may be 
unclear whether activities like natural language understanding, are 
modular (p. 356) and whether similar constraints could be specified. 
Instead, more heterogeneous approaches, like problem-solving approaches 
may be required. 
Although the general distinctions discussed by Marr have been 
maintained, researchers in Cognitive Science interested in HCI have 
tended to view human-computer interaction in terms of problem solving. 
The complexity of the activity, the kinds of knowledge that appear to be 
required and the difficulties of breaking apart particular problems, have 
led to more generic ways of modelling the activity. Thus, researchers have 
aimed at revealing `the structures and processes imputed to a person's 
mind in order to account for each person's behaviour or experience' 
(Carroll, 1984) or discovering the `grammar in the head' (Payne and 
Green, 1986). These processes are often conceived of in terms of 
grammars, production rules, propositions and networks, the processing 
being modelled in terms of symbol manipulation, pattern matching and 
rules of inference. These maintain the focus on mental activities, explore 
computational and information processing models, and rely on distinctions 
being made between representation and process, levels of analysis and 
different kinds of representations. However, in being concerned with the 
nature of human-computer interaction they necessarily have to address 
the performative aspects of the use of computers. Researchers in HCI 
have a further ambition: to inform the design of computer systems, or as 
Norman (1983) puts it `to govern the entire human interface with the 
system'. This requires attention to be paid to how humans interact with 
computers in practice. To the levels of analysis outlined by Marr 
(computational, representation and algorithm, implementation), other 
modelling activities may thus be required, including considering the 
designer's model of the user (Norman, 1983; Norman, 1986). 
Distinguishing the various models, the user's model of the technology, 
the researcher's model of the user's model and the designer's model of the 
user, may lay out the programme of HCI more clearly. However, there 
still seem to be possibilities for confusion amongst these multiple images, 
particularly when considering that these models may themselves be 
informed by computational metaphors. In the following sections, the 
utilisation of a computational metaphor for modelling an individual's 
behaviour on a computer system is explored. This is examined in the light 
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of the foregoing discussion of the programme of Cognitive Science. In 
particular, an attempt is made to reveal how the mental processes of 
individuals are conceived in cognitive models of human-computer 
interaction. This review centres on the influential programme of research 
initiated by Stuart Card and his colleagues, on what are called the `GOMS' 
models. This programme at its various stages, and with its particular 
concern for being relevant to the design of computer systems, can be seen 
to be prototypical of much work in cognitive modelling within HCI. 13 
An examination of the model also provides a background against which 
the analysis of computer-based activities provided in subsequent chapters 
can be viewed. GOMS and allied approaches explore the details of 
computer use, down to a hand's movement across a keyboard, in a precise 
and systematic fashion. This level of detail is not overlooked in the 
subsequent analyses, for example in chapter 6. However, the level of 
detail of provided by an analysis is not of issue, rather what will be of 
concern will the nature of the conceptions which underpin the analysis. 
2.4 A COGNITIVE APPROACH TO HCI 
Card, Moran and Newell are explicit concerning the motivations behind 
their research: to build a scientific and technical theory of HCI (Newell 
and Card, 1985). Their work on developing a quantitative model of HCI 
has been viewed as the `best established HCI user model' (Brooks, 1991, p. 
13 Amongst the other significant cognitive models for human-computer interaction 
are Cognitive Complexity Theory (CCT, and the later LICAI, Kieras and Poison, 
1985; Kitajima and Polson, 1992; Polson, 1987), Interacting Cognitive Sub- 
systems (ICS, Barnard, 1987), and Task-Action grammars (TAGS, Payne and 
Green, 1986). In some areas, these models seek to extend issues not considered 
by GOMS, for example, involving prediction (CCT) and routine procedures (ICS). 
In others, the critical distinction appears to surround the representation of the 
model (e. g. TAGs). Nevertheless, models such as CCT, the later CPM-GOMS (Gray, 
et al., 1993) and QGOMS (Beard, et al., 1996) have been seen to be a `family' and 
applied to several areas of computer use (Olson and Nilsen, 1988). Though other 
methods differ in their modelling strategies and representation, the analytic 
approach and conceptual apparatus are similar to the GOMS family of models (see 
the discussion of `extensions' to GOMS in Olson and Olson, 1990). Also, see the 
use of the SOAR cognitive architecture (Laird, et al., 1987), where it is 
hypothesised that the behaviour modelled, browsing through computer help, is 
'GOMS-like' (Peck and John, 1992). Hence, the discussion concerning the general 
aims of GOMS may also be related to these other cognitive models. 
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55) and the `most notable example' of a theoretical foundation and 
theoretical concepts within HCI (Barnard, 1991a, p. 103). Hence, it has 
provoked widespread discussion and influenced much subsequent research 
within HCI (e. g. Carroll, 1991b; Greif, 1991; John and Vera, 1992; Olson 
and Olson, 1990; Polson, 1987). 
The GOMS (Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection rules) models of 
Card, Moran and Newell were derived from their earlier work on what 
were called the `model human processor' and the `Keystroke-level model'. 
As particular key conceptions were developed in this work they are briefly 
reviewed first (in section 2.4.1). The GOMS models (discussed in section 
2.4.2) have recently been extended to account for more complex parallel 
processes. These extensions are considered in section 2.4.3. 
2.4.1 The Foundations to GOMS: the Model Human Processor and 
the Keystroke Level Model 
Compared with Marr's model of the human visual processor, Card's model 
human processor is a rather simple computational model for the user of a 
computer system (Card, 1984; Card, et al., 1978). Echoing a standard 
division of computers into input, central processing and output 
components, `the model human processor' contains three (sub-) processors: 
perceptual, cognitive and motor. This framework provides the basis for a 
detailed model of computer-based activities - The Keystroke Level Model 
(KLM) - (Card, et al., 1980). Focusing on an individual expert carrying out 
routine and repetitive activities, it examines in depth the operations that 
surround a user making keystrokes on a computer system. In doing so the 
KLM reveals in more detail the underlying psychological orientation of the 
approach and the ways in which mental processes are characterised. 14 
For the purposes of the KLM, tasks are considered at a variety of grain- 
sizes, all associated with the individual user. It is assumed that a user 
breaks a task up into small quasi-independent `unit-tasks', in order to 
make a task more cognitively manageable. Unit-tasks are divided into 
two parts: the acquisition of the task and its execution. Thus, the time it 
14 As with the model information processor, there is a pragmatic aim behind the 
KLM. It is intended to be easy to use by computer system engineers. Although 
Card et al's model is directed at user typing keys on a keyboard, they also utilise 
the model to account for reading instructions off a sheet, the system's response 
time and reacting to changes on the display. As with the earlier model, its design 
utility is seen essentially in terms of being able to predict the time it takes to 
accomplish tasks. 
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takes to accomplish a unit task is considered to be the sum of the times it 
takes to carry out the two components (i. e. Ttask = Tacquire +T execute). 
Because the focus is on `routine activity', the execution of tasks is 
considered the critical component. This itself is taken to be a sum of 
Keying (K), Pointing (P), Homing (H) and Drawing (D) operations and the 
response time of the system (R). These can be specified in terms of 
constants and simple formulae, including a constant for a mental operator 
(M). 
In a `deliberate simplification' Card et al. assign the mental operator a 
fixed time of 1.35 seconds. This can be considered to be the time in which 
a user is `mentally preparing' to execute an operation. The critical issue 
then becomes where to place mental operators when modelling sequences 
of activities (or `methods'). For example, one method of deleting text from 
a document on a particular computer system (say, via an Apple Macintosh 
menu) could be described by the following sequence of `non-mental' 
operations, (in KLM form). 
H[mouse] `home' hand to mouse 
P [word] `point' with mouse to word to be deleted 
2K[button] `double click' button on mouse 
R[selection] Response time of system 
P[Edit] `point' to Edit menu 
K[button] `click' button 
R[menu display] Response time of system 
P [Cut] `point' to `Cut' on Edit menu 
K[button] release mouse button 
R[menu deletion] Response time of system 
H [keyboard] `home' hand back to keyboard 
Alternatively, deletion could also be performed by the following 
sequence (without a menu): 
H[mouse] `home' hand to mouse 
P [word] `point' with mouse to word to be deleted 
2K[button] `double click' button on mouse 
R[selection] Response time of system 
H[keyboard] `home' hand back to keyboard 
K[Delete] press the delete key 
R[key deletion] Response time of system 
These are just the motor activities of the user and where the system 
responds. To place the mental operators (Ms), Card et al. give five 
`heuristic rules' (p. 400), which can be summarised: 
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" do not place M's in front of keys that select or type arguments to commands (i. e. 
they only occur before pointing to commands); 
" do not place them when they are `fully anticipated' (e. g. between pointing to an 
object and pressing the mouse button); 
" do not place them within a 'cognitive unit' (e. g. within a command name); 
" do not place them before a `redundant terminator' (e. g. when two terminators are 
required, one following an entire command and one following a final argument); 
" do not place them within a `constant string' (e. g. after a key that is always 
required, for example, in some systems the RETURN key is always needed after a 
command is typed). 
Therefore, the sequences for the operators above would be written 
something like: 
H[mouse] `home' hand to mouse H[mouse] `home' hand to mouse 
* MP[word] `point' with mouse to * MP[word] `point' with mouse to 
word to be deleted word to be deleted 
2K[button] `double click' 2K[button] `double click' 
R[selection] Response time R[selection] Response time 
P[Edit] `point' to Edit menu H [keyboard] `home' to keyboard 
K[button] `click' button K[Delete] press the delete key 
R[menu display] Response time R[key deletion] Response time 
P[Cut] `point' to `Cut' on Edit 
K[button] release mouse button 
R[menu deletion] Response time 
H[keyboard] `home' to keyboard 
Thus, in both cases mental operators are only placed where the user is 
about to point at a word with a mouse. The application of the heuristics is 
not straightforward and requires some work on behalf of the analyst in 
order to identify meaningful `chunks' that are `fully anticipated' or form 
part of a `cognitive unit'. Indeed, it is not clear whether the distinction 
between `commands' and `arguments' holds for some user activities, or 
when terminators are `redundant' and strings `constant'. The heuristics 
appear to suggest occasions when users are `thinking', but they also could 
be considered to mark out places where pauses or breaks in an activity 
occur, without any recourse to a notion of `mental preparation'. It is 
unclear what status these rules have, or what warrant there is for them. 15 
In order for KLM to go beyond being merely a description of physical 
and behavioural activities, the model needs to incorporate a mental 
operator. Card et al. derive a constant for the operator from the 
15 Lane et al. (1993) give a brief, but detailed, account of the problems of assigning 
the mental operator when looking at three closely related activities of users of a 
spreadsheet program. They note, in particular, difficulties with the terms `fully 
anticipated' and `cognitive unit' (p. 187). Different interpretations give different 
prediction times. 
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experiments it aims to model. In effect, mental activity is calculated as 
the residue left over after the times for observed activities (keying, 
homing, pointing etc. ) have been measured. The model assumes this gap 
to be `mental' and then spreads it about the sequences according to the 
heuristics. Card et al. admit that this procedure is problematic, but 
suggest that the utility of the constant lies in its use in similar analyses by 
others. 
Although there are admitted simplifications in the model, Card et al. 
see it as having its foundations in Cognitive Science. The distinctions 
between acquisition and execution, mental preparation and observable 
activity invoke the conception of a space where mental activity occurs. 
However, the nature of this mental processing is unclear. The KLM model 
suggests cases when mental activity might happen, however, it has 
difficulties accounting for when mental activity occurs in parallel to, or is 
interrelated with, physical actions. Even as a preliminary attempt at a 
cognitive model of computer use, the KLM model appears to draw on the 
distinction between mental and physical activities too crudely. 
The KLM model focuses on routine activities. Its characterisation of 
simple computer-related activities neglects deviations which may occur in 
those activities, in particular the model fails to account for users making 
`errors', as has been noted by HCI researchers (e. g. Kieras and Poison, 
1985; Landauer, 1991). However, the model has more fundamental 
problems. The account of mental activity as mental preparation prior to 
the accomplishment of action is a simplification that allows for the model 
to account for `gaps' in observable behaviour. Because it does not have an 
explication of mental activity, the model appears to be akin to a 
behavioural description. 
By taking into account the response times of the system, the KLM 
model begins to explore the notion of a human-computer `interaction'. 
Extending the focus of an individual user's observable behaviour to 
include, for example, scanning a piece of paper for instructions, appears to 
require a more sophisticated model of the inner cognitive processes of the 
user. However, even with this extension to the account of human 
behaviour it remains unclear how a cognitive component enhances the 
model. As a pragmatic method there is little need for the KLM model to 
attain explanatory adequacy, yet such a characteristic may be necessary if 
the model is to be extended towards other domains of activity. 
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2.4.2 The Symbolic Processor 
The GOMS models are a series of layered models proposed by Card et al. 
(1983), building on their earlier KLM. Indeed, the `basic actions' 
considered by KLM, such as making keystrokes, moving a hand and 
looking at objects, are modelled on the lowest level (called the MO. 5 
model). The models layered above this level can be considered as coarser, 
the operations being modelled being more generic and of longer duration. 
Card et al. suggest various models at four different levels (called M16, M4, 
M2) MO. 5). 16 On each level each model is made up of four components: 
Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection rules (hence, the name GOMS). 
Goals are `symbolic structures that define a state of affairs to be achieved' 
(p. 38); operators are `elementary motor or information-processing acts' 
(p. 40); methods describe procedures for achieving a goal; and selection 
rules allow choices to be made between alternative methods for 
accomplishing goals. 
Goals are considered to be hierarchical, for example, the top-level goal 
of editing a manuscript can be broken down into individual unit editing 
tasks. This is the grain of analysis for the highest level, M16, GOMS 
model. For lower level models, these tasks are themselves decomposed. 
So, for instance, particular `edits' could be broken down into getting a task 
and executing it, the latter consisting of locating a line, modifying the text 
and then verifying the change. If there are different methods for 
achieving these tasks then the selection rules come into operation. For 
instance, on an Apple Macintosh, there are various ways of locating a 
portion of text, including: scrolling down through the document, moving to 
a location in the document and then scrolling, or searching for a particular 
word. In the GOMS models context-free selection rules are defined to 
chose between these methods. These rules are specified in terms of 
`production rules' (or IF THEN rules). For instance, the following selection 
rules could be defined for the Macintosh example: 
16 The numbering scheme of the GOMS family of models reflects their granularity. 
The number indicates the order of the duration of operators considered at each 
level. Hence, at level 16, operators have durations of the order of 16 seconds and 
0.5 seconds at level 0.5. Letters following the level number (e. g. in M0.5E) 
arbitrarily distinguish different models at the same level. 
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Use Scroll Arrows as default 
IF destination further than a page away 
and less than a third of the document away 
THEN use Scroll bar 
IF destination further than a third of the document away 
THEN use search command 
At the lowest level operators are further decomposed: first, in terms of 
looking, homing to a target, moving a hand, typing and a mental operator 
(cf. the KLM model); then the mental operator is itself distinguished into 
searching, comparing and choosing. 
In organising the models in this way, close parallels to the work of 
Marr (1982) can be seen. There is an emphasis on levels, differing kinds of 
representation and a more modular categorisation of activities. Card et al. 
are explicit about the nature and purpose of their models, considering the 
manuscript-editing task they describe as a candidate for a domain of 
activity that could offer a verification of the theory of `man' as a `symbolic 
information processor' (p. 33). Indeed, they suggest that studying an 
example domain of activity should facilitate the extension of symbolic 
information-processing theory. Furthermore, the model should be able to 
make predictions about human behaviour at a computer terminal. These 
predictions would be in terms of sequences of activities or the time a task 
should take. In emphasising the symbolic aspects of the model, Card et al. 
are perhaps distinguishing their objectives from those of Marr. Certainly, 
apart from utilising a few familiar techniques (e. g. production rules and 
hierarchies), there is not a prime aim of specifying computational 
constraints and competencies. Instead, GOMS models appear to 
concentrate principally on the performative features of computer use. 
Card et al. identify some of the difficulties of using the different layers 
of GOMS models. For example, they note that the accuracy of the models 
do not necessarily reflect the level of detail by which a particular analysis 
is carried out; coarser grain analyses neglect particular details whilst fine 
grain units are more prone to errors in measurement. For the manuscript 
editing task, which involves examining an annotated sheet of paper and 
making the appropriate change to the document on the computer system, 
the coarsest level of analysis is simply in terms of performing a series of 
editing tasks (or EDIT-UNIT-TASKs). For intermediate models, tasks tend 
to have broadly appropriate labels such as GET-UNIT-TASK and DO-UNIT- 
TASK reflecting the Tacquire and the Texecute of the KLM model. However, 
even at the lower levels, descriptors are also given vaguely intentional 
labels such as GET-NEXT-PAGE, MODIFY-TEXT and VERIFY-EDIT. It is 
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unclear whether this is sufficient to allow these models to be considered 
cognitive. Presumably, a wide variety of labels could be given for these 
descriptors which may not have such mentalistic connotations. 
Furthermore, they are meant to cover a variety of observable behaviour, 
and it is unclear whether rigorous criteria can be specified for making 
such classifications. As these labels of generic activities are the only 
objects handled by the intermediate GOMS level models, it is perhaps 
worth examining the lower levels when considering its cognitive 
dimension. 
At the lowest level (model M0.5E) the mental operator is broken down 
into: SEARCH-FOR, COMPARE, CHOOSE COMMAND, CHOOSE ARGUMENT. In 
their manuscript editing experiment Card et al. note that the `mental' 
accounts for 60% of the total time, compared to 20% of the time the 
subjects are seen to be typing. However, certain difficulties are 
encountered when trying to categorise activities in terms of these 
operators. First, as with the KLM, identifying mental activity is 
problematic: `pauses' in the observed data of greater than 0.3 seconds are 
here counted as `mental'. Second, some observed data do not fit the model, 
in particular, some mental operators identified in the data could not fit 
any of the pre-assigned categories (in 71 out of the 581 instances). These 
had to be assigned a category of UNKNOWN, which always failed to match 
operators generated by the model. Hence, the accuracy of the model in 
predicting sequences was less than 50%. Third, when more than one 
mental operator is predicted in succession, it is difficult to determine the 
boundary between them. When examining the observed data it did not 
appear that mental operations combined additively. 
These difficulties with the GOMS models appear to reflect Marr's 
concerns with performative theories of cognition. Without any prior 
concern with the computational theory behind the activity, derived models 
are likely to appear ad hoc and unwarranted. However, the nature of 
visual processing accounted for in Marr's models and that of the activities 
involved in using a computer are quite distinct. From a cognitive 
viewpoint, computer use appears to be of quite a different order. Indeed, 
an account of visual processing appears to be one of the pre-requisites of a 
perceptual model (or a model on the GOMS 0.5 level). It appears to be 
much more problematic to break down activities such as searching, 
comparing and choosing into distinct modules and provide computational 
constraints and theories for these. It may be that, in order to proceed, 
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cognitive models have to rely on generic techniques, with different kinds of 
information processing being considered mainly in terms of the 
manipulation of different kinds of symbols. 
Card et al's description of the GOMS models offers an explicit account of 
a cognitive, and symbolic, approach to HCI. At the coarser levels, it is 
unclear what status the components of the models have; task descriptions 
appear to be cover a range of observable behaviour and method and 
selection rules seem to offer generic procedural accounts of repetitive 
activities. Although, tasks and methods are often given intentional labels, 
these appear to be too vague to offer a sufficient description of the user's 
internal mirror of technology. The lower level models are more specific 
and appear to involve particular mental activities and processes. 
Unfortunately, when these models have to fit observable data problems 
ensue. As with the earlier KLM, observations of the mental appear to 
coincide with pauses in physical activity. The proponents of these models 
are not suggesting that such a crude distinction between mental and 
physical activity pertains, but given their experimental apparatus it is 
difficult to envisage a more accurate way of matching the models to 
observed activity. 
Card et al. found that when fitting data to predicted operators it 
appears that the time taken to carry out two mental operations 
sequentially did not match the sum of the time taken to carry out each 
individually. This observation may have important consequences for the 
ways in which mental operations are conceived. If mental operators 
cannot be combined additively, it is unclear whether mental operators 
remain the same when occurring alone or when coinciding with other 
mental activity. However, these models, with their emphasis on routine 
and repetitive behaviour rely on an assumption that, particularly when 
associated with physical motor activities, mental operators remain stable. 
If mental operators can be transformed when in combination what 
warrant is there that they remain stable at other times? If the definition 
of mental operators such as `searching' and `comparing' is also open to flux, 
it would be unclear what status these operators would have in the model 
and, once again, the warrant for such activities being accounted for as 
mental would be brought into question. 
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2.4.3 The Parallel Human Information Processor 
The problems accounting for parallel activities in GOMS does not merely 
concern mental operators, but also other operators in the analysis (i. e. the 
perceptual and motor). With its foundations in the model human 
processor, GOMS is based on sequential processors for perception, cognition 
and motor control. Although other layers can be considered to operate in 
parallel, at the model human processor (or GOMS M0.5) level, the three 
processors are considered to be sequential, one occurring after the other in 
a cycle. 17 Hence, the models cannot provide for a user doing two related 
things at the same time, for example, typing and reading off a screen. To 
address this problem John (1990) has developed a GOMS technique that 
allows for modelling more than one processor in parallel and accounting 
for the dependencies between them. She utilises familiar techniques from 
project management for this: Critical Path Methods and schedule charts 
(hence CPM-GOMS). These allow for parallel activities to be mapped out 
and a critical path (where delays will delay the overall accomplishment of 
the project) to be determined. 
Gray et al. (1993) give a detailed account of an exercise in using CPM- 
GOMS. This is unusual in GOMS analyses, and cognitive analyses of HCI in 
general, in that it explores a real-world example: the so-called Project 
Ernestine. 18 This project was carried out on behalf of a telephone 
company involved with the introduction of a new computer system to 
assist their telephone operators responsible for handling routine enquiries 
relating to connections and billing (or Toll and Assistance Operators). 
This is a routine activity involving talking to the customer, typing into the 
17 Warranting such an assumption from previous work in cognitive psychology has 
been questioned (Olson and Olson, 1990). 
18 Project Ernestine continues the concerns of the original GOMS methods by 
utilising the models to derive comparative timings between design options. In 
this case the authors could compare the time taken to carry out activities between 
a proposed system and an existing one. The authors state that because of the 
way the telephone company calculates the cost of the time of the operators, 
findings from the CPM-GOMS modelling exercise can be seen to save considerably 
on costs (one estimate being that the 0.63 second difference predicted by the 
model could save $2 million). This, presumably, is the kind of design decision 
that fulfils the pragmatic objectives of the analysts. John gives another example 
of using CPM-GOMS in a model of the activity of typing transcriptions. This 
model is drawn from previous experiments and debates concerning these kinds of 
activities, and not a real-world study (John, 1996) 
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computer system and activating phone connections. The telephone 
company focuses on the duration of the average phone calls when 
examining costs, hence predictions concerning estimates of changes in the 
timing of the call due to the new computer system are viewed as 
consequential. 
The CPM-GOMS analysis is in many ways very similar to the classic 
GOMS analysis, with motor operators including the movement of each hand 
and eyes and verbal responses, perceptual operators being such items as 
`perceive BEEP' and `perceive complex-info', and cognitive operators being 
`attend-info', `verify info' and initiate an action (such as an eye movement). 
At the highest level the unit-task of `HANDLE CALLS' is broken down into 
sub-goals RECEIVE-INFORMATION, REQUEST-INFORMATION, ENTE R- 
INFORMATION and RELEASE-CALL. Between the two, other activities are 
defined, such as LISTEN-TO-CUSTOMER, LISTEN-TO-BEEP and THANK- 
CUSTOMER. The critical difference to GOMS is that activities can be 
modelled that occur in parallel, so the model allows for the telephone 
operator to read off the screen and to type whilst the customer talking. A 
detailed CPM-GOMS analysis of two systems designed to support the 
telephone operator, the existing one and a proposed new system, revealed 
that though the new system was quicker, the savings in time it introduced 
were not along the critical path. Indeed, the design of the new system 
introduced activities along the critical path. 
This is the kind of finding envisaged by Card and his colleagues for the 
model human processor and allied models; a cognitive analysis having 
direct consequences for a development activity: in this case, the general 
decision whether to deploy a system or not. 
In order to generate their predictions, Gray et al. had to make several 
deliberate simplifications. So, for example, although there were four 
different cognitive operators they were each assigned the same duration 
(50 msec). As for GOMS there were problems with the `placement 
heuristics of unobservable operators' (p. 262). The heuristics from GOMS 
were used as a guide for `best guesses' and then modified to remove 
`impossible times'. More interestingly the variation between the length of 
turns of talk, particularly those of the customer, had to be accounted for by 
scripting typical utterances. 19 
19 One problem Gray et al. faced is accounting for learning behaviour, so they 
discounted the first month of the trial. The differences for the average times over 
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These simplifications highlight the pragmatic character of the model. 
Gray et al. have undertaken a detailed analysis of a particular routine 
activity, exploring the potential changes to the activity introduced by a 
new system through an analysis of video-tapes and data collected of 
recorded calls across different types of calls and down to a level of detail 
that considers eye and hand movements. Indeed, the critical feature of the 
new system appears to be the positioning of the key to mark the end of 
call. Previously, this could be accomplished with the user's left hand, 
which could be moved towards whilst typing with the right hand. The 
change in key position made this awkward and, hence, shifted an activity 
onto the critical path (consisting mainly of motor operations). The 
difference in time between the two computer systems was, after all, only 
estimated to be 0.63 seconds. 
As with GOMS, the extent to which CPM-GOMS models cognitive 
activities appears to be limited. Once again, the focus is on routine 
activities that involve continuous use (principally typing) on a computer 
system. The accuracy of the predicted timings appears to be more due to 
attending to details of observed activities, rather than an incisive analysis 
of unobserved mental processes. 
In undertaking an analysis of a system used in practice, Gray et al. 
have extended the domain in which GOMS models have been applied away 
from experimental or hypothetical systems. As it directly relates to 
aspects covered in later chapters of this thesis, it is worth re-emphasising 
some of the assumptions behind the model. 
" the only resources users appear to have are a set of perceptual, 
cognitive and motor competencies. These are governed by goals, and 
sub-goals to achieve a unit task. The participants have limited 
resources for developing other courses of action (cf. the use of 
computer applications in chapters 3 and 4); 
" the system activity is modelled in terms of undiscriminated 
responses and changes of displays. It appears that the functions the 
system performs or the appearance of items on the display is not 
relevant to the activity being modelled. Indeed, it is unclear to 
what extent the system is a computational system (cf. the practices 
surrounding the use of CAD systems in chapter 4); 
the months can then be related to changes in the distribution of calls over the 
different categories. 
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" the activity as modelled is routine and involves continuous 
operation of the system. Even acknowledgement that there may be 
activities other than those accomplished on the computer system is 
not provided (cf., the use of a computerised phone system in chapter 
5); 
" the model only accounts for the behaviour of one individual. This is 
despite of the involvement of a customer in the activity. Indeed, 
there are calls which involve the participation of a second operator. 
These are ignored in the model (cf. the analysis of collaborative 
activities in chapters 5 and 6); 
" despite the focus on a telephone system the talk is neglected. The 
activities focused on remain on those surrounding the typing on the 
keyboard (cf. the analysis of the entry of commands within a control 
room in chapter 6). 20 
2.4.4 A General Discussion of GOMS Models 
Given that they are explicitly intended to be cognitive models of computer 
use it is perhaps strange that GOMS models focus on routine cognitive skill 
where `no puzzlement or uncertainty of what to do next' is apparent (p. 
69). Such a focus appears to preclude an examination of the very conduct 
that such models should be suited for. One might have expected an 
exploration of domains where there were more obvious opportunities for 
activities which could be analysed in terms of cogitation, deliberation, 
decision making and planning. There are many settings where the use of 
computer systems are interrupted by periods and gaps which might offer 
more appropriate occasions for giving an account of mental activity. 21 
The work on 
also intended to 
GOMS has various 
contribute to an 
pragmatic design 
understanding of 
objectives, but it is 
symbolic cognitive 
20 These constraints also seem to imbue the few design suggestions Gray et al. 
imply from the modelling exercise. Apart from suggesting that the system 
response time should be reduced, Gray et al. propose the investigation of 
automatic greetings and changes to the organisation of the call. The latter could 
include adding suggestions to the caller on how they should have presented their 
query. This does not appear to account for the sequential implications that such 
suggestions might have on the caller's next actions (see Chapter 7). 
21 There has been some work within the cognitive science approach to HCI on more 
exploratory activities. These tend to adopt the same mechanisms, namely 
production rules, to explain cases of this behaviour (e. g. Kitajima and Poison, 
1996). 
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processes. As such it exhibits many of the features that would be 
expected; a focus on building models of activities; a concern for the 
distinction between the process and the information (or symbols) being 
processed; and an arrangement of the model into levels where higher 
levels utilise the products of the lower ones. However, what does seem 
problematic is the general characterisation of activities as information 
processing. This relies on simple models of input and output with 
processing in between (the three processors of the model human 
processor), or of the firing of production rules (e. g. the selection rules of 
GOMS) or hierarchical relationships between tasks (e. g. the goals and sub- 
goals of GOMS). It is possible to break apart activities in many ways, the 
same activity could be defined on many different levels and in terms of 
differing combinations of symbols and operators. 22 Moreover, the nature 
of processing specified by these mechanisms is unclear. These are either 
too weak or too general. On the one hand, mechanisms, like hierarchies, 
merely express a relationship which activates a set of other processes (in 
sequence), or, like production rules, appear to imply that any kind of 
processing can occur. 23 On the other, a model in terms of input, 
processing and output is so general it appears to offer no constraints to the 
kind of processing that can occur. Indeed, this model though weakly 
specified would appear to have the power, in the mathematical sense, of 
any Turing Machine, and hence programming language. They are 
powerful, or strong, in being able to account for any computable function 
(Brady, 1977; Hopkin and Moss, 1976). Therefore, they offer few 
constraints on how processing is modelled. Hence, there are innumerable 
ways in which the distinction between information and process can be 
made. 
The warrant or criterion for selecting the various tasks, goals, 
operators and rules used within the models is unclear. In modelling an 
activity, the general conception of tasks is cognitive, however, this appears 
22 Indeed, in one extension to GOMS, QGOMS (for `quick and dirty' GOMS ), levels of 
analysis can be ignored and times directly substituted for the breakdown of tasks 
(Beard, et al., 1996). It is stated that this offers the desired accuracy for design. 
23 Indeed, the computational specification of the production rules in GOMS models is 
unclear. It is possible that the computational power of production rules can be 
equivalent to the power of a Turing Machine (i. e. specify any function that is 
computable). In more technical terms, the production rule mechanism lacks a 
computational semantics. So, for example, it is not clear whether there are any 
constraints to the kinds of functions specified in the `action' parts of the rules. 
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to rest on analysts assigning appropriate intentional labels to activities. 
More specific notions of mental operations, when examined in detail, face 
similar problems. They appear to be accounting for gaps in observable 
activities rather than explicating mental processing, and also rely on 
analysts' own competencies at recognising certain behaviour in terms of 
particular mental operations. Analysts are given little assistance on how 
to assign particular mental operations from the description of the models. 
Hence, there are difficulties attributing conduct to cognitive categories and 
distinguishing between them. Analysts have to use common-sense in 
order to determine whether an individual is, for example, searching or 
comparing. Utilising intuitions may not be problematic if the model is 
considered to be a tool for design, but this is inconsistent with the claims 
made for the model. Card et al. state that they aim to develop a more 
scientific approach, moving away from intuitions, anecdotal or subjective 
accounts of behaviour. However, when examined against these claims for 
a symbolic processing model of human conduct on a computer, or of 
Cognitive Science in general (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1988 [1993], p. 26), their 
aims do not appear to have been fulfilled. 
Similar concerns were expressed by Marr relating to approaches 
towards Cognitive Science developed within Artificial Intelligence (see 
Section 2.3.2). He considered that the warrant for a particular 
information processing model should be in terms of computational 
constraints on the process. In the first instance, it would not be necessary 
to be concerned with how particular cognitive activities were carried out 
by the human processor, but rather with the kinds of information that had 
to be processed. This would offer constraints for the later concerns of 
considering the representations required and the algorithms needed to 
process them. For visual processing, it is possible to see how such a 
programme progresses (cf. Marr, 1982). What arrives on the retina 
provides the first level of information. Subsequent levels of information 
can be postulated from experiments undertaken within studies of vision: 
such as primal, 21/2-D and 3D sketches. Then what has to be explored is 
the nature of computation required to process this information to detect 
shapes, textures and movements, for example. 
For analysing computer use, on the other hand, the pre-requisite 
information appears to be harder to constrain: there are images arriving 
from the screen, sounds from the machine, feelings from the various 
devices. There are also words and shapes presented on the screen and 
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courses of activities to be undertaken. Merely listing the competencies 
involved appears problematic. Take reading off the screen, for example. 
Presumably a transformational model of syntax would be one model of the 
competencies to be outlined for such an activity (cf. Chomsky, 1957; Marr, 
1982). But even in a cognitive account, users would have to be considered 
as bringing with them more than just syntactic competencies, for example, 
they may have resources from using the system before, concerning the 
activity to be undertaken on the machine, and common-sense, real-world 
knowledge. This would require an outlining of the kinds of information, or 
knowledge, required to use a computer system. Such a consideration of 
knowledge would indeed seem to be a pre-requisite of a cognitive model. 
Hence, some researchers have proposed that such a `knowledge analysis' 
be undertaken, where different types of cognitive resources are 
categorised, (Young, et al., 1990). These proposals are examined in more 
detail in chapter 3. 
A wider exploration of the information, or knowledge, required to 
operate a computer system would invariably raise problems of scope. 
There are other ways in which cognitive models could be extended. CPM- 
GOMS has already allowed for the examination of parallel activities in 
association with the computer. A model could also account for other 
activities engaged in by users, the `content' of what they are doing, their 
communication with others and the possibility of collaborative activities. 
Rather than gradually expanding the interests of cognitive or 
psychological models, some researchers have suggested a more radical 
departure by re-examining the scope of the programme. Of particular 
concern has been the possibility of incorporating social and communicative 
concerns within the framework. Whilst some of these developments, like 
Activity Theory, have quite distinct antecedents to Cognitive Science, 
others like Distributed Cognition have more obvious relationships to the 
orientation. 24 Of the several proposals drawn from a psychological 
24 So, for example, several researchers have suggested that Activity Theory, an 
orientation developed within Russian Psychology, is an ideal resource from which 
to develop an understanding of the use of tools and technologies (e. g. Bannon and 
Bodker, 1991; Kuutti, 1991; Nardi, 1996c). This has a broad conception of 
activities, not focusing on an individualistic and cognitive conception, but 
exploring how activities can be seen in terms of their socio-cultural development 
(Nardi, 1996c). Thus, skilled manipulations, cognitive processes, social factors 
and historical developments may all be relevant to the use of an object or artefact. 
However, some researchers have emphasised a concern to maintain a focus on 
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background, this has attracted considerable attention with regard to its 
applicability for design. Because of this, the more explicit outline of its 
analytic orientations, and its concerns with collaborative and 
communicative activities, it is on Distributed Cognition that the next 
section will focus. 
2.5 DISTRIBUTED COGNITION 
As with the conventional cognitive approach to HCI, the motivations 
behind much recent work in Distributed Cognition have been both 
scientific and applied. On the one hand, there has been an interest in 
broadening the scope of psychological studies to account for other 
concerns, particularly to take account of social and communicative 
activities. On the other, research of the activities of individuals on 
personal workstations appears to be largely irrelevant to recent 
developments in computer technologies, particularly those designed to 
support collaboration and communication. Hence, either methods and 
techniques for design will need to draw from other research programmes, 
or the techniques developed within HCI have to be broadened. As noted in 
the previous sections, approaches to HCI drawn from Cognitive Science 
appear to be particularly constrained to focusing on the individual user 
engaging in routine activities on a personal workstation. So, it may be 
that by seeking to explore a broader range of activities, analysts may also 
be able to develop their models of what is conventionally considered to be 
the domain of HCI. To pursue these concerns, both applied and scientific, 
researchers have begin to focus more on the accomplishment of real-world 
activities in various work settings. 
Although several frameworks have been proposed, drawing on such 
disciplines as anthropology, management studies and organisational 
analysis, particular attention has been focused on utilising resources 
drawn from both psychology and sociology, proposing, for example, to 
extend Cognitive Science to account for social action (Hutchins, 1990; 
Olson, 1990). What is distinctive about this programme is that it relies 
planful, intentional behaviour (Nardi, 1996c, p. 84). Hence, a strong `closeness in 
spirit' between Activity Theory and Distributed Cognition has been identified 
(Nardi, 1996c, p. 89). 
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principally on observations of naturally occurring social action whilst also 
drawing from the Cognitive Science paradigm. 
Despite the very recent development of Distributed Cognition and the 
tentative outline of the programme (Hutchins, 1985; Hutchins, 1995; 
Hutchins, et al., 1986; Norman, 1993a; Olson, 1990), there have been 
several attempts to explore its utility for the development of technology 
(e. g. Flor and Hutchins, 1991; Hutchins and Klausen, 1996; Rogers, 1992). 
These studies draw on field studies to examine particular settings and 
workplace activities, such as design and other offices, aircraft cockpits and 
shipboard navigation, with particular attention being paid to the uses put 
to artefacts in those settings. The studies, thus, provide many insights 
into the use of tools and technology in naturalistic settings, particularly 
concerning how objects like navigational instruments and dials are used 
as a resource for collaborative work. A range of notions which appear to 
be conventionally drawn from Cognitive Science are utilised within these 
analyses. So, for example, artefacts can act as `memories', individuals can 
collaboratively achieve `goals' and knowledge is shared and distributed 
amongst individuals. However, the nature of cognitive activities is 
significantly transformed in these analyses. Cognition is no longer 
conceived just as `residing in the head' but also as distributed between 
individuals. These shifts in perspective are most cogently argued for in 
Hutchins' (1995) account of navigation. 
Hutchins outlines the ways in which navigation is achieved both from 
accounts of Micronesian navigation and his own study aboard a large US 
Navy vessel. He then analyses these in terms of various computational 
activities, calculating speeds, identifying landmarks and plotting fixes on 
those landmarks, revealing ways in which these are achieved 
economically, reducing the need for re-calculation or complex arithmetic 
activities. Hutchins suggests that through activities such as plotting 
against imaginary stars or plotting fixes every three minutes, both 
Micronesian and Western navigators manage the complex computations 
required. Through these fascinating studies, Hutchins reveals how the 
activities are sensitive to the contingencies faced by the navigators, such 
as the artefacts they have available and the time in which they need to 
accomplish their work. 
Whilst taking account of the use of physical artefacts like the chart and 
the compass, and the talk between the navigation crew, critical to 
Hutchins' analyses is the conception of the activity of navigation as 
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cognitive. However, this is a distinctive account of cognition; Hutchins 
hopes 
... to show that human cognition is not just not influenced by culture and 
society, but that it is in a very fundamental sense a cultural and social 
process. (Hutchins, 1995, p. xiv) 
Hutchins reiterates questions concerning a strictly symbolic account of 
cognitive processes, wishing to move away from the narrow focus of 
cognition `residing in the head'. Whilst proposing this transformation he 
explicitly aims to maintain Marr's architecture for information processing. 
In particular, despite the shift away from Marr's focus on the individual, 
Hutchins circumscribes an activity - navigation - applies an analysis at 
several levels of description and pays attention to first developing a 
computational model of the activity. Hence, Hutchins outlines the 
computational constraints underlying navigation; the relationships 
between distance, time, speed and position. He then examines ways in 
which Western and Micronesian navigators deal with these constraints 
differently by developing various forms of representation and processes. 
For example, Micronesian navigators use reference islands and star paths 
to determine their position and route, Western navigators use charts and 
bearings. Finally, Hutchins outlines details of the implementation of the 
representations and algorithms in the work and interaction of a 
navigation crew on the bridge of a large naval vessel. 
With respect to levels of analysis, Hutchins does appear to follow 
Marr's programme. However, he makes two critical and explicit 
diversions, firstly applying cognition to social processes and secondly with 
regards to computation. Because Hutchins relies on a computational 
model of cognition, issues surrounding the latter diversion will be 
considered first. 
2.5.1 The Conception of Computational Processes in Distributed 
Cognition 
Citing the work of Turing, Hutchins notes that the original conception of 
manipulating symbols need not be applied to an internal process, it could 
involve interacting with the material world or be part of a social system. 
The problem for Cognitive Scientists is that they confuse symbol 
manipulation with individual human computational accomplishments. 
Searle's (1990,1980) criticism, that an account of symbol manipulation is 
not sufficient to model human conduct, is convincing because it too 
constrains the focus on the individual. If the origin of formal systems to 
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manipulate symbols is considered, and the nature of the activity, then 
`what Turing modelled was the computational properties of a socio- 
cultural system' (Hutchins, 1995, p. 362). For Hutchins, in formal 
systems, symbols are manipulated in terms of form only, and from these 
manipulations result other symbolic expressions (p. 359). This certainly 
has resonances with Turing's abstract symbol-processing machine. 
However, Hutchins is providing an account of human activity, not 
mathematical problems. 25 He analyses navigation in terms of 
computational constraints, so that the use of artefacts, the talk between 
participants and their coordination of activities are all considered with 
respect to the relationships between distance, time, speed and position. 
What is curious is that the computational level of the analysis does not 
appear to involve symbolic manipulation. There are good reasons for this. 
It is hard to envisage an analysis of symbols which is both outlining a 
socio-cultural process and culturally independent. For the examples 
Hutchins gives, the analysis would have to be implemented in both the use 
of Micronesian star paths and reference islands and to the `three minute 
rule' for taking bearings. This may not matter as the next level provides 
accounts of representations and algorithms which can be culturally 
specific. Western models of navigation can then rely on Western 
mathematical conceptions and symbol manipulation. However, it is 
unclear without a symbolic account of computation, even at an abstract 
level, in what way the `computational level' of analysis is computational. 
Hutchins gives constraints, which could be expressed as (constraint- 
satisfaction) rules, but there is no implication of a process. 26 What 
25 Note, the Turing machine provides a foundation for considering a set of 
mathematical problems, being utilised to prove, for example, whether a problem 
expressed in a particular way is computable (or non-computable), or whether it is 
decidable or enumerable. Critical to these proofs is the expression of the 
problems in terms of symbols and instructions, written and read by a simple 
notion of a machine. The motivations behind the original formulation of the 
machine was to provide a means by which general mathematical problems could 
be considered. This exercise in meta-mathematics needed a constrained 
conception of computation, provided by a device that processed distinct symbols. 
Thus, it is Hutchins who characterises Turing's innovations as a `model' (of a 
socio-cultural system, and not of a mental process). 
26 Hutchins does provide a general account of a constraint satisfaction process (p. 
295-310), but this is at the representational level, i. e. with respect to the activities 
in relation to mediating artefacts and representations by members of the 
navigation crew. 
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Hutchins appears to be giving, in his terms, is a formal system for 
navigation without symbolic representation. 
It appears that the computational level is necessary for Hutchins to 
outline a culturally independent conception of navigation. Here, he can 
state the constraints which apply to navigational activities. These relate 
positions to spatial displacements, and distances, rate and time (p. 58). As 
these constraints may, in different ways, be packed or `crystallized', into 
procedures, artefacts and representations, they are implicit to the 
activities and they are oriented to by participants. So, for example, 
onboard a large US Navy ship, the use of landmarks and the plotting of 
bearings within the `three minute rule', can be seen as a procedure that 
makes use of these constraints, but the crew need not orient to the 
constraints themselves. Instead, in order to reduce cognitive effort the 
procedure embodies the constraints. In the Micronesian case, which is 
non-literate, no explicit representation or process of symbol manipulation 
is undertaken. Arriving at a destination is achieved by breaking a voyage 
into segments and in navigating each with respect to the relationship 
between the objects in the sky and visible landmarks. By some 
sophisticated analysis, Hutchins shows how this process, particularly the 
use of phantom islands, could also be seen to operate within the 
constraints. 
What Hutchins gives is an account of a formal system in terms of some 
constraint satisfaction rules; what could be considered, perhaps grandly, 
as an explanatory theory of navigation competencies. But in the actions of 
the participants undertaking this activity, this formal system is only 
implicit. To accomplish navigation they have to utilise a wide range of 
common sense and skilled competencies. Hutchins provides a fascinating 
account of some of these, including the interactional accomplishment of 
the taking of bearings (p. 238-9), the relationship of the use of artefacts to 
the orientations of participants (p. 235-6), the use and recognition of local 
landmarks (p. 134-6) and in the Micronesian case, making sense of the 
colour of the sea, the swell patterns of the sea and the vicinity of birds. 
Thus, what is unclear is the status of the computational model. It 
appears weak in terms of its computational properties. Although 
Hutchins emphasises how computational properties, in terms of the 
processing of symbols, can be considered as socio-cultural, these do not 
appear to be relevant for the computational theory. Thus, it appears to be 
more an account of some formal properties; formal properties which are 
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not oriented to by participants, but are hidden, guiding the historical 
shape of artefacts, the organisation of procedures and the activities of 
participants. It is an analytical account that has to be distinct from the 
practices of participants. Hence, it could be argued why Hutchins' 
`computational level', without a clear computational specification, can be 
warranted with respect to other analytic models of hidden processes, or, 
why these formal properties have a primary status over the practices 
through which navigation is accomplished. Although in the explication of 
his analytical framework the computational and the symbolic are tightly 
related, the nature of this relationship is unclear in practice. 
2.5.2. The Conception of Cognition in Distributed Cognition 
As their name suggests, studies in Distributed Cognition adopt a social 
conception of cognition: cognition as a social process. However, this is not 
to say that researchers in this area reject cognition as a mental process. 
In fact, in many ways the conventional notion is maintained. So, although 
Hutchins calls for a deconstruction of the framework of Cognitive Science 
(p. xviii) and argues that symbolic manipulation is not the architecture of 
cognition, he believes that `humans actually process internal 
representations of symbols' (p. 370). Rather than rejecting an individual 
conception of cognition, Hutchins wishes to embed this notion within a 
broader social conception. In particular, he is concerned with a `division of 
cognitive labor' in which `the cognitive properties of human groups may 
depend on the social organisation of individual cognitive capabilities' 
(p. 176). 
As Hutchins emphasises his account of a socially, distributed cognition 
cognition applied to groups, it is this conception which will be considered 
here. This is largely accounted for in terms of communicative and 
interactional accomplishments. So, even the use of artefacts is considered 
in terms of them mediating communication. Hence, Hutchins' analysis of 
distributed cognition pays attention to language and the talk between 
participants. Hutchins notes that in Cognitive Science: 
... 
language is usually thought of primarily as a human computational 
capacity that should be understood in terms of the processing that 
individuals must do in order to produce or interpret it. 
(Hutchins, 1995, p. 231) 
He wishes to understand it in a new light in terms of technologies and 
the `larger cognitive system'. Hence, Hutchins is seeking a reconception of 
cognition that involves the use of artefacts, the distribution of social 
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activities and interaction between participants. Throughout his analyses 
of quite heterogeneous activities, however, Hutchins maintains his 
attention on what he considers cognitive properties. One way in which 
these analyses are brought together is with a concern with their 
computational nature and in terms of manipulating symbols and 
representations. Another concern is with the types of knowledge required 
by participants and the ways meanings are communicated and negotiated. 
Hutchins outlines these concerns principally in relation to the activities 
undertaken by the navigation crew aboard a large US Navy vessel. 
For example, in a simple interchange between three individuals -a 
plotter, a recorder and the watch responsible for taking the bearings -a 
first utterance by the plotter to the recorder "Tell him to take Point Loma 
first. It's on his beam" is transformed by the recorder for the watch into 
"Take Point Loma first, Mark, Beam bearing first, mark it". This, 
Hutchins sees as an example of language socialisation, of the recorder 
explicitly invoking a rule concerning the ordering of taking bearings and 
providing an opportunity for the watch to `add to his knowledge of the 
meaning' of the expression `Beam Bearing' (p. 209-210). 
In another example, a gesture by the plotter (or chief), a point towards 
a document, is seen not only in terms of its uses for the plotter, but also in 
terms of its `communicative function' for the recorder: as a clue to what the 
plotter is looking for (p. 235). 
The plotter's action is part of a memory-retrieval event that is internal to 
the system but directly observable... Because of this, the chief's pointing 
can be both a part of his private cognitive processing and an element of 
communication to the recorder about the sort of thing the chief is trying to 
accomplish. 
(Hutchins, 1995, p. 231) 
In these examples, and in many more cases, Hutchins reveals the 
complexity of the activities of the individuals on the bridge of the ship, 
how tightly coordinated they are and how they achieved in ways which are 
not made explicit. Hutchins provides an account of these in terms of the 
meanings of expressions and the `transportation of knowledge' (p. 218). He 
accepts that transporting knowledge between individuals, and between 
individuals and a `public context', may require some changes in the 
meanings of words (p. 218) and that meanings cannot be straightforwardly 
assigned to messages (p. 238). However, his analyses of activities is 
primarily in terms of assigning meanings to utterances and visual conduct 
to reveal how knowledge is passed from one individual to another. This 
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account does not seem to be so far removed from that of others within 
Cognitive Science who are concerned with communication and the passing 
of information between individuals (Clark and Schaefer, 1989). It relies 
on there being stable meanings of utterances (or messages) on which 
individuals can rely for them to be interpreted. This can be negotiated 
and subject to disruption, however, the accomplishment of interaction is 
primarily through a communicative interchange of information. 
There is some evidence that Hutchins does conceive of a more radical 
notion of meaning. He states that `The illusion of meaning in the message 
is a hard-won social and cultural accomplishment' (p. 238-9). This would 
seem to apply a more performative conception of meaning and knowledge. 
However, by maintaining a conception of an individual processing 
messages and knowledge which has to be passed or transported to others, 
knowledge and meaning have to be conceived of, to some extent, as stable 
and propositional. 
Hutchins' focus on naturally occurring activities and interactions does 
indeed provide a radical opportunity for `deconstructing' Cognitive Science. 
The insights into the accomplishment of activities in a workplace setting 
suggest issues which have not been a concern of Cognitive Scientists. 
However, the programme of Distributed Cognition appears to be 
hampered by its maintenance of a conventional conception of individual 
cognitive activities. Even when apparently subsumed by broader social 
concerns, an account in terms of mental processing constrains the extent 
to which cognition can be reconceived. What remains is essentially a 
conservative account of social actions and accomplishments. 
One final example illustrates this point. Hutchins provides an account 
of `why we talk to ourselves' (p. 313-6). Speaking aloud, as when a 
quartermaster enters numbers into a navigational calculator, provides for 
transformations so that meanings can be interpreted in an appropriate 
medium in relation to a task. The vocal mediating structure provides for 
constraints or procedures in the relevant medium that can be coordinated 
with the accomplishment of the activity. Despite being accomplished in a 
setting where other individuals are present, this is primarily an analysis 
of mental processing. It could be possible to provide an account of such 
`self-talk' in terms of social and public actions and as practical 
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accomplishments (cf. Goffman, 1981b). 27 However, although Hutchins' 
account of the individual mental process is conceived of as being embedded 
within a socio-cultural process, it is those conventional conceptions of 
cognition that seem to have primacy in the analysis. 
2.5.3 Distributed Cognition as a Distinctive Analytic Framework 
Hutchins does provide a distinctive analysis of the everyday actions and 
interactions through which an activity like navigation is accomplished in a 
real-world environment. With its concern on naturalistic materials it 
would be a significant development within Cognitive Science. But 
Hutchins' contribution to the study is more than a substantive broadening 
of the topic. He aims to explore a range of analytic concerns such as the 
embodied use of artefacts, the coordination of activities between 
participants and the achievement of learning in organisations. In setting 
out such an ambitious programme of work it is not surprising if the 
analyses of Hutchins and his colleagues are more outlines of potentially 
novel research issues rather than more extensive studies. However, in 
addressing each of these concerns the conventional conception of cognition 
remains to account for individual mental processing. Despite Hutchins' 
programmatics for considering cognition as a socio-cultural process, the 
individual conception appears to provide the resources through which 
accounts of communication and social interaction are given. 
Hutchins also maintains the conventional concern of Cognitive 
Scientists with accounting for cognition in terms of computational 
processes. In comparison to other studies of activities less-constrained 
than vision, Hutchins seeks to take seriously Marr's criteria for specifying 
information-processing models at a level which is not tied to 
representations and can operate across cultural implementations. This 
appears to lead to a computational theory of cognition in which 
computational processes are not specified. Hence, it is unclear in what 
sense descriptions at this level can be considered computational and 
whether there are any constraints on such theories. 
27 Heath and Luff (1992a) provide a quite different account of the practical social 
activities surrounding the `self-talk' of participants in a London Underground 
transport control room. Here, there is also a concern with coordination of 
activities, but this is with the incipient, or potential, courses of action of others. 
`Self-talk' can be utilised by colleagues as a resource for participating and 
contributing to the activities of others. 
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Hence, by diverting away from key elements of the work within 
Cognitive Science - the use of a strong model of computation and the 
individual conception of cognition - Hutchins appears to in danger of 
relinquishing its criteria for adequate explanations of human behaviour 
whilst still remaining shackled to its conventional conceptions. Of course, 
it may not be necessary to hold onto both of these concerns. For many of 
Hutchins' observations there neither appears to be a need for an 
underlying model of computational processes nor for an account of 
individual cognitive activities. Hutchins can be seen to be outlining some 
practices and methods by which individuals coordinate their activities in 
natural settings. In order to achieve these, participants rely on a set of 
competencies and common-sense resources. It may not be necessary either 
to account for these in terms of a single cognitive process, or to maintain 
that a heterogeneous set of concerns surrounding knowledge be considered 
under one rubric. This is a more radical conception of distributed or social 
cognition, one which draws from a social science orientation. 
In the next section, an alternative analytic framework for considering 
rational action and human conduct is outlined, one which pays attention 
to the practices and methods by which participants achieve social actions. 
Drawing on recent developments in ethnomethodology and allied 
orientations, researchers have been concerned with how interactions and 
activities are accomplished in natural settings. Although some 
commentators, including Hutchins, have included this work within the 
rubric of Distributed Cognition (p. 371), its provenance is from a different 
discipline with differing concerns and motivations. It is also an area of 
work which has also been of recent interest to researchers in HCI and 
CSCW. It is to this orientation to which we will now turn. 
2.6 A SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTION OF COGNITION 
In developing their programme of Distributed Cognition, Hutchins and his 
colleagues can be seen to be either broadening the concerns of Cognitive 
Science or attempting to respecify its key principles. Such developments 
have been suggested by the limitations of the field, they can also be seen 
in the light of a sustained criticism of the Cognitive Science programme. 
In the last ten years a set of critiques have emerged that question the 
foundational conceptions of Cognitive Science. These have been presented 
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives including; phenomenology 
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(Bolton, 1991), ecological (Morris, 1991) and discursive approaches to 
psychology (Edwards and Potter, 1992; Shotter, 1991) and cultural theory 
(Lave, 1988). These critiques have drawn on a disparate collection of 
works including Marx, to outline the practices through which cognitive 
activities like calculations are accomplished in natural settings (Lave, 
1988), and Heidegger to collapse distinctions between mental 
representations and actions (Winograd and Flores, 1986). In this section 
we will briefly explore one orientation from which critiques of the 
conceptual underpinnings of Cognitive Science have emerged. This is an 
orientation deriving from the original work within the social sciences of 
Harold Garfinkel (1967), which has been termed ethnomethodology. This 
has attracted interest not only because of its novel analytic concerns, but 
also because its focus on the accomplishment of practical actions has been 
considered as potentially useful in the process of system design. This 
orientation will be considered by paying attention to one study, Suchman's 
(1987) `Plans and Situated Action' -a work that has been significant in 
three respects. First, it suggests a reformulation of a particular concern of 
Cognitive Scientists: planning and plan-based models of action. Second, it 
appears to offer an alternative orientation for the analysis of artefact- 
centred activities (particularly `human-machine communication'); an 
orientation that has been termed a `Situated Action' approach (e. g. Nardi, 
1996c; Vera and Simon, 1993a). Third, it has been utilised as a key 
resource for an emerging domain of study, that of Computer-Supported 
Cooperative Work (CSCW). 
2.6.1 Situated Action 
Suchman draws on ethnomethodological studies in order to re-examine 
aspects of human-computer interaction. 28 In particular, she utilises work 
on the analysis of talk as a background against which to consider the 
nature of the interaction, or communication, with a computer system. The 
work she draws on, conversation analysis, derives from 
ethnomethodological concerns. Researchers in conversation analysis have 
sought to outline the social practices through which, from moment-to- 
moment, the production of turns of talk is both accomplished and rendered 
28 In a later article, Suchman (1993b) states an uneasiness with the term human- 
computer-interaction (p. 73). In the book, she opts for human-machine 
communication, but even this formulation is more of a resource for discussion 
rather than a conceptualisation of the activity (cf. Suchman, 1987, p. 118). 
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intelligible to others. These studies of talk rely on detailed analysis of the 
ways and methods by which activities are achieved in naturalistic 
settings. In line with these concerns, Suchman takes as materials for her 
study recordings of various pairs of individuals trying to use a complex 
`intelligent' photocopying machine. 
Suchman takes as resources for her analysis what is available and 
public for the participants, both through their talk and displayed on the 
machine. From these resources she reveals some of the ways in which the 
participants achieve an understanding of the operation of the machine, 
and manage to get the machine to produce copies. Thus, individuals 
utilise the locally available displays, commands and configuration of the 
machine to shape their understandings of its behaviour. By taking 
particular actions, the participants are provided with a further set of 
resources, which in turn contribute to the accomplishment of the task and 
their understanding of the machine's operation. These local 
understandings are contingent, displayed from moment-to-moment, 
through the participants' talk and actions. They are developed from the 
actions taken on the machine and also shape future ones. 
Suchman compares the accomplishments of the users with the 
rationale of the designers who developed the machine. The device, in 
common with many AI systems (and sophisticated prototypes of intelligent 
interfaces), developed a plan of actions for the user from what was 
accessible from the users' conduct (through the sensors and buttons on the 
machine). Thus, the system developed what is commonly known as a `user 
model' - an explicit model of the user (cf. Norman, 1986). The various 
displays and commands on machines were designed with respect to the 
current state of the model and these pre-specified plans. Unfortunately 
for the designers. the resources available to the machine were not 
symmetrical with those of the users. In making sense of the local 
resources with respect to their current circumstances, participants would 
utilise common-sense understandings of actions so that, for example, when 
a further instruction is displayed it can be seen to confirm a prior action, a 
non-response provides evidence of a trouble, and a repeated instruction 
could either be request a repeated action or invoke a repair of previous 
one. It would appear that these sense-making resources would be 
indefinite, and difficult to pre-specify in a machine. Because of the 
`profound and persisting asymmetry in interaction between people and 
machines' (p. 185), Suchman questioned the utility of developing such 
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plan-based user models in the design of computer systems. She then 
reflects back on the origins of such models from Cognitive Science (e. g. 
Miller, et al., 1960). 
From her analysis, Suchman suggests a reformulation of the 
conception of plans. Rather than pre-specifications of courses of actions or 
controlling structures, plans can be considered as resources for actions. 
This turns around the conventional problem of planning for Cognitive 
Scientists. Rather than aiming to outline plans that later get 
instantiated, or `filled out' in courses of actions and interactions at some 
`operational level', an analysis could explore how individuals are able to 
`bring efficient descriptions (such as plans) and particular circumstances 
into interaction' (p. 188). When considering the relationship of plans to 
situated actions, primacy is given to situated actions, with plans being one 
of the many things these produce (Suchman, 1993b, p. 72). 
In response to this study, some Cognitive Scientists have attempted to 
re-state their conception of plans, in terms of information and physical 
symbol processing (e. g. Vera and Simon, 1993a). They seek to give back 
the primacy to planning, and more importantly, to an account of action 
underpinned by symbol processing. For them, situated action can simply 
be viewed in terms of symbolic systems that `operate adaptively in real 
time in complex environments' (p. 47). In parallel with certain arguments 
of Hutchins, social processes are important to consider, but these too can 
be brought into a cognitive simulation (p. 43), by dealing with the `mutual 
transfer of knowledge or `simply aggregating the system to treat collective 
knowledge as shared memory' (p. 43). 
Such a treatment of situated action leaves the architecture of Cognitive 
Science in place. Symbols, internal representations and plans can still be 
considered to determine actions, just they have to be accounted for `in 
context', as flexible and dynamic. This account misses the fundamental 
respecification that Suchman suggests. Her reconceptualisation of plans 
draws on earlier ethnomethodological considerations concerning the 
nature of social action. These arguments, themselves, can be seen to have 
precursors in earlier philosophical debates concerning the nature of 
cognition and the attribution of conduct to mental processes. In order to 
see how Suchman's analysis suggest a more fundamental reconsideration 
of Cognitive Science, and HCI, a brief discussion of the respecifications of 
cognitive and mental conduct, drawn from an ethnomethodological 
orientation, is required. 
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2.6.2 An Ethnomethodological Orientation 
In Garfinkel's original formulation the term ethnomethodology does not 
specify a sociological method or approach, but rather a study of a 
particular range of phenomena: those procedures and methods which 
members of a society utilise in order to make sense of, and produce orderly 
social actions (Garfinkel, 1974). 29 So, 
In exactly the ways that a setting is organized, it consists, of members' 
methods for making evident that settings' ways as clear, coherent, 
planful, consistent, chosen, knowable, uniform, reproducible connections - 
i. e., rational connections. In exactly the ways that persons are members 
to organized affairs, they are engaged in serious and practical work of 
detecting, demonstrating, persuading through displays in the ordinary 
occasions of their interactions the appearances of consistent, coherent, 
clear, chosen, planful arrangements. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 34), italics in the original. 
From the original programme of study and empirical exercises, a wide 
range of studies of `naturally organized ordinary activities' have emerged. 
These include such apparently diverse interests as: 
" analyses of talk-in-interaction, and the practices through which 
turns at talk are produced and rendered intelligible in conversation 
(Sacks, 1992; Sacks, et al., 1974); 
" an analysis of the tacit practices by which the work of proving 
mathematical formulae are produced and recognised by professional 
mathematicians (Livingston, 1986); 
" an account of the `code', or rules of conduct, and its uses for 
members of a half-way house for narcotics offenders (Wieder, 1974); 
" an account of the practices through which coroners assess and 
categorise potential cases of suicide (Atkinson, 1978); 
9a study of the organisation of conduct in learning and producing 
jazz improvisations on a piano (Sudnow, 1978). 
29 Originally, the term was intended to parallel other related studies emerging at 
the time, such as ethnobotany and ethnomedicine where members own practices 
of botany and medicine were considered. Thus, the phenomena of interest to 
ethnomethodology is members' own methods, their mundane knowledge and 
common-sense reasoning procedures (Garfinkel, 1974), that is 
... not a method of understanding, 
but immensely various methods 
of concerted actions and methods of common understanding are 
the professional sociologist's proper and hitherto unstudied and 
critical phenomena. (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 31) 
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Throughout these and many other studies a range of concerns emerge. 
These reemphasise Garfinkel's original concerns with the methods by 
which members make sense of, and produce recognisable, organisational 
activities, and include: 
" that rational and methodological properties of action are treated as 
contingent accomplishments of socially organised practices (cf. 
Garfinkel, 1967, p. 33); 
" that members make observable the rational character of their 
actions (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, p. 8); 
" that in order to accomplish practical activities in a setting members 
take for granted what a member must "know" (cf. Garfinkel, 1967, 
p. 8); 
Thus, ethnomethodological analyses are studies of rational action. 
However, the conception of rational action, shared agreement, `what is 
known in common' and the like, is quite distinctive. These are social 
methods and accomplishments of a particular kind. They rest on the 
everyday practices and common-sense reasoning of participants. 
Moreover, the intelligibility of social actions are revealed and displayed to 
others in and through their production. 30 
These foundations have led to a reconsideration of critical concepts 
within sociology, including the use of formal structures (Garfinkel and 
Sacks, 1970), measurement (Lynch, 1992), culture (Lee, 1992) and context 
(Schegloff, 1992a; Schegloff, 1992b) as well as more general concerns in 
the social sciences (Button, 1991b). Amongst these reconsiderations and 
re specifications has been a reexamination of cognition, the mind and 
mental processes -a particular interest in the various books and articles 
of Jeff Coulter (1979; 1989; 1990; 1992). 
30 So, for example 
Shared agreement refers to various social methods for 
accomplishing the members' recognition that something was said- 
according-to-a-rule and not the demonstrable matching of 
substantive matters. The appropriate image is therefore an 
operation rather than a common intersection of overlapping sets. 
(Garfinkel, 1967, p. 30). 
Note, that in `Studies in Ethnomethodology' and earlier writings Garfinkel 
draws explicitly from Schutz' theoretical work (e. g. Schutz, 1962) with regard to 
`taken for granted' understandings, common-sense knowledge and `seen but 
unnoticed' background expectancies (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 53-7, Heritage, 1984b). 
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In keeping with the ethnomethodological orientation, Coulter explores 
the occasions of members' uses of cognitive phenomena, treating these as 
topics of study. For this analysis he draws on ordinary language 
philosophy (Austin, 1962), and what might be termed logico-grammatical 
resources of the kind developed by Ryle (1949) and the later Wittgenstein 
(e. g. Wittgenstein, 1953; 1958). Hence, he examines such phenomena as 
`understanding', `remembering' and `intelligence' and looks at how these 
`mental predicates' can be combined and used in practice. Shifting the 
domain of interest in this way involves a consideration of the nature of the 
uses of, for example, `understanding'. It is not a verb used to account for 
some inferential process, but an achievement (cf. Ryle, 1949). 
Understanding is a part of knowing how. The knowledge that is required 
for understanding intelligent performances of a specific kind is some 
degree of competence in performances of that kind. 
(Ryle, 1949 p. 53), italics in the original. 
Although producing an intelligent performance is distinct from 
recognising it, the two rely on similar competencies. Similarly, 
remembering is not an inferential process but a (defeasible) achievement. 
It makes no sense, for example, to recall or recollect things that have not 
been witnessed, nor is it legitimate to `recall unsuccessfully' or `incorrectly' 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 260-3). Such mental predicates relate to competencies and 
achievements, not internal, inferential processes operating on `sources' of 
knowledge. To assign them to the non-spatial workings of a mind and 
apply a framework developed in relation to a physical process is a 
`category-mistake' (p. 20). This is not because there are no such things as 
mental processes, but because mental processes are not the same kind of 
thing as physical processes. It is inappropriate to import conceptions, 
such as mechanical causation from the latter domain into the former: 
Minds are things, but different sorts of things from bodies; mental 
processes are causes and effects but different sorts of causes and effects 
from bodily movements. 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 20( 
The consideration of these activities as accomplishments, coupled with 
a concern for the contexts-of-use of cognitive phenomena suggests an 
alternative empirical programme for the study of knowledge and cognition, 
one which explores how memories, forgettings, agreements and 
understandings are achieved as social actions. Indeed, through the 
analysis of naturally occurring interactions and activities, researchers 
have begun to explore, for example, how agreements are accomplished in 
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conversation (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987), how forgetfulness can both 
be displayed for participants and a resource within interaction (Goodwin, 
1987), and some practices through which understandings and informings 
can be displayed (Heritage, 1984a). 
Suchman's analysis of plans can be considered in the light of these 
analytic developments. In her respecification of planned action, Suchman 
is seeking to turn the analytic attention onto how plans are accomplished 
in situ within interactions. By focusing on plans as achievements, these 
are being considered as `knowledge that' rather than `knowledge how' (cf. 
Ryle, 1949). Interpreting them in terms of the results of internal 
processing, no matter when this processing occurs, how dynamic and 
flexible it is and what external factors contributed it, maintains the 
conception of mental processing in terms of physical processing, in terms 
of physical causes, effects, states and processes (cf. Ryle, 1949, p. 20). 
Thus, it is not the domain of enquiry of Cognitive Science which is of 
concern. Expanding the field to account for social processes, no matter 
how benevolently, will not reconcile the differences between it and other 
frameworks, such as those drawn from an ethnomethodological 
orientation. Nor will just reconceiving cognition. Instead, the 
reconceptualisation that is required by recent work in philosophy and the 
social sciences involves a rethinking of the entire conceptual framework 
which is utilised to address the practices surrounding cognitive and 
mental processes and the uses of knowledge. 
2.7 DISCUSSION 
It is, at first, unclear what the direct relevance of such a respecification of 
mental processes in general, or planning in particular, would have for 
developers of new technology. The re specification, though addressing 
concerns which are fundamental to the underpinnings of much of the work 
undertaken within HCI, would appear to have little consequence for the 
design or deployment of technologies. However, the relevance may be not 
so much in terms of the domain of the study, but more on the orientation 
adopted for analysing practical, social actions. The potential relationships 
between the analytic orientation and the development of computer 
systems will be considered in more detail later in the thesis. In the 
discussion here, what will be considered will be the potential for 
developments in the analysis of the use of artefacts, in particular, of 
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computer systems. The relationship between these developments and the 
more engineering concerns, such as requirements analysis, and the design 
and deployment of new forms of computational support for practical 
activities will be considered in more detail in chapter 7. 
An ethnomethodological orientation could provide a novel perspective 
with which to consider artefact-centred activities, particularly the use of 
computers. The concerns outlined above, at least, suggest a shift towards 
naturalistic studies. So, a programme of studies could be initiated which 
explore the situated use of computer systems. Such a study would explore 
the resources through which practical activities are achieved through the 
use of technologies and artefacts, and how these utilised common-sense 
knowledge, practical reasoning and tacit practices. Thus, an 
ethnomethodological orientation does not just suggest a reconsideration of 
an existing framework for analyses of human behaviour, but a novel 
programme of research activities. In the last few years such a body of 
work has emerged that has begun to explore the in situ accomplishment of 
activities in various `tool-saturated' settings (Goodwin, 1993). Because of 
the interest in the achievements of social actions in interaction, it is 
perhaps not surprising that these studies have explored, in various ways, 
how collaborative activities are accomplished in natural settings, drawing 
from an ethnomethodological orientation and informed by studies in 
conversation analysis and visual conduct (e. g. Goodwin, 1981; Heath, 
1986). 
So, for example Goodwin and Goodwin have explored activities in an 
airport control room: the ways talk, such as instructions, are produced and 
made sense of within viewings of the local domain including various 
technologies such as screens, boards and Close Circuit Television monitors 
(Goodwin, 1992b; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Goodwin, 1996). Whalen 
(1995b) has analysed the interrelationship between talk and the use of a 
system for computer aided dispatch, revealing the practices through which 
the production of particular commands are organised with respect to the 
interaction between caller and dispatcher, and vice versa. These studies, 
with others by Heath, Luff and Greatbatch (Greatbatch, et al., 1993; 
Heath and Luff, 1992a; Luff, et al., 1994), suggest the foundations for an 
interactional analysis of the use of artefacts. 
This work on the use of artefacts in interaction has begun to outline 
some of the practices which appear to be relevant to the accomplishment of 
technological work. So, for example, studies have revealed the various 
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forms of participation individuals have with each other and in relation to 
the technology (Goodwin, 1992b; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Heath and 
Luff, 1992a). Hence, individuals may not just achieve tasks in focused 
collaboration with others, but may rely on monitoring the conduct of 
others, particularly their activities in relation to the uses of some 
technology. Many activities also appear to be coordinated with the 
activities of another, for example, a turn at talk commencing on a 
boundary after a sequence of typing (Greatbatch, et al., 1991), or the 
typing on a computer interrelated with the talk in a phone call (Whalen, 
1995b). These practices are tacit, `seen but unnoticed' by the participants. 
In this preliminary work, resources from conversation analysis have 
been utilised to begin to map out fragments of data, suggest some general 
issues for study and to explore how participants produce and render 
intelligible not only turns at talk, but also non-vocal activities. Studies of 
conversation analysis have revealed some of the systematic practices and 
methods by which participants in a turn of talk both display an 
understanding of another's prior turn and though its production display a 
sensitivity to potential recipients. Thus, turns of talk are sequential, both 
shaped by and shaping the emerging context (Heritage, 1984b). 
Researchers of naturally occurring activities have begun to explore the 
possibility of providing sequential analyses of conduct with respect to 
technologies and artefacts. Needless to say, these initiatives are 
preliminary and it remains unclear whether and how transformations can 
be made to provide a sequential analysis. Hence, the early work has 
outlined some broad early glosses of practices, such as monitoring, 
coordination and peripheral participation. These issues will be considered 
in more detail in chapter 6. 
Although this work has been undertaken in technology-rich settings, 
for example control rooms and service centres, it is perhaps strange that 
the details of the uses of the technology have not been primary to the 
analysis. This is partly due to the materials available for analysis. In 
collecting data, particularly video data, it is difficult to focus both on the 
interactions between participants and the detailed activities with the 
technology and other artefacts. Hence, the analyses have tended to focus 
on the public displays, the generally available screens and artefacts that 
are available (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Heath and Luff, 1992a), and 
the interrelationships between such activities as turns at talk and the 
hands movement across the keyboard (Greatbatch, et al., 1993). These 
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analyses centre on what is publicly available to the participants in a co- 
present environment, resources that are visible or audible and can be both 
utilised by the `computer user' and others in the local setting. In outlining 
such practices, the flexibility, contingency and variability of collaborative 
activities has been emphasised. In doing this, researchers in the field of 
CSCW, have drawn implications for the general requirements for 
collaborative technologies (Benford, et al., 1996; Hudson and Smith, 1996; 
Kristoffersen and Rodden, 1995). However, these preliminary studies of 
the production of technology-centred activities have also laid out analytic 
concerns and issues that need further exploration. To take just three: 
" monitoring, or mutual monitoring, itself appears to be a gloss for a 
range of interrelated activities including: maintaining an awareness 
of the `goings on' in a domain; general overlooking or overseeing 
another's activities, and monitoring for the boundaries or junctures 
in another's activities (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Heath and 
Luff, 1992a); 
" similarly, peripheral participation can cover activities out of the line 
of direct regard by another, non-focused collaborative activities, and 
even, by other authors, apprenticeship and learning prior to more 
full immersion into a professional setting (Brown and Duguid, 1994; 
Lave and Wenger, 1991); 
" coordination accounts for the tying together of diverse activities, 
such as typing or writing, to talk but it is unclear to what extent 
these non vocal activities can be said to display an understanding or 
render intelligible a prior activity (Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath, 
et al., 1993). 
These early observations are no doubt related: the coordination of an 
utterance, so that it is tied to a completion of a typing sequence, requires 
(often peripheral) monitoring of another's activities. The very conception 
of an activity as peripheral or as monitoring suggests some ambivalence to 
its nature which may not be available for further analysis. However, 
because of these concerns, what may be noticed about these early studies 
of complex domains is that the detailed nature of the activity in relation to 
the artefact, particularly the computer system, fades from view. Although 
this may be private, unseen or only partially available, the computer 
systems may be providing resources which shape the ongoing activities. 
In an example given by Whalen (1995b), the organisation of the items 
on a screen and the orderings through which operations can be carried out 
74 
on a system can be seen to shape, to some extent, the talk on the phone of 
a dispatcher of emergency services. The activities on the system, 
unavailable to the caller at the other end of the line, appear to be relevant 
to the public and social accomplishment of the activity. 
Paying attention to the details of computer use, the displays available 
to participants and the activities carried out using them is a concern of 
this thesis. This is explored not only in cases, like Whalen's, where the 
activity is distributed between different locales (chapter 5), but also in co- 
present settings (chapters 4 and 6). In making sense of these activities, 
participants rely on common-sense reasoning and practical resources in 
order to accomplish activities on the system. 31 
Such a focus brings attention back to the domain commonly of concern 
to HCI. Where related to the development of computer systems, 
preliminary studies of the accomplishments of activities in complex 
domains have been principally considered in relation to collaborative 
systems. By exploring the details of activities achieved on and through 
computer systems, it appears that the concerns of HCI and CSCW may not 
be quite so distinct. The use of a computer system is shaped by social 
practices, and social actions and interactions are shaped by the resources 
available on the technologies. The reformulation of the concerns of HCI, 
led in particular by Suchman's work, may not mean that researchers 
would be better directed to addressing themselves to the field of CSCW. 
This may, indeed, avoid some of the critical issues with respect to both the 
analysis of artefact-centred activities and the design of new technologies. 
Instead, what is required is an orientation that can underpin both 
substantive domains, and reveal the practices and methods through which 
individuals, with others and through the resources they have around 
them, `can produce stable accountable practical activities i. e. social 
structures of everyday activities' (Garfinkel, 1967, p. 185). 
2.8 SUMMARY 
Researchers in HCI have been concerned with the uses of artefacts, 
particularly computer systems. By looking at the ways particular objects 
are used it may be possible to replace them with computational 
alternatives or to suggest reasons why current systems are not being used 
31 An initial examination of these skills and practices is considered in chapters 3 
and 4. 
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effectively. Similarly, detailed analyses of the uses of computer systems 
should be able to provide resources for improving particular designs or, 
more generally, guidelines for the development of systems. To aid them 
with this programme, they have turned to Cognitive Science for methods, 
models and a conceptual apparatus with which to consider computer use. 
This chapter has explored the methodological foundations offered by 
Cognitive Science, not only with regard to its computational foundations, 
but also in terms of the ways these have been instantiated within models 
of HCI. Although models such as GOMS do provide a way for analysts to 
attend to the details of computer use, they have a limited domain of 
interest. It is also unclear to what extent they, in fact, do provide a 
cognitive model of the activity under investigation. This chapter has 
noted not only the rather limited extent to which cognitive activities figure 
in the models, but also the homogenous ways in which mental processing 
is treated, merely as gaps and pauses between other physical activities, 
where mental activities take place. Moreover, when some of the original 
objectives of the information processing programme are considered, 
particularly with regard to providing explanatory theories of cognition, it 
becomes unclear to what extent cognitive models within HCI satisfy these. 
Interestingly, a model of cognitive processing that explicitly attends to 
providing an explanatory and computational account of cognition, 
Distributed Cognition, also seeks to extend the domain of the study and 
transform its underlying conception of cognition. Though still a 
provisional framework, it appears problematic to maintain an individual 
conception of cognition and a computational model of symbol processing, 
whilst also seeking to account for the contingencies of social actions and 
interactions. From one perspective, the perseverance with individual 
cognition constrains the framework, from another it appears to be 
unnecessary. 
A quite distinctive approach to considering the concepts under scrutiny 
- cognition, mental processing and the mind - is as topics for analysis, 
through participants' own linguistic and social practices. Such an 
orientation in philosophy, linguistic philosophy and the social sciences 
suggests that the perspective taken by Cognitive Science fundamentally 
misconstrues its principal domain of concern. Mental activities are not 
processes occurring in some inner domain but social accomplishments. By 
assigning these to the individual is to mistakenly categorise these in the 
same order as physical activities and processes. 
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From the ethnomethodological orientation it has not only been possible 
to draw out critiques of cognition and allied conceptions relevant to 
Cognitive Science, but also to reconsider its domain of study - human 
behaviour. Hence, it may be that such an orientation may provide a 
framework for analysing how activities are accomplished on, with and 
through new technologies. Some such studies have been undertaken in a 
range of domains. What these have in common is a concern for the in situ 
accomplishment of activities and the resources participants utilise, 
through their interactions, to make sense of the conduct of others in 
relation to the technology. 
At present, these studies are at an early stage. However, their 
distinctive orientation raises a set of issues with regard to various ways in 
which computer systems, and other artefacts, can be utilised. The 
resources through which such activities are accomplished remain unclear, 
but do suggest a range of ways in which computers can be considered to be 
`used' or `interacted with'. As Suchman notes, the formulation `human- 
computer interaction' may be inappropriate for such studies. 
Nevertheless, computer systems, like documents and other artefacts, do 
provide resources through which participants accomplish activities and 
make sense of the conduct of others. In the remainder of the thesis, a 
range of settings with different configurations of technologies are 
examined. The resources, the common-sense reasoning, the practical 
knowledge and the tacit practices, that individuals utilise in these settings 
are the principal focus of these studies. By revealing how technology- 
centred activities are achieved through the interactions of participants, 
and how they inform those interactions, potential resources for the 
development process might be provided. At the conclusion of this thesis, 
the relationship between this analytic framework and the design process 
is considered. Such an approach suggests the foundations for an 
alternative way of conceiving and implementing `user centred design'. 
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Chapter 3 
The Practicalities of 
Menu Use: 
improvisation in screen-based 
activity 
I began to see and then find use for further work in the observation that 
note choices could be made anywhere, that there was no need to lunge, 
that usable notes for any chord lay just at hand, that there was no need to 
find a path, image one up ahead to get ready in advance for a blurting 
out. Indeed, to conceive particular terrain places up ahead seriously 
undermined the singing that I sought to sustain. Good notes were 
everywhere at hand, right beneath the fingers. 
(Sudnow, 1978, p. 94) 
I began to find, in the undulating nature of my entrance and pacingly 
tuned interdigitations, that I could undertake new sorts of shaped and 
rated courses with well-at-hand route segments. 
(Sudnow, 1978, p. 130) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The critiques of work within HCI that derive from psychology and, more 
particularly, Cognitive Science have led researchers in the field to consider 
different approaches to the study of computer use. These include not only 
developments to the existing frameworks, but also the use of resources 
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from different disciplines. The work of Suchman, outlined in the last 
chapter, has been critical to these; suggesting other features of computer 
use to focus on, a different, contingent conception of artefact use and 
alternative studies, principally from social science, to draw upon. In this 
chapter, a preliminary investigation of human-computer interaction is 
undertaken which draws on recent work in the social sciences. 
Suchman (1987) utilises resources from ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis in her analysis of `human-machine communication'. 
Section 3.2 briefly reviews work within HCI that has been influenced by 
Suchman's consideration of the `situated actions' surrounding the use of 
computational artefacts. Some of this work applies the resources, 
particularly of conversation analysis, more directly. This application of 
the `findings' of conversation analysis has recently been subject to 
criticism, with attention being focused on the status of the objects revealed 
in talk and their appropriateness to the analysis to activities in human- 
computer interaction (e. g. Button, 1990; Button and Sharrock, 1995). The 
focus of this chapter is to explore screen-based activities without the 
assumption that the use of objects on the screen has any similarities to 
activities in talk. The domain of this analysis is one familiar to 
researchers in HCI, the use of menus. 
The key elements of this study within the field are outlined in Section 
3.3. Most analyses of menu use have been highly constrained and have 
been accomplished through an experimental paradigm, however, recently 
there have been some exceptions. By adopting a more naturalistic 
approach, the findings from these appear to be surprising and have led to 
a rethinking of the underlying models concerning computer use. 
The materials utilised for the analysis in this chapter are similarly 
naturalistic, being video-recordings of a simple exercise in using a popular 
computer application, PowerPoint. In Section 3.4 the details of this 
exercise are given with some background concerning the PowerPoint 
application. The instances of menu activity are analysed in some detail. 
In order to support the analysis a transcription system for screen-based 
activity has been developed. The critical features of this system are also 
described in Section 3.4. 
As menu use, in particular, and screen-based activity, in general, has 
been a topic of considerable interest within HCI, a terminology has 
emerged related to these activities which draws on framework from 
Cognitive Science. Hence, uses of menus are often considered as searches 
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for particular items or general browses, which in turn are conceived in 
terms of the user's goals, plans and knowledge, that is the `knowledge that' 
a user possesses (cf. Ryle, 1949). In order to reconsider this conception, a 
different strategy is utilised for this investigation. A provisional typology 
of menu uses is outlined in Section 3,5. This typology is not intended as a 
classification of user behaviour, but rather as an analytic device for 
revealing some of the resources that individuals utilise in order to carry 
out activities on a computer system. 
Menu activities of increasing length and complexity are considered in 
terms of eight basic temporal and sequential types. By examining cases of 
these types some of the resources individuals utilise when using the 
menus are revealed. In particular, the menus offer the user resources for 
a continually changing set of possible course of actions. These can provide 
valuable means for accomplishing screen-based activities, and also can 
allow a user to improvise and digress. The reading and use of the menus 
can both shape an ongoing course of activity and be shaped by it. To 
perform activities on the menus, relies on being able to make sense of the 
possibilities being presented in terms of a shifting set of resources and an 
ongoing activity that can be transformed. This relies on practical 
reasoning and common-sense knowledge, that is `knowledge how' (cf. Ryle, 
1949). 
Section 3.6 briefly discusses the relevance of such a study for other 
approaches towards human-computer interaction. This discussion will 
draw particularly on work by Young and his colleagues (1990) which aims 
to categorise the knowledge users require to operate a system. It appears 
that though these models do seek to explore a set of wide-ranging 
concerns, this would have to be by formulating the user's knowledge and 
competencies as propositional knowledge. The study undertaken in this 
chapter seeks to reveal some of practices through which screen-based 
activities are accomplished. The focus of the study, on a particular 
circumscribed activity, makes it problematic to utilise analytic resources 
drawn from conversation analysis. The status of the analysis is discussed 
in the light of these concerns. Nevertheless, through the examination of 
the details of naturalistic screen-based activities the analysis suggests 
how even such a simple activity as the use of menus may be practically, 
skilfully and contingently managed and organised. 
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3.2 BACKGROUND 
The critiques of Suchman (1987), and others (Lave, 1988; Winograd and 
Flores, 1986) have generated a range of responses from researchers within 
HCI, ranging from those that reject entirely the critique (e. g. Vera and 
Simon, 1993a) to those who have sought to transform the study to adopt 
`social concerns' (e. g. Brown and Duguid, 1994). In less extreme 
responses, there are have been suggestions to either extend cognitive 
models in HCI or to utilise approaches drawn from the social sciences to 
analyse human-computer interaction. In the former case, researchers like 
Young et al. (1990) have sought to outline a range of different classes of 
knowledge utilised when carrying out activities on a computer system. In 
the latter case, attention has focused, in particular, on drawing upon the 
resources utilised by Suchman, namely ethnomethodology and 
conversation analysis. 
For Young et al. the disadvantages of models, such as GOMS, are due to 
their not taking account of the information available in the `external 
situation' and how it combines with the user's internal knowledge (Young, 
et al., 1990, p. 115). This requires a better understanding of `interactivity' 
within HCI. Thus, they suggest, a model is needed which outlines how 
internal knowledge of different kinds `interacts' with external information 
provided on the device. This proposal is considered through the analysis 
of particular instances of menu use in Section 3.5. 
The work of practitioners who have sought to utilise conversation 
analysis within HCI have a similar set of concerns with the interaction 
between a user and a system. So, for example, Norman and Thomas 
(1990) use `findings' from conversation analysis, such as rules for turn- 
taking and the repair of troubles, as a resource for proposing design 
guidelines, Bowers and Churcher (1989) analyse electronic mail in terms 
of `turn-taking' and Frohlich and Luff (1990) design an interface to an 
expert system which has system and user `turns', and sequences for the 
`repair' of trouble, changing `topic', `openings' and `closings'. In these early 
studies a direct application of findings from studies of social interaction 
has been undertaken, with organisations of talk between conversational 
interactants being used as resources for suggesting an organisation of the 
contributions between a user and a computer. 1 
1 There are a range of other studies of human-computer interaction also deriving 
from conversation analysis which include Cawsey, (1990); McTear, (1985); Payne, 
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This general approach has not been confined to those principally 
concerned with the design of interactive systems. For example, Thomas 
(1990) compares an analysis of the problems of individual users of a 
computer system with an analysis of troubles in a conversation. Similarly, 
Payne (1991) draws from an analysis of turn-taking for resources for 
analysing the contributions to a human-computer interaction (Payne, 
1991). 2 
Payne takes an approach to HCI that draws on a model of conversation 
proposed by Clark and Schaefer (1989). In particular, Clark and Schaefer 
embed in their model the notion that a single turn can be doubly 
contextual (see Heritage, 1984b). That is, a turn is both context-shaped, 
displaying an interpretation of preceding turns, and context-renewing, 
contributing to the context in which the next turn will be understood. 
Thus, Clark and Schaefer propose that contributions to a discourse have 
an acceptance phrase and a presentation phrase, that is, a single 
utterance can be the acceptance phrase to the prior contribution and the 
presentation phrase of the next. These contributions can then be 
represented on a `contribution tree'. Payne proposes similar `interaction 
trees' for HCI. Again, a single action by a user or the device can be both 
an acceptance and a presentation. 
Although from less direct sources than Thomas and others, Payne 
adopts a model of conversation for the analysis of HCI. Although, for 
Payne, a contribution may have a double duty, he still adopts essentially a 
turn-taking model for human-computer interaction. Such an approach is 
attractive. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the potential 
1991). Of principal interest for these researchers has been the work on the social 
organisation of turn-taking and repair in conversation, particularly that 
formulation of the analysis given in a few specific works by Sacks and his 
colleagues (i. e. Sacks, et al., 1974; Schegloff, et al., 1977). 
A similar set of resources have been considered by researchers looking at 
different aspects of computer use, including Computer-Mediated Communication 
(McCarthy, et al., 1990) and speech understanding and generating systems 
(Fraser and Wooffitt, 1990; Gilbert, et al., 1990). 
2 Payne does not directly cite work from conversation analysis, but utilises work by 
Herb Clark and his colleagues on language use and discourse (Clark and 
Schaefer, 1989). Clark draws extensively from conversation analysis including 
adjacency pairs (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) and side sequences (Jefferson, 1972), 
as well as the organisation of turn-taking (Sacks, et al., 1974). Further resources 
from conversation analysis are outlined in his later, more extensive, work (Clark, 
1996a). 
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similarities between human interaction and that with a computer has 
been a common resource for those in HCI seeking to conceptualise the 
activity of computer use, as well as for designing novel systems. It would, 
therefore, appear to be useful to draw from detailed studies of social 
interaction for rules, procedures and methods to analyse human-computer 
interaction and for the design of interfaces. However, such a direct 
utilisation of the work of conversation analysts has been called into 
question. 
Button (1990), in remarks echoed by Sharrock and Anderson (1991), is 
sceptical of the value of using `rules', `sequences' and `routines' revealed by 
conversation analysts for computational models. He suggests that the 
differences between both the nature of human interaction and that of 
human-computer interaction, and the `rules' posited by conversation 
analysts and the rules required for computer systems make it unlikely 
that the `findings' of conversation analysis can be usefully applied to the 
design of systems. In particular, he draws attention to the status of a rule 
in conversation analysis as a resource utilised by participants; a resource 
whose application is contingent to the moment-to-moment circumstances. 
Such rules are not deterministic, and are not followed by participants, but 
are oriented to. Their application reflects a moral order. Even when the 
organisation appears to be subverted or diverted from, there still is 
displayed in the contributions of the participants an orientation to the 
`rules'. 3 The rules a system is designed to follow are of a different nature; 
their design cannot take account of the participants' practical purposes, 
their ongoing concerns for undertaking a social interaction. 
So, the contributions for system and user suggested by Payne, are of a 
different kind to the contributions to a conversation. In conversation, the 
order of a conversation is revealed through the participants' production of 
talk: by displaying in a turn of talk an understanding of a prior utterance 
and by being designed from moment-to-moment with respect to a recipient 
(Sacks, et al., 1974). Thus, a turn of talk, whilst it is being uttered, can be 
transformed in the light of a contribution by a co-participant. The 
production of a turn of talk reveals members' practices, methods, for 
making sense of, and displaying an understanding of, the activities of 
another. Contributions to and by a computer are not of this kind. Not 
least because the nature of the resources are asymmetrical. When 
3 `Rules are oriented to features of action, they are contextual, situated practices of 
use' (Button, 1990, p. 84). 
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exploring human-computer interaction, it is no longer possible to analyse 
an `interaction' in terms of participants using the same resources to 
produce talk and display understanding of that talk. Nor is it possible to 
rely on a co-participant's turn to display an understanding of a prior. 
Therefore, rules, sequences, and routines revealed by such an analysis of 
conversation are no longer likely to be appropriate for such a different 
kind of activity. Hence, considering human-computer interaction as turns 
may be useful only as a metaphor with which to consider the activity, 
rather than an analytic device, or a design tool. An `interaction unit', 
consisting of an acceptance and a presentation, is a category constructed 
by the analyst, not one to which users nor, indeed devices, `orient'. 
Rather than directly applying findings and conceptions from 
conversation analysis, there may be other ways of following the 
programme suggested by Suchman. Although it may not always be 
possible to utilise as a resource the interactions of users whilst using a 
system, there may be other naturally-occurring materials that may 
provide resources for an analysis. In the following chapters, video- 
recordings taken from different work settings provide for the detailed 
analysis of the interactions and collaborative activities in which computer 
use is embedded. The analysis presented in this chapter takes a different 
approach. 
Rather than examining human-computer interaction in terms of 
system and user turns, initiation of repair, changes to topic and opening 
and closing sequences, it draws on conversation analysis, 
ethnomethodology and cognate developments in the social sciences to 
outline a methodological framework for analysing some of the resources 
participants utilise in order to accomplish screen-based activities on a 
computer system. This orientation is further explicated in later chapters, 
but by taking a domain familiar within the field of HCI, it is hoped that 
the distinctive nature of the approach can be sketched out. The particular 
focus for this analysis is on the use of menus. As this is an activity given 
some considerable attention in HCI, a brief review of the way that this 
activity is conceived in the field may be useful. 
3.3 ANALYSES OF MENU USE 
When confronted with the problem of designing interfaces that give a user 
a wide range of disparate options, HCI practitioners have commonly 
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turned to the `menu' as an orderly and convenient way of presenting these 
options. It is not surprising that a considerable amount of research has 
been carried out on the usability of various designs for menu systems. 
Most of this research has tested competing options by designing 
experiments where users select items from different configurations and 
then measure their speed and accuracy at these tasks. The menu designs 
tested in this way have ranged from the mundane to the exotic. For 
example, Landauer and Nachbar (1985) looked at response times of users 
when items are alphabetically or numerically ordered, and when the 
number of menus and the number of items on each menu are varied. 
Teitelbaum and Granda (1983) have examined the effect on the time users 
take to select items from a menu when information associated with the 
menu (e. g. the title and guidance) is displayed in a constant location and 
when it is varied from screen to screen. Various alternative mechanisms 
have been explored for manipulating menus, including those that are 
pulled down, those that have to be held down and those that stay down 
when selected (Macleod and Tilson, 1990). The use of colour for menus 
has also been examined, McDonald et al. (1988) examining the speed and 
accuracy of users of different layouts. Circular menus have been tested 
(Callahan, et al., 1988) and this has led to other research into menus that 
scroll, shift and rotate (Mills and Prime, 1990). Although after some of 
these experiments, users are asked for their preferences (e. g. Macleod and 
Tilson, 1990; Mills and Prime, 1990), these judgements are ascertained by 
structured questioning of the users when they have only performed the 
trials into accuracy and speed. Despite all this work, there has been very 
little research into the way menus are used as part of the general activity 
performed on a computer system. 4 
One exception is the study by Mayes et al. (1988), one part of which 
was an experiment where users were asked to carry out the whole process 
of creating a document. This included turning the machine on, formatting 
and printing it. At various points in the experiment the users were asked 
to anticipate what would appear on the screen including the contents of 
menus. Despite having a range of experience with the actual application, 
all the users performed worse than expected. Even `frequent users' (ones 
who used the application more than twice a week and most using it once a 
An alternative approach has been to explore the menu metaphor more generally, 
and investigate what else computer menus could be designed to support (Norman 
and Chim, 1989). 
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day) had difficulty recalling about 50% of the `gross details', such as the 
names of menus and the existence of menus and menu items. A follow-up 
study by Mayes et al. showed users had few problems performing a task 
that involved using the menus and menu items that they had had 
difficulty recalling. There appears to be a paradox, users are skilled at 
using an interface of which they can recall few details. 
Mayes et al. suggest an explanation for this that maintains a cognitive 
account of the users' behaviour. The users still have knowledge of the 
system, but this is somehow inaccessible, or `forgotten' (p. 284). Thus, 
there are different kinds of knowledge of the system that users can 
possess. They can have 'lexical' knowledge of the names of particular 
functions, for example, but they can also have 'semantic' knowledge that 
certain functions exist. In a move common in Cognitive Science, expertise 
is associated with a transformation of an explicit form of knowledge into a 
`compiled' or `internalised' version. 
The possibility that users may have knowledge of different kinds has 
led others to propose other categories and classes which may also be 
relevant. So, Young et al. (1990) have proposed a preliminary analysis of 
eight different classes of knowledge which appear to be relevant to the 
user of an interactive computer system). 
By proposing different kinds of knowledge, Mayes, Young and their 
colleagues are seeking to extend cognitive models of computer use. These 
include knowledge of the affordances of screen objects and general 
everyday semantics considered in terms of knowledge about the system or 
of common words. The models are still concerned about laying out what 
knowledge users have and how this `leads them to exhibit their individual 
behaviours' (Young, et al., 1990, p. 117). 
It may therefore be useful to explore the kinds of behaviours which are 
being sought to be modelled and the extent to which these can be 
considered in terms of the resources that individuals utilise when 
performing activities on a computer system. In line with the suggestions 
of Mayes et al. and Young et al. it would be useful to explore a more open 
activity, rather than the restricted tasks of conventional experiments in 
HCI. It would also appear to be useful to still provide some focus to the 
investigation, hence, an analysis of the naturalistic uses of menus. 
The approach taken in the next two sections is to lay out the kinds of 
activities that models such as those of Young and his colleagues are 
seeking to account for. Rather than try and seek to assign various classes 
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of knowledge to behaviours, instances of menu use are examined. The 
nature of these activities and the resources that individuals appear to 
utilise in these cases are considered. To examine instances in detail, a 
transcription system has been developed that provides a way of revealing 
aspects of the users' screen-based activities, and in order to provide a 
framework for the observations that are made, instances of menu use are 
considered in terms of a provisional taxonomy. The resources for this 
analysis are drawn from a `naturalistic experiment' where individuals 
were asked to carry out a simple task on a computer system. 
3.4 AN INITIAL EXERCISE FOR CONSIDERING HUMAN-COMPUTER 
INTERACTION 
To gather some appropriate materials relating to human-computer 
interaction, a straightforward exercise was undertaken where people were 
recorded using an Apple Macintoshs to prepare overhead projector slides. 6 
Eight users with variable experience with the Macintosh and the 
application, PowerPoint7, were given some headings and asked to prepare 
three slides about each of those headings. Having been told the name of 
the application that they should use, they were left alone to carry out the 
exercise. They were interrupted after thirty minutes if they had not 
finished by then. 8 The exercise was recorded using two cameras and a 
microphone. One camera recorded the user, the screen, the keyboard and 
the mouse and the other focused only on the screen. The exercise was 
fairly open-ended and `naturalistic'. Apart from a general specification of 
5A trademark of Apple Computer Inc. 
6 Using the Macintosh provides materials which are potentially useful when 
considering the proposals by Mayes et al (1988) and Young et al. (1990). The 
design of the Macintosh interface provides for easy movement between different 
menus. It is also the system that Mayes et al. used in their experiment and in 
terms of which Young et al. consider their model. Moreover the choice of system 
and application also has the possibility of raising a range of broader issues within 
HCI, concerning the direct manipulation of text and graphics, the use of screen- 
displayed tools and the use of a mouse and a cursor. 
7A trademark of the Microsoft Corporation. Details of PowerPoint can be found in 
the user manual (Microsoft Corporation, 1987). The version used was 2.01. 
8 Given that the application is to produce slides, none of the users could be called 
`frequent' users of PowerPoint, in the terms of Mayes et al., that is, using the 
package more than twice a week. However, all the users had some experience of 
using a Macintosh and some had used the PowerPoint application before. 
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the activity, users were not given a set of tasks to perform, nor did users 
have to perform any extraneous activities, such as producing a verbal 
protocol or answering questions about what they were doing. However, 
the audio recordings did capture anything they did say to themselves. 
Figure 3.1 gives a sense of the materials recorded from each of the 
cameras. 
Figure 3.1: A frame from the `mixed' recording. In the bottom left hand 
corner is the image taken from the camera focusing `over the shoulder' of 
the user and onto the screen. 
Inset in the general shot of the user and the system is the image 
recorded from the other camera. This was also recorded onto a separate 
tape so that details of the screen-based activity could be analysed with 
respect to the objects appearing on the screen. The general shot provided 
resources for analysing the user's orientation to the system, for example, 
whether they were looking at the screen. 
Figure 3.2 shows the PowerPoint application once it has been opened. 
r 
File Edit View Style Tent Draw Color Window re7o 
I 
Titl e 
e 
Figure 3.2: The PowerPoint Application 
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To the left of the screen is a set of tools for graphical operations such as 
creating lines, circles, ovals, rectangles and labels (the tool labelled `A'). 
After selecting one of these tools, the user has to specify the shape and 
position of the appropriate object in the main window using the mouse and 
mouse button. This main window, labelled `Untitled' at first, is where the 
image of each slide is built up, so all text that should appear on the slide 
should be typed into this window. Beneath the tools is a `Slide Changer' 
for changing between slides. 9 To the right of the screen are two buttons 
for viewing collections of slides (or presentations) and a scroll bar for 
moving up and down a particular slide. Along the top of the screen is a 
menu title bar. When the cursor is over a title, and the mouse button is 
pressed down, a menu appears (or is `pulled-down'). The contents of these 
are shown in Figure 3.3. As well as offering the usual facilities of a 
Macintosh application (e. g. filing, printing, `cut and paste'), they allow the 
user, amongst other things, to change the style of text, create set 
backgrounds to the slides (master slides), annotate slides, change the style 
of lines and boxes and colour the slides in complex ways. 
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Figure 3.3: The PowerPoint menus 
PowerPoint's menus, in common with other Macintosh applications are 
arranged in a particular order, general operations to the left ('File', `Edit' 
and `View'), text formatting in the centre ('Style' and `Text') and drawing 
9 When more than one slide is created a bar appears allowing the user to move 
easily between the slides, the slide number being displayed to the 
bottom-left of 
the window. 
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menus to the right ('Draw' and `Color'). The `Window' menu allows the 
user to select between open presentations and windows. The leftmost 
menu, the `Apple' menu, contains applications and accessories that can be 
used at any time, even when another (i. e. PowerPoint) is being used. 
PowerPoint's `Help' option is provided in this menu. 10 
Each menu has items arranged in groups of related operations divided 
by lines. Each menu item can be preceded by a checkmark (indicating 
that the menu item has already been applied to the current selection) or a 
diamond (indicating that the item is the default). It can be followed by a 
right-pointing arrow (indicating that a further sub-menu is available for 
more precise choices) and a symbolic representation for the keystroke 
alternative for the menu item. Menu items can also be grey indicating that 
the item cannot be selected at that time. 
Faced with the complexity of the conduct revealed by looking at the 
recordings of PowerPoint use, it is necessary to develop a transcription 
system. It is impossible to provide a literal description of all human 
conduct in the recordings, so the transcription system has to be selective. 
The principal concern is with developing a system which provides a 
shorthand for locating the emergent and contextual properties of screen- 
based activities. This system is used alongside the actual data, that is the 
video and audio recordings, and has evolved alongside the analysis of 
certain actions, in particular the use of menus. 11 It draws in part from the 
orthography created by Jefferson (1972) for the transcription of talk in 
interaction and it is described in more detail in Luff and Heath (1990). 
Fragment 1 gives a flavour of the transcription system. 12 
10 The rightmost menu, shown in Figure 3.2, whose title resembles an image of a 
tape is for a general Macintosh feature called `MacroMaker'. This allows for 
recording and repeating keystroke and menu selection patterns. It is not part of 
PowerPoint and was not used (nor opened by) any of the participants in the 
exercise. 
11 So compare with some notations used within HCI for describing tasks on 
interfaces for the purposes of design (e. g. Siochi and Hartson, 1988). 
12 It is possible to skip over menu titles and menu items by moving over them very 
fast. For example, in lines 5-6 of fragment 1 the user skips over the Style menu. 
There are also occasions when it unclear from the recordings where the cursor is. 
In keeping with the flavour of Jefferson's transcription system parentheses are 
used for doubt in transcription. 
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(1) BC 53 
11 [Untitled] T 
2 (3.1) 
3 .L File:::::::: 
4 Edit:....... 
5 View:::::: 
6 Text:::::::::: 
7 Draw 
8 Color: 
9 Draw::::::::: 
10 Text Right C Find/Replace... Find Next Spelling 
11 B: Errn:: " 
12 (0.5) 
13 T [Untitled] 
The user clicks on the main window, labelled 'Untitled' (line 1), and 
following a gap of over 3 seconds (line 2) he successively opens the File, 
Edit, View, Text, Draw and Color menus by moving the mouse over the 
various titles on the title bar (lines 3-9). Finally, he moves his cursor 
quickly down the Text menu (line 10) and releases the mouse over the 
`Untitled' window (line 13). The titles of menus, for example `File' or `Edit', 
are used to show when they are selected by the user and highlighted on 
the screen. They are written down the page, whereas when the user 
highlights particular menu items they are written to the right of the menu 
title. Colons are used to capture the timing of the activity, each colon 
representing one tenth of a second. Pauses between activities are given in 
seconds in parenthesis. Up and down arrows represent when a user 
presses or depresses the mouse button; a bracketed heading such as 
`[Untitled]' is for the region of the screen over which the mouse button was 
clicked. Users"self talk' is shown in double quotes, such as "Errn::: ", and 
follows the orthography of Jefferson (1972). 
So in fragment (1) the user selects the File menu for 0.9 seconds (line 
3), then moves the cursor to the right and holds the Edit menu down for 
0.8 seconds (line 4). After holding both View and Text menus down (lines 
5-6), he quickly moves further to the right with Draw and Color being very 
briefly displayed (lines 7-8). He then moves to the left, still keeping the 
mouse button pressed and holds down the Draw menu (line 9). After 
moving left again he drags the mouse down the Text menu (line 10) and 
says "Errn:: " (line 11). He does not select anything, releasing the mouse 
over the main window half a second after moving off the bottom of the 
menu (lines 12-13). 
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3.5 A PROVISIONAL TYPOLOGY OF MENU USE 
The instance of screen-based activity in fragment 1 reveals some of the 
complexities of naturally occurring menu use. It also points to certain 
problems with some of the conventional terms regarding menus utilised 
within the HCI literature. Fragment 1, for example, could be viewed as a 
`scan' of most of the available menus at the top of the screen, it could be a 
`browse' through the options, or a `search' for a specific item. Similarly, 
the simple holding down of a particular menu could be termed a `scan' of, 
or a `browse' at, the various menu items available, or even, as in Mayes, et 
al., (1988), a `hesitation'. In order to reduce the potential for confusion 
between these terms, descriptors such as `scans', `searches', `sweeps' and 
`browses' are avoided. Instead, a typology is introduced relating to the 
uses of menus. Commonly occurring features of these are distinguished in 
terms of `packages' of activities, described with respect to their sequential 
and temporal properties: i. e. the length of time spent at particular menus, 
the number of menus visited and the order of visits. The purpose of 
outlining these types of menu use is not to suggest that they specify 
organisations to the behaviour, let alone ones to which the participants 
orient. Rather, they are used to draw out some of the resources utilised by 
participants to accomplish particular activities through the use of the 
menus. 
The typology consists of eight types of gradually increasing complexity: 
the selection; the hold; the pick; the straddle; the shuffle; the chug; the 
ramble; and the meander. These in turn are described in terms of four 
simple, single menu uses: opting; brushing; peeping and holding. Opting 
for a menu item is where a user releases the mouse button when the 
cursor is over an item that is highlighted (i. e. that has not been `greyed 
out'). Users `brush' a menu or menu item when they move the cursor over 
the title or the item very briefly. In the case of a menu title, this is just 
long enough for the menu items to be displayed, and in the case of a menu 
item this is just long enough for the menu items to be highlighted 
(typically this is less than a third of a second). Users `peep' at a menu or 
menu item long enough for all the items or sub-items to be seen (typically, 
this is less than a second). A `peep' is marked by a user pausing when 
moving the cursor along the title bar or down a menu. A `hold' is when a 
user stops moving over a menu header or item for some considerable time 
(typically over a second). 
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These simple menu uses are primarily for distinguishing between 
different types of movement over a menu. As on a Macintosh application, 
and on similar interfaces, it is straightforward to move between menus, a 
single menu use can easily be transformed into a visit to many menus. 
Such uses of menus tend to be ignored by experiments that only measure 
the time to opt for an item and whether that was correct. It appears that 
individuals may utilise the resources available to them in quite complex 
ways, even when only peeping at a single menu. Similarly, the potential 
complexity of the uses of multiple menus may be ignored by glosses such 
terms as `searches' and `browses'. These compound into one activity what 
may be a heterogeneous range of actions. As a starting point a 
straightforward kind of menu use is considered. 
3.5.1 The Selection 
The menu selection is the type of menu use that is usually portrayed in 
the conventional literature on menus. It could be considered as the most 
`direct', or straightforward, way of using a menu, consisting of three 
components, pressing the mouse down over the title bar, moving down the 
menu to a menu item and finally opting for that item. Due to the ways 
Macintosh menus are manipulated there is always a brush of the menu 
title as the mouse button is pressed and a brush of the menu item as the 
mouse button is released. In (2), the user selects a block of text by 
dragging the cursor over it (line 1) and then selects the item on the Text 
menu (line 3). This justifies a block of text to a left margin. 
(2) BN 79 
11> [Text] >T 
2 (1.6) 
31 Text: Left:: T 
4 (1.3) 
The selection of the text prefigures the forthcoming activity on the 
menu. Perhaps surprisingly, there are few instances of such direct 
selections in the data. More often, users peep at the menu title 
before 
selecting an item: 
(3) BN 95b 
(1.3) 
1 Text::::::: Left:::::: 1' 
or peep at or brush a menu item when moving down the menu; 
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(4) LD 116 - Transcript 1 
(1.6) 
.ý Style:: Plain Bold Italic Underline:: Italic::::::::: 1' 
(1.1) 
or hold or peep at a menu item before it is opted for; 
(5) LD 104 
15 (1.8) 
16 J. Text::: Left:::::::::::::::: T 
17 (6.2) 
In fact, when users opt for an item they usually pause in some way on 
the menu from which the item is chosen, as in the fragments above. Of 
course, the physical operation of the system features in this activity. It 
takes some time for the system to display the menu, the user has to 
change the direction of the mouse to move down a menu, and there are 
limits to how far the mouse can be moved in any one direction. The users' 
`pauses', however, tend to be noticeable `breaks' in the ongoing activity. It 
could be conjectured that these reveal users' lack of experience or 
knowledge of the system or application. Indeed, as such, these 
perturbations could provide a useful resource for those endeavouring to 
model the cognitive capabilities of users of a computer system, as in the 
GOMS analyses presented in the last chapter, or as evidence of a `search' 
taking place, or for a lack of knowledge concerning the contents of a 
particular menu. However, there appears to be no simple match between 
the experience which users reported and these breaks in activities. All the 
users, no matter how often they had used the Macintosh or the particular 
application had some perturbations on a menu before opting for a 
particular item. Such perturbations occurred throughout the duration of 
the exercise, even in cases where users had been examining the same 
menu moments prior to opting for a particular item. 
This may support the observations made by Mayes et al. (1988) that 
even frequent users of an application have difficulties recalling the details 
of the interface. From their experiments, Mayes et al. suggested that 
users may not have to remember mental replicas of menus. Instead, their 
skills may be in `remembering only enough to make the right choices 
accurately' (p. 287). So, rather than perturbations in the course of activity 
being an indication of the lack of expertise of the users, they may point to 
the opposite, at the users' proficiency with the Macintosh: experienced 
users may know in which menu to find the `target' of their search and 
merely pause to home in on their target. 
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Alternatively, it may not be the case that users are `looking for' or 
`searching for' a particular item. There may be some equivocality, or 
ambivalence, to their activities. In each of the above cases the user has, 
just prior to the instance, opened the same menu. Indeed, in these cases 
the users appear to be engaged in an activity which could be characterised 
as `trying out' various options. In (3), the user has just `justified' the text, 
in (5) the user has just held open the Text menu for over 3 seconds and 
then goes on to select `Center', and in (4) the user has been engaged in a 
multitude of style changes. 
(4) LD 116 - Transcript 2 
1 (5.8) 
21 Style::::::::::::::: Plain Bold Italic Underline Outline::::: T 
3 (2.4) 
4 4. Style Plain: Italic Underline Shadowed:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1' 
5 (2.6) 
61 [Untitled] 1' 
7 (1.4) 
81 Style:::::::::: ::::::::::::: Plain Bold Italic::: 1' 
9 (2.3) 
10 .L Style:...:.:.......::::: "::::::::........ T ...... . ......... 
11 (1.6) 
12 1 [Untitled] T 
13 (0.2) 
14 J. `Witty' `Witty' T 
15 (1.6) 
16 1 Style:: Plain Bold Italic Underline:: Italic::::::::: T 
17 (1.1) 
Thus, the user in (4) is not unfamiliar with the Style menu, having 
visited it four previous times in her recent history (lines 2,4,8 and 10). It 
would then seem strange to characterise any delays in terms of searching 
for an item, or even in looking for a lexical match for a semantic 
specification, as she has just selected the same item from the menu. The 
selection is part of a course of activities which appear to be related to the 
appearance of text on the slide. Prior to the selection of Italic (in line 16), 
she has selected Outline (line 2), Shadowed (line 4) and Italic before (line 
8). Instead, a characterisation of the single menu activity has to be seen 
in relation to her prior activities or selecting various options on the same 
menu, of clicking on the main window (line 6 and 12) and on the word 
`Witty' (line 14). Hence, she not only is selecting a single Style for the text, 
but this is part of a course of activities where she is looking and selecting 
the various options available on the same menu: each selection being 
viewed in terms of its consequences to the objects on the slide. 
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The Style menu, as with many on a Apple Macintosh, by its very 
design, offer a range of related items in one place (e. g. Figure 3.4). 13 
Plain HP 
Bold 39 B 
Italic 391 
Underline ¬U 
MOO[mm 
............................ 
Font 
............................... 
Size 
... ... . ..................... 
Styles 
............................... 
º 
Define Styles... 
Figure 3.4: The Style Menu in PowerPoint 
The possibilities the menus offer are read in the light of a previous 
activity on the screen. The Style menu offers a range of related actions 
that can be undertaken. These can be read as offering a way of changing 
the style of the text, but they can also be read as a more flexible set of 
resources, for developing a course of activities where styles are tried out, 
options are attempted and the results on the screen looked at. 
Users can read the menu for their purposes at hand, the choices 
offering potential developments for the particular activities in which they 
are engaged. In (4), the selection of the Style menu is part of a course of 
activities, it emerges from a series of other activities on the menus and 
with the text. 
By focusing on a single menu selection it is possible to attribute 
possible kinds of mental processing to pauses in the activity. So, in the 
GOMS models the pauses could be counted as cognitive operators for 
mental preparation. A similar account might be provided by those 
wishing to explore more complex analyses of the knowledge required to 
interact with a system. Even a simple instance of activity reveals that 
such an analysis would have to provide an account of the knowledge of the 
application (what is on this menu), the general features of the system 
13 The apparent consistency between different applications provided on the 
Macintosh can be attributed to following the Apple Human Interface Guidelines 
(Apple Human Interface Group, 1987). Among other things these outline ways in 
which menus should be designed and presented. 
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(what typically is on this type of menu) and the ongoing task (changing the 
style of text), and also some account of the prior activities on the system. 
However, the nature of these tasks and activities have to be considered in 
particular ways, for these do not remain fixed and can appear ambivalent. 
The user in (4), for example, could be considered to be italicising a piece of 
text, changing the style of the text, trying out some styles of text, 
discovering the operation of the system or selecting a suitable appearance 
for the slide. It would be problematic to consider the single menu use in 
isolation or too have too fixed a definition of the task that is underway. 
There could be many accounts for the perturbations which occur in 
menu selections: in terms of the physical properties of the device, as delays 
due to the operation of the machine; the mental processing of the 
individual, as time for mental preparation, or just as junctures in the 
activity. However, it may be misleading to consider a pause as indicating 
an unseen activity guiding a forthcoming action. Instead, even in the 
course of an action on a single menu, different menu activities could 
develop, one of which is opting for a menu item. 
In the following sections we will see how, from similar small 
beginnings, a range of activities on menus can emerge. 
3.5.2 The Hold 
Holding a menu varies from a menu selection in two ways: the menu is 
held down; and an item is not opted for. The menu is held open `for view'. 
The mouse may be released after a hold over the title bar (6), or over the 
`greyed out' (unselectable) items in the block. In these latter two instances, 
both on the Text menu, the mouse is released over the unselectable items 
which only apply to particular types of interface objects (i. e. for indenting 
text, showing text rulers and altering line spacing). 
(6) LD 103 
(2.5) 
J. Text:....:.. "........ "..:...::::::: 1' .....: :... 
(1.1) 
(7) UN 163 
(2.9) 
. l. Text:::::::::::: Left 
Center Right (0.5) T 
(0.4) 
(8) CB 29 - Transcript 1 
(1.6) 
. LText ::::::::::::::::: 
Left Center (0.7) T 
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At first, a hold of the menu may appear to be an aborted menu 
selection where a user is looking for an item that does not, in fact, appear 
in that particular menu. Thus, dropping down the menu and releasing 
over a `greyed-out' item, as in (7) and (8), could be seen as a way of not 
selecting an item, different to releasing the mouse over the title. 
Alternatively, holding down menus could also be seen as occasions 
when users are drawn to items on menus, but also draw away from opting 
for one. As with the simple selection, the user may be actively engaged in 
using the system: for example, a user opening, holding and then closing 
the menu without moving the mouse may not have `failed' to find an item. 
A user could be involved in other, or a range of other activities, whilst 
holding down a menu. 
In (8), prior to the hold on the Text menu, the user selects an object on 
the screen (containing the text `How I see Myself - line 1). 
(8) CB 29 - Transcript 2 
11 [`How I see Myself] T 
2 (1.6) 
3 C: " thats a word processor object if ever there was oneT" 
4 
. LText ::::::::::::::::: Left Center (0.7) T 
5 (10.2) 
On arriving at the Text menu, he holds it down for 1.7 seconds and 
then moves the cursor quickly down the menu, releasing the mouse button 
after pausing for 0.7 seconds (over the `greyed out' items Indent » and 
Indent «, line 4). This activity commences whilst he is saying `object' in 
his utterance `thats a word processor object if ever there was onel' (line 3). 
Earlier to this fragment, the user has been utilising a range of the 
application's resources, not only has he frequently opened menus, but he 
has also used the on-line help system. He keeps the window of the help 
system open (which is the one related to `indenting and tabbing text', see 
Figure 3.5) whilst returning to the menus several times, the fourth 
occasion of which is (8). 14 
14 The utterance `thats a word processor object if ever there was oneT' appears to 
echo the instruction `Select a word processor object, then choose Select Text Ruler 
on the text menu' in the help (Figure 3.5). 
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Indentin g and Tabbing 
You indent and tab text using the Text Ruler. Select a word processor object, then choose Show Text Ruler on the text menu. 
Each indent symbol controls the indenting LZM . - for a different level. Drag a symbol 
4 
along the ruler to set its indent distance. Indent symbols Tab mbols 
To indent text, choose Indent  (right) in place 
or Indent " (left) from the Text menu To set tabs, drag a tab symbol from its 
and begin typing. To indent (or box at the top right to underneath the "un-indent") existing text, select it, ruler. The plain triangle is a normal tab; 
then choose Indent  or Indent . The the one with a dot in it is a decimal tab shape of the symbol indicates the left . Numbers align on their decimal points at a margin for its level like this: decimal tab (text aligns at its right). You 
can have multiple tabs for each word 
processor box. texttexttext texttext 
texttextte texttextte To remove the ruler click off the box. texttextte texttextte , 
" For more about this topic, refer to page(, e) 169-177 in your PowerPoint User Manual. 
Figure 3.5: The `help' for indenting and tabbing in PowerPoint (v. 2.01) 
Hence, it appears that the user's activities are related to the possible 
resources offered by the system, particularly with respect to manipulating 
`word processor objects'. 
As previously mentioned, the menus on an Apple Macintosh are more 
than just lists of available commands or words. They provide a range of 
resources for the user. Each menu is divided into groups and each item 
can be marked in various ways, including being `checked' and being 
`greyed out'. The checkmarks can be used to provide information about 
the properties of items previously selected and the `greying' of items can 
provide information on the availability of the various options that could be 
applied to selected items. Thus, by `greying out' particular items, menus 
can reveal not only which actions are possible to perform at the moment, 
but also a selection of other actions which are possible at other times. It 
appears that the user in (8) holds down the Text menu as part of an active 
exploration of the possibilities afforded by the system. When simple text 
is selected, the Text menu in PowerPoint appears as follows: 
Left 
Center 
Right 
1-1 SIif J 
........................................................ 
Indent >: 
Indent « t. 
........................................................ 
Show TeHt Ruler 
L ne dein ... Set as Defa ult... 
..................................................... 
Find/Replace... 
Find Nest 3ßF 
Spelling... 
Figure 3.6: The Text Menu in PowerPoint when a simple block of text is selected 
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Options like justifying text, finding or replacing text and spell- 
checking are applicable to text. Options such as indenting lines of text, 
altering line spacing and displaying text rulers, on the other hand are only 
applicable to `word processor objects'. So, by displaying both the items 
that are applicable and inapplicable to the object selected at the time, the 
Text menu can be used to reveal the type of an object. It can also suggest 
operations which can be accomplished on other types of objects. Thus, the 
menus can be utilised as a resource for making sense of the workings of 
the system and can draw users into other courses of activities. So, in (8) 
the user's hold of the menu (line 4) appears to be in the light of the 
changing appearance of the menu: what is `greyed out', what it makes 
visible and what may or may not be a `word processor object'. Following 
the hold on the menu, the user goes on to select another object on the 
screen (the tool for creating `labels' - line 6) and then returns to hold down 
the Text menu again. 
(8) CB 29 - Transcript 3 
5 (10.2) 
6 1[A]T 
7 (1.4) 
8 .ý Text:..:.:.: ".....::::.............. ...... .............. 
The label tool does not create `word processor objects'. Again, opening 
the Text menu reveals that the items applicable to these objects are 
`greyed out' and not available. 
In (8) the user could be considered to be trying to indent text, to create 
a `word processor object' or to discover properties of a system. The user 
appears to make use of the dynamic and changing nature of menus as a 
potential resource for subsequent activities. However, identifying one 
particular `goal' of the user, even a vague one, appears to be problematic. 
His activities appear to be related to indenting text as well discovering 
whether a particular object is one to which you can apply word processor- 
like actions. Indeed, there may be some ambivalence in the nature of the 
activity from moment-to-moment. It can be transformed in its course. 
Hence, when a user holds down a menu, it may not be just in order to 
look for an item to select (a `search' that fails), it may be with respect to a 
range of practical purposes and embedded within an emerging course of 
activity. The menus provide a resource for actively making sense of the 
system. In displaying options which cannot be selected, PowerPoint is 
typical of those applications. Indeed, this is one of many features that is 
meant to contribute to the Apple Macintosh's `look and feel'. These options 
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can draw users into a course of activity, which itself develops. Skilled 
users of a Macintosh can make use of the changing nature of the menus to 
make sense of an unfamiliar application or unfamiliar aspects of an 
application. It would appear to be inappropriate to attribute such an 
activity to a particular goal or plan, instead, the menus are read in the 
course of an emerging course of activity. An alternative characterisation 
would more be in terms of improvised activity. 
3.5.3 The Pick 
Picking a menu item can be considered as a composite of the previous two 
types. The menu is held down whilst the cursor is over the menu title, or 
over a menu item, and then the user goes on to opt for an item (e. g. 9). 
(9) TX 65 
(2.3) 
. Edit :......:::::::........... Cut Copy::::::::::::::: .... 
(0.9) 
Often, picking an item involves traversing up and down the menu, 
holding on items along the way. 
(10) BN 97 
(2.3) 
.. Text :::::::::::::: Left Center::::::::::::: 
Right::::: Center::::: Right: Center::::::: 
Right:.......: ":::::::: ".................. T . ................... 
(2.9) 
In (10) the user, after going down the menu once, returns to the title 
bar. Without releasing the mouse, he then holds the menu down for 
nearly four seconds, goes down to Right, up to Center, back down to Right, 
back up to Center and, finally, opts for Right, after holding it down for 
nearly another four seconds. Fragments (9) and (10) are relatively 
straightforward cases of picking items. A pick may also involve holding 
down one of the menu items which has a sub-menu attached to it, and 
then moving up and down that sub-menu (e. g. the Size sub-menu in 
fragment 11). 
(11)XT69 
1 (2.3) 
2 4. Style:::: Plain Bold Italic Underline Outline Shadow Font: 
3 Size:::::::::::::::::::: 10: 9:: 10 12 14 18 24::::::::::::::::: T 
4 (3.3) 
In (11), the pick appears to be composed of two parts: the movement 
down the Style menu (line 2); and the pick of 24 from the Size sub-menu, 
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with holds on the Size and `24' items (line 3). Here, the shape of the 
activity on the sub-menu resembles the shape of activity on the main 
menu revealed in other instances (e. g. in fragment 9). There are other 
similar instances of complex, single menu activity in the data. In (12), the 
user has just finished the contents of a slide. He then goes down and up 
the View menu three times before releasing the mouse button over the 
title. 
(12) BN 82 - Transcript 2 
8 (3.2) 
9 . 
t, View:::::::::: Full Size: 66% Size 50% Size 33% Size:: (1.7) Notes (#1) 
10 Notes Master:::: Handout Page:::::::: Notes (#1) Slides (#1) 
11 Notes 50% Size: 66% Size::::::: 
12 Full Size:::::::: 66% Size::: 50% Size::::: 
13 View::: T 
For the user's particular circumstances prior to arriving at the menu 
there are a wide range of appropriate next activities. He has completed 
his first slide, created a new one, and added some text which is centred. 
He has then selected this text and justified it to the left (line 3). 
(12) BN 82 - Transcript 1 
11> [Text] >T 
2 (1.6) 
31 Text: Left:: T 
4 (1.3) 
5 Text: Left:: Center::: T 
On opting for `Left' the text moves almost to the left hand margin of the 
slide, further to the left than on his first slide. The user immediately 
returned to the Text menu and centred it again (by the selection in line 5). 
This is the position of text when he goes to the View menu in (12, line 8). 
Full Size 
66% Size 
50% Size 
33% Size 
............................................... 
Slides (#1) NO 
Notes (#I) ¬E 
............................................... 
Slide Master 
Notes Master 
Handout Page 
............................................... 
Title Sorter 
Slide Sorter 
Figure 3.7: The user holding down the View Menu (line 12, fragment 12) 
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The user in (12) could be seen to be looking for inspiration from the 
View menu, the items over which he holds suggesting candidate next 
actions and candidate next courses of activity, his movements up and 
down the menu corresponding to him being drawn to various possibilities. 
For example, the menu provides an option for viewing several slides 
together (i. e. the Slide Sorter), for manipulating several slides at once (i. e. 
the Title and the Slide Sorters) and for altering the size of the image of the 
slide (i. e. Full Size, 66% Size, 50% Size and 33% Size). The user in (12) 
first moves towards the Title and Slide and Sorter options (lines 9 -10) and 
then back up to the slide sizes (line 10-12) and down them again (line 12). 
These options not only suggest next actions to take, but potential courses 
of actions, or trajectories. On creating a second slide, there are various 
courses of activities that would appear to be appropriate and relevant. 
These include aligning the text on the second slide with the first (or vice 
versa), going on to create a third slide, or editing or formatting the text on 
the second slide. The View menu can provide the resources either to assist 
with these activities or, more accurately, to project a course of actions to 
accomplish them. The Slide and Text Sorters, for example, offer 
capabilities for adding and comparing slides. The various Size options 
offer the potential for reducing the size of the slide displayed on the 
screen, and therefore, making the objects on it easier to manipulate. 
However, in (12) the user appears to be faced with a particular 
problem: one in which text is placed too far to the left. His activities on 
the menu, nevertheless, suggest an ambivalence to the nature of the 
activity in which he is involved. Even the choice of the View menu 
appears to be problematic. Of course, it could be accounted for in terms of 
goals, knowledge of the menus, the capabilities of the system and the 
interaction between these and the menus. Vaguely formulated goals 
concerning a general search for a solution to a problem and accounts of 
lacking knowledge of the menus could be suggested. However, such 
accounts would lose the continually shifting nature of the activity, where 
goals, courses of actions and purposes appear to be continually 
transformed in the light of the menus and possible readings of them. In 
(12) there appears to be some ambivalence to whether the activity on the 
menus can be related to the change to a new slide or the position of the 
text. The View menu could provide ways of dealing with both of these, and 
could, indeed, assist with the in situ discovery of the nature of the problem 
at hand. It is unclear whether assigning a vague a priori goal to the user 
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provides anything to the analysis. Rather, what appears to be relevant to 
the user is the in situ uses of the menus; how in their reading they can be 
utilised to develop a course of activity, in other words, how they can be a 
resource for innovation. 
3.5.4 The Straddle 
In the data there are several instances of users opening one menu, then 
quickly going onto an adjacent menu and opting for an item on that menu. 
For example, in fragment (13) the user flicks over the File menu before 
picking `New Slide' from the Edit menu. 
(13) BC 56 
(0.6) 
1 File 
Edit:::::::::::::::::::::: Undo Omit Master::: Set as Title::::: New Slide::::: T 
In (14), the user holds down the File menu before opting for Help from 
the `Apple' menu. 
(14) CB 24 
(2.3) 
. File:........... 
::::::: Alarm Clock:: Help:::::: 
1' 
(0.9) 
Straddles can themselves be viewed as a package of two single menu 
activities. For example, (14) could be considered as a hold on the File 
menu followed by a menu selection of Help on the `Apple' menu. However, 
it is not always clear where the division between the two menu activities 
occurs. A user may also quickly go up and down a first menu before going 
onto the second, as in fragments (15) and (16). 
(15) XT 71 
1 (2.5) 
-º 2 . Text:: Left Center Right Right Center Left 
3 Style Plain Italic Outline Shadow:: Font Size::::: 9:: 10 12 14::: 18:: 
4 24::::::::::::: 36::::::: T 
(16) BN 77 
1 (2.4) 
-+ 2 .L Style: Bold:::::: Plain::: 
3 Text: Center::: Right:: Center Left 
4 Text Left:::::::: T 
In these instances a move towards making a menu selection appears to 
be curtailed. Immediately, the user moves to an adjacent menu and moves 
down that one. The actions on the two menus seem to be closely tied 
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together, the first providing an environment for making sense of the 
second. 
The design of the Macintosh makes switching between menus very 
simple, only requiring a user to move the cursor up to the title bar of an 
adjacent menu without releasing the mouse button. So a transformation 
of an activity from one menu to another could be seen to start in the visit 
to the first menu (marked by an arrow). In fragments (15) and (16) the 
user moves down the first menu immediately after he selects the title (0.2 
and 0.1 seconds respectively), the selection and the descent being part of 
the same movement. Within a second, the user changes direction and 
moves onto the next menu. Immediately as he arrives on the second 
menu, he descends that one. After some perturbation, a descent of the 
Size menu (lines 3-4, Fragment 15) and a return to the title (line 4, 
Fragment 16), the user opts for an item in the second menu. These 
instances appear to suggest that in one movement users go to select an 
item, find themselves on the wrong menu, try the next menu and then go 
on, with slightly more circumspection, to opt for the item from there. 
It is interesting to note that, although the instances of straddles in the 
data are spread across most of the users, they are not spread across all the 
menus. Particular pairs of menus appear to be `straddled': the Text and 
the Style menus, the File and the Apple menus, and the File and the Edit 
menus. If we take one particular pair, the Text and Style menus, it can be 
seen how these can be read together. 
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Figure 3.8: The Text and Style Menus 
In PowerPoint, the Style menu offers a range of options, many of which 
can be applied to text objects (e. g. Plain. Bold, Italic, Underline, Font and 
Size). Similarly, many of the items in the Text menu could be considered 
as `stylistic', particularly those which relate to line spacing, indenting and 
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justification. Indeed, in other Macintosh applications similar options are 
provided, in different configurations, on menus with titles such as 
`Format, ' `Font', `Type' etc. So, given a particular activity at hand, users 
read the menu titles for potentially relevant descriptors for classes of 
appropriate next activities. Both Text and Style could describe a class of 
operations for transforming text; the File and Apple menus are, within the 
Macintosh domain, relevant locations to find on-line help; and the Edit 
and File menus can both act as descriptors of a class of actions of which 
defining a new slide could be part. 
When arriving at a menu where the title appears to be relevant to a 
developing course of activities, for example the Style menu in (16), the 
appropriateness of the contents may not be immediately apparent. In the 
light of this reading of title and contents, another menu title may appear 
to offer relevant resources. Though the course of activity may appear tied 
to a prior activity, a selection of text, the developing activities may still not 
be straightforward - even as straightforward as the characterisation of a 
search failing initially and then being successful. In (16), on arriving at 
the second menu, the user drops down the menu beyond the first block of 
options, peeping at Center and Right on the way. He then goes up the 
menu pausing over Left before it is selected. 
It is a problem for designers to arrive at an appropriate classification of 
actions for the various menu options. They are faced with either 
presenting a large number of options on one menu which may be difficult 
for a user to cope with (and possibly break guidelines for interface design), 
or distribute options between potentially confusing categories. For a user 
engaged in a course of activities, the menu titles provide potential 
classifiers of possible next actions on that course. On opening a menu, the 
user is faced by a range of names for possible next actions. These contents 
can be read as items to opt for, and also as a collection of related objects. 
The contents of a menu may not only be utilised to make sense of 
particular items in the set, but also read together to make sense of the 
classification as a whole. Users then have to make use of a set of practices 
for making sense of menus, these practices relying on common-sense and 
skilled readings of items and collections of items. A title like Style can 
suggest a set of options relating to the style of objects on the screen. Only 
when presented with options like `Plain', `Bold' and `Italic' can a more 
precise nature of the menu be revealed: it relates to text, but only its 
appearance (and not its shape). The Text menu then can be seen to be 
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relevant as an alternative However, that an alternative is required may 
only emerge in the light of a first visit. The menus together not only 
provide a solution, but also help define the problem. 
Hence the process for understanding the menus is an emergent one, 
undertaken in the light of particular problems at hand, and developing 
through the changing appearance of the menus as they are opened. The 
division of options between menus and the relationships to their titles in 
PowerPoint may not be straightforward, but then again there are a large 
number of options and ways in which they can be divided. The purposes 
for which menus can be visited is indefinite. The skills of users, whether 
familiar or unfamiliar with the application, is in making sense of these 
resources for their own practical purposes. 
In the cases so far considered, characterising the use of a menu as 
`selecting' or `searching' for a command glosses the ways in which even 
that apparently simple activity is achieved. The contents of a menu are 
read in relation to particular activities at hand and serve as a resource for 
shaping subsequent actions. Moreover, the possibility that their contents 
can be transformed in subtle ways allows menus to be utilised so that 
users can make sense of both prior actions and the general operation of 
the system. The use, or reading, of a menu is not only embedded within 
an ongoing course of activity, but also serves to shape that developing 
course. 
3.5.5 The Chug 
There are many cases in the corpus where the user proceeds in a single 
direction across two or more adjacent menus and holds down more than 
one of these on the way. These are characterised as `chugs'. 
Fragment (17) is a chug through the File and Edit menus, (18) is a 
chug through four menus and (19) through seven menus. 
(17) TX 66 - Transcript 1 
(3.7) 
.ý File :.:.............:. ".......:...... 
Edit:................................................... Undo Cut Copy Clear ............................................ 
Bring to Front Paste as Picture::::::: T 
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(18) LD 119 
2 View::::::: 
3 Style:::::::::::::::: 
4 Text::::::::::::::: 
5 Draw::.....: """.::.... "........... Shadow: T ... .... ...... 
(19) BN 78 
1 [Untitled] 1' 
(2.4) 
. Window:::::::: 
Color:....... " ............... ................ 
Draw::.......... ........................... ............................... 
Text :....................::.:.:........:..::::::............:.. ............. 
Style:::::::........... """": 
View ::::......................:: "....::::: " ............................................. ................ ..... ................................. ............. 
Edit:....... """"...... """"::.... """"". (Select All) Omit Master New Slide::::::::::::: 1' 
The chug might be considered to be a slow, systematic search for a 
solution to a problem that a user is facing at a particular moment. 
However, it is hard to think of a single problem to which all the menus 
from Edit, View, Style, Text and Draw (in fragment 18) or all the menus 
from Window to Edit (in fragment 19) could offer a potential solution. The 
instance (19) comes from very early on in the exercise: just prior to the 
fragment the user has justified the text to the left, the first action he has 
opted for from a menu. The click in the main (Untitled) window deselects 
the previously justified text and leaves nothing on the screen highlighted, 
an activity which does not prefigure a specific next action, rather the 
combined deselection/selection appears to foreshadow the possibility of 
leaving options for a next action open. His steady progression through the 
menu, particularly the long holds over Color, Draw, Text and View, does 
not seem to be oriented to a single `goal'. Instead, it is as if the user `ends 
up' selecting the New Slide option. This selection is problematic if the 
entire menu activity is characterised as a `browse', however (as in Young 
and his colleagues' hypothesised examples). 
Like searches, browses are broad classifications of menu activities. In 
(18), the user has just typed some text and she goes to the Edit menu (line 
1), peeps at the View menu (line 2), then she holds over the Style, Text 
and Draw menus (line 3-5). 
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Figure 3.9: The Text, Style and Draw menus 
As with straddles, the options presented when opening one menu can 
lead the user onto another. The Edit menu is a potentially relevant place 
to go after typing text, however, the characterisations of Cut, Copy, Paste 
and the like, may not necessarily be appropriate. The Style and Text 
menus might suggest the availability of alternative resources. In (18) the 
user goes on from holding these to the Draw menu. This visit appears to 
be more problematic to consider in the light of the foregoing activity with 
the text. Nevertheless, an item, Shadow, is selected from it which can be 
applied to text. 
This selection is not unequivocal. The user holds on the menu title for 
over three seconds. It is as if the user is `drawn' into this selection. 
Chugs through the menus, as in (18) and (19), do not seem to be best 
characterised in terms of either browses or searches. The user may have 
just undertaken a particular activity where a menu option would provide 
an appropriate next action, however, the user can appear to be ambivalent 
towards the options being made available to them. The user may be 
looking at the broad range of items on the menus, but ends up selecting 
one. The items on the menus can be seen, at one and the same time, as 
relevant or irrelevant to the activity at hand. 
It may be that a browse or a search is too crude a categorisation for 
particular menu activities. The nature of the uses of menus is 
transformed in its course, broad classifications for a range of activities 
being inadequate to capture the details, and the work involved, in 
practically utilising these resources. 
3.5.6 The Shuffle 
In a `shuffle' a user visits two or three different, adjacent menus, but in 
the course of this activity, changes direction once or twice. So, for 
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example, in (20) the user returns to the Text menu (line 3) and in (21) the 
user changes direction and returns to the File and Edit menus (line 5)15. 
(20) TX 59 
11 Text:::::::: 
2 Draw :...........::...:.........:: 
-+ 3 Text:::::::::.:::::::::.::: 
4 Style: Font:::: Size: 9::: (18)::: 1' 
(21) BC 58 
11 [((Slide Sorter))] 
2 (2.7) 
31 File::::: 
4 Edit::::::: 
5 File:::::::::::::::: 
6 Edit:::::::::::::::::::::: 
7 View::::::::: Full Size::: 33% Size:::::: Slides #1::: Notes #1::: 
8 Slide Master::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Slide Sorter::: T 
Because of the wide range of options available in the application, 
characterising an activity that involves the entire range of menus as `a 
search' for a particular item, or a solution, would appear to be problematic. 
However, a user shuffling through two or three menus might be 
characterised in such a way. After the event, the activity appears to be 
more tightly focused. 
Prior to (21) the user completed his first slide, created a new one, 
typed in a title and some contents into the second slide and then 
highlighted a block of text. He now moves back to the first slide by 
selecting it within the `slide sorter' (line 1). 16 By highlighting some text, 
the user appears to foreshadow a forthcoming activity with respect to that 
text. It would be now be possible to change its style, `cut' it or copy it, for 
example. Moving to another slide suggests the last of these possibilities. 
Indeed, the File and Edit menus (lines 3 to 6) could suggest ways of 
moving text from one slide to another. 17 After moving to the View menu, 
he holds over a few items, and selects `Slide Sorter' (line 8). The slide 
15 In the following fragments, the menu visit after a change in direction is marked 
by an arrow. 
16 In PowerPoint, the `slide sorter' is a way of viewing and organising a set of slides. 
The slides appear as small images. Selecting one of these images with the cursor, 
as in line 1 of (22), will result in `moving to' that slide (i. e. that slide being 
presented so that it can be edited. To select the `slide sorter' itself, there is either 
an item at the top-right of the main window, or an item in the View menu. 
17 Either through the standard `cut and paste' (on the Edit menu) or through such 
items as the `Paste from... ' on the File menu. 
110 
sorter is another way of beginning an activity of moving text from one 
slide to another. The user goes on to copy his first slide twice and delete 
the one he just started. This is one way of copying the same text onto each 
of the slides. There are other ways, such as selecting all the objects on a 
slide and copying them onto new ones, which may be quicker. 
In (21) the user does appear to face a problem and goes to the menus to 
provide a solution. However, neither the problem or the solution need be 
precisely specified. Once again, the menus can draw the user into opting 
for an item, providing a posteriori, a possible definition of the problem 
(and solution). By making a choice the user can get drawn into a 
particular course of actions. 
In (23), the user appears to be trying to alter the style of some text on 
his slide. 
(23) CB 2 Transcript 1 (simplified) 
2 . Text:.::::::: 
4 Style :........................... .................... 
5 Text:::::::::::::: 
7 Style::::::::: Underline Outline Shadow Font::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
10 Size::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 12 14 18::: 24:::::: T 
An item of text is selected and he only visits two menus, each of which 
provide options for changing the nature of text. Hence, fragment (23) 
could be considered to be a `search' where, though vague, an appropriate 
problem could be specified. The following more detailed transcript, 
includes the user's `self-talk', and begins to reveal the ways in which this 
activity may change whilst a user is `interacting with the menus'. 
(23) CB 2 Transcript 2 
1 C: "err: (0.2) alright um:: (0.2)" 
2 ., Text:::::: 
3 C: Centre» 
4 Style: r:..:... """ .... 
5 C: "Sty: le" 
6 
7 
8 C: 
9 
10 
11 C: 
12 
"Bol: (d) 
::....... 
font" (0.6) som ewhere in here's going to be a 
Text:::::::::::::: 
Style::::::::: Underline Outline Shadow Font: r::.... """"""" 
(0.8) 
'. """"' I 
"Here we are" 
"font" "Helvetica 
you've decided tha t for me size you've decided thirty six>I think 
..:... .. 
C"Size:......:......... 
"Size::::::::::::::::::::::: 10 12 14 18::: 24:::::: T 
"thats too big (1.1) what about 24 " 
(1.5) 
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At various points in (23) the activity could be characterised as reading 
off the menus, checking what is on them, searching, finding or correcting. 
So, in the first two visits to Text and Style the user echoes items 
appearing on the menus `Centre, Sty: le, Bol: (d)' (lines 3-5). On returning 
to the Text menu, he utters `somewhere in here's going to be a font', then 
`Here we are font' when moving down to the Font item (lines 5-8). This 
item has a sub-menu. When this is opened he utters `font Helvetica', and 
when he opens the Size sub-menu he says `size you've decided thirty six>'. 
Whilst selecting `24' he utters `I think thats too big (1.1) what about 24'. 
In many methods for human-computer interaction, such talk would be 
considered a useful resource for analysts, a `verbal protocol' as discussed in 
approaches developed within Cognitive Science and Psychology (Ericsson 
and Simon, 1980). Needless to say, the status of such reports can be 
questioned if they are considered to be reports of mental processing. 
However, in this case, it suggests at least how a `self account' of an activity 
can be transformed in its course, as menus are opened and their contents 
are inspected. After the event, it could be said that a goal of changing the 
style of the text had been satisfied by reducing the size of the text, but this 
would miss how the activity emerges. In this instance, in some sense, the 
user is interacting with an interface. The objects on the screen and the 
contents of the menus are made sense of with respect to one another. The 
former make relevant readings of the menus, the latter are read with 
regard to what is on the screen (e. g. the text and its font) The use of the 
menus is an emerging activity, shaping and shaped by the ongoing 
activities of the user. 
Even if they are crude glosses, scanning and browsing can be useful as 
ways of considering activities on menus. Unfortunately, what is usually 
associated with these terms are cognitive accounts of the activities; 
matching targets to a priori goals, the mental processing involved in 
choosing between different methods and the knowledge of the screen 
objects, the application and the system - in other words, knowledge that. 
An alternative conceptualisation is in terms of knowledge how, how 
individuals manage to make use of the system for the in situ 
accomplishment of activities. A browse or a scan, would then 
be 
considered as an accomplishment, from the active utilisation, 
from 
moment-to-moment, of the resources available. 
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3.5.7 The Ramble 
A'ramble' is an extensive jaunt through the menus, encompassing a large 
number of different menus. 18 Most of the ramble proceeds in one 
direction, but after three or four menu visits there is usually some change 
in direction. After this change, either the ramble proceeds along in the 
new direction (as in line 7 of fragment 24) or returns to the old one, the 
diversion being only to revisit a single menu (as in lines 4-7 of fragment 
25). Often, towards the end of the ramble there is a review of the last few 
menus visited (as in lines 13-14 of fragment 25). 
(24) LD 122 
11 [Untitled] T 
2 (7.3) 
3 ý. View:..:....................::::.............. 
................ .............. 
4 Edit:.:..... """"...... "......:.: ".. 
5 File:::::::::::::::::: 
-º 6 Edit:::::: 
7 View: 
8 Style:::::::::::::::::: 
9 Text:::::::::::::::::::::...::.:: ...... ... 
10 Draw:::::::::::::::: Opaque Framed 
11 Ignore Grid Show Guides 
Filled Shadowed Sized To Text 
Show Edges: Show Guides:::::: T 
(25) LD 106 
1 (3.7) 
2 ... File::.:.... "....... 
3 Edit:....... "....... """":..... "................... :....: .... ..... 
4 View:..............::: ". ...................... ........................ 
5 Style::::::::::::::::::: 
6 .... ... ..... 
7 Style:::::::::::::::::: 
8 Text::::::::::.::.::.:..::.::::.:.:::: .......... 
9 Draw::::.:.: "................................................:......... ...................... .................................... 
10 Color :......:........................................................... ........................................................... 
11 Window Untitled:::::::: Window: 
13 Color::::::::::::::::: 
14 Draw:::::: T 
15 (8.5) 
Just prior to fragment (25), the user has been clicking and dragging the 
mouse over objects and pieces of text in the main window. From the 
nature of these actions, she is apparently trying to move a portion of the 
text she has typed. The user starts at the left hand title (excluding the 
18 For the purposes of this investigation, a ramble extends over at least six different 
menus. 
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general Apple menu) and proceeds across to the rightmost title (excluding 
the general MacroMaker menu). When the user reaches the Window 
menu, she changes direction (line 11), reviews the Color and Draw menu, 
releasing the mouse over the title of the Draw menu. This ramble, as with 
others in the corpus, is bounded by the span of the PowerPoint menus 
(from Edit to Window). 
It appears that in (25), and in other instances, the user is actively 
engaged in some activity in the application and then goes to the menu in 
relation to that activity: the movement of the text. In (24), after changing 
in various ways the style of the text, the user goes to the View menu, and 
in (26), after (re-centring) some text, the user goes to the Edit menu, and 
then rambles and sub-menus, including some just visited (e. g. the Styles 
sub-menu, lines 5-6). 19 
(26) BN 86 
1 (5.5) 
21 Edit:....... "................................. .................................. 
3 View:::::::::::::::: 
4 Style ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Plain Bold Italic Underline Shadow: 
5 Styles:: Helvetica 18::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::: Styles::: Define Styles::::: 
6 Styles Shadow Italic Bold Plain 
7 Style 
.... .... .... ..... .......... .. 8 Text:..:.... """" ....:.....:.............. ".............::::.. """ ....: ..... ..... .... ...: 
9 Draw::::::::.::::::.:.:::::::::::: ............ 
10 Color::::::::::: Fill:::: Color::::::::::::::::::::::: 
11 Window::::::: 
-º 12 Color:::::::::: 
13 Draw:::::: T 
As with other instances of menu use, it is difficult to characterise the 
activity as a whole in terms of some pre-specified goal. Even though prior 
to the use of the menus the users were engaged in some activity, through 
the use of the menus they appear to be drawn away from this. On 
departure from the menu, either nothing is selected (as in 25 and 26), or 
an unrelated item is picked (such as `Show Guides' in 24). In other cases 
looked at so far, the menus appear to be a resource for innovation and 
improvisation, suggesting courses of activities. In these rambles, the 
menus appear to offering little with respect to the ongoing activity. The 
19 In (25) and (26), the user on reaching the Window menu changes direction, 
holding down the Color menu again, then peeps back at the Draw menu. There 
are other rambles where this occurs (cf. the return to Draw and Text menus in 
fragment 1). It is as if the user is attracted to the recent and more exotic sights of 
the ramble. 
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ease with which they can be opened and perused allow for menus to 
provide for novel courses of activity to emerge. It also can provide for 
distraction, the user being drawn into viewing options which it is 
increasingly difficult to make relevant to the prior activity on the system. 
3.5.8 The Meander 
The meander can be considered to be a composite of the shuffle, the chug 
and the ramble. In a meander, in the course of making several visits, a 
user repeatedly returns to one of them. 20 In (27) the user visits six 
different menus, changing direction three times and opening the Text 
menu three times. 
(27) XT 68 
1 (1.6) 
2 . iText:::::::: 
3 Draw:::::::::.:::::::.:: 
4 Color::::::::: 
5 Window::::::: 
-+ 6 Color 
7 Text 
8 View 
--+ 9 Style 
10 Text 
-º 11 Style::::::::::: Plain Bold Italic Underline Outline Shadow Font 
12 Size:......:...................... T 
...................... 
13 (2.3) 
The meander, therefore, appears to characterise the constantly 
changing nature of menu activity. Fragment 27 begins with a chug 
through the Text, Draw, Color and Window menus (lines 2-5). On 
reaching the end of the menus, the user brushes across the Color, Text and 
View menus (lines 6-8), changing direction once more, before shuffling 
between Text and Style (lines 9-11). The user then holds down the Style 
menu, goes quickly down to the Size item opening the sub-menu and after 
3 seconds releases the mouse button without opting for an item. Thus, 
there are two distinct components to this fragment: the chug from left to 
right (lines 2-5); and the shuffle between Text and Style menus (lines 9- 
12). The transformation from one to another is marked by the brush 
across the menus (lines 6-8). 
20 For the purposes of this investigation, a meander extends over at least five 
different menus, where at least one menu is opened at three times. 
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In fragment 28, the instance can be considered a composite of several 
parts: a hold of the Text menu (line 2); a chug through the menus (lines 7- 
18) and then a shuffle between Text and Style (lines 20-25). Again there 
are brushes which mark the transitions between the components (lines 4-6 
and line 20). 
(28) BC 52 
1 (1.1) 
21 Text::::::::::::::::::: Left::: 
3 Style::::: 
-º 4 View 
5 Edit:: 
6 File::: 
-ý 7 Edit:..:..:.. 
8 View:::::::::::::::::: Full Size::::: 
9 Style:::::::: 
-' 10 Text::::::::::::::: 
: 11 Draw::::::::::..:::.::::::::. .......... 
....... .... 12 Color:..................... .. .......... [13 
»» B: ern::. 
14 1Window::::: 
15 B: "let's see" 
Color:::::::::::::::::::: 
16 
17 B: "how does this thing work" 
18 Draw::::::::::::::::: :: 
19 B: 
[))no:: 
V' 
20: Text 
21 Style:: r::: 
22 B: L "tex: 
23 
Text:::::::::::: L 
24 B: IC u 
25 Style::::: Styles Define Styles 
26 (0.2) 
27 T [Untitled] 
28 (0.6) 
29 B: "err: I can't even remember how to get text in here" 
30 (0.2) 
In previous instances it has been noted that menus appear to draw 
users into different activities. An activity in which a user seems to be 
engaged appears to become transformed in the course of using the menus. 
In these instances of meanders, the changes in activity are more dramatic, 
the user brushing over menus and between two different shapes of menu 
use. In both instances the users appear to be engaged with some problem 
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associated with the text they have just typed. In (27) the user has been 
attempting to alter the style of the text (including trying to centre it) and 
in (28) the user appears be trying to create a box in which to type text. In 
each instance, the user appears to be drawn into a chug through the 
menus, only when they arrive at the last PowerPoint menu do they change 
the course of action. In (27) this is marked by a brush back towards the 
Style and Text menus and in (28) it is marked by the user's `let's see how 
does this thing work' (line 15). These appear to close off the present 
activity and reorient to a new one. 
In meanders, as in the other instances, there are difficulties attributing 
the menu use to a single activity. The users' prior activities do suggest 
some resources for making sense of their uses of menus: for example a 
manipulation of a text box foreshadows a move to the Text menu; or the 
completion of a slide is prior to moving to the Edit menu; or the small size 
of the slide on the screen precedes the visit to the View menus. However, 
from these beginnings it is harder to provide an account of the menu 
activity as a whole. Instead, this appears to be transformed in mid-course, 
so from a visit to a neighbouring menu a slow progression along other 
menus emerges. This, in turn, can then be characterised as a general 
browse of the available functionality, but then from this, a shuffling 
between menus emerges, which itself could be seen as a search for 
something in particular. 
Meanders involve broad and sustained activities with respect to the 
menus. At times visits can be seen to be relevant to a prior activity, at 
others the appropriateness of a visit to the menu is less clear. The user 
appears to be drawn into visits to other menus. The reading of the menus 
can suggest other options, other course of activities open to the user which 
may be of relevance. These readings can be more of general interest. 
Along the way, the user might be drawn back towards, once again to 
consider menus previously visited. However, these visits are now in the 
light of other alternatives which now have been seen. In (27) and (28) the 
users return to a place on the menu near to which they started, but in 
neither is anything selected. 
In the course of using the menus the ongoing activity can be 
transformed. Menus appear to draw users into novel courses of activities, 
sometimes they can be a resource for innovation, at others, for distraction. 
Investigating the details of this rather mundane screen-based activity 
does suggest its emergent nature. The uses of menus, the ways in which 
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they can be read and applied, are contingent with respect to the prior 
activity, potential future courses of activities, and the practical purposes of 
the users. 
3.6 DISCUSSION 
The foregoing investigation of menu use has revealed how rich even a 
straightforward activity like menu use can be, when examined in detail. 
Even a use of a single menu is complex when the range of potential 
purposes that the users could be orienting to, the various ways menus can 
be read and the possible relevance of other objects and prior activities are 
considered. Even if a model of the activity is preserved in terms of goals 
and the selections of different methods to attain them, a great deal of 
flexibility in the model is required. So, for example, goals either need to 
able to be transformed at any time, or to be so vague that almost any 
action could satisfy them. Selection rules would also have to be specified 
that choose between an indefinite number of methods, or the criteria for 
selection open enough so that novel options could be considered. It is 
perhaps not surprising that models such as GOMS are considered to be too 
restrictive to account for human conduct on a computer system. 
The provisional model of Young et al. (1990) does suggest a 
sophisticated way in which models of computer use could be extended. If 
the foregoing analysis of menu use is considered, it does appear that the 
resources utilised by the participants have many similarities to those 
suggested by Young and his colleagues. They distinguish between eight 
classes of knowledge including: knowledge of the screen; the ordinary 
meanings of common words; the specialised meanings of words associated 
with the computer system; knowledge of how to translate everyday 
meanings into these specialised meanings and knowledge of how to divide 
a task into sub-tasks. Such common-sense resources appear to be made 
use of when making sense of a particular menu item, sets of menu items or 
an object on the screen. Young et al. suggest that it is the different 
patterns of knowledge that users have across these categories, in 
interaction with 'external' knowledge arising from the situation, that can 
account for different kinds of behaviours. 
The foregoing investigation suggests a few difficulties with such an 
approach. The first would be to catalogue such knowledge. It would be 
hard to envisage how to delimit a category such as the common-sense 
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meanings of words, or the `knowledge of tasks. Second, it would be hard 
to transform such knowledge into the kind appropriate for a model, i. e. 
propositional knowledge. The use of menus appears to make use of 
common-sense competencies, embodied, tacit and skilled practices, the 
nature of which would be lost when formulating it into a form to be 
utilised in a model. Third, the characterisation of the interaction between 
what appears as external and what is considered internal is problematic. 
Presumably, reading a menu item would be a simple case of such an 
interaction. However, in the instances above, making sense of even a 
single menu item can be seen to be accomplished with respect to what else 
is available and the ongoing course of activity. Models such as Young et 
al. would require a highly volatile, unstable and indefinite catalogue of 
resources. Users would have to be ambivalent about their goals, the ways 
they are to achieve them and the relevant knowledge to be applied to a 
particular case at hand. In other words, goals, knowledge and their rules 
of application would have to be defeasible. 21 
What models like those of Young and his colleagues and GOMS share is 
an account of human conduct in terms of mental processing, particularly 
with respect to an activity of mental preparation. In this, either methods 
are selected or internal knowledge is matched with external information: 
`knowledge of the interface, or of the world is brought to bear, applied or 
utilised. 
It is this conception of knowledge that was questioned in the previous 
chapter. If this is reconsidered, then a distinctive account of human- 
computer interaction might be offered. Drawing from Ryle (1949), the 
skills of using an interface could be considered as `knowledge how' - how 
an activity is accomplished through an interface - rather than the 
knowledge of, or the `knowledge that' a user possesses. This has been an 
aim of the foregoing investigation. Through the use of a preliminary 
typology, some of the ways in ways in which menus figure in the 
production of naturalistic activities have been uncovered. 
The analysis of the uses of menus with respect to a series of types 
should be distinguished from similar classifications of activities 
undertaken in the social sciences and psychologically-informed work. The 
aim here has not been to construct a set of types that exclude, ignore or 
21 A term borrowed from jurisprudence and the philosophy of language (e. g. Hart, 
1961). See, Heath, (1982) and Heath and Luff (1996b) for a discussion of 
defeasibility in relation to the uses of rules in practice. 
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abstract away from the details of particular accomplishments. Rather, the 
classification is intended as a resource through which the details of 
naturalistic activities can be revealed. It should be clear that the types 
outlined cannot be considered to be member's categorisations of their own 
activities (cf. the membership categorisation devices of Sacks, 1992) and 
nor can they be warranted through the sequential resources drawn upon 
in the analysis of talk by conversation analysts. The materials explored 
are not amenable to such analyses. As such, the analysis of menus 
presented in this chapter is more akin to a detailed ethnographic study, 
where the materials available are subjected to close scrutiny and the 
analysis is sensitive to the ongoing concerns of the participants in the 
setting. 22 The foregoing analysis has sought to reveal the nature of the 
activities with respect to the use of menus. For example, menu activities 
can perform multiple duties: the reading of a menu item being an 
opportunity to see if it is relevant as a next action, but also for making 
sense of a prior action, or to discover properties of some screen object. 
Menus can not only used to accomplish particular activities at hand, but 
also those activities can be transformed moment-by-moment through the 
use of menus. Users can appear to be ambivalent about the tasks they are 
performing with menus, they can be drawn into certain courses of actions 
or away from apparent trajectories. 
The uses of menus, even in instances where users visit a single menu, 
can reveal how individuals utilise the resources around them to make 
sense of what is underway and what is possible. The uses of menus can 
shape that understanding, but also that understanding can shape the 
ways menus are used. The menus are read with respect to the ways the 
contents are collected together, the relationship between their title and 
their contents and the individual appearance of each item. The 
understanding of one item made with respect to what is around it, the 
sense of the collection by the appearance and readings of the individual 
entries. 
The activities on the menus can have an improvisational and 
innovatory character. It can be problematic even to provide a suitable post 
hoc characterisation of these. Instead, menu activities develop in their 
course, there is an `at handedness' quality to the conduct. The analysis, 
then, has certain resonances with an earlier study of jazz improvisation on 
22 In this sense it has similarities to the study of the use of signs in a hospital by 
(Sharrock and Anderson, 1979). 
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the piano. In his insightful analysis of his own development as a pianist of 
improvisational jazz, Sudnow (1978) how through practice his note choices 
became `just at hand'. Rather than trying to `find a path' or imagine notes 
up ahead, `good notes were everywhere at hand' (p. 94). Menus on a 
computer system are, of course, of quite a different kind to keys and 
chords on a piano. They have to be read and made sense of. However, the 
openness of these simple options to various readings in the light of the 
particular purposes of the users, means, to some extent, relevant courses 
are often `at hand, right beneath the fingers' (cf. Sudnow, 1978, p. 94). 
From these it is possible to shape new courses of activity along the menu 
bar. 
This understanding of the menus then need not be seen as a mental 
process, but an achievement, an accomplishment made possible through 
the, in situ, and ongoing activity of using an artefact - made possible by 
the continually shifting resources at hand. 
3.7 SUMMARY 
The investigation of menu use has been undertaken within a framework 
that is, in many ways, similar to conventional studies within HCI. An 
`experiment' was recorded where users were given a circumscribed activity 
to perform and an analysis undertaken which focused on a particular 
phenomenon. This focus, the use of menus, itself being a topic of research 
and enquiry within HCI. 
The nature of the analysis has been distinctive, however. Instead of 
particular pre-specified criteria, such as the accuracy or speed of the 
activity being of issue, the activities have been investigated afresh. 
Through the use of a transcription system, developed for the purpose, 
instances of naturalistic menu use have been explored. In order not to lay 
too much emphasis on the goals and purposes that users may have when 
using the menus, a simple taxonomy of menu activity has been utilised. 
This reveals the richness and complexity of what appears to be a 
straightforward activity. 
Not only do there appear to be a wide variety of uses for menus, but 
also the very nature of a particular use can be transformed in the course of 
its accomplishment. In scanning a menu bar a user could be involved in a 
wide range of activities including those that could be characterised as 
selecting an item, searching for an item and browsing through a sequence 
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of menus. These activities could also be characterised as discovering 
properties of the system, and objects on the screen, or as solving, defining 
and redefining the general activity in which the user is engaged. The 
particular nature of the activity is often ambiguous. Also, even when 
traversing a single menu or when holding open a menu, the user's activity 
can be transformed in the light of the particular circumstances at hand. 
There is often an ambivalence to the user's activity and a user can appear 
to use menus as a resource for improvisation. These are not only those 
users who could be characterised as `novices' seeking inspiration for a next 
possible step. The menus are such a resource for all users, once a certain 
skill of moving through the menus is acquired any user can be drawn from 
one current activity into another. 
It has been suggested that it may be problematic to consider these 
practices in terms of an individual's knowledge, whether internal or 
interacting with external information. Rather these resources might be 
considered in terms of the ongoing activity when using an interface, the 
practicalities of menu use, the in situ demands and possibilities that 
menus offer and provide. Menus figure in how individuals produce actions 
on an interface and render it intelligible. In this way, menu use can be 
considered an emergent, improvisational and innovatory activity. 
The nature of the foregoing investigation places constraints on this 
exploration of contingent activities. In organising their actions and 
activities, the participants in the exercise no doubt orient to the 
constrained nature of the experiment. For practical purposes they are 
accomplishing an experiment, and this is revealed in how they carry out 
the activity, what they type into the application and how they order their 
activities. They are isolated from their work activities, other individuals 
and are performing a contrived activity. 
An extension of the study would be to explore the nature of using a 
slide-making application in the course of everyday activities. This is 
indeed the focus of an ethnographic study by Nardi (1996b). However, the 
nature of screen-based activities can also be explored more broadly 
in a 
range of domains. In the next chapter, the use of a different graphical 
application is considered -a Computer Aided Design package - with 
respect to the practices and activities of the participants in the settings, 
that is, the members of an architecture practice. 
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Chapter 4 
Human-Computer 
`Interaction' in an 
Architecture Practice: 
observations on computer use and 
collaborative activities in a 
workplace 
Let him be educated, skilful with the pencil, instructed in geometry, know 
much history, have followed the philosophers with attention, understand 
music, have some knowledge of medicine, know the opinions of the jurists, 
and be acquainted with astronomy and the theory of the heavens. 
(Vitruvius, 1960, p. 5-6 cited in Cuff, 1992, p. 84) 
The `bricoleur' is adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; 
but, unlike the engineer, he does not subordinate each of them to the 
availability of raw materials and tools conceived for the purpose of the 
project. His universe of instruments is closed and the rules of his game 
are always to make do with `whatever is at hand'; that is to say with a set 
of tools and materials which is always finite and is also heterogeneous 
because what it contains bears no relation to the current project, or 
indeed to any particular project, but is the contingent result of all the 
occasions there have been to renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it 
with the remains of previous constructions or destructions. 
(Levi-Strauss, 1962, p. 17) 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
By examining individuals engaged in a circumscribed activity on a 
computer system in an isolated environment, the domain presented in 
Chapter 3 has many similarities to those experiments undertaken in much 
of the research undertaken within HCI. In this chapter the focus shifts to 
the production of screen-based activities in a work setting, an architecture 
practice. Through the analysis of naturally-occurring instances of screen- 
based activities, the ways in which computers are used to achieve the 
practical, everyday accomplishments of drawing and architectural work 
are examined. This approach to human-computer interaction differs from 
most of the work carried out in HCI, particularly the conventional 
approaches reviewed in Chapter 2. When examining naturally occurring 
screen-based activities not only is it problematic to categorise these in 
terms of a priori specifications, as suggested in the previous chapter, but 
these activities may be shaped by the contributions of others. Even 
screen-based activities then, the typical domain of HCI, can be considered 
as collaborative. The ways in which these activities are collaboratively 
achieved is the concern of this chapter. 
By exploring the collaborative nature of screen-based activities the 
concerns of this chapter resonate with issues raised by researchers in 
CSCW, not only because of the analysis of the use of artefacts in 
workplaces, but also because of the focus on activities associated with 
drawing. `Shared drawing', both as an activity and as a domain for 
technological support has been a long-standing concern of researchers 
within CSCW. However, the approach taken here explores the 
interactional production of screen-based activities. This orientation 
suggests what a more finer sense of `sharing' and `collaboration' than that 
current being considered in CSCW. 
As a foundation for the analysis of the collaborative production of 
human-computer interaction, the nature of individual screen-based 
activities in an architecture practice is explored. After briefly giving some 
background to the motivations, analytic assumptions and methods behind 
this and the remaining studies in the thesis (Section 4.2), the setting and 
the technologies utilised within it are outlined (Section 4.3). This provides 
for a consideration of the issues raised in the previous chapter, in 
particular with respect to how architects organise their conduct on the 
screen, for example when they use menus (Section 4.4). Two further 
features of screen-based activity are explored in detail, the ways in which 
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they manipulate objects (Section 4.5) and how they navigate around the 
drawings (section 4.6). 
In section 4.7 the domain of concern is broadened. Changing focus 
from the details of just the screen-based activities on the computer system, 
such activities are considered with respect to the ongoing conduct of the 
architects. Through the detailed analysis of an instance of activity, the 
use of the computer is explored in relation to other activities on paper 
plans, and the talk and visual conduct of the participants. The 
interactions of the participants are shaped by the shifting resources 
available to them on the paper and the screen. Moreover, and what may 
be of more concern with respect to HCI, the screen-based activities are 
organised, produced and even designed for another co-participant. This 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the relevance of the analysis to 
current conceptions of context within HCI and CSCW, and potential 
resources that may be useful when considering the analysis of workplace 
activities (Section 4.8). 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
One consequence of the recent critiques of plan-based, goal-oriented 
models of system use, by Suchman and others (Suchman, 1987; Winograd 
and Flores, 1986; Gilbert, 1987; Frohlich and Luff, 1990; Whalen, 1995b) 
is a turn away from the focus on experiments on individuals performing 
restricted tasks and towards more naturalistic studies of the uses of 
technology. Hence, there have been a variety of studies of technology and 
artefact use in a range of settings, including control systems for air traffic, 
airports and urban transportation (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Harper 
and Hughes, 1993; Heath and Luff, 1992a), record-keeping systems in 
general practice (Greatbatch, et al., 1993), navigation on a large naval 
vessel (Hutchins, 1990), and computer-aided dispatch systems in 
emergency services (Whalen, 1995b). This chapter reports one such 
workplace study, of architects using Computer-Aided Design systems in a 
medium-sized architectural practice. 
Although addressing particular sociological concerns, the workplace 
studies mentioned above have principally been reported in terms of their 
relevance for technology design and deployment. The reports of the 
studies have been primarily addressed to an audience concerned with 
supporting collaborative activities with new technologies: those involved 
in 
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the emerging field of Computer-Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW). 
Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that the focus of the studies has been 
towards forms of collaboration and participation. The technologies 
currently being developed are principally concerned with distributed 
capabilities, either within a single setting, like a meeting, or 
geographically dispersed, through computer networks or through video. 
As the primary interests of researchers in CSCW are with respect to these 
capabilities, the design of the particular interfaces to the various devices 
can remain within the domain HCI. 
Similarly, the analytic focus of HCI and CSCW can appear disjoint. 
Workplace and other studies of collaborative work explore the nature of 
social interaction and cooperative activities between groups of individuals, 
whilst those concerned with human-computer interaction focus on the 
individual using the computer. As mentioned in Chapter 1, methods and 
conceptual frameworks drawn from the social sciences are considered 
appropriate to the former study, whilst experiments and psychological 
conceptions can be utilised for the latter (e. g. Dix, et al., 1993). However, 
this leaves the primarily cognitive conception of artefact use largely in 
place. The potential consequences of the critiques of Suchman and others 
are dissipated. Whereas in CSCW the focus has been on the interactional 
and collaborative nature of artefact use, the concerns and approaches of 
those within HCI can remain largely unaltered. Moreover, studies of 
collaborative work have, save for a few exceptions (e. g. Whalen, 1995b), 
ignored the domain of activities which have been of interest to researchers 
in HCI: the ongoing production of activities on computer systems. By 
examining naturally occurring materials gathered in a workplace setting, 
such activities can be subjected to scrutiny, and the local and emergent 
nature of screen-based activities with respect to the skills and practices of 
architects can be considered. This analysis may suggest some ways in 
which conventional activities which have been investigated by researchers 
in HCI and User Centred System Design (UCSD), such as direct 
manipulation and navigation through systems, can be reconsidered. 
An alternative development for the field of HCI is to develop 
psychological frameworks and conceptions so that these account for social 
activities and naturalistic materials. Such are the motivations for those 
interested in Distributed Cognition (e. g. Hutchins, 1995, considered in 
Chapter 2), and related initiatives (e. g. Nardi, 1996a). These leave 
particular cognitive conceptions of human conduct in place, whilst seeking 
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to explore conduct `in context'. The motivations and concerns of such 
programmes have much in common with other work within CSCW, indeed 
when considering the collaborative, communicative and informal practices 
surrounding the use of artefacts it can be difficult to distinguish the 
approaches. 1 However, when considering the use of particular devices the 
cognitive and psychological foundations reappear: an individual's activity 
still appears to be disjoint from a surrounding social and communicative 
context. 
As an alternative approach resources could be drawn from the large 
literature within the social sciences concerned with the use of new 
technologies, particularly analyses of work activities that makes use of 
qualitative materials gathered in real-world institutions and 
organisations. For example, within the sociology of work and 
organisations a wide range of studies drawing on field observations and 
informal interviews in the workplace provide accounts of the interactions 
between participants and the interrelationships between the introduction 
of new technology and the organisations and institutions into which it has 
been deployed (Taylor, 1911; Hughes, 1956; Becker, et al., 1961; Simon, 
1960; Burns and Stalker, 1961; Cyert and March, 1963; Friedman, 1977; 
Hannan and Frieman, 1977; Aldrich, 1979; Dawson, 1994). 
Within this body of work a wide range of orientations have been taken 
towards the nature of organisations and the tasks and interactions of 
participants in the workplace (Morgan, 1986). Given this diverse 
literature, it is not surprising that researchers in CSCW, and to a lesser 
extent HCI, have sought to explore the utility of this corpus of studies for 
the field (see reviews by March, 1991 and Jirotka, et al., 1992). 
Particular attention has focused on the possibilities of drawing from the 
work of Mumford (1986) and earlier of Emery and Trist (1969) which 
consider organisations in terms of the informal relationships and as socio- 
technical systems (Cherns, 1976) This notion has been particularly 
influential on researchers concerned with the design of new technology 
encouraging a more participatory approach to the development of systems 
where managers, individuals and designers collaborate in the process (e. g. 
Bjerknes, et al., 1987; Ehn, 1988; Greenbaum, 1988). Although these 
studies frequently involve the researchers undertaking observations and 
interviews with participants, the focus of these exercises is on involving 
1 For example, see Nardi's (1996c) comments on the similarities between 
Distributed Cognition and Activity Theory and the possibilities for convergence. 
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participants in the design activity. Through these exercises it is hoped 
that the participants concerns with new technology will become part of the 
design, and that the designs will in some way be consistent with their 
skills and work practices, whether these are tacit or made explicit in the 
process. Nevertheless, if some qualitative materials are gathered in the 
process some orientation is required for their analysis. 
In the remaining studies in this thesis a particular orientation is taken 
to the analysis that focuses on the tacit practices of the participants in the 
work setting. As mentioned in Chapter 2 this draws on previous work 
within conversation analysis and the ethnomethodology. It is worth 
reiterating some of the assumptions underlying the analysis. 
First, the analysis focuses on the practices and procedures employed 
by the members of a particular setting. It has been a long-standing 
problem within the social sciences to assert the relevance of a particular 
analysis of social actions and activities (Weber, 1947). By detailed 
inspection of in situ human conduct the relevant `features of context' are 
those which are oriented to by the participants themselves. Hence, the 
`problem of relevance' is also one for participants, whose solution is 
revealed in the in situ procedures, practices, knowledge and reasoning 
they use and orient to. An analyses then seeks to specify, and provide 
evidence for, the relevance of features of context which inform the very 
accomplishment of the participants' conduct. 
Second, the analyses in the remaining chapters focus on the 
interactional organisation of social actions and activities, where these 
activities may be accomplished through visual and vocal conduct as well as 
though tasks achieved on or through a computer system. 
Third, the principal organisation of these interactional social actions 
and activities is sequential: a prior action providing the resources for 
making sense of a next action; a next action revealing the relevance of a 
prior. 
Fourth, the domain of inquiry of these studies - tasks and activities on 
and through a computer system - may also be sequentially organised. 
Such tasks as an individual entering a command into a computer may, at 
times, serve to `respond' to a colleague's prior action. Particular tasks may 
also provide the resources for next actions by others to be accomplished. 
In other words, tasks may also be sequentially organised. 
Fifth, following an ethnomethodological orientation, the common-sense 
organisations revealed through the participants' actions are seen both as a 
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topic and as a resource for inquiry. They provide a focus for the study as 
well as access to previously unstudied phenomena and the `methods of 
understanding' of the participants (Garfinkel 1967 p. 31). 
The orientation necessarily requires empirical materials, both of visual 
and vocal conduct. From these lengthy audio-visual recordings instances 
of particular phenomena are selected, say of possible coordinated computer 
activities with visual and vocal conduct. As is typically undertaken by 
researchers in conversation, these instances are then transcribed and 
collected together and into candidate sets for analyses. These sets are 
refined, often requiring a return to the original materials and more 
detailed transcription. In the studies in this thesis it was also necessary 
to develop novel transcription systems for detailed analysis and 
comparison, particularly with respect to providing a resource for revealing 
aspect of computer use found in the materials. Particular instances were 
then selected for inclusion in the thesis, this often requiring further 
developing the transcription systems for presenting the fragments. 
Also in the development of the analysis instances which appeared not 
to fit within the candidate sets were subjected to particular detailed 
scrutiny. These so-called `deviant cases' provided for extending and 
enhancing the analysis by revealing how the available resources were 
being oriented to. Such cases can often help a search for a more general 
socio-interactional organisation, which can deal with the specifics of the 
case at hand whilst preserving the integrity of related cases. They can also 
be used to demonstrate how a procedure or practice is oriented to even 
when a feature or action, recurrently provided for by a proposed 
organisation, is either absent or uncharacteristic. So, in Chapter 5 
differences in the timing of the vocal activities of participants suggest 
further how temporal features may utilised as a resource within an 
interaction, and in Chapter 6 activities that, at first, did not appear to be 
tightly coordinated revealed resources which participants were orienting 
to in their collaboration. 
After giving some background to activities undertaken in the 
architectural practices and continuing some of the issues revealed in the 
study of menu use in Chapter 3, these analytic and methodological 
resources underpin the remaining studies in this thesis. They provide a 
foundation for unpicking how the activities accomplished in and through a 
computer system are interactionally organised, allowing for instances of 
computer use to be scrutinised in some detail. Thus, the social context of 
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computer use need not be considered in terms of some spatial conception, 
as an `arena' in which individual activities are accomplished, even where 
the focus in on the `periphery' (Brown and Duguid, 1994), or in terms of 
some pre-specified variables, rather the context can be considered as 
continually being produced and shaped by the ongoing interactional 
activities of participants. 
4.3 TECHNOLOGIES AND TOOLS FOR ARCHITECTURAL WORK 
The domain of architecture and, more generally, design has been utilised 
both within HCI and CSCW as a resource for the development of novel 
computer systems and as a site for analysing computer and artefact use. 
So, for example, the practices of designers have been considered a useful 
starting point for considering the capabilities of collaborative systems, 
particularly the designers' use of shared artefacts (Bodker, et al., 1987; 
Harper and Carter, 1994; Tang, 1990; Tang and Leifer, 1988). Such 
studies are either centred on constrained `design' tasks in experimental 
settings (e. g. Tang, 1990; Tang and Leifer, 1988), or rely on fieldwork, 
exploring the activities surrounding design, particularly the 
communication between designers and their `informal' work practices 
(Harper and Carter, 1994; Murray, 1993; Rogers, 1992). 
The materials upon which the observations in this chapter are drawn 
consist of video recordings of 'naturally occurring' computer use and 
collaboration in a provincial architectural practice in England. 2 The 
2 The data consist of field notes and video recordings which were collected on 8 
different days in a period of three months. Two video-cameras were used, one 
focusing on the screen and the other, either on general activities in the design 
office, on an architect's work area, or on the architect in relation to the computer. 
Hence, there are nearly 90 hours of video-based materials available. 
These materials principally concern the main project in which the practice 
was involved. This was to produce the working drawings for a large public 
building -a courthouse. The original designs had been produced by a public 
agency and the activities of the architects involved producing drawings that had 
the necessary details for building contractors to use. The project consisted of two 
parts: the demolition and redevelopment of portions of an old, existing courthouse 
and the design of a completely new building linked to the old one. The work of 
producing the working drawings was originally scheduled to take about ten 
months. 
During the period of data collection, around six architects were working full- 
time on the building. The project was divided between the architects in terms of 
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practice studied is, for the United Kingdom, a medium sized practice, 
employing about 15 architects, town planners and graphic designers. It is 
an unusual British practice in that, although it is quite small, it uses 
computers extensively throughout the process of designing a building 
including: showing clients what prospective buildings will look like and 
how they will fit within the local landscape; producing the working 
drawings for building contractors, and even drawing sketches of original 
designs. In order to do this, they extensively use Apple Macintoshes, and 
principally a CAD package called MiniCad to construct drawings. 3 
The use of the application and the system makes the setting quite 
opportune to study. This is the same hardware as used in the experiment 
reported in the last chapter, so that the in situ use of that technology can 
be explored. The software incorporates a direct manipulation interface 
and a direct metaphor. There has been a considerable amount of research 
into these ideas (e. g. Ankrah, et al., 1990; Hutchins, et al., 1986; Norman, 
1988), primarily because they are considered to help make an interface 
easy to use and yet it is unclear, precisely, why this might be. Such 
properties may account for the apparent popularity of the Apple 
Macintosh for professionals like architects. However, it has also been 
claimed that the system's popularity is due to its unique design and 
marketing, reflecting `creativity' and even a certain 'individualistic and 
anti-establishment' outlook (Jones, 1990, p. 25). By examining the in situ 
use of the technology it may be possible to cast light on the affordances of 
the system, and particularly how it might support the actual 
accomplishment of practical activities by architects. 
the drawings that had to be produced: one worked on the old building, one on the 
plans for the bottom six levels of the new building; one on the plans for the top 
five levels; one on the sections, one on the elevations and one on the staircases. 
Two more architects contributed to the work: one was concerned with managing 
this and other of the practice's projects and an eighth worked part-time on 
drawings, including those of the details of the windows. This was the general 
division of responsibilities. The architects, in the course of their work, would 
make more contingent arrangements concerning which plans had to be drawn so 
that these could be produced according to the demands of other organisations, 
such as the fire and planning authorities and the customer. 
3 Macintosh is a trademark of Apple Computer Inc. and MiniCad is a trademark of 
Diehl Graphsoft Inc. More details concerning the version of the software used by 
the architects (v. 3.0) are given in Diehl Graphsoft (1990). 
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At various stages during the course of a particular commission, the 
architects will be given the responsibility to undertake drawings of a 
particular section, plan, elevation or detail of a building. 4 In the cases 
focused on here, these include the staircases. As both the number of 
architects involved and the number of drawings can vary throughout the 
course of a project, so the division of responsibilities related to the kinds of 
drawing each architect worked on changed. Furthermore, the architects 
had to continually collaborate in order to produce a consistent set of 
drawings. 
All the architects on the project used the MiniCad package which 
shares many features with other Macintosh applications. Figure 4.1 
shows the overall screen layout when MiniCad is opened for the first time. 
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Figure 4.1: The MiniCad Screen when opened. The details of the tools on 
the top left of the screen are shown, enlarged, on the right. 
MiniCad's tools are provided on two palettes, initially on the left hand 
side of the screen. The top one contains drawing tools allowing users to 
type text, draw rectangles, polygons, arcs and special, recurring symbols 
such as double doors and desks. The bottom palette is for a set of tools 
that allow the user to constrain the placing of certain objects on the 
screen, for example, constraining one line to be perpendicular to another 
4 Plans cut through a building horizontally about 1.5m above floor height, sections 
cut through vertically, usually at places where there are significant changes to 
the shape of the building, and elevations show the sides of the building viewed 
from the outside and capturing all its possible faces. 
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or ensuring that two objects fit precisely together. Below the main 
window is a `data display bar' that provides information about the status 
of the drawing at a particular time, such as the current position of the 
cursor. Above the main window is a menu bar. Figure 4.2 shows the 
menu bar and the contents of the individual menus. 
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In addition to the Apple menu available on all Macintosh applications, 
there are eleven MiniCad menus. The File and Edit menus have similar 
options to those in other Macintosh applications for opening, printing, 
saving and closing files and for simple editing operations. These menus 
also include options for smoothing, mirroring and reshaping objects. The 
Tool menu collects together several miscellaneous functions including 
joining objects together, combining several lines into a polygon, breaking 
up a polygon into several lines and changing surfaces for later three- 
dimensional manipulation. MiniCad allows the user to create a drawing 
in layers. These act rather like tracing paper, except that the user not 
only has control over which layers of a drawing can be seen at any time, 
but also how each layer can be used, so certain layers can be invisible, 
greyed out, visible but unchangeable or visible and changeable. Options 
for manipulating layers are given in the menu labelled `==`. Apart from 
the Delta menu (labelled `o') which provides users with ways of changing a 
Q Tool 
Rdd Surface 
Clip Surface 
Intersect Surface 
(onuert to Lines 
Conuert to Polygons 
Combine Into Surface 
Join xi 
Trim XT 
Fillet... 
Intersect 861 
Hatch... 
133 
drawing into a 3D representation, the rest of the menus have similar 
capabilities to menus in other Macintosh drawing packages. 5 
4.4 THE PRACTICE USING MENUS 
Although designing a building using a CAD package is a quite different 
activity to the production of presentation slides explored in the previous 
chapter, the architects' uses of menus appear to be similar in many ways. 
For example, in the following instance an architect is working on an 
elevation of the old building. 6 
(1) 4B MV 5124 - Transcript 1 
1 . I. Fill:..:::.: ".. ................: "...... ..... ....... 
2 Color::: Fill Foreground:::: (0.5) 
3 Color (Fill Foreground) (Fill Background) (Pen Foreground) 
4 (Pen Background) Use Layer Colors:::: T 
5 (5.7) 
He opens the Fill menu, holds it down for over 3 seconds (line 1), then 
goes down the adjacent Color menu (line 2), back up to the title bar, and 
then down again, selecting `Use Layer Colors' (lines 3-4). So, even in a 
setting where an individual uses the system almost continually every day 
in the course of his work, there appears to be some ambivalence over the 
nature of the activity. It could be possible to characterise this use of the 
menus (lines 1-4) as a `search' for a particular item (i. e. `Use Layer Colors') 
where the long hold on Fill is considered to mark a failed step and the 
eventual selection a successful match. Or, as in the accounts of Mayes and 
Young and their colleagues, in terms of some type of matching of semantic 
5 To list these: the Text menu offers a range of ways of changing the style, font, size 
and layout of text; the Page menu allows the user to view the drawing in various 
ways; the Color menu provides `pens' for drawing and shading objects on the 
screen in different colours; the Fill menu offers a range of shadings (or hatchings) 
for objects; and the Line Weighting menu (labelled `//') gives a variety of styles of 
lines in differing thicknesses, differing dashing patterns and with differing 
arrowheads. Though these options are similar to other graphics packages, for 
example PowerPoint considered in the last chapter, MiniCad offers a larger 
number of options, with a greater degree of flexibility. 
MiniCad also provides for the user to associate spreadsheets (or `worksheets') 
with drawings. The rightmost menu, the command menu, provides options for 
manipulating these. 
6 The transcription system uses the same orthography as that in the previous 
chapter. A fuller description of the transcription system is given in Luff and 
Heath (1990) 
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and lexical, or internal and external knowledge, taking place (Mayes, et 
al., 1988; Young, et al., 1990). However, the Fill menu only contains a set 
of different graphic patterns (see Figure 4.2). It is, of course, possible to 
provide an account of such an activity in terms of plans and goals, but a 
goal that is both related to the long look at the set of patterns and the 
selection of `Use Layer Colors' would have to rather broadly defined. So, 
as in the cases of menu use in previous chapter, the activity, even for a 
routine user of a system, would appear to be more fluid, flexible and 
dynamic. 
Over five seconds later the architect goes on to briefly peep at the File 
menu (line 6) before typing the command key and the `S' key together (line 
8)7. 
(1) 4B MV 5124 - Transcript 1 
5 (5.7) 
6 .. File::: New (Open) 1' 
7 (2.3) 
8 `ßßS' 
Again, this could be viewed as a search: for example as a search for an 
appropriate key command for saving a file displayed on the File menu. 
Both the command and the `accelerator' for the Save command are 
displayed on the menu. The typing (in line 8) could be related to the 
activity with the menu, but to account for these in terms of a goal, plan, 
learning or matching knowledge appears somewhat strange. As Save is 
available when the menu is opened (in line 6), such an account would 
require the target of the search or the knowledge on the interface not to be 
appropriate just prior to when the command was eventually performed 
(line 8). Some aspect of the knowledge would have to be defeasible, 
appropriate and applied in one case and not the other. Alternatively, the 
goal could be transformed or changed in some way. The question then 
would be what relevance such an account of shifting goals would have to 
the user's ongoing activity. 
7 As with many other applications for the Macintosh, MiniCad offers users, what 
are called, `accelerators' as quick alternatives to selecting items from menus. 
These are performed by typing combinations of keys simultaneously (called 
`chording'). In (1), the user types the command key labelled `SC' and the `S' key 
together. This performs the same operation as selecting `Save' from the File 
menu. These chords are often displayed on the menu to the right of the 
appropriate item. 
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As in the case with the PowerPoint menus considered in the last 
chapter, the difficulty may be not be in specifying an appropriate 
characterisation of the activity, but in characterising the activity in terms 
of the knowledge and goals that the participants possess at any particular 
time. 
In the following instance, the architect is working on a particular box 
on a plan. 
(2) 6B MV 4302 
11 //:::: ((Line thickness 1))::: ((Line thickness 2))::::: 
2 Fill:::::: 
3 Color::::::::::::: Put Down Color::: Use B&W Color: T 
Once again, this activity does not appear to be that conventionally 
associated with experts using menus. It is also difficult to view it as a 
search for a solution to a particular problem, the line menu offering quite 
different possibilities for action to the Fill and Color menus. Instead, the 
nature of the activity of the user when engaged with the menus appears to 
develop in the course of using them. Although appearing to go to select a 
particular line width, the nature of the user's activity transforms as he is 
using the menus. Characterising such an activity as an interaction 
between knowledge in the head of the user and knowledge on the menus 
(as in Young, et al., 1990), focuses analysis on developing some mechanism 
or causal connection linking the two together and ignores the innovatory, 
improvisatory and, almost ambivalent nature of the activity. 
Studies in HCI frequently focus on one aspect of the interface, like the 
use of menus, or on particular pre-designed tasks which users are asked to 
accomplish, often in experimental settings. By concentrating on 
individuals carrying out such tasks, these studies operate with a relatively 
constrained conception of screen-based activity. In the following sections a 
broader view of the interaction between computer and user will be taken, 
one which explores naturalistic screen-based activities. 
4.5 THE MANIPULATION OF OBJECTS 
Much of the architects' day-to-day activity is involved in making detailed 
changes to the working drawings of the building using the CAD package. 
It is worth examining in detail an instance of this screen-based activity. 
In the following fragment an architect is making changes to a staircase in 
a drainage tunnel that leads away from underneath the building. Figure 
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4.3 is a sketch of the plan of the staircase. The arrow is used by architects 
to indicate the downward direction of the staircase. Each stair is also 
numbered. 8 
Figure 4.3: Sketch of the plan of the Tunnel Staircase (line 1, fragment 3, 
arrowed in transcript 1) 
The user has just been moving around the plan, both panning across it 
and selecting various layers of the drawing. He then shapes a box (a 
Marquee9) over the region of the staircase (line 1), 
(3) 7B MV 4284 - Transcript 110 
f11 >Marquee:::::::::::::::::::.:: > T 
2 (0.8) 
3 VC 
4 (1.4) 
5 (XI X1 X1 aßß. ), 
6 (1.5) 
7 `(aß. L)' 
8 (1.9) 
9 `8ßV' 
This marks the objects contained within the box as `selected'. He types 
the command and `C' keys simultaneously (line 3), moves down five layers 
(lines 5-7), by holding down the command key and pressing the down 
arrow key, and then types the command and `V' keys simultaneously (line 
9). Together the actions in lines 1 to 9 are commonly characterised in 
Macintosh and related applications, as a `cut and paste', or more 
accurately, a `copy and paste'. The architect copies a portion of staircase 
8 These are just visible in the figures, numbered from 1 to 15. By the operations 
that follow, the architect accomplishes a deepening of the tunnel. 
9A Marquee is a dashed box which can be shaped by then user to mark out an area 
of interest on the screen. 
10 '>' is used when the user `drags' the mouse over some area of the screen, in line 1, 
for 2.3 seconds in marking off an area of the screen. 
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from one layer and pastes it onto another (see Figure 4.4). The architect 
goes on to manipulate the amended plan. 
Figure 4.4: Sketch of the Tunnel 
Staircase (after line 22, transcript 2) 
mº 
(3) 7B MV 4284 - Transcript 2 
10 (7.2) 
11 `8ßJ' 
12 (3.0) 
13 1 >Marquee::::::::::::: >T 
14 (0.3) 
15 IT 
16 (0.2) 
17 .L ((left point of arrow))1' 
18 (1.6) 
19 L ((right point of arrow)) T 
20 (1.5) 
21 1 >((arrow)):::::::: > T 
22 (4.1) 
He types `command-J' (line 11), this `joins' the new portion of staircase 
to the old. After marking out an area of the staircase that contains all the 
numbers of the individual stairs (line 13), the architect clicks in the area 
above the staircase (line 15). He then selects each end of an arrow and 
then moves it upwards and rightwards (lines 17-21). After positioning a 
construction line using the `+' drawing tool and removing an indent in the 
wall below the staircase (not shown in the transcript), the architect moves 
first the wall at the end of the staircase (line 29) and then extends the wall 
alongside it (line 31). The shape of the walls now encloses the extended 
length of the staircase. Figure 4.5 is a sketch of the plan at this point. 
(3) 7B MV 4284 - Transcript 3 
((moves construction line and indent in wall)) 
28 (3.3) 
29 1 >[Right >T 
30 (2.3) 
31 1 >[Top Wall]::::::: >T 
4- 
(after line 31, transcript 3) 
The architect then removes a portion of stairs at the left end of the 
staircase and makes several alterations to the numbers on the stairs. He 
then selects the right and left hand sides of the arrow (line 35 and 37). 
After appearing to group the ends of the arrow together (by the `command- 
G' combination, line 39) he moves it into a new position on the stairs (line 
41, Figure 4.6). 
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Figure 4.5: The Tunnel Staircase 
(3) 7B MV 4284 - Transcript 4 
((removes numbers and stairs)) 
35 .1 ((right point of arrow)) T 
36 (1.5) 
37 1 ((left point of arrow)) T 
38 (1.4) 
39 `(NG)' 
40 (2.9) 
41 .ý >((arrow)):....::: " ....:::.::::::..............::::...:::...: > 
T :..... ......... 
Figure 4.6: The Tunnel Staircase 
(after line 41, transcript 3) 
This fragment is extracted from an extended flow of activity. It is 
possible, post hoc, to view these actions as steps towards a goal that the 
architect had before commencing, or in terms of sub-tasks that make up 
some overall task he had to accomplish. In order to extend the staircase, 
the user has to add a new portion to the existing flight of stairs, and move 
the existing walls to surround this new portion. The numbers and arrows 
on the new staircase have also to be matched to the new drawing. The 
remainder of the activity could then be characterised as local adjustments 
necessary in order to accomplish the overall goal. 
It might be expected that an activity such as extending a staircase 
would, for an architect, be a routine, general procedure that, with minor 
alterations, could be instantiated for particular cases at hand. Yet, in the 
fragment above, and throughout the corpus of data, it is hard to discover 
such a routine procedure. Although it is possible to construct a post hoc 
`plan' for an architect's manipulation of a drawing, even for other 
manipulations of staircases, there appears to be no generality to these 
`plans'. 
When the new portion of staircase is pasted onto the old there are a 
range of actions to perform and a range of possible ways of performing 
them including: moving the walls and stairs; renumbering the stairs; and 
grouping, ungrouping and constraining the movement of the various 
objects displayed on the screen. As the architect continues to manipulate 
the plan there remains a range of further and different possibilities for 
action. As with the use of menus mentioned earlier, the nature of the 
screen-based activity that the user engages in is continually changing 
throughout the articulation of the activity. 
A characterisation of the activity as a pre-specified plan would have to 
provide for some flexibility in the way the `sub tasks' are carried out. 
It 
would be difficult to envisage operators or selection rules that could 
define 
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an ordering between, say, removing an indent from a wall, moving an 
arrow, or renumbering the stairs. There would be an indefinite number of 
such orderings. Similarly, apparent diversions from a plan, or 
`inappropriate' activities might have to be characterised as `errors', 
`aborted sub-tasks' and the like. 
So, in foregoing fragment (3) the architect selects the numbers of the 
stairs using a `Marquee' (line 13) and then deselects them with the 
subsequent click of the mouse button (line 15). 
(3) 7B MV 4284 - Transcript 2 
10 (7.2) 
11 `8ßJ' 
12 (3.0) 
13 .L >Marquee ::::::::::::: >T 
14 (0.3) 
15 IT 
16 (0.2) 
17 1 ((left point of arrow)) T 
This selection and deselection does not contribute to a change in the 
drawing. However, it is also not arbitrary: the Marquee takes some time 
to shape over a portion of the drawing. When the Marquee has been 
drawn the items within it are then highlighted. Making the selection with 
the Marquee also brings into view a set of objects that can be manipulated. 
This provides resources concerning not only what can be manipulated but 
the range of relevant next activities for the architect. Actions performed 
at the time will be applied to the selection. The click away removes the 
highlighting, and also provides for a range of other next actions, like 
selecting the left end of the arrow (line 17). The Marquee is one way of 
discovering what can be done at the current time on the interface and 
what is appropriate. By its use the architect can reveal the nature of the 
objects on the screen, whether they are disjoint or connected, for example. 
Therefore, a particular activity need not have to be related to some 
subsuming goal or plan, instead each action can be seen to be linked to the 
prior and making possible a range of next actions. A course of activities 
could then be seen to unfold temporally and sequentially. There is no 
doubt a trajectory to the actions, but it is managed locally from moment- 
to-moment, a selection bringing to light possible next actions, revealing 
the resources through which the objects on the screen can be manipulated. 
Likewise a movement of an object can make apparent not only the further 
actions to be undertaken, but the nature of those actions: adding the block 
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of stairs reveals the ways the accompanying arrows and numbers need to 
be altered. Even the starting point in this fragment suggests an 
improvisatory and unfolding nature to the activity. Rather than creating 
the additional stairs afresh, they are borrowed from a layer above. Not 
only does this save on the work the architect has to perform, but also helps 
ensure that the drawings on the various layers will match. The architect 
utilises the tools that are at hand, with what remains of previous 
constructions and destructions (cf. Levi-Strauss, 1962). 
The ease of manipulating screen objects on systems like MiniCad on 
the Macintosh has been characterised in terms of its `directness' 
(Hutchins, et al., 1986). Although the user has to move objects on the 
screen by operating a mouse and a mouse button which then makes 
cursors, marquees and the like move around the screen, these act directly 
on the images on the screen, unlike, say, type-written commands. 
Hutchins et al. explain the properties of such interfaces in terms of the 
mappings between an individual's goals and the physical tasks required to 
operate a system. They suggest that there are two aspects to the notion of 
directness of an interface: distance and engagement. Distance accounts 
for the translation necessary from goals into physical tasks. Engagement 
accounts for the `qualitative feeling' of manipulating the objects of interest. 
Direct manipulation interfaces make the distance shorter by, for example, 
avoiding the semantic translation necessary to construct typewritten 
commands, and they increase engagement by employing visual metaphors 
of objects related to the user's task on the screen. Other researchers have 
attempted to further clarify aspects of direct manipulation by, for example, 
exploring the interrelationships between direct manipulation and 
metaphors (Ankrah, et al., 1990) or by characterising the properties of 
screen objects in terms of their affordances (Gayer, 1991). 
To account for the screen-based activities of architects using the 
MiniCad application conceptions such as metaphor may not be adequate. 
They may be useful for interface designers when developing the system, 
but it is unclear to what extent the invocation of the metaphors of pens, 
erasers, rulers, set squares and tracing paper utilised within the 
MiniCad 
interface design contributes to an analysis of the architects' moment-to- 
moment use of the system. Similarly, an account of the affordances of 
the 
objects on the screen may be able to suggest the various perceptual 
properties associated with different kinds of lines, boxes and shapes, 
but it 
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is hard to see how such an account could be related to the unfolding 
activity of the users. 11 
Obviously, the positioning and sizing of objects is a critical aspect of the 
work of the architects. Not only are they working on drawings on which 
the measurements to be used by building contractors need to be accurate 
to about 5mm, but also the placement of objects must fit precisely across 
layers in a drawing and across separate drawings. In (3) the architect 
organises his activity so the location to which objects are to be moved are 
specified before he moves the object. The join command (line 11) does not 
just connect together two disconnected objects, it makes one object of two 
distinct objects. So, in the case of walls, the join command not only 
connects the walls together, but also removes intermediary lines between 
the connected walls. So, the architect's `paste' of the new portion of 
staircase (line 9) is carefully designed for subsequent actions. The 
architect still has to make adjustments to the positioning of objects on the 
drawing, especially to related ones, but his manipulation of those objects 
could be better characterised as extending a staircase rather than sliding 
or pushing them around the drawing. The activity is one related to the 
production of drawings of buildings rather than merely the movements of 
graphical objects. Throughout the course of the day, the architects engage 
in making a series of changes to the drawings that they are responsible 
for. Each can have knock-on consequences for other parts of the drawing 
and even for the drawings of others. The visual appearance; the size, 
shape and position of objects on the screen is important for managing this 
work, but these are utilised within an unfolding course of the activities. 
An activity and its results on the screen shapes the development and 
production of the next. 
It is not just the tools and the objects on the screen that are essential to 
the way the architect orients to this activity, but it is also the space on the 
11 Indeed, the original formulation of the conception of affordances is a radical turn 
in psychology, focusing on the direct perception of objects without intermediate 
information or mental processing (Gibson, 1979). In recent uses of this work, 
particularly for technology design, the conception has become blurred (Gayer, 
1991; Norman, 1988). These do preserve, however, the primacy given to the 
direct and perceivable properties of objects. It is unclear whether the concept of 
`an affordance of an object' can be preserved (and still remain stable) within a 
framework where the sense-making practices of participants are contingent on an 
unfolding course of activities. See also Coulter and Parson's (1990) discussion of 
the discursive practices surrounding perception. 
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screen. So, for example, in (3), the user moves the arrow on the staircase 
up and to the left (line 21). This position is out of the way of the staircase, 
which the user goes on to manipulate. It also is vertically above the new 
location of the staircase, visible whilst he is working on the stairs and in a 
position where it can be easily moved back down. Its very presence on the 
screen can be seen to mark out future possible and necessary courses of 
activities. 
In the following instance the architect is redrawing a plan of a toilet. 
After calculating the distance between two walls in the centre of the 
drawing (`250'), the architect then moves the number slightly (line 1). 
deselects it (line 3) and moves the left wall to the right (line 5). 
(4) 6B 5249 
1 . l. >(('250'))::::::::::: > T 
2 (. ) 
3 `return' 
4 (5.2) 
51> [Wall]:::::::::::::: > T 
6 (2.1) 
8 
>[Wall]:.::...: " .................... >T . ........................ 7 .L Cu 
I: ummm» 
9 (3.5) 
Figure 4.7 is a sketch of the plan before he moves the wall and Figure 
4.8 is after it. 
moll. 
Figure 4.7: Sketch of toilet (line 4) Figure 4.8: Sketch of toilet (line 6) 
The architect then moves another wall, originally in the same position 
as the wall he just moved, 12 to the right hand side of the drawing (line 7). 
(Figure 4.9 is a sketch of the plan at this point. ) 
12 It appears that two walls are drawn in the same place, one on top of the other. 
143 
Figure 4.9: Sketch of toilet (line 9, fragment 4) 
He then goes on to work in the space he has now made available to the 
right of the urinals, adding a thinner, shorter wall. As in (3) the walls are 
moved into a space clear but related to the area in which the architect is to 
work. Though in this case, one, and probably both, of these walls are no 
longer required for the plan. The walls, whose size and shape are still 
consistent with the rest of the drawing, are possibly, being preserved as a 
resource for further work. Such preservation of objects recurs throughout 
the corpus of data. There are also related instances where a copy of an 
object is moved into an area of free space and manipulated there, for 
example, to work on its precise shape or to carry out various operations 
upon it. The MiniCad package in particular, and the Macintosh system in 
general, facilitates the use of space as a practical resource for working on 
drawings. Just as an area of a work table may be utilised to perform 
various detailed activities, an area of space on the screen can provide for 
such work. It can also offer a location for temporarily placing objects to be 
moved back into main drawing or for placing objects which require further 
work on them. As with the objects on the screen and the tools available, 
the use of spaces in a particular drawing can be improvised in the light of 
both the foregoing course of activities and with regard to possible 
forthcoming trajectories of action. Such practices could be considered in 
terms of the `directly manipulation' of objects and space. However, this 
would gloss a range of heterogeneous practices concerning how objects on 
the screen are utilised for the practical purposes of the users. Moreover, 
the characterisation of the use of artefacts in terms of the distance 
between a goal and a physical task neglects precisely those resources 
through which the activities are achieved. 
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4.6 NAVIGATING AROUND THE DESIGN 
Another oft-cited feature of usable systems is the ease with which users 
can `navigate' around the information and capabilities offered by them. 
Systems like MiniCad provide menus and tool palettes to make accessible 
an extensive range of capabilities. Designers attempt to make these 
menus and palettes both familiar and recognisable, so that they have a 
fairly unchanging appearance. The menus and palettes also need to 
reflect the current possibilities for action, changing in subtle ways like 
shading out actions that are not currently available, for example. Hence, 
they provide resources for presenting the capabilities of a system in 
similar ways to the menus of PowerPoint considered extensively in the 
last chapter. 
The information presented by CAD systems would at first appear to be 
straightforward, drawings consisting of recognisable shapes and text. But, 
like other systems, such as Hypertext and other forms of complex 
databases, the information presented can be on different levels, or layers, 
and the items on each can be related together in subtle ways (e. g. Monk, 
1989). MiniCad provides three ways of moving around a drawing: panning 
across a drawing; zooming into and out of an area of a drawing; and 
moving between layers of the drawing. 
Panning allows the user to move around a drawing that is too big to fit 
on the screen. It is possible by pan around the drawing either by using the 
panning tool on the drawing palette or by pressing the appropriate arrow 
key on the keyboard. This moves the view on the screen to a contiguous 
area of the plan. 
Zooming in and out of a particular portion of a drawing allows the user 
to focus in on a detail or to see a wider view of the current area of the plan. 
This is performed by selecting the Zoom In and Zoom Out tools in the 
drawing palette (on the second row). So, for example, to zoom in on a 
portion of the drawing, the `Zoom In' tool is selected with the mouse, the 
user then specifies the area to focus on by shaping a Marquee over the 
appropriate area with the cursor and then releasing the mouse. Zooming 
out is accomplished by locating the Marquee over the area which will 
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remain the centre of the wider view, after the `Zoom Out' tool has been 
selected. 13 
Layers offer a way of providing different kinds of information on the 
same drawing. Each layer can be displayed or hidden, so that, for 
example, particular details such as the plumbing, can either be available 
for manipulation or hidden from view. The user can move between the 
layers of a drawing in three ways: using the Layer menu; selecting the 
`Lyr' section of the data display bar at the bottom of the screen, or pressing 
the Command key and either the up or down arrow at the same time. 
In the following instance the architect uses all three ways of moving 
around the drawing (shown schematically in fragment 5). 
(5) 4B 5417 
1 
2 
((Pan T)) 
(3.3) 
3 ((Pan T)) 
4 (3.3) 
5 ((Pan F- )) 
6 (2.5) 
7 
8 
'(x4)1 
(18.3) 
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e 
13 Note, that this is the opposite way of operation compared with similar functions 
on other Macintosh applications, where the selection on the menu applies 
to a 
previously selected object on the screen. 
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9 .ý [Zoom Out] T 
10 (0.3) 
11 . 
L>Marquee::::::: > T 
12 (11.5) 
13 1> [Window 
14 Bar]:::::::::::::::::::: > T 
15 (3.1) 
16 1 [Bottom Window] T 
17 (2.5) 
18 1 [Zoom out] T 
19 (10.8) 
20 .L0::::::: 
21 Page:: 
22 (Text) 
23 ==::: Layer::::: T 
24 ((selects items from 
dialogue window)) 
=11. 
EP m 
111 
mº 
[1 
f 
g 
h 
After working on the title block in the bottom right hand corner of a set 
of elevations (sketch a), the architect shuffles the drawing up twice by 
moving the cursor over the edge of the drawing (b-c, lines 1-3) and then 
across to the left (d, line 5). He types `C4' (e, line 7), fitting the entire 
drawing onto the screen (the accellerator for `Fit To Window'). He then 
zooms out further using the `Zoom Out' tool on the Drawing Tools palette, 
specifying the area the new drawing will focus on with a Marquee (f, lines 
9-11). By selecting the top window bar of the window and dragging it 
down to the bottom of the screen he effectively moves the set of elevations 
out of view and reveals another elevation (line 13). He clicks on this 
elevation (g, line 16), zooms out (h, line 18), goes to the menus to select the 
layers of the drawings to display (lines 20-24) and then goes on to alter the 
title block of this drawing. 
The architect not only moves from one drawing to another in three 
different ways, he accomplishes this by moving the mouse, using an 
accelerator, the menus and the `Zoom Out' Tool. Just as in previous 
instances it is possible to consider this movement as a path from one title 
block to another; zooming out of the first plan, jumping across to the other 
drawing and then zooming in on that. But once again this ignores the 
development of the activity from moment-to-moment. 
At the beginning of the fragment very little of the main drawing is 
displayed, indeed only a few lines are visible on the bottom left of the 
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screen. The architect pans up and left (lines 1-5) bringing into view a 
portion of the building. Once the details of this appear, the architect goes 
on to display most of the complete drawing (line 7-8). This takes some 
seconds to draw, as details of each elevation have to be presented. When 
completed, he then marks out the area which the `zoomed out' picture will 
centre on: an area in the centre of the screen. Once he has specified this 
area, a much smaller image is presented with the title block. Again this 
takes time to complete. Only as the last bottom right component is being 
drawn does the architect move towards the window bar and onto the next 
elevation. 
The architect appears not merely to be moving from one component on 
one drawing to a similar component on another, but taking account of the 
images as they appear: these images providing resources for example, to 
confirm aspects of the drawings' completeness and correctness. Each 
activity then appears to be tied to a previous one: confirming the sense 
made of the prior displays, its location and contents, and making possible 
further activities. 
In the following instance the user has just finished altering some walls 
at the right hand end of the service tunnel (shown schematically with 
(6) 7B MV 4470 
1 'f-' 
2 (0.3) 
3 'E-' 
4 (0.4) 
5 'E-' 
6 (0.5) 
7 'E---' 
8 (1.2) 
9 '*-' 
10 (2.5) 
11 `1, 
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fragment 6). 
12 (3.3) 
13 `. 1' 
14 (8.5) 
15 '1' 
16 (5.3) 
17 1 ==: Set Layer::::: Layers:::: 1' 
18 (1.3) 
19 ((selects layers in the scrolling menus 
20 in the dialogue box)) 
21 .L [OK] T 
22 (0.7) 
23 `1' 
24 (12.0) 
25 ((Pans diagonally down and 
26 to the right)):::::::.:.......... ":::::.:::: " 
By pressing the appropriate arrow keys the architect pans left across 
the top of the tunnel five times (lines 1-9), then down three times (lines 11- 
15). He adds some layers to the drawing (lines 17-20), pans down again 
(line 23) then pans diagonally down to the right (line 25-26). At the end of 
the actions the architect has a plan including the female staffroom in the 
main building displayed on the screen. 
The service tunnel is a rough `T-shape' with a bend in the middle. 
There are staircases outside the building (at each end of the top of the `T') 
for underground access to the main building. The architect pans across 
and down the plan following the service tunnel into the building. He also 
paces his activity with the system's redrawing of the plan. It is possible to 
press keystrokes in quick succession, avoiding redrawing intermediate 
plans along the way. By slowing down the frequency of hitting the arrow 
keys as he nears the centre of the service tunnel, the architect is able to 
monitor the system redrawing the plan as he passes the bend in the 
middle. Progression down the tunnel slows down further once he passes 
the crook in the tunnel (line 15). When he arrives at the main building, 
the architect adds layers to the drawing and then proceeds into the female 
staff-room. 
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There are other ways in which the user could move between the 
staircase at the right end of the tunnel and the female staffroom in the 
main building; for example, zooming out to a plan of the whole drawing 
and then zooming into the relevant area. Yet, the organisation of this 
activity rests on the architect's skill of manipulating this particular plan 
and the system in general. Zooming out and in requires MiniCad to 
display the entire drawing before a Marquee can be selected to mark the 
location to focus on. As MiniCad can take tens of seconds to display a 
detailed drawing, zooming out to locate the position for a next area of 
detailed work can take considerable time. 
In moving down the tunnel the architect can make use of the 
geography of the projected building, even possibly taking account of 
features, like the bend in the tunnel, that are not straightforward. He can 
also coordinate this activity with the projected speed of the system. For 
moving around the drawing in this way, it is not necessary to have all the 
details presented. Layers need only to be drawn once the destination is 
neared. As MiniCad takes longer to draw the details of a plan if it has to 
draw several layers each time, the organisation of the activity in (6) can be 
seen to be shaped by a range of contingencies. The movement down the 
tunnel and the drawing of the details of the layers are shaped not only 
with respect to when items appear on the screen and the geography of the 
building, but also with the projected speed of the system. 
Navigation around the plan can also be seen as contingent on aspects 
of architectural practice in general. The building the architects are 
working on has certain consistencies and symmetries. The architects can 
make use of these in their drawings, for instance, copying portions of a 
plan from one area to another. It also means that work on one localised 
area of a plan has important implications for changes that need to be 
made to other areas. For example, changes to an internal staircase on one 
level will involve similar, but not identical, changes to other staircases on 
that level. In the materials there are numerous instances of movements 
back and forth between spatially distant areas of the plan, moving along 
corridors, up and down stairs and across to other corners of the building. 
In some senses, when moving around the drawings the architects are 
`interacting' with the computer. They have to make sense of the images as 
they appear on the screen and carry out actions in the light of what is 
presented. However, making sense of and achieving this interaction rests 
on the everyday, architectural skills of producing drawings and buildings, 
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and common-sense practices for economically utilising the tools available 
to them. 
4.7 THE CONTEXT OF COMPUTER USE: MULTIPLE ACTIVITIES AND 
COLLABORATIVE VIEWINGS 
Though the architects utilise the CAD system to construct their working 
drawings, the use of the system is immersed within activities with other 
artefacts, including calculators, product manuals and most significantly, 
paper. Despite all the architects having a computer system on their desks, 
they still keep next to them large (over a metre in length) paper versions 
of the plans, sections and elevations, and frequently use them when 
working on the details of the drawings. Thus, the use of the system is 
interleaved with other activities: a calculator may be required to work out 
a particular dimension, a manual as a resource for the size and shape of a 
component on the drawing. Architects may also make use of the projected 
nature of activities in order to interleave these with the use of other 
artefacts. So, for example, an architect may roll up a set of plans whilst 
the system may be opening, saving, plotting or closing a file - operations 
that can take some time with complex drawings. 14 He may coordinate this 
activity with glances to the screen to monitor its progress, utilising 
junctures in one domain as a resource for moving onto another. The 
pacing of his activity on the computer system may thus not merely be 
related to the changes on the display. Consequently, too narrow a focus on 
screen-based activities neglects the interrelationships between the actions 
undertaken on the computer system and the circumstances of its use. 
In the following instance, an architect, Pete (P), moves between one 
section of a drawing to another, both showing different staircase sections. 
These are one part of a set of three sections contained in a single file. 
Thus, he can move between the sections via an intermediate `zoomed out' 
view of the drawings. From a complex drawing of one section, the 
architect first pans over to the portion containing the staircase (lines 1-5), 
and then removes layers from the drawing, thus simplifying what is 
displayed (lines 6-9). 
14 See Luff and Heath (1993) for a detailed case of such interleaving of activities. 
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(7) 8A JVC 3094 - Transcript 1 
simplified 
1 . [Pan Tool] T 
2 (0.5) 
3 L>((Pans right))::::::::::::::::: 
4 (3.1) 
5 1>((Pans left))::::: >T 
6 (0.3) 
7 .L [Selection Tool] T 
8 (0.2) 
9 . ((Removes layer))T 
10 (19.5) 
11 `3¬4' 
12 (8.2) 
13 1 [Drawing Window] T 
14 (9.1) 
M* 
m> 
. 0l. 
15 . ((image 3))T 
16 (3.3) 
17 1>((cursor movement up the 
lowest set of stairs))>T 
DDD 
a 
b 
C 
d 
The architect then selects a complete view of the drawing (containing 
small images of all the sections) using the `Fit to Window' command 
(through the `ßg4' accelerator, line 11). From this he selects the third 
image (line 15) -a section of a different staircase. After some 3 seconds 
Pete can be seen to follow the direction of the lowest staircase's upward 
with a movement of the cursor. 
These drawings are complex and the system takes some time to display 
each. 15 However, this rather straightforward instance of computer use is 
organised with respect to the ongoing activities and interactions of 
architects in the setting. It is tied to a discussion between Pete and a 
colleague, Richard, concerning the staircases of the building. In the course 
of this interaction, the two participants make use of resources both on the 
15 The system takes nearly 2 seconds to display each of the new drawings in this 
fragment. 
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computer system and on paper plans. The use of the system is interwoven 
with this interaction. 
In the following sub-sections, this instance is considered in some 
detail: first, with respect to the activities involved in securing alignment to 
the screen; second, with regard to the management of the shifts in 
orientation between computer system and the paper plans; and third, 
relating to how the screen is utilised and made sense of in the course of 
the interaction. Through examination of this single instance, a computer- 
based activity can be seen to be thoroughly immersed in the talk and 
visual conduct of the participants: it provides resources for making sense 
of these activities and it is also made sense of through them. 
4.7.1 Securing an Alignment to the Objects on the Screen 
A few minutes prior to the fragment presented in transcript 1, whilst Pete 
is working on his computer, another architect, Richard (R) asks Pete about 
a particular feature on the plans 16 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 - Transcript 2 
1 R: are you su: re you're flipping the right one 
arou: nd. L Pe: te. 
2 (0.2) 
3 P: yeah 
4 (2.5) woo. 
5 P: I'm flipping (0.5) look on level one ýº 
6 (1.1) 
7 R: you you just told me that you have 
9 flip>flipped that one arou: nd 
10 (0,6) 
Richard's question concerns some changes the architects have been 
making to the plans in relation to the staircases, and draws Pete into a 
discussion over the paper plans sited on the table to Pete's left. 
16 The arrows are intended to give an approximate indication of the location of 
images on the right with respect to the talk on the left. 
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PR 
In order to accommodate a new room at the top of the building the 
directions of all the staircases leading up to it have to be changed (or 
`flipped'). Any single drawing produced by the architects must not only be 
internally consistent so that objects, such as staircases between the same 
floors have an equal number of stairs, but also so that different types of 
drawings (i. e. plans, sections, elevations and details) are consistent with 
each other. These drawings may be the responsibility of others in the 
practice. One of the ways architects both maintain a record of the present 
state of a design, and make public the changes which they are making to 
it, is by `marking-up' the paper versions with annotations and comments. 
Unfortunately, in this case, there is some confusion about the exact nature 
of the change, the plans being marked up in two colours each indicating 
the stairs running in a different direction. 
Over three minutes later, the architects are still discussing the 
staircases, and Pete turns back to his computer and says `you see (0.3) um: 
(0.6) there () this is the outside level'. 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 - Transcript 3 
10 P: you see (0.3) um: (0.6) there (. ) this is the outsi level 
11 (1.0) 
12 R: umml 
13 (1.3) 
14 P: and it can start (0.7) (part of the drawing) we are on now 
15 (2.3) 
16 righ(t) (here we are) 
17 (1.4) 
18 you've done a section through 
19 (1.2) 
20 this guy here (. ) right? 
21 (0.6) 
22 R: yep 
23 (. ) 
24 P: thats the start of the section I had. (0.3) to: give myself ( them 
25 levels) and he (has to start) back there (. ) and go upT= 
26 R: =oh yeahl thats the same one 
Both the architects have been making changes to their 
drawings with 
regard to the staircases, Pete to the general sections across 
the building 
and Richard to detailed drawings of the stairs. 
Pete's turn to the 
computer system appears in the light of the apparently confusing marks 
on the paper. In the ensuing talk in 
lines 10-26, he points to a drawing of 
the stairs on the screen, over to an area on 
the paper plan and then back 
to another drawing on the computer. 
In his talk and through his visual 
conduct Pete is locating features on the screen and on 
the paper plans, in 
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order to resolve the difficulties concerning which way the stairs are and 
should be drawn. 
Throughout this talk, Richard's contributions appear to be minimal: an 
`umm L' (line 12) and a curt `yep' (line 23). Only after Pete has uttered `and 
he (has to start) back there (. ) and go upT' does Richard offer a more 
substantial confirmation: `oh yeahl thats the same one'. The activities, in 
relation to the screen and to the paper drawings, in concert with Pete's 
talk achieve, eventually, a confirmation from Richard that a particular 
object on the screen is `the same one'. Pete's work in securing this 
alignment is particularly complex, involving both the paper documents 
and the computer system. Moreover, Pete utilises two screen images of 
different areas of the staircase (the images b and d in transcript 1). 
Pete's talk is accompanied by a series of perturbations: his initial 
utterance in the fragment, for example, includes both pauses and an 
extended `um: ' (line 10). Whilst he utters this, although he orients 
towards the screen, his right hand remains on the plans. After he utters 
`you see um: ', Pete turns to the system and points to a location on the 
drawing on the screen with his right hand. His right arm remains 
pointing to this general domain until he utters `and it can start' (line 14). 
However, Pete's reorientation and the point itself, though they are 
designed for Richard, do not immediately secure a realignment. Instead, 
Richard remains oriented towards the paper. It is only as Pete is uttering 
`there (. ) this is the outside level', does Richard glance away from the 
paper plans. 
is the outside level 
i 
Despite the emphasised `there', the brief pause and the point, Richard's 
glance towards the screen only commences on the word `outside'. Pete 
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10 P: you see (0.3) um: (0.6) there (. ) this 
utters this word not only with vocal emphasis, but also raises his eyebrows 
as he says it. 17 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 - Transcript 4 
P points eyebrow P points left along 
to screen flash floor level on screen 
rý r 
paper 
"ýýscreen 
P: you see---um: ------ there-this is the outside level....;....; 
R: 
uimn 
paper screen 
L 
R moves towards 
screen 
As his glance arrives on the computer screen, and on the completion of 
Pete's utterance, Richard begins to reorient towards the screen. Richard's 
glance toward the screen and his movement appear to be in the light of 
Pete's activities; Pete successively appears to secure Richard's 
realignment, through his talk and visual conduct. 
The initial perturbations at the commencement of Pete's turn may be 
designed in part to secure an alignment towards a common object (cf. 
Goodwin, 1981). Whether or not this is the case, following Pete's own 
reorientation, the perturbations in his talk, his point towards the screen 
and the emphasised `there', there is no realignment or contribution from 
Richard; Richard continues his orientation towards the paper plans. Only 
on the emphasised word `outside', as the gist of the utterance emerges, 
does Richard begin to reorient. As Richard's glance arrives at the screen, 
Pete moves his finger from right to left along the bottom-most displayed 
floor of the section. This pointing is designed in the light of Richard's 
glance to the screen. Once it commences, Richard moves further towards 
the screen. Through his talk and his visual conduct he first manages to 
secure Richard's alignment to the screen and then further engagement in 
the looking at the object on the screen. 
17 Visual conduct is transcribed horizontally along the page, features of Pete's 
conduct is given above his talk and Richard's below his. The transcription system 
draws on that developed by Goodwin and Heath. A continuous line indicates that 
the party is looking towards an individual or an object, dots indicate a turn 
towards a co-participant or object, and commas away. Further details of the 
transcription systems are given in Goodwin (1981) and Heath (1986). 
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It is not just a pointing at the screen that accomplishes this 
realignment, Pete's talk and visual conduct together provide resources for 
Richard. Nor is the point a simple activity. Indeed, it appears to be made 
up of three components: the point to the right of the bottom-level, a first 
movement to the left, and then as Pete utters `and it can start' (line 14) a 
movement back along the floor to the right (see the sketch in figure 4.10). 
10 P: you see (0.3) um: 
(0.6) 
there (. ) 
this is the 
outside level 
11 (1.0) 
12 R: umm. L 
13 (1.3) 
14 P: and it can -º 
start (0.7) 
Figure 4.10: Sketch of staircase section (displayed in lines 10-14, transcript 3, whilst P 
utters `there (. ) this is the outside level 0 and it can start') 
On completion of the second component of the gesture Richard utters 
`umm . 
L' and after that Pete commences the third component, back along 
the floor. However, as the third hand movement comes to a halt so does 
Pete's talk. He pauses for (0.7) seconds. Though having secured the 
alignment of Richard, it is unclear what is the gist of Pete's utterance 
`there (. ) this is the outside level () and it can start', even when he 
completes it with `(part of the drawing) we are on now'. Richard's 
contribution is less than unequivocal, but this may be in the light of the 
nature of Pete's own emerging utterance. 
Pete's gestures mark out a precise location on the drawing, along the 
line for the floor of the ground (the outside) level of the building, and to 
the bottom of the first staircase up, but they also secure an appropriate 
alignment from Richard. Through their talk, orientation and gestures 
Pete and Richard arrive at a common viewing of the screen. This viewing 
is accomplished through the local management of their conduct, one's 
activity being produced in the light of the changing contributions of the 
other. 
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4.7.2 Managing the Alignment Towards Paper and Screen 
In his pause after the word `start', Pete goes on to make a series of actions 
on the computer, first moving his right hand down to the mouse, then his 
left to the keyboard, then he strikes two keys together and finally moves 
the mouse again (lines 10-12, transcript 1). 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 Transcript 5 
points right 
across screen 
right 
hand d'n 
to mouse 
left 
hand d'n 
to kbd 
rI 
P strikes 
key chord 
`iß4' 
rI 
P moves 
mouse 
screen 
P: ;....;... and it can start------- (part of the drawing) we are on now 
R: 
screen 
The keys Pete presses are a `key-chord' combination for zooming out 
from the present drawing ('¬4' or `Fit To Window'). The result of this starts 
to appear on the word `now' of Pete's utterance `we are on now'. Zooming 
out from the single section results in three very small images of sections 
being displayed on the screen in minute detail (see Figure 4.11). 
-V-T7-) 
M4. 
r---l 
Figure 4.11: Sketch of the staircase sections (displayed in line 14, transcript 3) 
The precision of these diagrams means that the computer requires 
some time to display them, and this is apparent once the image starts to 
appear. As they are being drawn Richard turns away from the screen, 
back towards the paper and there is a pause in the talk for 2.3 seconds 
(line 15, transcript 3). When Pete starts to speak again witn -ngntti) kliere 
we are)', Richard not only turns towards the screen, but moves toward 
the 
computer. It is as if his movement is oriented to the particular 
display on 
the screen, the minute images of the sections requiring him to move closer 
to the screen. Indeed, Richard goes on to move behind Pete to get even 
nearer to the screen. However, whilst he is moving and 
Pete is uttering 
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`through' in `you've done a section through' (line 18) Pete reorients back to 
the plans, and moves his left hand to the paper. 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 Transcript 6 
P moves left hand P points to left 
to paper plan edge of plan 
rr 
.,,,, 
screen paper 
II 
screen 
P: through .... ;.... ;.. this guy here-right?....;. thats that start of 
R: yep. 
paper 
R moves towards computer 
screen 
L 
looks to back 
of office 
As Pete is beginning `this guy here (. ) right? ', Richard is moving behind 
him towards the screen, which displays the minute drawings of the 
sections. Thus, Pete and Richard are looking at distinct domains: Richard 
towards the computer and Pete at the plans. 
The utterance `this guy here' appears to be produced in relation to 
Pete's hand movement, to point, for example, at a particular area on the 
paper plans. However, Richard is neither oriented to nor looking at the 
plans. Pete briefly pauses and utters `right? ' with rising intonation. 
Together these appear to arrest the movement of Richard towards the 
screen, engender a reorientation towards the plan and encourage a 
response from Richard, a brief `yep' (line 22). Yet just as he does this, Pete 
begins another reorientation. Thus, Pete and Richard are only 
momentarily oriented towards the same general domain, the plans. 
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20 P: this guy here (. ) right? 
21 (0.6) 
22 R: yep 
23 (. ) 
Hence, from being both oriented on the screen, Pete and Richard turn 
back to the plans. Only momentarily are they oriented to a common 
domain, before Pete turns back to the computer. Nevertheless, Pete's 
orientation to the plan, his point and his `this guy here (0.1) right? ' do 
manage to secure a reorientation by Richard and a `yep'. Pete's utterance 
does appear to be organised with respect to the conduct of Richard. As it 
commences Richard is still moving towards the computer. This movement 
halts after Pete's point begins and whilst Pete is saying `this guy'. 
However, Richard remains oriented to Pete's right. Only after Pete's hand 
movement is completed, with Pete's arm still outstretched, and after he 
has briefly paused as he is asking `right? ', does Richard begin to glance 
back towards the plans. Pete pauses for (0.7) seconds, before Richard 
answers. Immediately on doing so, Pete starts talking again and Richard 
begins to turn away. 
As when turning towards the screen (in line 10), reorienting to the 
paper is accomplished through the moment-to-moment activities of the 
participants. The pointing can only be made sense of with respect to the 
talk and the artefacts in the domain. However, although Pete appears to 
organise his visual conduct and talk with respect to securing the 
orientation of Richard to a particular locale, he only appears to require 
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24 P: thats the start of the section I had. 
some minimal contribution from Richard. Once Richard is glancing at the 
plans and utters `yep', Pete turns back to the screen. This utterance 
displays an alignment to the emerging description of the various locations 
on the plan, providing Pete with adequate resources to continue. 
The activities in this fragment are complex because they require, at 
various times, the participants to shift orientation between the paper and 
the screen. Pete uses these two artefacts to locate details of the stairs on 
the particular drawings on which he is working with respect to details on 
the marked up plans. More precisely, he utilises the two domains for an 
account of the different directions in which the stairs are going in the two 
versions. Furthermore, the system displays sections, cuts through the 
buildings; the paper shows plans, viewed down from above. The 
participants have to resolve these two perspectives - part of the common 
skills required of an architect - and make sense of the various changes 
being made and proposed alterations to be undertaken on the building. 
The paper plans provide an indication, though in a rather confusing 
manner, of these changes, the computer displays the current version, as 
revised by Pete. Making sense of the work that has been performed on the 
drawings and also what is required to be done, necessitates seeing 
features of both the computer and the paper versions in relation to one 
another. Richard's utterance `oh yeahl thats the same one' explicitly 
displays an understanding of the work Pete has undertaken in bringing 
out features on his computer system in relation to features on the paper 
plan. However, this has been achieved through a series of activities by the 
two participants, oriented at times with the computer system and at 
others with the paper plans. 
This work does not merely involve a matter of seeing the two domains 
in relation to one another. It requires Pete to get Richard to see particular 
features as relevant to him in the light of the current circumstances. 
Richard has to see this particular staircase, one of many, where the stairs 
lead from and where they lead to, and make sense of the various `mark- 
ups' in relation to these. This activity is further complicated by the nature 
of the drawings that Pete needs to display on his screen. These concern 
the changes he has been undertaking and cannot be adequately shown on 
a single display. He has to first zoom out from one level to a general view, 
before zooming in to another level (cf. fragment 5). He thus has to 
coordinate his orientations to the various artefacts with the changing 
display of the computer system. Retrospectively, the shifting between 
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computer and paper and back to the computer can be seen as reflecting 
juxtapositions between the first section on the screen and the plan, and 
the plan and the second section. However, this work is achieved through 
the visual conduct and talk of Pete, from moment-to-moment, in the light 
of the contributions produced by Richard. It is also produced in the light 
of the operation of the computer - its timing. Particular utterances and 
even words, like Pete's `right? ' (line 19), are produced with respect to his 
orientation towards the paper, for Richard to see `this guy here', now. In 
this case, Pete's utterance is produced, and even transformed, in the light 
of Richard's current orientation, towards another domain and eventually 
secures Richard's reorientation and participation with respect to this 
domain. In this way the activities, the reading from the screen and the 
paper, are interactionally managed and produced. 
The viewing of objects on the screen of the computer can thus be seen 
to be immersed within a range of ongoing activities, including those in 
relation to other artefacts and those accomplished in collaboration with 
others. However, it is not merely that a viewing of the screen is shared 
and collaborative, but that to achieve this viewing, to arrive at a common 
orientation, is itself a collaborative accomplishment. Similarly, a 
reorientation away from a computer is jointly achieved. These 
accomplishments are delicately managed through the talk and visual 
conduct of both participants. Indeed, in the case explored in detail here 
the work of managing a common orientation appears to strongly contrast 
with the activities accomplished once the orientation has been achieved. 
4.7.3 Readings of the Screen in Interaction 
The computer display is made sense of, for Richard, through the talk of 
Pete. Pete's `there this is the outside level' (line 10) makes relevant a 
particular component on the screen to be seen in a particular way. The 
talk is also made sense of in relation to what is displayed on the screen, for 
example, its inherent indexicality (reflected at least in the components 
`there' and `this'). The talk and the items on the display are mutual 
resources for participants to render intelligible the emerging activities. 
The visual conduct of the participants forms a further piece 
in this 
complex interweaving. The orientation towards a screen provides 
for a 
domain to be seen as relevant and a point can locate a particular area, or 
location, within that domain. Thus, the talk, the visual conduct and 
the 
artefact each mutually complement each other as resources 
for a co- 
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participant to make sense of an ongoing activity. However, these 
complementary resources do not stand in isolation from the co-participant, 
they are themselves designed with respect to the conduct of the other. So, 
in (7) Pete's hand movement along the floor level displayed on the screen 
is only produced once he has secured the orientation of Richard to the 
computer (lines 10-14 transcript 3). Indeed, Pete's movements, turns-at- 
talk and even his commands into the computer are designed with respect 
to the activities of Richard: i. e. Richard's reorientations and his responses. 
In this way, the production of activities, talk, visual conduct, and those 
related to the computer, both the typing and the reading of the screen, are 
interactional. They are designed with respect to the contributions of 
colleagues and also rendered intelligible by others. 
When Pete turns back to the computer system he selects the third 
image on the screen using the mouse; releasing the mouse button in the 
pause after `I had l' in `thats the start of the section I had.. (0.3)' (line 24). 
As the next section is being displayed on the screen, Pete is uttering `and 
he (has to start) back there (. ) and go upl' (line 25). Richard is looking 
behind Pete, to the back of the room and only turns towards the screen on 
the word `there'. 
(7) 8A JVC 3094 Transcript 7 
head section displayed P nods cursor moves 
nods on screen head upward up stairs 
7-1 F-1 I r--I F-ý 
screen 
P: myself ( them levels) and he (has to start) back there-and go upT 
R: oh yeahl 
screen 
R looking to the back of the office 
Pete's talk `and he (has to start) back there' is produced just after the 
image of the second section has been displayed on the computer screen. As 
he utters `there', Pete nods his head upward. It appears to be on this 
movement that Richard reorients from the back of the office towards the 
computer screen. When Richard is looking at the screen, Pete moves the 
mouse up to the right. This movement causes the cursor to move 
diagonally up the staircase and coincides with the words `and go upT' (see 
figure 4.12). 
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Figure 4.12: Sketch of second staircase section (displayed in lines 24-5, fragment 7) as 
P moves his cursor up the screen and utters `and go upT'. 
The timing and organisation of this cursor movement is designed for 
Richard. Only once he is looking at the screen does Pete produce `and go 
upT' accompanied by the gesture. 
Once again, the realignment of Richard appears to be in the light of the 
talk and visual conduct of Pete; particularly his `and he (has to start) back 
there' and his head nod. Only on `there' - an indexical - does Richard begin 
to turn back towards the screen. The movement of the cursor and the talk 
echo each other, not only does the cursor move upwards but `and go upT' is 
uttered with rising intonation. The talk and the activities on the screen 
are interrelated. 
Pete's `and go upT' is designed to locate a particular feature on a 
section, a location that is common to both Richard and Pete's drawings 
and is a place from which to begin to understand the mark-ups and the 
various drawings available. This is located by securing a common 
alignment to particular objects on the drawings on the computer and on 
the screen and managing the shifts of orientation between them. The 
reading of the screen is accomplished through a collaboration by the co- 
participants, in the light of these various artefacts. 
On completion of Pete's `and go upT', immediately Richard utters `oh 
yeahl thats the same one'. Only at this point does Richard display more 
than a minimal understanding of the ongoing actions of Pete. This 
understanding is an accomplishment by the two participants, produced 
and displayed through their contributions. The simple movement of a 
cursor up the screen is one component in this accomplishment. It can only 
be made sense of in the light of prior interaction and activities of the 
participants, the work taking place around the screen and the paper. 
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The activities associated with making sense of an item on the screen 
appear to require an inordinate amount of work by the participants. 
However, the activity is itself complex, requiring: objects in the plans to be 
seen in relation to objects on sections on the screen; mark-ups and old 
versions of drawings to be seen in relation to modified versions; and one 
area of a building to be seen in relation to another. It then is perhaps not 
surprising that some displayed recognition of these differing components 
is produced as they are brought into play in the interaction. The course of 
the activity proceeds sequentially; the production of an action such as a re- 
orientation displaying an understanding of a prior turn of talk or a 
gesture, and also providing the resources for a next activity. The 
computer system figures in this emerging course of activities. It provides 
for the possibility of displaying the current state of the drawings. 
However, this may not be straightforward, and may require careful 
management. 
It may be that the original removing of layers (line 9, transcript 1) can 
be seen in this light. Certainly, from where Richard originally stands, on 
a small screen, presenting too many details would make seeing what is 
relevant problematic. Pete's turn toward the plans, occurring whilst the 
small zoomed out images of the sections are being displayed, may be 
accomplished with respect to what appears on the screen. Displaying 
these drawings takes some time. It may also be that these sections are not 
directly relevant to the problem at hand. The time for redisplaying can 
then provide an opportunity to orient to the plans. Similarly, when Pete 
selects one of the sections, this also takes time to display. Richard's 
delayed orientation to the back of the room could be seen in this light. 18 
The screen is a small and changing domain for providing resources for 
topics of interaction. The work that is apparent in drawing another into 
look at it appears to require participants not only to display that what is 
available is relevant, but when it is available and relevant. The use of the 
system is not only shaped by the interaction between the participants, but 
also figures in shaping it. 
The simple movement from one section to another can thus be seen in 
the light of the collaborative work of the two participants. Though one of 
them does all actions on the keyboard and with the mouse, the 
18 In Chapter 7, some design implications relating to these observations are 
considered. 
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contributions of the other are relevant to the production of the activity. In 
different ways, both could be considered `users' of the system, with 
different footings towards the system. Focusing on the individual user 
would neglect the ways in which the activities are produced and how they 
are understood by the participants. Nor could these activities or viewings 
be seen merely as `shared activities', they are produced from moment-to- 
moment and are continuously in flux. Hence, a simple activity in relation 
to the computer system does not appear to fall within either the current 
conceptions within HCI or CSCW (cf. Heath, et al., 1993). Both neglect 
how the activity is emergent, situated and produced through the 
interactions of the participants. Activities on the system are coordinated 
with respect to a complex of contributions by others, contributions which 
may be a point or gesture, a glance towards a screen or a turn of talk. 
This detailed analysis of one instance of naturally-occurring computer use 
suggests some of the ways in which the use of the artefact is situated 
within a socio-interactional environment. 
4.8 THE SITUATED AND THE COGNITIVE IN HCI: THE INTERACTIONAL 
CONTEXT OF SCREEN-BASED ACTIVITIES 
Conventional approaches to HCI, particularly those utilising a framework 
from Cognitive Science, tend to be unconcerned with the particular 
environments in which computer-based activities naturally occur. Either 
when conducting an experiment or when modelling an activity, the focus 
in HCI remains largely on the individual undertaking a circumscribed, 
often pre-defined activity. Even when more naturalistic examples are 
explored, as in Kitajima and Polson's LICAI19 model of the background 
knowledge required to use textual instructions in manuals, the 
hypothesised activities of users are tightly circumscribed (Kitajima and 
Polson, 1992; Kitajima and Polson, 1996). Removing an object from the 
screen is characterised in terms of the knowledge required to comprehend 
the words in the instructions, to identify graphical objects, and to select 
appropriate action schemata. These activities are divorced from the 
particular circumstances in which users may be engaged. Instead, generic 
tasks such as `searching for an item in a menu' or `removing a title' are 
utilised as a starting point for the modelling process. From there, 
hierarchies of objects can be constructed, goals can be given in terms of 
19 LInked model of Comprehension-based Action planning and Instruction taking. 
166 
actions like `move' or `edit' (operating on these objects and on the devices), 
and `if-then' rules defined specifying under what conditions actions can be 
performed. A complex architecture of objects, rules, goals and schemata 
can be built up specifying what knowledge is required to understand a set 
of instructions or to perform some circumscribed activity. All this 
architecture resting on a foundation that some cognitive processing, 
comprehension or planning is antecedent to some performance taking 
place (cf. Ryle, 1949). 
Restricting the focus on general, pre-defined, individualistic tasks no 
doubt reduces the complexity of the models generated. To take account of 
all the various objects appearing on a screen, and the different ways in 
which they could be defined, specified and grouped would be a 
considerable exercise. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
activities which are modelled tend to be tightly constrained; focusing on 
particular objects, often in one window or screen, and operating on 
hypothesised examples. The accomplishment of everyday activities, 
produced from moment-to-moment, even mundane ones, such as those 
given above, continues to be neglected by most researchers within HCI. 
The use of objects on the screen to achieve the users' practical purposes is 
thus neglected. Within the current conceptual cognitive framework of 
HCI, it is difficult to characterise the improvisatory nature of naturalistic 
screen-based activities, as this framework requires plans, goals and pre- 
defined knowledge. It is also problematic for these models to take account 
of the practical skills of users, their common-sense reasoning. Even 
though there are proposals to include categories of knowledge, such as 
those involving the knowledge of particular tasks, heuristics, everyday 
semantics (Young, et al., 1990) or `general' knowledge, as in the model of 
Kitajima and Poison (Kitajima and Polson, 1992), how this is to be 
modelled remains to be specified. 20 Indeed, `general knowledge' is often 
assumed to be a set of propositions of the kind that 'graphs have titles' and 
'graphs have horizontal axes'. Similarly, attempts at defining background 
knowledge in terms of rules and schemata make particular assumptions 
about the nature of that knowledge. As in the model of Kitajima and 
Poison, this knowledge is often defined in terms of the relationships 
20 See also examples from within Artificial Intelligence, where there have been 
several attempts at defining general knowledge in encyclopaedic fashion in terms 
of propositions. See, particularly Lenat, et al., (1986) and the relevant critiques 
by Dreyfus (1992 [1972]). 
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between particular objects, such as screen objects and their components. 
The models incorporate a static conception of meaning where 
comprehension, planning and other intellectual activity is accomplished 
prior to any action being performed. To model situated aspects of 
behaviour within such a framework requires a stable and fixed conception 
of knowledge, tasks and activities, at least whilst they are considered a 
resource for reasoning and inference and performing the consequent 
action. 
Recent debates have suggested that Cognitive Science can take 
account of `situated action' by extending particular models so that they 
attend to the temporal and dynamic features of behaviour (e. g. Vera and 
Simon, 1993a). However, the problems with these models may then be not 
so much their fixed or static nature, but in their commitment to what Ryle 
termed the `Intellectualist Legend' where: 
... the agent must first go through the 
internal process of avowing to 
himself certain propositions about what is to be done (`maxims'. 
`imperatives' or `regulative propositions' as they are sometimes called); 
only then can he execute his performance with those dictates. 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 30) 
In order to maintain such a conception it is necessary to conceive of the 
`knowledge how' to perform tasks as `knowledge that' various propositions 
hold (cf. Ryle 1949). Thus, emergent practices and situated activities are 
transformed into actions which are the product of the processing of stable 
meanings, propositions, rules, and so on. Such transformations lose the 
very nature of the activity they are attempting to account for. Rather than 
it being possible to adapt and extend Cognitive Science models to account 
for situated action, the conceptual framework which underpins them is 
incommensurate with a conception of situated action where meaning and 
action are conflated and congruent. 
Maintaining a static and fixed conception of meaning allows for 
researchers in HCI to continue to utilise explicit representations and 
formulations within accounts of human computer-based activities. 
However, such an approach will be necessarily restrictive. In providing an 
account of an activity it will always be possible to provide further 
descriptions of activities with different elaborations at various levels of 
details (cf. Garfinkel's discussion of the etcetera clause and etcetera 
thinking, Garfinkel, 1967, p. 74). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
current approaches to HCI are limited in their accounts of computer-based 
activities to models of restricted sets of screen-based objects and actions. 
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Models of human-computer interaction are constrained in other ways; they 
tend to focus on an individual user only engaged in the activity on the 
computer system, often isolated from others and unconcerned with other 
demands. These constraints pervade both theoretical models and the 
empirical experiments. 
The limitations seem also to pervade more novel approaches to HCI. 
For example, following Suchman's (1987) critique of the conceptions drawn 
on by Cognitive Scientists to analyse human-computer interaction much 
debate ensued centring on the nature of situated activity. For some, 
Suchman's critique has been viewed principally as an attack on the static 
nature of models that rely on conceptions such as plans, goals and tasks 
(Vera and Simon, 1993a). The solution then is to develop dynamic models 
of a human's activity on a computer system. Such an account would then 
be able to cope with more exploratory, and improvisational, uses of a 
system. Others have focused on the critique of planning and have engaged 
in efforts to eliminate that aspect from their models (Agre, 1988; 
Chapman, 1991). 21 A third consequence of this critique has been a focus 
on naturalistic activities. Although, this has led to an increased emphasis 
on workplace studies within system design, particularly within CSCW, 
with this interest some of the original motivations behind the critique 
appear to have been lost. In particular, the conception of `situated action' 
has become identified by some authors with merely being situated in a 
particular context (Nardi, 1996a, Chapter 4). This has led to the 
assumption that the consequences of the subsequent programme of 
research are only relevant to the specific domains of study (Nardi, 1996a). 
21 Agre and Chapman offer a more radical approach to modelling situated action. 
Rather than attempting to model dynamic and temporal behaviour in terms of 
fixed rules and propositions, where state information has to be maintained during 
the inferential process, they utilise a model with no representation of internal 
state. These models are instantiated in systems which carry out such actions as 
playing games with simulated agents. Although the computer systems are 
sophisticated, the characterisation of action appears to be rather behaviouristic 
with stimuli from various objects in the games world producing actions in the 
agents. Agre and Chapman's models do attempt to avoid the problems inherent is 
separating meaning from action, however, the actions they model appear to be as 
constrained and restrictive as those in more conventional cognitive models. 
Their systems may be dynamic, but they avoid any consideration of the practical 
reasoning underpinning everyday actions, the resources utilised by participants 
to make sense and produce actions, and the socio-interactional nature of 
activities. 
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The conception of context in which collaborative activities are 
accomplished has been conceived of in a variety of ways by different 
workplace studies. Context has involved the organisations, institutions, 
cultures and even the history in which activities are situated. Broadly 
conceiving of context has thus allowed for a range of frameworks to be 
utilised for understanding situated action, including Distributed Cognition 
(e. g. Rogers, 1992) and Activity Theory (Nardi, 1996c). However, 
Suchman explicitly draws on an interactional framework in her account of 
situated action; situated activities shape and are shaped by an emerging 
interactional context. 
If the focus is moved away from the individual user carrying out 
experimental tasks and onto instances of naturally occurring activities 
then a conception of activity in terms of actions preceded by mental 
preparation, where static meanings are processed, appears to be 
problematic. However, even the focus on the single user of a computer 
merely manipulating objects on the screen and moving amongst the 
system's capabilities appears to be unduly constraining. In a setting like 
an architecture practice, such activities rely on a range of practices, 
including common-sense resources as well as those which constitute the 
skills of producing architectural drawings. But these activities are not 
accomplished alone; they are achieved with regard to the contribution of 
others. The nature of collaborative activities has been recently the focus of 
a range of workplace studies in the field of CSCW. These suggest an 
alternative conception of human conduct which may be appropriate for 
analysing computer-related activities as well as be relevant for system 
design. The nature of these studies suggests that their consequences are 
primarily for novel, cooperative or groupware systems. However, some 
researchers have suggested that workplace studies may be relevant for the 
analysis of conduct in relation to more conventional computer systems 
(Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath, et al., 1994-5). 
In the foregoing analysis of the computer-based activities of architects 
it appears that activities characterised as browsing, scanning, 
manipulating objects and navigating around a system are shaped by the 
skills and practices of the participants. The architects use resources 
developed in the course of their work, such as those associated with their 
profession, concerning the manipulation of plans and the organisation of 
particular buildings. Utilising the available computer-based tools, 
including the software and hardware, requires particular skills. Some of 
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these appear to rely on common-sense resources, such as the utilisation of 
space within the screen, the preservation of screen objects, the use of the 
organisation of a building to facilitate shifting from one domain to 
another, and the pacing of activities with the computer system's operation. 
However, what is revealed through these brief observations is how these 
skills shape and are shaped by the emerging course of activity. 
The detailed analysis of fragment 7, reveals how a simple movement 
from one drawing to another is developed within an emergent context: a 
context that shapes and is shaped by the interactions of the participants. 
By taking account of the ongoing activities in the domain, it is possible to 
reveal not only how screen-based activities provide resources through 
which activities are rendered intelligible but also how they are designed 
with respect to the conduct of others. Computer-based activities are 
produced, and made sense of, through a complex interweaving of talk, 
visual conduct and activities articulated on the computer system. 
Navigation around the interface, can thus be shaped by and through the 
interactions of the participants. 
Human-computer interaction then, is situated in a socio-interactional 
context; a context that is emergent from moment-to-moment. This is a 
richer conception than those where context is conceived of in terms of the 
spatial, as a set of variables or as a static container (Drew and Heritage, 
1992a; Schegloff, 1992a; Schegloff, 1992b). In HCI, even studies which are 
in some way naturalistic neglect how screen- and other computer- based 
actions are coordinated with other activities, what common-sense or 
skilful resources are necessary to make sense of the work involved in using 
the system, and how talk, visual conduct and human-computer interaction 
are interrelated. Observations of the work, activities and interaction of 
architects suggest how further examination of these issues may be 
relevant to those concerned with human-computer interaction, 
particularly those involved in recent attempts at focusing on the 
contextual, the situated, or the in situ use of computer systems. 
4.9 SUMMARY 
In this chapter some observations of human-computer interaction 
in a real 
world, organisational setting have been made. Even a cursory glance of 
the ordinary use of such systems within everyday work begins 
to reveal 
characteristics of computer use which cannot be incorporated comfortably 
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into more conventional descriptions of the interaction between human and 
computer. Attempts to distinguish internal from external knowledge 
conceptually and empirically unfortunately neglect the innovative and 
improvisational character of a system's use, and the ordinary 
competencies upon which individuals rely in undertaking screen-based 
activities in 'practical situations of choice'. More importantly, these 
approaches neglect the socio-interactional environment in which activities 
emerge. Activities on a computer system can be designed for others, and 
can be accomplished and rendered intelligible through the emerging talk 
and visual conduct of the participants. 
Part of the difficulty in utilising more conventional cognitive models to 
characterise real-world computer use, derives from their concern with 
conceptualising the knowledge a user has `of a system, rather than `how' 
knowledge is used within the situated accomplishment of a range of social 
actions and activities. Users, and in this particular case, architects, bring 
a range of resources to bear in producing and rendering intelligible screen- 
based actions and activities, and more detailed analysis of the procedures, 
practices and reasoning involved in the accomplishment of technologically- 
informed architectural work might well provide a more satisfactory 
characterisation of certain aspects of human-computer interaction. 
Moreover, by analysing in detail the production of activities on a computer 
some of the resources through which these are accomplished can be 
identified. These activities are achieved through a delicate coordination of 
talk and visual conduct. Through this complex interweaving, participants 
manage to produce and understand meaningful activities, an 
understanding which is displayed by their colleagues through their own 
contributions. This suggests an alternative resource for understanding 
human-computer interaction through understandings that are 
accomplished and displayed by the participants' own activities and 
interactions; activities that are not mental processes, but social and 
interactional achievements. 
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Chapter 5 
Distributed 
Collaborative Work 
The use of the radio phone system in 
the Docklands Light Railway Control 
Room 
That's a funny kind of thing, in which each new object becomes the 
occasion for seeing again what we see anywhere; seeing people's 
nastinesses or goodnesses and all the rest, when they do this initially 
technical job of talking over the phone. The technical apparatus is, then, 
being made at home with the rest of our world. And that's a thing that's 
routinely being done, and it's the source for the failures of technocratic 
dreams that if only we introduced some fantastic new communication 
machine the world will be transformed. Where what happens is that the 
object is made at home in the world that has whatever organisation it 
already has. 
(Sacks, 1992, p. 548) 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The study reported over the next two chapters aims to contribute to the 
developing body of work concerning the study of in situ collaborative 
activities. These chapters draw on materials gathered in a control room of 
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Docklands Light Railway (DLR). This is a highly automated setting, 
where computer support is provided for activities as diverse as controlling 
the power supply, monitoring passenger alarms, scheduling trains and 
handling phone calls. 1 In Chapter 6 the tightly coordinated activities of 
the controllers sited in the control room are considered. In this chapter 
activities of a different kind are examined: those which occur on the radio 
phone system between the controllers and remote personnel. 
The analysis will focus on these distributed activities, particularly how 
they are accomplished by the participants through a range of social 
practices. Section 5.2 briefly provides some further background to 
previous analyses of workplace activities, particularly with respect to the 
concerns of the analysis of geographically-dispersed activities and the 
design of novel CSCW systems. 
In the DLR Control Room, critical to the control and management of 
the moment-to-moment running of traffic on the transport system, and the 
handling of crises as they emerge are the conversations on the radio phone 
system. The remote parties can inform the controllers of important 
events, such as suspect packages or train failures, and drivers may need to 
be told of changes to the running order of the traffic. Therefore, the 
effective accomplishment of these activities is essential for the safe and 
smooth running of the service. To meet these ends, a computer system has 
been introduced to assist with the taking and making of calls. This system 
queues incoming calls and allows the controller to choose which call to 
take from this list. Analysing the radio phone talk also happens to provide 
resources for a distinctive way of analysing the use of this system. An 
analysis of the radio phone talk is the focus of this chapter. 
To provide a foundation for the presentation of the analysis, both here 
and for the following chapter, a brief overview of the activities of 
individuals in the DLR Control Room is given (Section 5.3). This reveals 
the critical nature of the radio phone conversations; how they are utilised 
to manage the day-to-day running of the service and to handle crises and 
The materials on which the analyses in chapters 5 and 6 are based consist of field 
observations and video-recordings carried out over three days and several shifts 
in the control room of DLR. Two cameras were used: one focusing on the 
controllers' desk in general; the other mainly centred on one controller and the 
phone system. The corpus of materials consists of nearly 40 hours of video- 
recordings. 
174 
emergencies. As background to the analysis of this radio phone talk a 
brief review of some work which has been undertaken on the opening of 
telephone conversations is provided (Section 5.4). This gives a foundation 
for some general observations on the distinctiveness of the radio phone 
conversations, on the general organisation of the opening of calls, and on 
some practical problems that contributors to the calls have to face when 
initiating the talk (Section 5.5). 
The resources utilised by the participants are considered in two ways: 
first, how the initiation of the conversation is managed through 
interactional devices, available to the participants, both through talk and 
through other non-vocal means (Section 5.6); second, how these devices 
may themselves be produced with respect to other features in the call, 
particularly the pacing of the initial contributions to the calls (Section 5.7). 
It appears that participants are very sensitive to the contributions of 
their colleagues to the radio phone call: the design of particular turns and 
the intonational contour of the turns provide resources through which the 
management of the initiation of the call is accomplished. The nature of 
the calls also appears to introduce some features which need to be 
considered by the participants (and for analysts), particularly with regard 
to the nature of a summons to answer (Section 5.6.1) and for eliciting the 
reason for a call (Section 5.6.2). However, even when there are apparent 
problems in the call, participants appear to be orienting to the 
conventional demands placed on them in ordinary social interactions 
(Section 5.6.3). 
The management of the initiation of the calls provides for a 
consideration of some observable features of the calls with respect to their 
pacing. Section 5.7 considers the details of the timing of the talk in two 
domains within the conversation: with respect to the gap just after the 
first turn of talk (Section 5.7.1) and to the one just prior to it (Section 
5.7.2). It appears that features of the talk may be managed with respect 
to this pacing, the talk unfolding with regard to such details in the 
interaction. When examined at this finer level, it appears that the general 
distribution of responsibilities in the calls is very carefully managed. This 
is a critical and ongoing concern of the participants. The talk is not 
organised to some pre-specified pattern, but rather the various 
contributions are shaped with respect to the prior activities of a co- 
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participant. Moreover, even the gaps and pauses in the talk may reveal a 
sensitivity to the conduct of a remote colleague. 
The pacing of the talk appears not only to be resource for the 
accomplishment of activities through the radio, but also for other activities 
in the control room. Pauses in the talk can provide opportunities for 
undertaking prospective activities with respect to the call, for example, 
examining the various computer displays available to the controllers. This 
can provide resources for making sense of the circumstances of the caller, 
hence the readings of the screens can be seen in the light of the emerging 
phone call, even prior to any talk from a co-participant (Section 5.8). 
Therefore, in this chapter, various kinds of resources utilised by 
participants in the course of their activities are considered. These include 
the design of turns of talk, the pacing of talk and the information available 
on computer screens. These resources are critical for the accomplishment 
of the controllers' management of activities through the computer system 
and, hence to, the transportation network. They are, however, resources 
that are made use of through interactions, through turns of talk. Hence, 
they rest on common-sense practices and practical reasoning, practices 
which are socially ordered and organised. Section 5.9 concludes the 
chapter with a brief discussion of the nature of the analytic resources 
utilised here with respect to some other recent analyses of distributed 
activities in technological domains. 
5.2 BACKGROUND 
For researchers in CSCW the potential contribution of Workplace Studies 
is that they may yield a better understanding of social interaction and the 
coordination of activities between individuals. For designers who aim to 
develop novel computing and audio-visual environments for individuals 
who are geographically dispersed, such an understanding could suggest 
potential capabilities that could be supported by the technology. So, for 
example, analyses of activities in complex environments could inform the 
ways cameras, videos and other technologies could be reorganised and 
reconfigured within `media spaces'. With this reorganisation, the audio- 
visual environments could better overcome the problems of existing 
arrangements and provide more flexible ways in which individuals could 
accomplish collaborative activities (Heath, et al., 1995b). Similarly, 
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detailed studies of interactions and the use of artefacts could suggest ways 
in which to develop collaborative virtual environments (CVEs). These 
provide an electronically presented setting in which representations of 
individuals can interact with each other and with certain objects available 
in the virtual environment. Studies of social interaction and activities 
could suggest, for example, how objects need to be presented in relation to 
the `individual' in the system, how movements between different kinds of 
collaboration could be presented, and some of the requirements for 
achieving `pointings' and `collaborative viewings' in CVEs (Benford, et al., 
1996). Hence, studies of activities of individuals who are co-present could 
inform the development of systems to support activities between 
individuals who are dispersed. 
Although there is an interest from researchers and developers in 
resources concerning the nature of collaborative work, there is an 
inadequate corpus of findings to draw upon that could be relevant for 
design. However, in the last few years some studies have been 
undertaken that may begin to address the interests of designers (e. g. 
Benford, et al., 1996; Bowers and Button, 1995; Filippi and Theureau, 
1993; Hughes, et al., 1992; Hutchins, 1990). Of particular interest, have 
been those that utilise video-recordings to reveal the interrelationships 
between naturally-occurring tasks and interaction (Goodwin and Goodwin, 
1996; Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath and Luff, 1992a; Whalen, 1995b). 
These studies are beginning to outline a distinctive approach to the study 
of activities, for example, how an individual's activities can be considered 
as designed for others, and with respect to the conduct of others. 
The study reported in this chapter seeks to extend this corpus of 
studies by exploring the use of a technology to support distributed 
activities: the computerised radio phone system used on the DLR. 
The phone system has several interesting features, including a `call 
back' facility. In effect, all calls from remote parties are queued. This has 
the consequence that, no matter who initiated the call and has a `reason' 
to call, the controller almost always utters the first turn in the call. This 
may appear strange given previous studies of telephone conversations 
which have explored how delicately the initial turns are managed in a call. 
These studies reveal how through the management of the opening of the 
call co-participants initiate the talk, give the reason for the call and, 
hence, set up a distribution of activities between the participants and a 
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trajectory for the remainder of the call (Schegloff, 1968). Given the nature 
of calls on the DLR, how they are initiated would appear to be critical to 
the way they unfold, specifically concerning the reason for the call. 
How participants manage and accomplish such actions in their talk 
through this novel communication and computer technology would provide 
a distinctive approach from those considered in Chapter 2 which examine 
similar activities. In CPM-GOMS, for example, talk on the phone, in the 
domain of call operators, is considered too varied to be a topic of analysis 
(Gray, et al., 1993). In the analysis of Hutchins, talk, either in the co- 
present setting or mediated by technology, is considered in terms of 
communicative acts and functions. 
Through their contributions to the talk on the phone the participants 
accomplish activities regarding the handling of the traffic on the line. 
These activities are achieved through an interaction where one activity 
both displays an understanding of a prior turn, and also is designed for a 
co-participant. The participants' activities, therefore, provide an analysis 
of their colleagues' contributions. This analysis can also be a resource for 
revealing how the calls are organised. As the use of the computer- 
supported communication system is displayed through talk, these 
contributions can also be a resource for analysing the participants' 
activities through the system. The talk provides what is publicly available 
to the participants in the call. In this way, turns of talk can be a resource 
for analysing the naturally-occurring and necessarily distributed activities 
that take place in the setting. 
This may be interesting if the technology, both the radio and the 
computer system, requires an organisation to the talk not found in similar 
conversations, like telephone talk. Though there may be differences 
introduced by the technology, a consideration of the in situ organisation of 
the openings of telephone talk may shed some light on the organisation of 
both radio talk and the operation of the computer-supported radio phone 
system. In particular, given from previous studies of telephone calls that 
the resources utilised in their commencement are particularly critical to 
the way in which they develop, it might be expected that transforming 
these critical resources may require a different nature of activities in the 
initiation of a call. This could have consequences for how the management 
of what gets done by whom in the call is accomplished. 
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The detailed analysis of a different domain of social interaction, a radio 
conversation, may further be useful for reflecting back on the resources 
utilised by participants in the openings in conversations and telephone 
calls. 
As with the CAD system examined in the previous chapter, the 
controller's operation of the radio phone system is not isolated from 
activities with other artefacts or with other colleagues. Hence the 
organisation of the calls need also be considered with respect to the 
activities of others in Control Room. This is the focus of Chapter 6, but in 
the present chapter the operation of the phone system is also considered in 
the light of the publicly available resources. By considering the 
interrelationship between the talk on the phone and the use of the system, 
the resources through which participants make sense of the call, and the 
ways the call can suggest ways of `reading' what is presented through the 
technology, can be explored. Through a complex web of contributions, 
interactions between individuals in the control room and personnel in 
different locations, with varying responsibilities and concerns, can be 
managed. 
5.3 THE GENERAL ACTIVITIES OF CONTROLLERS ON THE DLR2 
The taking and making of phone calls in the DLR is the responsibility of 
one of the Control Room Supervisors (CRSs), or `controllers', who sits at a 
large console which takes up most of the space in the control room. This 
controller (here called Ci) usually sits on the leftmost seat of the console, 
nearest to the computer-supported phone system. Next to him sits 
another controller (Cii), who tends to be responsible for traffic movements 
in the shunting yard and discussions with the personnel who sit at the far 
right of the console, the Control Room Assistants (or CRAs). They 
manage the passenger announcements and the distribution of mobile 
radios to those personnel who are responsible for each of the trains, called 
Train Captains (or TCs). There are usually two other personnel in the 
control room, a Control Room Manager (CRM) with strategic 
responsibilities for the line and control room; and an Electronic Works 
Coordinator (EWC) who is concerned with the technical operation of the 
2 Appendix A gives further background to the DLR, including a glossary of terms 
used in the radio conversations (Section A. 5). 
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line. Figure 5.1 shows the general location of these personnel within the 
control room. 
V ARA 
r 
ýR, qý 
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Hi o Figure 5.1: The DLR Control Room Staff The principal concern of the controllers is to maintain a smooth and 
safe service for customers. This requires them to monitor and alter the 
running of the line and to establish and maintain contact with personnel 
out on the system. To assist them with these responsibilities the 
controllers have two computer systems: an automatic train scheduler (or 
ATS) and a phone system (PS). The various devices that make up the 
hardware of these systems are located in the middle of the console at 
which the controllers sit (Figure 5.2 gives the general organisation of the 
technology available to the controllers). Both controllers have a keyboard 
which can operate the ATS, with a display to it in front of each of them. 
Because the phone system is positioned to the left of the leftmost 
controller (Ci) it is this controller who tends to take and make calls. 
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At peak times, the calls the controllers have to deal with can nearly be 
continuous, with Ci dealing with one call after another. These calls may 
concern the operation of the service, such as in (1) when a train captain 
has to be informed of a change in the destination of a train. 
(1) 43a (PT) 2134B 2174A - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: five two? 
(0.5) 
Ci: five two ( receiving )? 
(0.7) 
TC: yeah five two 
(1.3) 
Ci: err: Gordon we're going to run you down to Island Gardens 
(0.2) from there you'll be a Stratford service over. 
or concern traffic movements in the shunting yard, or Operations and 
Maintenance Centre (OMC), as in (2): 
(2) 45 (T) 2345B 2380A (xi) - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: (ee) five three:? 
(") 
E: five threeT to ba:: se? (. ) I've got vehicle twelve being 
moved forward then waiting your instructions () overT 
(0.3) 
Ci: yeah thats roger on that ( Re: g ) follow (green Ess 
specs) from err (0.2) Dee You ru: n (. ) (and we'll put you 
on (machine road) over. 
As well as these routine occurrences, controllers also have to deal with 
a wide range of problems and emergencies that arise during the course of 
the day. These include not only the well-known difficulties of operating 
public transport systems in a large city, such as bomb scares and suspect 
packages... 
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Figure 5.2: The controllers' desk and technology 
(3) 14Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: three two go aheadT 
(3.9) 
TC: (yeah this is ) three two to bas: e (0.2) umm: (. ) 
(someone has) umm (0.2) (a black) briefse (on 
tracksi: de) (1.2) coming out of (. ) All Saints (two) 
(0.2) (on the way to) Devons Road>about two hundred yards 
down. (between) on trackside over? 
(2.5) 
and requesting police officers to deal with troublesome passengers 
refusing to pay fares (`revenue disputes')... 
(4) 8iii 3570B - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: seven three? 
(2.3) 
TC: seven three errrm: (. ) (will you be able to get me a Bee 
Tee Pee at the depot. 
but also problems with the lifts,... 
(5) IOCo - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: six two: oo: T? 
(1.4) 
TC: ( can you give me ) can you give me errr (0.4) the 
information (regarding the lifts err) at West India Quay 
() one on the southbo: und"L one at>one at Stratford one 
on westward) over? 
(1.8) 
Ci: eea: h I can err (0.2) I can tell you that one (0.2) lift 
at West India Quay is out of order but which one I don't 
kno:: w"L(. )>its lift one (0.8) errrrrm: >and the lift at 
Stratford has err not been reported as defective so I 
presume it is worTking over? 
lost property... 
(6) 52 (T) 3635B 3662A (xii) - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: four:: eight? 
TC: (four eight )I have a ( lady on board) (saying she's 
lost a) set of keys ( ) over. 
(0.2) 
Ci: any keys handed into l ost property? 
(2.3) ((Cii shakes head)) 
Ci: four eight? 
(2.3) 
TC: ( yeah ) four eight to base (0.2) I'm enquiring about a 
(ladies) set of keys ( .) (you haven't had any one hand 
them in) over? 
(0.8) 
Ci: yeah (I have a) roger on that I've made enquiries ( with 
our ) Cee Ar A:: s and they've no:: keys (have been) 
handed in (. )() 
(1.3) 
TC: (oh very good) over. 
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and a wide variety of other difficulties with the power supply, phones, 
radios, public announcements, the relief of train captains etc. They also 
have to keep management informed of significant events... 
(7) 22Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: four two: T 
(0.5) 
CRM: (Peter Cribb. ) 
(0.6) 
Ci: yes is that Peter Qver? 
(1.2) 
CRM: receivingt 
(") 
Ci: yeah errrm"L (0.2) just to put you in the pictur: eT we 
have just had a report of a suspicious i: teml between All 
Saints and Devons Road stations. 
(0.2) 
and maintain a record of less significant failures and delays (F&Ds) 
with the system. Hence, there are a large number of apparently distinct 
activities that controllers have to cope with, many of which can arise at 
any time in the course of the day. The work of informing individuals of 
changes to the service, of dealing with incidents and even of generally 
maintaining the state of the service largely happens over the phone. 
Matters are raised in the calls which are then managed through the 
interaction with the remote party. 
Although controllers have to operate the ATS and deal with the 
concerns of CRAs, CRMs and other staff in the control room, the critical 
aspects of their work is accomplished through the talk on the phone. As 
will be seen in Chapter 6, even the operation of the ATS is also tied to this 
talk. Through the conversations on the phone controllers do not merely 
communicate or convey information, they carry out actions: transforming 
the service and managing crises. The accomplishment of their work is 
accomplished through these interactions. Therefore, in order to explore 
the nature of work and interaction in the control room it is important to 
examine, in more detail, how these phone conversations are organised. 
It may be noticed that, after the initiation of the call, the participants 
go on immediately to give the reason for the call: the reporting of a suspect 
package or lost property, a change in the schedule, or a request for 
assistance or for information. It would appear to be important in this 
domain that the `reason for the call' is produced promptly so that it can be 
acknowledged or dealt with there and then, and then both participants 
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can move on either to related activities or something else. 3 Indeed, in 
most cases, the reason for the call can be considered to be the sole `topic' or 
issue addressed in the conversation. If it is a request then it is replied to 
in the next turn, if some news is given then this is acknowledged in the 
next turn, and if it is some statement of a problem by the remote party 
and a potential solution is given by the controller in the next turn then the 
remote party will typically repeat this solution as an acknowledgement. 
The parties will then briskly move into some sort of closing with typically 
`that's received', or `thanks for that' or just a `thanks' from each 
participant. Thus, in terms of the transition of turns, radio phone 
conversations on the DLR are typically short and rest on the initial 
delivery of the reason for the call. This will be a focus of the ensuing 
analysis. 
As has been noted, in the DLR Control Room the phone calls are 
mediated by a computer system, a technology that allows calls to be 
queued and taken in any order. Any analysis of the organisation of the 
radio phone conversations is also an analysis of the `use' of this computer 
system. As conversations, and, in particular telephone conversations, 
have been a focus of study for many years by conversation analysts, 
particularly conversational openings and initiations, these studies may be 
a useful resource for beginning to understand how this technology is being 
used by participants. The mediation of a computer system in the 
interaction may have an impact on how the talk is organised in this 
domain. Analysts of telephone talk (e. g. Schegloff, 1968) have both 
identified how talk on the telephone is organised with respect to the 
3 It may be that the consideration of an object like a `reason for a call' may be itself 
be a problematic analytic category. This will not be dealt with at any length in 
the ensuing discussion. Suffice it to say that the participants in the setting 
manage to analyse such components for what is relevant and what has to be dealt 
with quite unproblematically, they acknowledge what is provided, sometimes 
repeat it and in other ways deal with what is given them. There may be 
difficulties with hearing the `reason for the call' or even with associating the 
`reason for the call' with the responsibilities of the recipient, however, this 
component does invariably seem to be treated in this way, and not, say, as some 
preamble to another `reason'. The production and recognition of this is a skilful 
and collaborative achievement by the parties involved. See Sacks' (1968 [1992]) 
discussion of the differences between announced reasons for calls and findable 
reasons for calls, and the `interesting' cases for people to make calls `without 
reasons for a call'. 
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particular features of the technology, and also how the organisation still 
relies on more generic moral and social commitments by the parties. A 
consideration of talk in this more familiar domain may contribute to the 
analysis of radio talk. It may also be interesting to consider to what 
extent the resources utilised by participants in telephone conversations 
can be relied on in radio phone conversations. 4 
5.4 THE ORGANISATION OF TELEPHONE CALLS 
The organisation of the telephone call has been of particular interest to 
researchers involved in the analysis of conversation. Telephone calls 
provide an accessible resource of naturalistic materials which can be 
recorded cheaply. Moreover, although participants in a call have 
constrained access to each other (only through audio), this access is not 
only symmetrically available to the participants but can also be similarly 
available to analysts. Thus, it can be seen as a resource for studying 
naturally occurring social actions and also for revealing features of other 
forms of talk. For example, Schegloff (1968) analysed a substantial corpus 
of conversational openings on telephone calls, which provided a resource 
for a more generic analysis of conversational resources. 
Schegloff notes one particular consistency in the corpus of data he 
analysed, that answerers talk first. This is despite caller and called having 
differential `informational resources'. 5 The caller, for example, knows who 
is his or her intended interlocutor, the called can only speculate. Indeed, 
although Schegloff has a corpus of roughly 500 examples, only in one does 
the caller speak first (reproduced as 8). 
(8) #9 (Police makes call) (from Schegloff, 1972, p. 356) 
((Receiver is lifted) ) 
(1.0) 
POLICE: Hello. 
OTHER: American Red Cross. 
POLICE: Hello, this is Police Headquarters... 
He utilises this `deviant case' to reveal a more generic aspect of 
conversations, that summons demands answers. In a phone conversation 
4 For other analyses of radio conversations, see the analysis of intonational 
contours in radio talk (Goodwin, 1996), and the accomplishment of multi-party 
conversations through voice loops in a complex interactional setting (Watts, et al., 
1996). 
5 See also comments by Sacks in his lecture of Fall 1967, (Sacks, 1992, p. 632). 
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the ringing of the phone serves to summon the interlocutor, much as other 
`attention-getting devices' such as terms of address (e. g. `John'), courtesy 
phrases (e. g. `pardon me') and physical devices (e. g. a wave of a hand), 
serve to summons potential co-participants in other interactional domains. 
So, in (8) though the caller, the police dispatcher, answers first, rather 
than the called, the talk can be seen with respect to prior (non-) activities 
in the call, the one second delay. Thus, the dispatcher can be seen to be 
repeating the summons of the phone ringing, following the delay after the 
called has lifted the phone. Once this second summons `Hello' is 
answered, the caller then gives the reason for the call. The `deviant case' 
can thus be seen to reproduce the generic case, the repair revealing that 
participants remain oriented to summons demanding answers. Moreover, 
by considering the case with respect to phone calls, the `distributional rule' 
of `answerer speaks first' can be considered more generally, in terms of the 
obligations placed on participants within interactions. The initial 
summons and its answer can be seen to provide for coordinated entry into 
conversation and for its continued orderliness. So, for example, Schegloff 
summarises some observations concerning the first two turns as follows. 
A summons item; obligates other to answer under penalty of being found 
absent. insane, insolent, condescending etc. Moreover, by virtue of 
orientation to properties of answer items, i. e. their character as questions, 
provides for users' future obligation to answer, and thereby to have 
another turn to talk. Thus, preliminary or prefatory character, 
establishing and ensuring availability of other to interact. 
Answer summons, thereby establishing availability to interact further. 
Ensures there will be further interaction by employing a question i. e., 
which demands further talk or activity by summoner. 
(Schegloff, 1968, p. 376) 
Thus, through the coordination of the opening of the conversation the 
organisation of the subsequent talk can emerge; an answer to a summons 
allows the summoner the right to talk again. A question, such as `what? ' 
as an answer to a summons provides further resources for the other, the 
summoner, to talk again. 
The suggestion that the ring of a telephone provides comparable 
resources for a co-interactant as a summons may shed some light onto the 
organisation of calls in the DLR Control Room. For, even if the technology 
may transform the resources which can be utilised, it would be interesting 
to explore whether the more in-depth analysis suggested by Schegloff of 
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the obligations demanded by a summons permeates this other 
interactional domain. 
5.5 TAKING AND MAKING CALLS ON THE DOCKLANDS LIGHT RAILWAY 
At first hearing the calls in the DLR Control Room appear to be highly 
formalised and repetitive. They frequently involve the repetition of key 
components like instructions, the completion of turns with the word `over' 
and the identification of participants by numbers. The initiation of the 
phone call appears to be particularly curious involving numerous rings 
and beeps, lengthy pauses and the talk commencing with the controller 
uttering the phone number of the remote party. The particular design and 
operation of the phone technology gives a partial account of some of these 
curiosities. 
The DLR uses a radio phone system allowing members of staff to 
contact, or to be contacted by, the control room anywhere on the system. 
However, as the phone system is not a typical telephone network, it does 
have a few peculiarities. 6 For example, the control room can broadcast 
messages to all members of staff with a radio phone. In its more usual 
operation, when a remote caller wishes to contact the control room, he or 
she makes a call which is then queued (or more accurately listed) on the 
computer system. This queue is displayed on the screen to the left of the 
principal controller (Ci). 7 The controller can then make calls either by 
selecting calls from the list (in any order) or call any other phone that is in 
operation. So, in effect, the controller has to make a `call' with the system 
even when `answering' the call. Hence, whether the call concerns a 
controller telling a train captain of a change or an incident being reported 
by a member of staff, the first turn is uttered by the controller. As well as 
6 It was stated by the controllers that the telecommunication system was a version 
of one used for communication by bus operators, and this, in some way, accounted 
for its particularities. One example is the problem of drivers having the ability to 
hold the line at the end of a call. This may be necessary in emergencies on the 
buses, but presented potential difficulties in the everyday running of DLR, as 
controllers can only move onto further calls when the remote participant 
disconnects the call. 
7 For each call the phone system screen displays the time of the call, the name of 
the caller, the radio number and the train number, if appropriate (in different 
columns, each call being assigned a row in a table). 
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the changing display of the phone system, the system emits various rings 
and beeps at various stages in the call making procedure. So, in the 
following call a train captain is enquiring about which automatic ticket 
machines are in operation. 
(9) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
1 (T) 2B / 3B - transcript 1 
((long ring)) 
(1.5) 
((beep)) 
(3.5) 
((Ci picks up phone - short ring)) 
(3.5) ((Ci selects call)) 
((long ring)) 
(0.5) 
((long ring)) 
(1.2) 
Ci: (three eight) 
(1.4) 
TC: ()A:: 
go ahead? 
Tee eM operating over. 
The initial ring (line 1), a five tone sound, is the train captain `calling 
in'. The following beep (line 3) comes from the computer-supported phone 
system and is accompanied by changes in the screen display, also notifying 
the controller that a call is waiting. Unlike a conventional telephone 
system the phone does not continue to ring, and some three and a half 
seconds later, the controller picks up the phone (line 5). This itself is also 
accompanied by a ring, a short two tone sound. The controller then selects 
the call from the phone system using the mouse. Two further rings are 
generated by the system, the first signalling the call being made from the 
control room (line 7), the second being for the train captain (line 9). The 
controller follows this by uttering the radio number of the caller. This 
appears to demand a response, which it gets. The train captain gives the 
reason for the call 1.4 seconds later. 
Outgoing calls are a little simpler. 
(10) 3- transcript 1 
1 ((Ci picks up phone, selects call)) 
2 (7.0) 
3 ((long ring)) 
4 (0.4) 
5 ((long ring)) 
6 (1.2) 
7 Ci: (train base to train) six one? 
8 (1.3) 
9 M: six one? 
10 (1.3) 
11 Ci: yeah er take a minute (ordering that) all clear if 
12 you'd like to standby for giving instructions... 
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Again, the two sets of rings follow the selection of the call on the 
computer-supported phone system, and the controller commences talk on 
the phone with the callers' number. After the caller replies, the controller 
then gives the reason for the call (lines 11 and 12). 
From the foregoing fragments, it is apparent that phone calls in the 
control room can be distinguished from conventional phone calls by several 
straightforward features. These include. 
" One party only, the controller, begins to talk on the phone. 
" The callers are identified by and identify themselves through 
numbers rather than names. 
" There are a variety of phone rings and beeps which have different 
characteristics to telephone rings (i. e. ringing is not continuous, and 
hence, does not stop when the called is available to answer). 
"A computer system mediates the incoming calls and displays 
information concerning potential recipients. 
" Incoming calls are kept by the system as requests to make contact 
rather than direct `summonses' to the control room (i. e. calls need 
not be dealt with on a first-come-first-served basis). 
" In all calls one party is always the same, namely the controller. It 
is not possible for anyone other than the controller to make a call to 
other members of staff on the radio phone. 
" On incoming calls, the controller can identify who is calling through 
the computer-supported phone system. 
At first glance, the common features revealed by Schegloff for 
telephone conversations do not appear to hold: answerers do not speak 
first, the caller does. However, as noted, the first speaker is the controller, 
whether or not the call has been queued or initiated. Through the phone 
system technology the categories `caller' and `called' become problematic: 
these could relate to the initial request for a call or the particular call 
underway. In `outgoing calls' these would be the same; in `incoming' ones 
they would be different. Hence, the conception of a summons would 
appear to be problematic for incoming calls: this could be related to the 
original request or the particular call. Moreover, the ringing of the phone 
is not continuous, and the `picking up' of a receiver cannot be regarded as 
an answer to a summons. 
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However, when the instances above are considered there does not seem 
to be any undue difficulties in moving through the opening of the 
interaction. The opening sequence may appear to be extended, say in 
comparison to those in telephone calls, but, given the differences between 
when a call has been requested by a remote party and when it is initiated 
by the controller, there do not appear to be obvious ways of explicitly 
eliciting the reason for the call, or, perhaps more curiously, of explicitly 
marking an incoming from and outgoing one. 
When the particularities of the technology are considered further, the 
characteristics of the calls in the DLR appear to be even more curious. If 
the member of staff and the controller can assume or have information 
concerning the identity of their co-participant, why does it appear that so 
much work is involved to establish contact? In all but one of the 
fragments above, where it can be heard, both controller and the remote 
party repeat the radio number. 8 As there has just been a phone ring, the 
number of the remote party is displayed on the screen and, on incoming 
calls, both parties are `known' to each other, this may be just an example 
of `formal' talk, the organisation of turns being prescribed beforehand. 
Even if this so, it would still be interesting to investigate how these formal 
procedures are utilised in practice, given the `information resources' 
available to the participants in the radio phone call. 
When considering the operation of the technology one particular issue 
emerges. Given the potential for a delay between a request for a call and 
the call itself and the operation of system, it would appear to be 
problematic to distinguish between incoming and outgoing calls. The talk 
in each has to be initiated by the controller. However, there appears to be 
no explicit routine device for this. In the cases so far considered in two 
(fragments 3 and 9) the controller utters `go ahead', but this is not routine. 
Conversely train numbers seem to routinely be uttered with a rising 
intonation, but this occurs across all the calls, both incoming and outgoing 
(e. g. fragments 1 and 10). Nevertheless, it would appear to be a practical 
problem for the participants not only to elicit the reason for the call, but 
also to manage that elicitation. It is of course possible that controllers 
may want to contact a train captain on the queue, or that after some time 
8 In the other case (7), a CRM, replies with his name. In all other instances in this 
chapter, where it can be heard, the radio number is uttered at least twice by the 
two parties in the opening of the call. 
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a reason for a call may no longer relevant. It might be expected, given the 
apparent formality of the call, that some formal device would be specified 
to mark `call backs' from `new calls'. 
In the remainder of this chapter, the ways in which this work is 
achieved will be explored. 
Before considering how these problems are managed through the 
initial activities of the participants in the calls, it may be worth providing 
a general outline of how the openings are organised (see Figure 5.3a). 9 
Given the operation of the system the distinction between incoming and outgoing 
calls may be misleading. However, to facilitate the ensuing exposition, calls 
which have been requested through the phone system by a remote party will be 
considered as incoming. The reason for the call is produced by the remote party. 
Where the reason for the call is produced by the controller the call will be 
considered as outgoing. Hence, the distinction between incoming and outgoing 
calls can be seen to be emergent rather than assigned a priori through the 
technology. In most cases when the reason for the call is sequentially relevant, 
the parties, through their actions, display an understanding as to who should 
produce the turn. Hence, the call at this point becomes incoming or outgoing. In 
the problematic cases, as we will see, the difficulties are managed through the 
sequential organisation of turns' of talk. The parties display first an 
understanding that a reason for a call is relevant and appropriate, and, then 
eventually produce one. 
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Incoming Calls 
TC: <long ring of controller's phone, 
change on system display> 
(= 1.5 seconds ) 
<beep of system> 
(after some period, intervening 
actions etc. ) 
C: <takes actions to call remote party> C: 
<long ring of controller's phone> 
(= 0.5 seconds) 
<long ring of remote party's phone> 
<pause> 
C: ('train base to') radio number C: 
< pause > 
TC: (<feedback>) TC: 
radio number + <reason for call > 
C: 
Outgoing Calls 
<takes actions to call remote party> 
<long ring of controller's phone> 
(= 0.5 seconds) 
<long ring of remote party's phone> 
<pause> 
('train base to') radio number 
< pause > 
(<feedback>) 
radio number 
<pause> 
<reason for call > 
Figure 5.3a: A general schematic for the organisation of radio phone calls on the DLR 
Apart from the initial ring to request a call, the general outline of the 
calls is similar: the controller selects the other party on the phone system; 
the phone rings twice; he then pauses, utters a turn which includes the 
radio number of the other party who, after a little while and perhaps some 
feedback, then replies. The reply is different in the two cases. For the 
incoming calls the other party, typically a train captain, provides the 
reason for the call, after uttering his or her radio number. In outgoing 
calls, the reply is minimal, including a radio number. The controller then 
gives the reason for the call. 
5.6 THE INITIATION OF RADIO PHONE CALLS ON THE DOCKLANDS 
LIGHT RAILWAY 
Amongst the many ways that the radio phone in the DLR differs from the 
telephone is the differential access participants and potential participants 
have to the call. Most critically, the radio can be a broadcast medium 
where all remote participants can hear the controller's turns of talk. This 
occurs when the controller makes an announcement to all `train captains'. 
Train captains can also `switch channel' to listen in to the calls broadcast 
by the control room. In this mode they only hear the controllers' talk to 
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other colleagues on the system, but it does provide some access to the 
`goings on' on the train system. 10 Thus, only the controller can hear the 
remote recipient through the radio. 
For train captains outgoing calls are in some ways like the telephone, 
only the controllers can hear that a call is being attempted. However, 
because of the call-back nature of the system it can be unclear to the train 
captain whether the subsequent rings are related to the call he or she 
requested. The rings might foreshadow a return call to someone else or 
herald an outgoing call. Thus, the rings merely inform potential recipients 
that a call is being attempted, the particular interlocutor is not apparent 
until the relevant call sign is uttered. Even when this is uttered, because 
of the delay between the request for a call and the call, it may not always 
be clear whether and how this particular call relates to the prior request. 11 
Hence, it would seem that it might not be clear who is initiating the 
call and, thus, who should provide the reason for the call. The analysis of 
telephone conversations suggests that the initial turns provide for a 
trajectory of subsequent actions: a summons demanding an answer, the 
answer to the summons providing for the caller to give the reason for the 
call. This organisation does not immediately seem apparent in the radio 
phone conversations on the DLR. In the next sections, particular activities 
in the radio phone conversations are considered: the summons (Section 
5.6.1) and the production of the reason for the call Section 5.6.2). As with 
telephone conversations the production of the reason for the call is 
sequentially relevant given the prior activities in the call. However, these 
activities are distinctive to this particular domain, they are designed with 
respect to the technology and the resources available to the participants. 
In Section 5.6.3 cases are considered which do not fit with the general 
10 The use of this is problematic when considering that most of the time train 
captains are in trains occupied by passengers and are meant to be dealing with 
such matters as checking tickets and dealing with passenger queries. On the 
Bakerloo line, where drivers are in cabs the `broadcast mode' of the radios is 
critical to the running of the line (Heath and Luff, 1992a). 
11 It may be that the participants may orient in some way to the different length of 
delays before the call is returned. Some such resources are considered later in 
fragment (24), but without a detailed history of the operation of the phone system 
a more explicit analysis of such possibilities is not feasible. It could be that 
different delays project different ways of dealing with the call, or even 
differentiate the sequential demands of the upcoming call. 
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organisation given in Figure 5.3a. Nevertheless, even in these, whilst the 
distribution of responsibilities for activities in the call are locally 
managed, the participants appear to be orienting to the sequential 
demands of activities in the talk. 
5.6.1 Summonsing the Other 
In the following instance, the second controller (Cii) has, sometime earlier, 
requested Ci to `(just quickly tell number five to go to the Island)' (not 
shown in the transcript). 
(11) 39Co 
1 Ci: one o: fi: ve to the Island. L. 
2 (0.3) 
3 Cii: yeah (. ) please 
4 (3.3) ((Ci selects call)) 
5 ((long ring)) 
6 (0.1) 
7 ((long ring)) 
8 (0.2) 
9 Ci: three nine go aheadT 
10 (0.3) 
11 TC: three ni: ne. (err )a platform announcement 
12 saying (we would be going) to Island Gar: densl can 
13 you confirm (that ) over. 
14 (0.2) 
15 Ci: thats affirmative over that was the purpose of my 
16 err call to you (. ) your destination is Island 
17 Gardens over 
18 (1.4) 
19 TC: ( destination ) Island Gardens ( return) to () 
Following this request, Ci confirms this change (line 1) and then selects 
a call on the phone system. Ci's turn `three nine goo aheadT' appears to 
request the reason for the call and in the reply the train captain gives a 
potential reason for calling: a platform announcement has been made 
giving a different destination for his train. However, in the next turn, 
although Ci confirms the change mentioned by the train captain, he utters 
`that was the purpose of my err call to x'. 12 It appears that, at least at 
this point of the call, Ci is orienting to the call being outgoing. The train 
captain replies with a confirmation of the change. 
12 It may be noted that between the initial request by Ci's colleague to alter the 
route of the train, Ci takes a call from another member of staff. He does not 
appear to make any attempt to call another train. Hence, Ci appears to be 
referring to the call at hand in lines 15 - 17, and not, say, to an earlier failed 
attempt at an outgoing call. 
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Given the nature of the communication system it may seem irrelevant 
whether calls are considered incoming or outgoing, as in one sense, all 
calls are outgoing. However, a prior request for a call from a remote party 
would appear to require the controller to elicit the reason for the request. 
In conventional telephone conversations the answer to the summons 
provides the opportunity for the summoner to speak. In DLR radio-phone 
conversations the rings of the phone are always initiated by the controller 
and can be heard by others, therefore it would be difficult to suggest that 
the rings on the radio-phone suffice to summons a particular individual. 
Instead, it is the initial turn by the controller, which obliges the 
interactant to answer. So, in (9) and (10) the controller's first utterance 
provides the occasion on which the train captain can then speak. 
(9) 1 (T) 2B / 3B - transcript 2 
7 ((long ring)) 
8 (0.5) 
9 ((long ring)) 
10 (1.2) 
11 Ci: (three eight) go ahead? 
12 (1.4) 
13 TC: ()A:: Tee eM operating over. 
(10) 3- transcript 2 
3 ((long ring)) 
4 (0.4) 
5 ((long ring)) 
6 (1.2) 
7 Ci: (train base to train) six one? 
8 (1.3) 
9 M: six one? 
10 (1.3) 
11 Ci: yeah er take a minute (ordering that) all clear if 
12 you'd like to standby for giving instructions... 
In (9) the `go ahead' appears to provide the opportunity for the train 
captain not only to take the turn, but also give a reason for the original 
request for a phone connection. In (10) the reply by the train captain, 
minimally a repetition of the call sign with rising intonation, demands 
further talk from the controller. Indeed, in the following instance (1), 
when no answer is forthcoming, Ci repeats the call sign. Only when he 
gets an answer `yeah five two' does Ci give the reason for the call. 
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(1) 43a (PT) 2134B 2174A - transcript 2 
1 ((long ring)) 
2 (0.3) 
3 ((long ring)) 
4 (1.5) 
5 Ci: five two? 
6 (0.5) 
7 Ci: five two ( receiving )? 
8 (0.7) 
9 TC: yeah five two 
10 (1.3) 
11 Ci: err: Gordon we're going to run you down to Island 
12 Gardens 
Thus, in each instance various activities appear to contribute to the 
production of the reason for the call: the rings, the uttering of a call sign, 
its repetition and devices like rising intonation and `go aheads'. The phone 
rings by themselves do not summons the called. In telephone 
conversations an answer to the summons will then demand the reason for 
the call, setting `in line' the subsequent activities in the conversation. 
Here, more work appears to be required. 
Schegloff (1968) distinguishes summons which open conversations from 
other activities, particularly questions, both in their design and in the 
responses they demand. They may involve terms of address, courtesy 
phrases or physical devices and constrain the kinds of responses provided 
in the answer to the summons. The call sign does appear to do similar 
work. By being minimal itself it constrains the possibilities for the remote 
participant until he or she has responded. Hence, in (1) the uttering of the 
call sign and its repetition appears to parallel the ring and the caller 
speaking in telephone conversations, like (8). DLR phone conversations 
then may provide another domain where the obligations of a summons 
demand particular responses which then can set in line the subsequent 
conversation. The technology in the control room has transformed the 
sequence in quite a different way to the telephone. No longer can the ring 
be utilised as a summons, instead the activity has to be accomplished in 
other ways, through other devices. A `summons' as such is accomplished 
through two activities: the ring and the uttering of the call identifier, both 
being required by the way the technology operates. The first could be 
thought of attracting the attention of the audience of remote personnel, 
the other selecting a particular party (or parties) from that audience. A 
conventional summons then might have to be considered to be distributed 
over two distinct activities. 
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Although the organisation of the initiation of radio phone calls may be 
provided by the sequential demands of a summons, such an account 
appears to be only partial, ignoring other activities which have to be 
accomplished by the participants. In the opening of the call the controller 
not only has to establish contact with the appropriate individual, he or she 
also has to elicit the reason for the call. As the controller always makes 
the call, the selection of who should provide this reason would appear to be 
potentially problematic. To explore this, it is worth briefly considering 
different resources the participants have available to them and the 
circumstances they face. 
Although controllers have a computer system informing them of 
members of staff who wish to `make calls', they still have to select the 
interlocutor from an audience of potential recipients. 13 Unlike a telephone 
call, there is no resource for controllers to ascertain that the intended 
recipient is available to speak. Even if the train captain has requested to 
make a call, the delay in making that call may mean that he or she has 
become occupied in other matters, such as ensuring passengers have 
safely embarked and disembarked, dealing with a passenger's query or 
problem, or operating the train. Furthermore, the train captain works in 
an environment that is potentially noisy and open for interruption, where 
there are occasions when it is difficult to answer a call, or answer 
promptly. 
The train captain, on the other hand, has few resources with which to 
ascertain when a request for a call will be answered. Although some of the 
radio traffic can be monitored, the train captain does not have access to 
the circumstances facing the controller - the state of the service, the queue 
of phone calls etc. When a call is requested from the controller, it is not 
possible to determine when the relevant call will be made or if, when a call 
is made, whether it will necessarily relate to the train captain's request. 
There is another way in which the resources of the interactants are 
asymmetric. Controllers have a range of technologies that provide access 
onto the system: CCTVs; displays of the line; calls from other drivers, all 
allow the controllers to ascertain the state of the service. These offer a 
13 At the time of recording the DLR would have up to 15 trains out on the system, 
each with a train captain. Furthermore, members of staff in the shunting yard, 
engineers, some members of management and a'mobile controller' also have radio 
phones. 
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potential resource, revealing some of the circumstances surrounding a call 
from a train driver. Train captains have little access to the state of the 
service, they can only speculate on the reason for the call. 
The need to cope with these different problems may account for the 
distinctive nature of calls on the DLR. In telephone conversations, the 
called speaking first can be seen as one part of a collaborative solution to 
the problem of producing a reason for the call. Partly because of the 
nature of the technology, calls in the DLR Control Room are always 
commenced by the controllers and when a call is initiated by the remote 
party, the controller's actions may occur some time after the initial request 
is made. There would appear to be then not only a problem of eliciting the 
reason for a call, but also identifying the individual who needs to provide 
it. Thus, it is unclear whether the ways in which activities are distributed 
over the initial contributions to conversations and telephone calls can 
account for the organisation of calls in the DLR. In effect, it would appear 
to be a practical problem for participants using the technology, 
particularly the remote party, to distinguish between incoming and 
outgoing calls. 
5.6.2 Producing the `Reason for a call' 
In the opening of phone calls, there appear to be several resources which 
participants utilise to deal with the practical problems at hand. Following 
the rings the controllers invariably summons using a call sign, a unique 
number identifying the radio set of the recipient. These numbers are 
available on the computer-supported phone system. On hearing the 
number, the remote party then replies using the same number. 14 With 
the absence of any resource to mark that a party is ready to speak, such as 
the phone stopping ringing, these turns serve to establish that both 
parties are available to talk at the current time. They also ensure that the 
party summoned is the party who is speaking. 
There are other recurrent features in these initial turns of talk in the 
phone conversations. With a few exceptions the number is spoken with a 
rising intonation, as in the following examples. 
14 It should be noted that these numbers are not the same as train numbers. Train 
captains can change trains during a shift, but their radio set number will remain 
the same. So, in (11) the captain of train `105' has radio set `39'. 
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(12) 4B 
((long ring)) 
(0.6) 
-' Ci: seven three? 
(3.3) 
(13) 5 
((long ring)) 
(1.3) 
Ci: four five? 
(5.1) 
(14) 33 
((long ring)) 
(0.3) 
Ci: one five? 
(3.4) 
(15) 11i 
((long ring)) 
(2.3) 
Ci: four two? 
(3.3) 
controllers may also include other components to their talk, for 
example. identify themselves, as the `train base'. 
(16) XbCo (17) 35Co (18) 13Co 
Ci: train base to train Ci: train base to Ci: train base to train 
three two: oT train six oneT at five two:: T 
(8.2) (5.0) (3.3) 
or encourage the other to speak with `go ahead'. 
(19) 9- transcript 1 (20) 
((long ring)) 
(2.5) 
Ci: four eight go ahead? Ci: 
(2.6) 
12 - transcript 1 
((long ring)) 
(2.4) 
five two go ahead 
(2.2) 
(21) 11ii - transcript 1 
((long ring)) 
Ci: three two go 
ahead 
(3.2) 
With some slight variations, these are the conventional ways in which 
controllers begin their talk on the radio phone, completed either with a 
rising intonation or a `go ahead'. As Schegloff remarks about summonses 
on telephones, these are special forms of questions demanding particular 
types of responses, hence the distinctive `rising terminal juncture'. If no 
response is forthcoming, the summons is repeated (as in fragment 1). 
Speaking the radio number with rising intonation, even if it has to be 
repeated, is sufficient to identify a potential co-interactant and elicit a 
response. 
The `go ahead' appears to accomplish another activity, not only 
summonsing the potential co-interactant, but also eliciting the reason for 
the call. 
(19) 9- transcript 2 
Ci: four eight go ahead? 
(2.6) 
TC: () I've got a Bee 
Tee Pee here at err 
(South Quay) ( 
can't get through) 
over? 
(0.4) 
(20) 12 - transcript 2 (21) 
Ci: five two go ahead Ci: 
(2.2) 
TC: yeah five two ( to TC: 
) set one o six 
over. 
(0.4) 
11 - transcript 2 
three two go ahead 
(3.2) 
yeah three two () 
err: () (got a 
trip) () 
(0.6) 
This then, is one way of solving one of the critical problems for co- 
participants, how to identify whether this is an `incoming' or `outgoing' call 
and who is to give the reason for the call. Controllers can elicit the reason 
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for a call that had been requested by the other party, by simply tagging on 
a `go ahead' to the summons. This not only makes it relevant for the co- 
participant to give the reason in the next turn, but also displays the 
speaker's orientation to this as an effective `incoming' call. 
Though controllers can display an orientation to the distinction 
between incoming and outgoing calls in their first turn of talk, the initial 
turns of incoming calls are not always accompanied by a `go ahead'. In 
fragments (12), (14) and (18), for example, following the number given by 
the controller, the remote caller goes on to give the reason for the call (e. g. 
fragment 14, lines 5-6). 
(14) 33 - transcript 2 
1 ((long ring)) 
2 (0.3) 
3 Ci: one five? 
4 (3.4) 
-ý 5 TC: yeah one five () I've got a( light) at () Bow 
-+ 6 Church () over. 
7 (1.3) 
8 Ci: Roger on that (0.2) select A: Tee Pee manual please 
9( for a couple of seconds ) and then go back into A: 
10 Tee 0: ( see again) ( Bow) over. 
11 (1.3) 
In outgoing calls, like instances (1) and (10), the reason for the call is 
produced in the controller's second turn, but does not appear to be 
foreshadowed by any vocalised device by the controller. Indeed, in these 
calls the remote party's turn appears to be designed in order to elicit the 
reason for the call, through the call sign being terminated by a rising 
intonation or with the addition of a component such as `receiving'. It is as 
though, through the response to the call sign, the call emerges as an 
outgoing call. 
The distinctiveness of the radio phone calls from conventional calls is 
not only in the ways the technology operates (the way the phone rings, the 
broadcast capability etc. ) or because the controller tends to speak first, but 
it is also because the controllers do not necessarily distinguish the type of 
call, particularly in terms of who should give the reason for the call. Given 
the potentially critical nature of the calls, it is perhaps surprising that 
there is apparently no routine means of either eliciting or foreshadowing 
the reason for the call at the beginning of the call. Instead, the reason for 
the call appears to emerge, first by giving the remote participant the 
chance to provide it and then, if this is not forthcoming, by the controller 
producing it. In incoming calls the controller occasionally will elicit the 
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reason for the call with a `go ahead', however, in most cases controllers 
will initiate both incoming and outgoing calls in the same manner. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, one of the participants will manage to 
produce, quite unproblematically, such a reason for the call. The 
controller, on occasions, may appear to elicit the reason from the remote 
participant, however, there are a few cases when the controller utters 
anything other than the standard repertoire in the first turn. 15 Given the 
resources available to the controller, and the demands of the setting, it 
may appear strange that the controller, particularly on what might be 
considered outgoing calls, does not appear at least to foreshadow an 
upcoming reason for a call. The `powerful machinery' for distributing 
turns at the beginning of phone and other conversations seems to be less 
clear in the radio phone talk. Instead, it appears as if there is a rather 
looser means for distributing turns when the ringing of the phone, or the 
first speaker, cannot be relied on to set out a trajectory for turn allocation. 
15 One case where the controller does utter talk prior to a response from the co- 
interactant is in the following instance. 
(22) 29Co 
1 Ci: train base to train six oneT 
2 (5.0) ((loud beeps from emergency system)) 
3 Ci: yeah can you keep your emergency (mushroom (. ) in. over? 
4 (12.5) 
5 Ci: six oneT 
6 (1.8) 
7 TC: (six one) over. 
8 (. ) 
9 Ci: yeas have you stopped your train overT 
10 (1.2) 
11 TC: yes (. ) I have stopped my train (0.2) over. 
12 (. ) 
13 Ci: right what I would like you to do: is go to your (leading 
14 eN: Pee Dee Pee:: I) (0.4) and select emergency shunt 
Here, when the call its initiated, in the 5 second gap after controller's `train base 
to train six onel" there are a series of loud beeps (line 2). The talk in line 2 `yeah 
can you keep your emergency (mushroom (. ) in, over? ' then appears to be designed 
for the particular recipient, so that the call can continue less problematically. 
The `emergency mushroom' is a button pressed in the train in cases of 
emergencies and emits the beeps in line 2. Once the noise stops, the controller 
begins again. This may appear strange as it might be expected that the cessation 
of the ringing might suggest that the particular recipient is available and 
listening. However, as in most cases, the controller appears to delay giving the 
reason for the call or commencing any details concerning the call until the remote 
participant has replied. Indeed, in this case, the controller appears to delay even 
further, until he has confirmed the status of the train, that it has stopped. 
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controllers provide their co-participant with an opportunity to speak and 
give a reason for their call. Only in third turns do controllers give the 
reason for an `outgoing' call. 
The work of initiating conventional telephone calls appears to be rather 
brief and economic when viewed alongside the calls in the DLR Control 
Room, a phone ring summons another party, setting up a trajectory for the 
distribution of turns of talk, at least for the first few turns, and sometimes 
for the entire call. In the radio phone talk the distribution of the 
activities in the calls is managed in the first few turns of the call. The 
technology and nature of radio phone conversation requires participants to 
perform particular activities which are efficiently accomplished in the first 
turn of a conventional telephone call. Producing the reason for the call, 
and more importantly managing who produces it requires distinct 
activities. These allow the participants also to manage other 
contingencies which may arise, such as in the delay between the request 
for a call and the controller initiating the call, other matters needing to be 
dealt with (as in fragment 1) or the reason for the call no longer being 
pertinent (like a train that has been delayed beginning to move). 
Nevertheless, the initiation of the phone conversations in the DLR are 
routinely accomplished unproblematically. They are managed from 
moment-to-moment, the participants collaborating in the emergent 
distribution of turns at talk and the activities they entail. 
5.6.3 Problematic Cases 
In most cases, this collaborative management of the distribution of the 
turns is accomplished routinely, the reason for the call being produced 
unproblematically by one of the parties. However, occasionally, there do 
appear to be problems at the commencement of a call, as in fragment 23. 
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(23) 29 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
((long ring)) 
(0.3) 
((long ring)) 
Display at the back of the room)) 
(err ) we're showing one at Mudchute and one at All 
Saints over. 
(1.4) 
(0.7) 
((Ci picks 
(1.2) 
five one? 
(3.3) 
five one 
(2.0) 
five one? 
(1.4) 
up phone - beep)) 
over? 
(2.1) ((Ci turns to Automatic Ticket Mar-hin, - 
Ci: 
TC: 
Ci: 
TC: 
Ci: 
The controller has to repeat his utterance of the remote party's call 
sign `five one'. Although there is some delay to the reply, this or any other 
problem with the transmission of the call does not appear to warrant the 
repetition. There is no evidence, for example, of the controller not hearing 
the train captain's reply in line 9. The timing of it and its production with 
the same tonal contours of the original, however, appears to be consistent 
with there being something problematic not in the hearing of train 
captain's first reply, but in its character. Indeed, when the train captain 
goes on to produce a reason for the call (which is unclear and appears to 
concern the automatic ticket machines, line 13), the controller turns to the 
back of the room where a machine is available displaying the status of all 
ticket machines and he reports which are not working (lines 16-17). 
Hence, when the train captain gives the reason for the call, the talk 
appears to continue quite unproblematically. It appears that the 
controller is orienting to the call as an incoming call, one for which the 
remote caller has to produce the reason. The production of the train 
captain's response to the call sign in line 9 appears to be problematic in 
this regard. The repeated call sign (line 11), not just requiring a 
confirmation of the remote party's identification, but something more, like 
a reason for the call. Once this is produced (in line 13) the controller can 
then take the appropriate action, and does so unproblematically. It is also 
interesting to note that the train captain's initial repetition of the call sign 
neither has the usual rising intonation of a response to a summons in an 
outgoing call nor is it accompanied with a component like `receiving'. 
Instead, it is delivered with little tonal contour. Hence, the nature of the 
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train captain's response may then appear to be rather ambivalent. The 
controller may orient to this, a minimal repetition of his first turn 
displaying a potential absence in the train captain's turn, without 
initiating any particular talk on the matter. 16 
Although there are systematic ways in which reasons for calls are 
elicited and turns are distributed between participants, this is not to say 
that turn-taking in the beginning of radio phone conversations is pre- 
determined, or even set to a course by previous actions on the computer 
system. A request for a call heard by a beep and displayed on the 
computer system provides resources for a controller when initiating a call. 
The ringing of the phone to a train captain also provides resources, 
particularly if this is heard in the light of a previous request. However, 
the work of initially finding the reason for a call has still to be carried out 
by participants. The following instance is particularly unusual, as in it the 
train captain speaks first. 
(24) 32ii 
1 (0.6) 
2 ((long ring)) 
3 (6.1) 
4 TC: five one (go ahead) 
5 (0.6) 
6 Ci: yeah five one err I've still got no (0.2) news (on) 
7 you yet for your relief over. 
8 (1.5) 
9 TC: okay then well (we'll just stay here until we get 
10 the job done anyway) okay thanks a lot 
11 (1.3) 
Here, after a long pause the train captain says `five one (go ahead)' 
(line 4). It is as if the pause after the ring of over six seconds is noticeable 
by the train captain. Indeed, the train captain's call echoes the design of 
initial turns of incoming calls given by controllers, by eliciting the reason 
for the call through a `go ahead'. After some perturbations in his turn, 
`yeah five one err', the controller does produce the reason for a call. 
It emerges through the turn that this call relates to some previous 
matter (getting relief for the train captain) that the controller has been 
dealing with, the topic, presumably, of a previous call. Indeed, the design 
of the talk is produced with respect to this prior matter, as is displayed in 
the controller's `I've still no (0.2) news'. The talk is designed as a call-in-a 
16 An activity that may be characterised in terms of a preference for `self repair' 
by 
the train captain (cf. Schegloff, et al., 1977). 
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series (cf. Button, 1991a). The controller's turn appears to be designed 
with respect to hearing the train captain's utterance in the light of a 
previous call. 
Nevertheless, the train captain, uses routine components to initiate the 
call and identify the remote party. He has not only taken over the turn 
but the nature of the turn - to identify himself and to elicit the reason for 
the call, which the controller does. Even in non-routine cases, the 
production of particular turns places demands on a co-participant which 
are treated as accomplishing particular activities and requiring 
subsequent action. A call sign, for example, can serve to summons 
another, identify oneself and also to elicit the reason for the call in the 
next turn. The natural ordering of the turns provides resources for 
participants to make sense of such a component, and the work it is 
achieving. The components also serve to make up the ordering, being 
produced in different ways to accomplish various activities in the light of 
differing foregoing circumstances. Thus, though the beginning of the 
phone calls may appear to have redundant or irrelevant parts, or to follow 
some routine, each component has to be made sense of by the co- 
participant in the interaction, placing demands on their subsequent 
activities. The beginning of the phone conversation unfolds, establishing 
contact, identifying the participants and producing the reason for the call, 
from moment-to-moment it is made sense of and managed by the co- 
interactants. 
5.6.4 Initiating Calls through a Mediating Technology: a 
Summary 
The technology supporting radio phone conversations in the DLR Control 
Room no doubt provides capabilities which are not (or not yet) available on 
other forms of comparable telecommunication services, like mobile 
telephones. It is possible to broadcast messages, for remote parties to 
listen in to parts of the other conversations of their colleagues, and also for 
controllers to deal with callers when they wish to and in an order they find 
appropriate. These capabilities, however, place additional demands on the 
talk in the early part of the call. Calls to particular parties have to be 
distinguished from general calls to all potential co-participants and the 
possibility of others using the open channel requires that remote parties 
are successfully selected and identified. These require a method of calling 
individuals by using identifying call signs (radio numbers) and receiving a 
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response using the same numbers. The design of the technology also 
separates, for remote parties, the activity of requesting a call to be made 
from the call itself. This can mean that there is a substantial delay before 
a call is established, and that controllers, in effect, initiate the talk in all 
radio phone conversations. As is revealed through the aforementioned 
instances this requires participants to collaboratively establish who is to 
give the reason for the call. This work of producing the reason for the call 
is interleaved with that of establishing contact between participants. 
Most commonly, it is achieved by participants utilising the first 
opportunity to provide a reason for the call once the remote party has been 
identified and successfully established contact. For the remote party, this 
is immediately after they have given the call sign, for the controller this is 
in the next turn. Various devices can also be appended to the turns 
required to identify co-participants, such as with `go ahead' by the 
controller on incoming calls or `receiving' by the remote party on outgoing. 
Nevertheless, in the vast majority of cases the establishment of who is 
to give the reason for the call and the subsequent production of the reason 
is accomplished through the turn-by-turn management of the first turns of 
the conversation. The first position is given to the remote party allowing 
for cases where a prior request for a call has been made. If both have a 
reason for a call then the controller's will be dealt with after the remote 
party's. In this way, the production of an incoming call or an outgoing one 
is emergent, accomplished through the collaborative activities of both 
participants. When one of the parties does produce a component related to 
the distinction between the responsibilities of caller and the called, it is 
produced for the other in the next turn of talk and not to outline a 
particular course for their own activities. 
In DLR radio phone calls, each participant has different resources 
available to them relating to the putative nature of the call. The controller 
has a computer system that provides information on who wants to be 
called and other displays relating to the overall state of the service. These 
can be used to suggest possible reasons for the calls. However, the remote 
parties on the trains, platforms or in the shunting yard are engaged in 
particular local activities unavailable and inaccessible to the controller in 
the control room. The organisation of the commencement of the call, 
particularly its flexibility, may reveal ways in which the participants take 
account of these contingencies. The remote party always has the 
206 
opportunity to give the reason for the call first. Even if circumstances 
have changed and other things have to be dealt with, the organisation of 
the talk provides for a `queued' request for a call to be considered in 
preference. Of course, in most cases it will be unproblematic for the co- 
participants to work out which party has to provide the reason for the call. 
Remote parties know that controllers have a display of queued requests in 
front of them, and no doubt recognise the possibility that a ring will 
foreshadow a `call back'. Nevertheless, the organisation of the call in this 
way at least allows for the circumstances local to personnel out in the 
world to be dealt with first and for controllers not to have to rely on the 
displays in front of them to shape the nature of the call. All calls can be 
commenced in the same way, with the work undertaken in each turn being 
managed as the call emerges. Moreover, the organisation of the talk 
requires little talk to be explicitly related to the kind of call being 
undertaken, not only allowing for the emergence of the reason for the call, 
and then, presumably, to how that call can be dealt with, but also reducing 
the need to deal with problems which could emerge relating to the 
distribution of the work in producing the call rather than the reason for 
the call itself. 
5.7 PAUSES AND DELAYS - SYSTEMATIC RESOURCES FOR THE 
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ACTIVITIES IN RADIO PHONE CALLS 
An observable feature of calls on the DLR is the curious timing of the calls 
between controllers and remote parties. Not only are there, on occasions, 
substantial pauses within the calls, but there also appear to be particular 
regularities in the timing and pacing between contributions to the phone 
conversation. In part, these may be due to the nature of the technology 
and the demands of the activities in which participants are involved. A 
train captain, for example, may be involved in a range of activities when a 
call is initiated. Various noises in the local setting, problems in reception 
and even the use of the phone technology may also delay the production of 
a response or a turn at talk. Therefore, it is not surprising that the delays 
and pauses in radio phone conversations, and the tolerance towards them, 
routinely appear to be longer than those on the telephone or other kinds of 
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conversation (Jefferson, 1989). 17 So, even when the call appears to be well 
established it is not unusual to find lengthy pauses between the turns of 
talk of co-participants. 
(25) 41 
Ci: yeah thats roger on that I've got (0.3) one lift out of 
service at Mudchute. (. ) as far as we are aware the 
other one is working. (over) 
-+ (1.7) 
TC: (alright ) also the lift at South Quay isn't working 
I've just been informed over. 
(2.3) 
Ci: yeah okay thats received thanks for that I've got n- 
(0.2) nothing on my board (0.3) that says South Quays 
out and we'll get someone out to investigate? (0.2) 
thanks for that? 
(0.5) 
TC: okay 
As such participants may then take account of these contingencies and 
the delay may not be considered by the participants as problematic. This 
is not to say that participants will wait indefinitely for a next turn. As 
revealed in (24) a pause of over six seconds before a controller produces a 
first turn can be viewed as problematic, and in (1) there is a brief pause of 
only 0.5 seconds before a controller repeats a summons. The participants 
in the radio phone calls, therefore, appear to be sensitive to apparent 
pauses of different lengths by their colleagues in different temporal 
locations during the call. Exploring these domains, these apparent 
silences, may reveal some of the sensitivities that participants may be 
orienting to. An examination of the timing of the calls at various places 
within the call may reveal features of the organisation of the call, and also 
how participants analyse the ongoing happenings and items within a call. 
Given the foregoing analysis in Section 5.6 two domains appear to be of 
particular interest: those surrounding the controller's initial turn. The 
gap following the turn will be considered first (Section 5.7.1). The first 
turn by the controller demands a response from the remote party. 
Examining the pause may reveal the type of resources the participants 
rely on to secure participation in the talk by a colleague. The pause 
between the ringing on the phone, considered in Section 5.7.2, may help to 
further explore the nature of the summons discussed in the previous 
17 Jefferson (1989) considers the possibility of a candidate 'standard maximum 
silence' of about 1 second. She does, however, raise concerns about its status 
within sequential and interactional analysis. 
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section. The activity of summonsing the other appears to be distributed 
over two actions; considering the gap between them may shed some light 
on the ways this activity is distributed. 
5.7.1 The Second Gap: a Resource for Securing Engagement in the 
Call and for Prospective Activities in Relation to the Call 
After the initial call sign, long delays before the remote party replies are 
not uncommon. So, for example in (3), a pause of nearly 4 seconds after 
the first turn by a controller on an incoming call may not be considered a 
noticeable delay in answering. 
(3) 14Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: three two go aheadT 
-ý (3.9) 
TC: (yeah this is ) three two to baas: e (0.2) umm: (. ) 
(someone has) umm (0.2) (a black) briefcase (on 
tracksi: de) (1.2) coming out of (. ) All Saints... 
Even though the remote party may have requested the call, the time 
before the controller acts on it may be substantial enough for the train 
captain to be engaged in other matters, or at least take time to answer his 
phone. Thus, delays in answering after the phone has rung and an 
identifier uttered can be quite substantial. However, this is not to say 
that an utterance or a reply can be left indefinitely. In the following case, 
after over 8 seconds the controller repeats, in abbreviated form, the 
identifier. 
(16) XbCo - simplified transcript 
Ci: train base to train three two: oT 
(8.2) 
Ci: three two: o? 
(0.3) 
TC: (this is train three two) to train base o: verT 
Here, the lack of reply for 8 seconds by the train captain could be seen 
as an `official absence' (cf. Schegloff, 1968, p. 363-4). When the identifier is 
repeated the reason for the call quickly follows. It appears that the 
controller orients to the delay as an absence. In (24) above, the opposite 
case appears to hold, where the absence of a particular turn appears to be 
by the controller. After over six seconds, the train captain takes the 
unusual action of commencing a call with `five one (go ahead)'. The 
participants by repeating call identifiers and taking turns appear to be 
orienting to a certain pacing to the calls, where some pauses mark 
noticeable absences in the activities of another. However, the time 
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between these activities is not fixed, pauses or delays are treated 
differently by the participants according to the activity at hand and the 
occasions of the call. Nevertheless, participants do appear to be utilising 
particular resources in order to make sense of the silence; as marking 
missing activities at the beginning of the radio phone calls, for example. It 
is a domain of particular relevance to participants as it is through these 
first turns of talk that not only the identity of the co-participants is 
established, but also it is through these they can establish contact on a 
communication system where reaching a particular party cannot be 
guaranteed. 
One way of considering these pauses may be to examine whether there 
are any systematic features in the timing between the initial turns of talk 
in the more routine calls. If the fragments already considered are 
examined, there do appear to be some crude regularities. For example, the 
delay following the initial turn by the controller ranges up to 4 seconds in 
the more straightforward incoming calls. 18 In the straightforward 
outgoing calls, the delay can range up to around 8 seconds. 19 This kind of 
difference might be expected between recipients who are `waiting for a call' 
and those who are not. Controllers may thus be tolerant to waiting for a 
reply in different ways to those remote parties who have requested a call 
and those who have not. 
In (16), the gap in the talk in the phone is not completely silent. After 
about 3.5 seconds a high pitch feedback tone emerges. 
(16) XbCo - transcript 2 
8.2 seconds 
Ci: two: oT ....:....:....:....:....:....:....:....:. 
three two: o.. 
--((feedback)) --- ---- 
TC: this 
LJ 
Ci moves 
coffee cup 
L__ 
hand over 
mouse 
18 These are fragments 1,2,3,4,5,6,9,10,12,14,18,19,20,21, and 22. In a 
larger corpus of over 40 instances of incoming calls, there are 3 where the delay is 
greater than 4 seconds, the longest being 5.2 seconds. 
19 These are fragments 6,10,12,13 and 14. In 16 outgoing calls the delay after the 
controller's turn is over 4 seconds in half the cases, and ranges up to 11.3 seconds. 
In all the cases where there is a delay of over 6 seconds, the call sign is repeated 
or the phone re-rung. 
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This first tone briefly stops before re-emerging at an even higher pitch 
for another 0.5 seconds. It is after this noise has stopped that the 
controller utters the call sign again. The delay in summonsing the train 
captain again appears to be in the light of this noise. Indeed, the noise 
may be related to the activities of the train captain. The train captain 
may be attempting a reply. It is only when a significant pause emerges 
after the feedback that the controller utters `three two: '. Similarly, in (26) 
a feedback noise occurs about 2.5 seconds after the call sign. 
(26) 30Co - transcript 1 
11.3 seconds 
IIII// 
ATS PS CCTV PS ATS 
Ci: twoT.... .... ... ".... ".... "... ((ring)) 
-----((feedback))------- ---- 
LI L_J 
hand over clicks mouse 
mouse button 
It is only after the noise has faded does the controller begin a series of 
activities associated with the phone system: moving his hand to the 
mouse, glancing at the phone system screen and then pressing the mouse 
button. This causes the phone to ring again. In (16) and (26) the 
controllers appear to hold off re-ringing or re-summonsing the remote 
party until the feedback has faded. In (27), the controller again holds off 
any phone related activity, until the feedback noise has faded. 
(27) 26Co - transcript 1 
II 
5.5 seconds 
PS table ATS2 ATS1 
:..... Ci: two ni: neT ......... :......... :......... :......... :......... 
TC: two ninE 
-----------((feedback))----------- 
LJ 
Ci moves pen across desk 
In this case soon after the feedback has faded, the train captain does 
reply. There are numerous instances where noises appear on the phone 
line. The controllers have to make sense of these, as they may foreshadow 
an activity from a remote party. The feedback may indeed be part of the 
attempt by a train captain to establish contact. So, though there may be a 
significant delay after a controller's first utterance, before he goes on to 
repeat his efforts to make contact he has to make sense of other 
occurrences on the phone line. 
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Various components of the initiation of radio phone calls have already 
been explored in detail which can be utilised by co-participants. These 
include: the way the rings of the phone and the initial turn by the 
controller serves to summons the remote party; the work involved in 
establishing the reason for the call and who is to give it; and the ways 
silences and noises in the phone call Each of these components provide 
resources for both participants to make sense of the unfolding activities 
which emerge in the call. 
So, although a gap between uttering a call sign and its repetition, or 
the repetition of the phone ringing, may be over ten seconds, this may be 
filled with activities that can be heard as potentially related to the call. 
There does appear to be a slight difference in the ways in which controllers 
handle incoming and outgoing calls, the delays before repair in the former 
being slightly shorter than in the latter. However, there is no simple 
metric when a gap becomes problematic. Instead the controllers appear to 
be sensitive to the circumstances of the remote parties. 
In (16), (26) and (27), the controllers appear to engage in a series of 
unrelated activities whilst a potential reply is being awaited: moving a 
coffee cup, scanning CCTV displays, or moving a pen on the desk. 
However, even these may be utilised within the unfolding course of 
activities. In (16), the movement of the coffee cup leaves free a space to 
the right of the mouse making it possible to hold and move the mouse. As 
he utters the call sign for the second time the controller's hand is over the 
mouse as if in preparation to re-ring the phone (as in 26). The movement 
of the object may then be retrospectively useful for an emergent course of 
action. 
The glances at the CCTVs, the ATS displays and the phone system 
may provide other resources with which to make sense of the call, showing 
if the train the remote party is on is moving, docked, or ready to depart, 
for example. A resource which controllers can use in their talk, as in (16). 
(16) XbCo - transcript 3 
Ci: train base to train three two: oT 
(8.2) 
Ci: three two: o? 
(0.3) 
TC: (this is train three two) to train base o: verT 
(0.2) 
Ci: Yeah i do believe that you have just pulled into 
Poplar. (. ) Can you see a Bee Tee Pee officer (0.2) at 
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all? (I believe he may be 
train overT 
(0.9) 
attempting to get on your 
The characteristic features of the talk on the radio phone, like the 
structure and pacing of the talk, may in part be due to the nature of the 
technology. The requirement to identify a co-participant in a broadcast 
medium and the problems of communicating through a radio each demand 
work and activities to be designed in particular ways. There are also 
procedural requirements: to repeat instructions and to establish contact 
through radio number identifiers, for example. However, these necessities 
and demands are both utilised for, and transformed by, the practical 
purposes at hand. The organisation of the phone call allows for the reason 
for the call to be produced with little `negotiation' required concerning who 
should produce it. Noises on the phone can be heard as preparatory to 
further contributions and it may therefore not be necessary to explicitly 
repeat a summons or a call for identification. Although the calls may 
apparently involve unnecessary turns and repetitions, and pauses may be 
lengthy, talking in this way may indeed secure the engagement of a co- 
participant, and get to the matters at hand without engaging in talk about 
talk. 
5.7.2 The First Gap: a Resource for Distinguishing Calls 
From the foregoing discussion, Figure 5.3a can be refined slightly. The 
domain just considered is arrowed `1'. 
Incoming Calls 
<long ring of controller's phone> 
(= 0.5 seconds) 
<long ring of remote party's 
phone> 
2-' < less than 1 second > 
C: ('train base to') radio number 
or 
radio number + 'go ahead' 
1-+ < up to 4 seconds > 
TC: (<feedback>) 
radio number + <reason for call > 
Outgoing Calls 
<long ring of controller's phone> 
(= 0.5 seconds) 
<long ring of remote party's 
phone> 
< over 1 second > 
C: (`train base to') radio number 
< up to 6 seconds > 
TC: (<feedback>) 
radio number 
<up to 1.5 seconds> 
C: <reason for call > 
Figure 5.3b: A general schematic for the organisation of calls 
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The second domain to consider is arrowed `2'. This is the pause 
between the second ring of the phone and when the controller utters the 
call sign; the activities which parallel a summons in a conventional phone 
conversation. 
In this domain there appear to be some curious temporal regularities. 
In outgoing calls the delay before the controller's turn tends to be over a 
second long and in incoming calls it tends to be less than a second. 20 This 
may be another case of controllers being sensitive to the circumstances of 
their recipients, taking account of the potential difficulties of, not only 
replying to a call but also, discriminating that a call is for them. The talk 
may then be designed with respect to the varying circumstances at hand, 
so that the potential recipient `has more time' before the identification is 
given. This would be a particular difficulty for recipients who had not 
previously requested that they wanted to call. 
There are cases where for an incoming call the pause after the ring is 
longer than a second. 
(8) 1- simplified 
((long ring)) 
(1.2) 
Ci: (three eight) 
go ahead? 
(1.3) 
(19) 9- simplified 
((long ring)) 
(2.5) 
Ci: four eight 
go ahead? 
(2.6) 
(20) 12 - transcript 
((long ring)) 
(2.4) 
Ci: five two 
go ahead 
(2.2) 
In each of these the controller adds a `go ahead' to the call sign. As in 
other incoming calls the `go ahead' appears to be designed to elicit the 
reason for the call from the remote party, which it does. Indeed, in other 
cases when a `go ahead' is uttered, it is produced after some anomaly or 
problem in the call, as when the train captain talk first in (24), or when 
there is no hearable gap between the phone ringing and the identifier (as 
in 21). 
(21) 11 ii - transcript 3 
((long ring))= 
Ci: =three two go ahead 
(3.2) 
TC: yeah three two () err: () (got a trip).. 
It may be that a `go ahead' not only acts prospectively to elicit a 
particular type of talk from the co-participant, but also may serve to 
retrospectively take account of some problem or anomaly in the call. A 
20 For outgoing instances see fragments 10,13,15 and 14, for incoming ones, see 12, 
14 and 21. 
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simple device like a `go ahead' may follow these apparently long pauses (or 
notably short ones), ensuring the call is heard as incoming for the relevant 
participant. 
There are potentially numerous accounts for why there may be a long 
delay between a summons and an answer. Even after a phone ring, the 
called party can be occupied in some other matter or located in a position 
not amenable to replying, for example. The controllers appear to take 
account of this by delaying any attempt to repair and hearing particular 
noises on the phone line as potentially foreshadowing a response. They 
may even hold off uttering the call sign for a period so that co-participants 
are able to discriminate the subsequent talk from other activities in their 
local environment. It may also be that these delays are discriminated 
between forthcoming incoming and outgoing calls: a recipient of an 
outgoing call, a genuine `called', being given a substantial period in which 
to reply and a longer period in which to hear the summons. The overall 
activity of securing a recipient for a call being not only designed in order to 
select that hearer from an audience of overhearers, but also to secure a 
particular kind of participation in the forthcoming call. 
5.7.3 Designing Radio Talk through a Mediating Technology: a 
Summary 
To distinguish whether a call is incoming or outgoing would appear to be 
an activity for the participants that has to be managed through the talk on 
the radio phone line. The technology in the DLR Control Room rather 
subtly masks many of the features used in telephone calls to distinguish 
caller from called: the ringing of the phone, the cessation of the ringing 
and the answerer always speaking first. In all of these, the technology in 
the control room operates differently, the radio phone only rings for a fixed 
period, call requests from remote parties are queued and a remote party 
has to be called back. This technology is also different from many other 
radio telecommunications systems where a completely open channel 
requires caller to both speak first and identify a recipient in the first turn. 
Though in these cases the work of the summons may be the reverse of that 
in a telephone conversation, it may not have the unusual results 
found 
with the DLR system. The mediating technology, essentially a computer 
interface for making calls and queuing incoming calls, requires the 
controller to always speak first. The subsequent work of both obtaining 
the reason for the call and managing who has to give it 
has to be 
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accomplished over the subsequent turns of talk. This is a critical problem 
for the parties as the reason for the call sets up a trajectory for the 
forthcoming call. Following a query for information, the announcement of 
a problem or a request to take a particular action - the typical `reasons' for 
a call - the controller and remote party may engage in a fairly brief 
interaction. This usually involves either a confirmation of the news, or the 
controller suggesting actions to be taken and the remote party confirming 
them. In a domain where a phone call may be critical it would appear to 
be essential that the production of the reason for a call is timely. 
As outlined in the previous section the work of producing the reason for 
a call is a collaborative activity, making use of the resources available to 
the parties, and which are understood to be available. In this section, it 
has been suggested that the actual timing of the contributions is a 
potential resource for participants in accomplishing the initiation of the 
call. In particular, it may be that there are resources which can be 
utilised very early in the call, before the first turn is uttered. Both parties 
may be sensitive to these resources and to potential problems in this 
pacing. Although such an account relies on absences from the talk, it is 
interesting to note the one case where there appears to be problems in 
eliciting the reason for the call occurs after a long delay of nearly 2 
seconds between the ring and the summons by the controller (lines 4-6), 
and when the controller does not explicitly elicit the reason of the call (23). 
(23) 29 
1 ((long ring)) 
2 (0.3) 
3 ((long ring)) 
4 (0.7) 
5 ((Ci picks up phone - beep)) 
6 (1.2) 
7 Ci: five one? 
8 (3.3) 
-f 9 TC: five one 
10 (2.0) 
11 Ci: five one? 
12 (1.4) 
13 TC: () over? 
14 (2.1) ((Ci turns to Automatic Ticket Machine 
15 Display at the back of the room)) 
16 Ci: (err ) we're showing one at Mudchute and one at All 
17 Saints over. 
18 (1.4) 
After nearly two seconds after the ring the controller utters `five one? ' 
(line 7). There is a further delay and the train captain utters his call sign 
without any particular intonational contour (line 9). After another two 
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seconds the controller repeats his utterance (line 11). With each having 
contributed to the talk, although uttered in the same fashion as 
previously, the controller's call sign can only be heard as a request for a 
reason for the call. This it achieves in the next turn (line 13). Though 
there appears to be problems in distributing the activities through the 
call, producing it is still, however, accomplished through sequential 
resources. The call sign eventually being heard as a request for the reason 
for the call. 
5.8 THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN THE INITIATION OF PHONE CALLS 
Through the apparently formulaic and plodding nature of the phone calls, 
particularly in their beginnings, members of staff on the DLR manage to 
accomplish contact, divide out the responsibilities between the co- 
interactants and set up a trajectory for the remainder of the call. The 
computer-supported phone system technology, no doubt, figures in this, it 
being a broadcast medium with associated difficulties of trying to contact 
and maintain contact with a co-participant. However, the technology does 
provide a useful resource for co-participants, particularly, the display in 
front of the controllers. This is one of many displays in the control room, 
including CCTV monitors at the right of desk, a display at the back of 
room which reports the state of the Automatic Ticket Machines (ATMs) on 
the line and various whiteboards, including one which reports the lifts 
that are not working. In most calls, controllers are seen to be look 
between these different domains. Some of these lookings appear to be 
straightforward, for example, when a train captain asks about the state of 
the ATMs or the lifts, controllers will turn towards the display at the back 
of room or the whiteboards. In other cases, the controller will be engaged 
in making a change to the train operation on the Automatic Train 
Scheduler (ATS) or making a call on the phone system and so will look at 
the appropriate display whilst this is being done. However, particularly at 
the beginning of phone calls, controllers will switch their orientation 
between the phone system display (PS) and the leftmost Automatic Train 
Scheduler Display (ATS 1), often looking at these displays several times 
before the reason for the call emerges, as in (28). 
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(28) 1OPh - transcript 1 
phone ring phone system beep 
r1 Ci:.... :.... :.... :....:....:....:....:....:....:....:....:....:....: 
document 
phone ring 
rI TC: 
Ci: 
II 
PS 
phone ring 
rI 
IIIII 
ATS1 
....:....:....:....:. (base to) three nine?....; 
ATS1 PS 
III 
ATS1 
When the phone rings the controller is looking down at a document in 
front of him on the desk. Only after the phone system beeps does he look 
up to the display. He then starts to make the call, selecting the call with 
the mouse. Once the system has begun to carry out the operations of 
making the call the controller looks towards the ATS display. He returns 
to this display after he has summoned the train captain. Thus, the 
controller looks at each monitor twice before the reason for the call 
emerges, and he is looking at the ATS 1 screen whilst the reason for the 
call emerges. He remains in this orientation until he starts typing into the 
ATS at the end of the call. 
It is not uncommon for the controller to orient towards the ATS system 
when taking a call, particularly for incoming calls. Indeed, in all the 
instances of incoming calls in the corpus, the controller is either oriented 
to (and looking towards) the ATS screen, either whilst he is summonsing 
the remote party or by the time the reason for the call emerges. This 
screen provides diagrams showing the positions of the trains on the line, 
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L 
Ci selecting call 
so it is not surprising that it offers resources for dealing with the issues 
raised in the calls. It appears that the ATS screen can also provide 
resources for making sense of a call, as in the incoming call in (29). 
(29) 6Ph - transcript 1 (simplified) 
((long ring)) 
(1.7) 
((phone system beep)) 
((Ci moves to phone, looking at screen)) 
(1.3) 
((Ci picks up phone, phone system beeps)) 
(3.2) 
((Ci selects call with mouse)) 
(1.2) ((Ci turns to ATS) ) 
((long ring)) 
(0.7) 
((long ring)) 
(0.8) 
Ci: four five? 
(4.7) 
TC: four five () over. 
(0.2) 
Ci: Yeah err (0.3) there's a bit of a holdup () as soon... 
From the two displays the controller can make use of various pieces of 
information. With respect to train captains, the phone system display 
presents the radio number of the caller with the number of the train the 
remote party is assigned to. The ATS identifies the location of trains by 
this number. So, by scanning the two displays it is possible not only to 
identify the caller, but also their location. Moreover, the controller can see 
particular relevant features of the train, such as their mode (if the train is 
being manually or automatically operated) and whether the train is at or 
between stations (as in fragment 16). They also provide a resource for 
practical reasoning concerning the circumstances of the call. From the 
phone system display, controllers can identify whether the call is from an 
engineer, a worker in the shunting yard or special staff, such as trainers 
or mobile supervisors, each of these may have quite different reasons for a 
call. 
In (29) the train captain is on a train on the same line and running in 
the same direction as a train where there is a `revenue dispute' with a 
passenger. The location of the train on the ATS display can provide 
resources for making sense of an incoming call, even prior to any talk. A 
train captain being on a train that is `backed up' in this way will 
frequently request information concerning the reason for the delay. 
Hence, by utilising the two displays controllers can prospectively orient to 
the nature of the call. The displays also provide other resources which are 
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potentially relevant for the call. So, returning to (28), after the train 
captain has been asked to repeat the reason for the call, the controller 
provides what is a common solution to many of the problems on the track - 
to operate the train manually, in `emergency shunt'. 
(28) 1OPh - transcript 2 
1 (0.2) 
2 Ci: yeah thats right Steve err once again select shunt () 
3 once you have done so (do continue) forward in shunt () 
4 from Canary to Herons (Park) () (back into A: Tee 0: ) 
5 ... 
By looking at the ATS1 screen, for a while, it is possible to see whether 
a train is stopped. The looks towards the ATS 1 screen prior to the call 
commencing and the controllers focus on it (presented in transcript 1), 
may be utilised to make sense of emerging call. In (28), this can provide a 
resource to be utilised with the talk of the train captain to deal with the 
problem at hand. Here, the controller also makes use the name of the 
train captain `Steve', another item which can picked up from the phone 
system display (line 2). In another case, the controller can make use of the 
location of the train captain to assist him with `seeing for himself part of 
the problem. 
(30) 28iPh - transcript 1 (simplified) 
((Ci looking at PS) ) 
Ci: (five) two? 
(2.5) ( (Ci turns to ATS1) ) 
TC: (five two) 
(1.6) 
Ci: yeah apologies for the delay and (keeping you at that 
intermediate routeboard) (0.2) Norman (0.6) as you can 
see there's one stuck on the delta I can't get hold of 
the train captain err soon as I can (deal with) it you 
can depart. 
(1.5) 
The phone system then offers a range of resources for assisting with 
the management of the call, it provides the identifying number of a caller, 
their name and the number of the vehicle which they are operating. This 
itself can suggest features concerning the nature of the upcoming call. So, 
in a call coming in from a member of staff at the shunting yard, a 
controller looks at the ATS2 display showing a diagram of that location 
(31, line 5). This glance follows a look to the phone system and precedes 
any talk on the phone. When the talk emerges it concerns a request for a 
change of route in the depot. 
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(31) 27iiCo - transcript 1 (simplified) 
1 ((long ring)) 
2 (0.6) 
3 ((phone system beep)) 
4 (4.3 seconds) 
.45 ((long ring)) 
6 (0.2) 
7 ((long ring)) 
8 (0.2) 
9 Ci: three fou: r? 
10 (2.3) 
11 TC: yeah three four to ba: sel (Martin) 
12 could you get me a route (please 
13 from Dee Eye one to Dee Jay: ) (. ) 
14 o: verT 
The phone system technology can thus provide a resource for 
suggesting where to look for putative reasons for an emerging call. The 
identity of the caller, their responsibilities, their location and 
circumstances all have to be made sense of in relation to one another. 
In concert with the ATS displays it is possible also to have some access 
to the circumstances for the call. The reason for a call then, can be made 
sense of in the light of the resources available to the controller. So, after a 
phone rings in the DLR Control Room, controllers will glance at the 
displays in front of them either before they take the actions necessary to 
make the call, or, more commonly, whilst they are making the call. The 
information on the two displays have to be made sense of in relation to one 
another, the identity of the caller providing for a particular way of looking 
at the ATS, the very occurrence of the call itself suggesting possible 
happenings on the line. Moreover, the general happenings on the line, 
disputes with passengers, the reporting of suspect packages and the 
general operation of the service can all be brought together to reveal 
possible reasons for a call. 21 The use of the displays is contingent on the 
21 These observations, and those relating to the initiation of the call, could be 
considered with respect to the distinctive discussion of the resources of a 
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PS ATS 1 ATS2 
circumstances occurring on the line and in the call. Even though the 
phone system may provide a rather minimal set of information concerning 
the call and only once a request for a call has been made by a remote 
party, this can be utilised in concert with other technologies available in 
the control room. The rather lengthy procedure for initiating calls in the 
DLR Control Room then can be made use of by the controllers to utilise 
the rich resources available to them, both displayed on the screen and 
through their practical skills in making sense of the local scene. 
Although the resources offered by the displays are useful in making 
sense of emerging incoming calls, controllers also orient to the displays in 
front of them when making outgoing calls. As in incoming calls, 
controllers tend to shift from the phone system to the ATS 1 screen as the 
call is ringing or whilst they are summonsing the remote recipient. There 
are potential happenings visible on the ATS 1 screen which would be 
relevant for an outgoing call, a train holding up others may start to 
depart, for example, or the train of the remote party may be seen to dock 
at a station, making it more straightforward for that party to take the call. 
The delays and pauses noted in the previous section after the ringing of 
the phone in outgoing calls may be further tied to the ongoing 
circumstances of the remote party. 
The gaps between talk and the activities on the phone system can thus 
be utilised as resources for the controllers, as potential locations in the 
talk where activities in relation to other artefacts can be accomplished. It 
may be that a glance to the phone or ATS screen may figure in the 
production of the activities in the call: the gaps may not only shape what 
is possible to be undertaken by the controller, but they may also be shaped 
in the light of these other activities. It is hard, however, to conceive of a 
way of developing such an analysis of `noticeable absences'. Whatever the 
case, the activities which are undertaken between the controller and the 
remote party, and those unavailable to the remote party occurring in the 
control room are thoroughly interrelated. The organisation of the 
distributed activities is interwoven with the organisation of co-present 
ones. The nature of this relationship will be considered further in the next 
chapter. 
`summoning phone' by Garfinkel and Wieder (1992) and subsequent discussion in 
Clayman and Maynard (1995). 
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5.9 DISCUSSION: INTERACTIONAL RESOURCES FOR THE PRODUCTION 
OF DISTRIBUTED COLLABORATIVE ACTIVITIES 
One resource that appears essential for the production of collaborative 
activities within the control room are the phone calls between the 
principal controller and the various remote parties. A hearing of these is 
relied on for an understanding of the state of the service. The foregoing 
analysis has been concerned with how participants themselves analyse 
these activities. Through the organisation of their talk it is possible to 
reveal what is relevant (and problematic) in the calls. The participants 
are sensitive to the fine details of the available conduct of their colleagues 
on the phone line, including: the pacing of the talk, pauses, sounds on the 
line and the intonational contour of the talk. However, these are not just 
treated as signals or markers, they are made sense of in the light of the 
ongoing activities of the participants, with respect to, for example, a 
foregoing summons or question. These project relevant next activities, the 
interactional domain in which the contributions to the call are understood. 
Despite the apparent formality of the talk, it is this interactional and 
social organisation to the talk to which participants orient. This is 
displayed in their ongoing contributions to the talk through what they 
reveal to be unproblematic and problematic. 
The participants to the radio conversation are, in perhaps a different 
sense to the way usually characterised within CSCW, monitoring the 
activities of their co-participants. They are closely attending to the details 
of the talk with regard to the particular demands of the moment. In other 
words they are, through their own talk and activities, displaying, from 
moment-to-moment an analysis of the conduct of their colleagues. Even in 
what may appear to be a peculiar interactional domain, they can manage 
to accomplish activities and display an understanding of them. Although 
they may be some requirement to repeat particular utterances, like 
instructions, or end some turns with `over', it is through the handling of 
the minutiae of the talk that the conversation is managed. 
The participants' analysis of the ongoing talk on the phone line is an 
analysis of their distributed activities. Through their contributions 
it is 
possible to reveal how critical interactional (and line management) 
activities are accomplished. So, for example, it appears through the 
design of their talk that producing a reason for the call is a relevant and 
critical matter for the participants in a call: invariably this is presented as 
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the first substantive matter in the call. Arriving at this requires an 
initiation of a call, an identification of and selection of a participant (as the 
technology relies on broadcasts). These activities are accomplished 
through a sequential organisation of rings, call signs and the repetition of 
call signs. Each contribution may be brief, but the activities which need to 
be accomplished through them produces a rather convoluted opening to 
the conversation. The production of a participant's contribution is 
analysed by the other party, and an understanding of it displayed in the 
next turn, which is then available to the participant. 
Thus, participants are displaying an orientation to the socio- 
interactional resources and demands available in their turns of talk. The 
organisation of the talk is not a pre-assigned protocol of signals, nor is it 
merely a set of communication or information exchanges. The interaction 
is managed through the production of the contributions: a summons and a 
question places demands on the other, a silence can be accountable, and as 
revealed in studies of social interaction, there can be preference for 
speakers to repair their own contributions. These interactional resources 
have been revealed in other interactional domains, such as telephone, 
ordinary, face-to-face conversations and institutional talk. 
As it is available to the participants, this sequential analysis is also 
available as a resource for analysts. As noted by other analysts of 
computer-supported phone conversations, the talk that is produced can be 
indefinitely variable (Gray, et al., 1993). However, this does not mean 
that there is no organisation to the calls. Indeed, in the materials of the 
Docklands Light Railway, the participants appear to be sensitive to the 
social organisation of the call at every point. Participants organise their 
activities on the phone calls with respect on a set of practices for 
accomplishing social interactions. Indeed, even when apparent problems 
emerge, participants appear to be orienting to preferences, practices and 
commitments engendered by social actions A particular silence or 
contribution may be problematic, but dealing with it is still accomplished 
through routine interactional practices for repair. 
The analysis of the talk and activities through the phone system on 
DLR is also an analysis of the use of a computer-supported phone system. 
Such an approach is distinctive not only with respect to the use of 
naturally-occurring materials, but also because of the utilisation of an 
analytic framework that these make possible. Unlike studies which 
have 
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considered human-computer interactions (e. g. Thomas, 1990) or human 
interactions mediated by technologies like electronic mail (e. g. McCarthy, 
et al., 1990), in terms of conversational resources, an analytic framework 
drawn from conversation analysis would appear to be relevant for the 
consideration of the talk through a telecommunications system. Both 
participants have symmetric access to the talk on the line and the 
resources with which to continually monitor and analyse the moment-by- 
moment accomplishment of the other's activities. However, the system 
which has been deployed would appear to transform critical resources 
relied on by participants in other interactional domains, like ordinary and 
telephone conversations; as examples, the cessation of ringing does not 
mark that the other party is available to speak, the same party always 
speaks first, and the operation of the technology can introduce spurious 
noises and breaks into the conversation. Nevertheless, the interactional 
resources relied on the participants appear resilient. Individuals in the 
DLR phone conversations still orient to the demands of summons and 
questions, and a preference for self-repair. These may be implemented by 
different means, but still carry with them social obligations and 
commitments. 
It is unlikely that the social organisation of phone calls was a 
consideration of the designers of the technology. Indeed, as already noted, 
the technology was actually designed for a different domain with differing 
communication requirements. It may be that an alternative design of the 
technology could provide for ways in which a summons could be produced 
through one device, or where incoming calls are distinguished from 
outgoing ones. It may also be that other `pseudo-formal' procedures could 
provide resources for the participants to make sense of the nature of the 
call. Furthermore, it may be that alternative designs and deployments 
could lessen the `work' involved in initiating a call and producing the 
reason for a call. 22 
Interactional practices may also be a concern in other domains where 
call taking is critical or routine. In these domains it would appear to be 
22 It may be possible, for example, to devise technologies or telecommunications 
services which provide the parties with more symmetrical resources. Even a 
capability that provides similar interactional resources to that of a ringing phone 
ceasing ringing may be useful. Such possibilities are considered in more detail in 
Chapter 7. 
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relevant to consider the sequential organisation of talk. In the DLR, the 
participants manage to accomplish their work and activities utilising 
conventional and robust interactional resources. This is neither to suggest 
that individuals will always find a way of working through the technology, 
nor that such resources can always be relied on no matter through which 
technology they are achieved. The analysis does, however, reveal the kind 
of commonly-occurring resources that individuals can make use of in order 
to accomplish activities on and through technologies. 
5.10 SUMMARY 
The work performed by controllers in the DLR Control Room is, in the 
large part, accomplished through the phone system. They have to inform 
the train captains, shunting yard staff and other personnel out on the 
system of significant changes and happenings they are making to the 
service. They also have to be informed of incidents such as those involving 
problems with passengers, suspect packages and lost property, and have 
to provide information about lifts, ticket machines, relief breaks, delays, 
the running of the service etc. Thus, the reason for any call could come 
from either party, and, in certain critical situations both the controller and 
a particular member of staff on the line may wish to contact each other. 
The computer-supported radio phone system adopted by the DLR has 
certain advantages, it allows controllers to chose in which order they wish 
to make and take calls and to delay responding to particular calls. This 
requires controllers to talk first in the radio conversations, and hence 
involves participants in accomplishing activities which are not usually 
required in more conventional telephone and radio conversations. The 
talk through the system appears curious in several other ways. For 
example, on incoming calls, where a remote party has requested a 
connection, the opening of the call appears convoluted, especially as both 
parties can expect to know who is who. This does not appear to be 
distinguished from cases where a request has not been made by a remote 
party. Nevertheless, the participants in the call have to establish who is 
in effect calling who and, thus, is responsible for giving the reason for the 
call. Although there are cases where the controller provides some explicit 
indication of the kind of call, with a `go ahead', for example, these only 
appear to be when some problem or anomaly with the call may have been 
226 
heard to have occurred. It is far more common for there to be little to 
distinguish incoming from outgoing calls. The distinction between an 
incoming and an outgoing call only appears to emerge when there is an 
absence of a reason for the call in the remote party's reply. Remote parties 
themselves may include, in their first turns, devices like `receiving' or may 
terminate the repeated call sign with a rising intonation to make a call 
outgoing. However, they too may just give a minimal call identifier as 
their first turn. The participants then collaboratively produce the reason 
for the call, relying on the preceding circumstances and the ongoing 
development of the talk. 
The organisation of the radio conversation appears to give preference to 
the remote party to give the reason for the call. This may reflect the 
different resources available to the participants. A request for an 
incoming call is heard in the control room as a ring on the phone and 
beeps on the phone system. An item on the phone system screen also 
records pending phone conversations, and controllers orient to this screen 
prior to calling personnel. However, although the remote parties can only 
be contacted by the control room and are aware that controllers have this 
technology, they do not have symmetric resources. When a ring is heard 
on the open channel the remote party does not have access to the queue of 
calls or the particular number being called, so after requesting a call they 
have few resources with which to hear the ring as related to their request. 
This asymmetry may be reflected in the organisation of the talk, the 
controller providing initial resources through which the remote party can 
make sense of the call. In most cases, despite glitches in the 
telecommunications systems and noise in the respective environments, the 
call proceeds unproblematically. The division of activities relating to who 
does what is accomplished through the talk and the activities on the phone 
system. The talk may appear to be rather formulaic, repetitive and 
unwieldy, but the production of a minimal turn of talk like a two digit 
radio phone number, its intonation and even the time taken before it is 
uttered, may all be relevant to the way it is heard by a remote party, and 
the activities for which it is being utilised. The initial turns of talk in the 
radio phone conversation are more than signs or signals uttered to 
establish a communication channel, they perform particular activities 
concerning the distribution of responsibilities to be taken later in the call. 
Even though they may appear rather minimal, the initial components of 
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the radio phone conversation are an essential resource for the distribution 
and management of collaborative activities between personnel in the DLR 
Control Room and remote staff. 
More detailed inspection reveals a range of interactional problems to be 
resolved by the parties, including having to select the remote party from 
an audience of possible `overhearers' in the broadcast medium, dealing 
with the potential delay of responding to a request for a call and managing 
who is to give the reason for the call. As call taking and call making is a 
principal activity of the controllers, one which may occupy one of the 
controllers for most of a shift, the effective management of calls would 
appear to be crucial. It is also the medium through which most 
communication between the control room and staff on the line happens in 
the DLR. Indeed, it is principally through the talk on the phone that 
crises are identified and managed and the smooth running of the service 
maintained. This is a collaborative activity between distributed 
personnel. Calls typically are short, often dealing with a single 
substantive matter. Therefore, the establishment of the reason for a call 
would appear to be a critical matter for the co-participants. In the 
foregoing analysis, the activity of producing this reason has been revealed 
to be collaborative, relying of the participation of both parties. 
The technology of the radio phone system transforms the resources 
relied on in conventional telephone conversations, the ringing telephone 
by itself cannot be seen to be a summons to a conversation, the first turn 
as both a response to the summons and an object that elicits the reason for 
the call. In DLR radio phone conversations both of these resources are 
different. Nevertheless, through the organisation of the initiation of radio 
conversations the responsibilities between controller and the remote party 
on the phone are managed so that reasons for a call are usually produced 
unproblematically and the matters at hand dealt with. 
Further examination of the organisation of the activities in the 
commencement of calls reveals some subtle differences between incoming 
and outgoing calls. Controllers may design the pacing of their talk so that 
they are sensitive to the circumstances of the remote party. They are not 
just sensitive to long pauses and gaps which might indicate problems on 
the phone line, but to the differing delays at different points in the 
development of the call. These sensitivities reflect the particular 
interactional demands and even the demands in different kinds of calls. 
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So, for example, a long delay prior to a recipient answering an outgoing 
call may be treated differently from a delay in an incoming one. Moreover, 
controllers may also design their own pacing with respect to prospective 
activities in the call, even prior to any talk being uttered. 
By exploring the visual conduct of the controllers, it appears that they 
have resources available to them with which they can access certain 
features of the remote party's circumstances. Not only do they have 
information concerning the identity of the remote party and their general 
responsibilities, in concert with other displays, it is possible to also locate 
the remote party and to some extent the circumstances they are facing. 
controllers can utilise these to not only make sense of an incoming call, 
but also so that they can give prompt and timely responses to the issues 
raised. So, for example, the ATS display is read in terms of the local 
circumstances at hand and helps to make sense of them. The initiation of 
a call provides resources with which to make sense of the happenings on 
the display, the possible relevance, say, of a stationery train on the line. 
The display also reflexively can help make sense of the call, revealing 
possible reasons why, for example, the remote party may be ringing. The 
`use' of each relies on the resources provided by the other. It also relies on 
seeing the objects on the screen in relation to the foregoing happenings on 
the line. These practices rely both on common-sense reasoning and skills 
though which artefacts, like computer displays, are both understood and 
used, and through which participants can make sense of the activities of 
colleagues. These practices are also interleaved, and rely on, the 
systematics in the pacing of the activities in the opening of the calls. 
The production of activities by the participants in the calls rely on 
interactional resources. Through the contributions to the calls, the parties 
to the call not only have to achieve the practical tasks related to managing 
the line, but also have to manage the actual accomplishment of the call. 
This chapter has focused on the interactional achievement of producing 
the reason for a call. This is done through the contributions of both 
parties, interactionally, locally managed from moment-to-moment. Hence 
the management of the distribution of activities in the call and the 
management of the call is achieved through the self-same resources: 
through the sequential organisation of talk -a common-sense, practical 
and social accomplishment. 
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In producing an activity, particularly through talk, participants 
display an ongoing understanding of a prior activity, and provide for the 
resources by which that activity can be made sense of. Through their 
actions participants provide an analysis of another's actions. So, by giving 
a reason for a call, a train captain provides an analysis of a number 
uttered by the controller with a rising intonation as providing an 
opportunity to provide that reason. In the next turn, the controller 
through his or her actions provides an analysis of the reason for the call. 
These activities are situated; they are interactional and sequential. 
The analysis of the participants provides an analysis available to 
others. In this case, through their talk and other activities the 
participants are displaying and revealing their competencies of using a 
computer-supported phone system. Hence, it appears that a sequential 
analysis of talk can also provide an analysis of the use of a particular 
computer system. Though this is a particular kind of system, not 
commonly considered in HCI, it no doubt provides for a distinctive 
analysis of its use. The talk is also a collaborative activity, through it the 
participants, who may be many miles apart, manage, with limited access 
to each other, the traffic and happenings on an urban transportation 
system. Thoroughly interwoven with this is a management of their 
collaboration, for most part seen, or heard, but not noticed. It may not be 
readily apparent that a phone system is a technology for supporting 
cooperative work, but by providing for the utilisation of practical, 
interactional resources it facilitates, usually quite unproblematically, the 
management and accomplishment of collaborative activities. 
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Chapter 6 
The Collaborative 
Production of Computer 
Commands 
the interrelationship between 
activities and talk in a natural 
setting 
It is for others to do the worrying, to take the action. In the world of the 
great organization, problems are not solved but passed on. 
J. K Galbraith, The Culture of Contentment, 1992, p. 69, Penguin. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter continues the examination of activities accomplished on the 
Docklands Light Railway begun in the previous chapter, but focuses on 
the details of the collaboration between the controllers within the DLR 
Control Room; in other words on co-present collaborative work rather than 
on geographically dispersed activities. These activities will be considered 
in the light of their use of one particular technology: the Automatic 
Scheduler System (or ATS). 1 
1 Background to the activities within the Control Room and the technologies 
available is given in Chapter 5. 
231 
Each controller has a screen in front of them to the ATS which can be 
switched between a set of common views of the line and which can vary in 
detail. Therefore, the controllers could view a similar area of the line or 
send commands to the same area of track. However, in observations of 
their activities it does not appear that they do this. Instead, they divide 
the responsibilities between them and coordinate their activities with one 
another. This division of responsibilities is a practical problem for the 
controllers. However, managing who does what, and when, is a problem to 
which they readily find a solution, from moment-to-moment, throughout 
the course of their work. How the activities of the controllers is 
collaborative managed is the principal concern of this chapter. 
In previous analyses, the management of collaborative activities has 
been considered in terms of the practices of `monitoring'. In Section 6.2 
this research is briefly outlined. In particular, the section discusses why 
such practices have been a concern of researchers in CSCW, both to 
analysts of collaborative activities and to developers of novel technologies, 
and some of the potential problems with the characterisation of these 
practices. 
As the analysis pays particular close attention to the operation of the 
computer system, some background is given to the technology in Section 
6.3, for example what is typically displayed on it and how it is typically 
used. The controllers are, in effect, not only viewing a common resource, 
but using a `collaborative' system. Although the controllers are not 
geographically dispersed and, therefore, can see, not only what the other 
can see, but also their colleague's activities in relation to the system, they 
can each switch `perspectives' and perform a symmetrical range of 
operations. These are capabilities considered by many proponents of 
groupware, and presumably would have a similar range of problems in 
their operation, such as the management of the activities through them. 
It may, thus, be that the collaborative accomplishment of the commands 
on the ATS system may reveal some of the resources through which 
participants in a natural setting manage collaborative activities on a 
computer system. The analysis in this chapter then, could be considered 
an analysis of a collaborative technology. Whether the technology is 
considered in this way or not, the analysis of activities on the ATS is a 
case of a naturalistic examination of the details of the use of a computer 
system. 
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As mentioned in the last chapter, a critical feature of the work in the 
DLR Control Room is the handling of radio phone calls. It appears that 
these too provide a resource against which the responsibilities for 
activities within the control room can be managed. In particular, certain 
calls require next actions to be undertaken on the ATS. In Section 6.4, the 
resources which the controllers utilise for performing the relevant and 
appropriate commands are considered. The phone call may not only be 
consequential on the controller taking the call (Ci), but also on the 
controller's colleague (Cii). It appears that certain features, like the 
confirmation of a change by Ci can be utilised as a resource for Ciis to take 
particular actions. 
However, Cis may not just be attending to features in the call such as a 
confirmation of a call, but may be attending to the calls in close detail. In 
Section 6.5 a case is considered which reveals some of the particularities of 
a call through which it may be heard to be relevant by another who is not 
a direct party to the call. It may even be that the controller taking the call 
may be producing talk to make the details of a call hearably relevant. 
Hearing a call between a colleague and a remote party as relevant so 
that an appropriate action can be taken on a computer system, would 
appear to be a suitable candidate for consideration as monitoring. In 
Section 6.6, by detailed consideration of two instances, the resources 
through which such activities are accomplished are considered. It appears ' 
that not only may Ciis be overseeing Cis, but that Cis may be attending to 
the interactions and activities of Ciis. Even whilst engaged in an 
apparently distinct activity, Cis are making sense of particular commands 
entered by Ciis. In Section 6.6.1, the resources they attend to in order to 
accomplish this understanding are considered. Controllers also may be 
`monitoring another's monitoring' (Section 6.6.2). 
This analysis reveals a close coordination of activities by the controllers 
where commands entered into the system are publicly available as 
operations that have been, or are being, undertaken to the railway line. In 
Section 6.6.3, an instance is considered where the activities of Ci on the 
phone and those by Cii appear to be particularly tightly coordinated. 
Indeed, the talk to the remote party appears to be shaped through its 
course, in the light of a command being entered into the system. The 
computer command, in a distinctive way, is collaboratively accomplished. 
Such activities requires a continual analysis of the activities of others: 
whether they are relevant and appropriate, whether they demand a next 
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action or not, and when. However, the activities are accomplished through 
little explicit talk about these activities. Moreover, participants appear to 
rely on their own activities being attended to by their colleagues. In 
Section 6.7 a case is considered where these methods for common 
understandings appear to break down. A colleague explicitly `volunteers' 
to take an action. Detailed examination of this instance reveals that the 
participants are sensitive to the conduct of their colleagues, and more, 
that they may transform their activities with respect to others not in the 
control room. 
Through the analysis in these sections, the use of the ATS system is 
seen to be thoroughly embedded within the interactions between the 
controllers, and with other personnel, both in the control room and 
outside: what is on the screen is made sense of with respect to the talk on 
the phone: what is being talked about is made sense of in the light of the 
reading of the screen, and what activities another individual performs on 
the computer system is seen, monitored and understood in relation to the 
other artefacts available, the talk between individuals and the visual 
conduct of co-participants in interaction. This reveals quite a distinctive 
conception to computer use to that usually considered as human-computer 
interaction. These practices also appear to be unsuitably glossed as 
`collaboration', `monitoring' or `peripheral participation'. Section 6.8 
discusses these issues in relation to recent debates within HCI and CSCW. 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
When observing the conduct of controllers in the light of their phone 
conversations considered in the previous chapter it is not always apparent 
why they glance at the computer systems in front of them at particular 
times. As suggested in the Chapter 5, these glances can be with regard to 
particular happenings in the call or may prospectively serve to provide 
resources for making sense of an upcoming call. However, there are cases 
when the glances do not appear to be tied to an ongoing activity in this 
way. For example, controllers are seen to orient to the ATS screens in 
more general calls, in broadcasts, where there is no particular recipient for 
a call, where for instance, all train captains are being informed of a 
problem on the line. These lookings appear to be a resource for keeping 
track of the train movements along the line. From these, with an 
understanding of foregoing problems on the line, it is possible to see where 
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there are problems in the service, trains stopping too long at stations, or 
unexpectedly between stations, or where there are long gaps between 
trains. The controller can then change the schedule in the system if these 
problems emerge. Therefore, continuing attention to the ongoing 
happenings on the line is an important part of maintaining a regular 
service and also dealing with crises and potential crises. The ATS 
diagrams, particularly the one usually displayed on the left screen which 
presents the whole line, are essential resources for keeping track of the 
state of the service. 
Therefore, on many occasions, including during calls to other 
individuals, or when no call is being made, controllers will be oriented to 
the ATS 1 screen. There appears to be a different character to such 
activities. These appear to be distinctive to the lookings at the screen at 
the beginning of a call or when particular problems are being dealt with on 
the service. Moreover, other participants, particularly the second 
controller (Cii) will also look towards the same screen. In these cases, 
they appear to be `monitoring', not only the activities on the line, but the 
activities of the principal controller. Indeed, monitoring appears to be 
pervasive and a resource for forthcoming activities, particularly 
collaboration: glances to a common screen being an opportunity to begin 
an interaction between colleagues concerning a related problem, or for one 
to take some related action like change the schedule of the trains or make 
a call. Similarly, participants in the domain not only appear to `oversee' 
the activities of their colleagues, but also overhear them. The phone calls 
as well as being available on the controller's phone are relayed through a 
loudspeaker above the controller to the rest of the control room. Thus, 
colleagues can get a sense of the state of the service and the actions the Ci 
is taking. Again, on hearing features of a call, participants in the control 
room, particularly Ciis, will frequently be seen to perform some related 
activity. 
It appears that these practices are critical for the achievement of 
activities within the control room. Not only do controllers appear to be 
continually scanning the local environment, overhearing anothers' phone 
calls and overseeing the activities of colleagues, but these can only be 
accomplished in the light of the activity at hand. Controllers have to be 
able to determine the relevance of their colleagues' activities in relation to 
the current state of the service and with respect to the particular 
trajectories that these activities project. Overseeing and overhearing, or 
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monitoring, then, in this domain as in others (e. g. Goodwin and Goodwin, 
1996; Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath and Luff, 1992a), is an essential 
resource for collaboration and for getting the work done. The technology, 
the talk on the phone system and the displays available appear to be 
essential for allowing others to make sense of an individual's activity. 
There do appear to be distinctions which can be made between these 
activities and, say, `focused collaboration' where one or more participants 
actively engage in some activity together, however, a stronger 
characterisation is harder to realise. 
There are many activities which could be considered as monitoring: 
individuals may monitor a display, or the activities of their colleagues, and 
they may do this whilst oriented to that domain or elsewhere. There are 
a range of similar conceptions which can be utilised: participants may 
`oversee', `overhear' or `listen in to' the activities of another; they may 
`peripherally participate' in this conduct. These activities appear to make 
possible the performance of another appropriate activity, if something 
relevant emerges. Individuals can then accomplish tasks and activities 
with little explicit instruction or comment, and their colleagues can rely on 
them working in this way. It may thus, be apparent why `monitoring', 
`peripheral participation' and the like has attracted the interest of 
researchers developing systems to support cooperative work (Brown and 
Duguid, 1994; Robinson, 1993). It may be a desirable feature to provide 
for similar capabilities in these systems where the users may be 
geographically dispersed. Hence, video systems could provide a more 
general sense of `awareness' for participants (e. g. Dourish and Bellotti, 
1992), or Collaborative Virtual Environments could offer multiple ways for 
colleagues to `interact' with one another (e. g. Benford, et al., 1996). 
There may be problems, however, with attempting directly to apply 
observations made in a variety of domains (e. g. Goodwin and Goodwin, 
1996; Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath and Luff, 1992a) to particular 
designs of technology. These observations have only begun to uncover how 
such practices are accomplished. Monitoring, and similar conceptions 
such as peripheral participation, serve as glosses for a wide range of 
implicit and tacit work practices that underpin collaborative work. 
Because they are peripheral or implicit, little more than a tentative 
analysis of these glosses can be offered, often in terms of later activities 
where it can be seen that a colleague must have overheard or overseen a 
prior activity of a colleague. Monitoring can, thus, appear to be both 
236 
indiscriminate and ubiquitous. It also appears to be characterised in 
these developments as a rather passive activity: an individual watching or 
listening to another to provide a `general awareness' of another's activities 
(e. g. Dourish and Bly, 1992). 
A stronger conception of monitoring could be considered. In the 
analysis of turns-of-talk in conversation, analysts have revealed how all 
parties to a conversation, at all times, have to monitor, or analyse, the 
emerging talk of the speaker for opportunities for self-selection or places 
for turn transition (e. g. Sacks, et al., 1974). Through these practices 
conversational contributions are managed from moment-to-moment and 
the activities of the participants are coordinated. Moreover, in one turn a 
participant displays an analysis of a co-interact's prior contribution, and, 
hence, their analysis or monitoring of the ongoing activity. Of course, 
problems can emerge, but these are managed, and repaired, through 
practices which rely on a similar sequential organisation: displaying an 
analysis of a prior in the production of a next turn of talk. 
Several researchers have sought to explore the appropriateness of such 
an orientation to the analysis of activities with regard to computer 
systems. Greatbatch et al. (1993) examine the interrelationship between 
the talk between a doctor and a patient and the doctor's use of a computer 
system. Here, it appears that not only is the talk between doctor and 
patient shaped by the operation of the system, but that patients orient to 
the doctor's typing in order to coordinate particular features of their own 
vocal conduct. Whalen (1992) reveals how the use of a computer system 
for dispatching emergency services is tightly interrelated with the talk on 
the phone between the dispatcher and the person reporting the incident; 
the ordering and timing of the talk being shaped by the demands of the 
system. Heath and Luff (1996a) have analysed activities in a London 
Underground Control Room for the Bakerloo Line between the various 
members of staff who work there. In this study, particular attention has 
been paid to the ways technologies and displays feature in the 
collaborative activities of participants who have different responsibilities 
and resources available to them. 
In each of these studies the researchers have been concerned with 
developing a sequential analysis of the activities of the participants with 
respect to the use of the technology. Greatbatch at al. consider how a 
patient pays particular attention to the details of the typing of the doctor, 
even hand movements surrounding specific keys. The occurrences on the 
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screen of the computer may not be visible to the patients, however the 
patients appear to tie their talk to the publicly available conduct of the 
doctor; the typing and movements of the hand across the keyboard. 
Whalen considers how the dispatcher's typing is coordinated to the audible 
talk with the remote party, and also how the dispatcher's talk is organised 
with respect to filling in particular items on the screen of the computer. 
However, in both these cases there is an asymmetry to the resources 
available to the participants, the computer system and the activities on it 
are invisible, or only partially visible to one of the participants. It is thus 
problematic to develop an analysis of the activities on the computer as 
sequentially relevant to the conduct of the other party: the patient has few 
resources with which to make sense of the typing of the doctor, the remote 
caller can only hear, on occasions, the typing of the keys. Hence, for the 
patient and the remote caller, the activity on the computer can only be 
considered as typing, hitting keys on the keyboard. They may 
discriminate between particular keys, like the `return key' on the doctor's 
keyboard, but they have minimal access to the nature of the activity these 
actions accomplish. Similarly, for analysts the resources available to 
develop a sequential account of the activity are limited. 
In the Bakerloo Line Control Room which Heath and Luff consider the 
participants have greater access to the conduct of their colleagues with 
respect to the technology. A glance at a large public display can be seen to 
be related to an ongoing activity, not only for analysis, but for the 
participants in the setting: a look to a display appearing to implicate 
others in activities with respect to particular happenings on that display. 
The participants may at one time appear to be engaged in distinct 
activities, and yet be attending to the conduct of their colleagues. An 
activity being later undertaken that requires an understanding, a 
foregoing `monitoring', of a colleague's prior activities. Moreover, one 
participant may take a particular activity by a colleague, such as a turn to 
a phone system, as being related to their own, in so doing accomplishing a 
collaborative activity implicitly through interactional resources. Hence, 
activities by an information assistant such as pressing a button on a phone 
system, can be seen to be sequentially relevant to a controller's activity, an 
attempt to contact a train driver; the controller going on to provide the 
information assistant with what needs to be conveyed. The talk of one 
participant displays an understanding of an activity of another. 
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This chapter seeks to extend this form of analysis of artefact-based 
activities. The domain in question, and the activities explored, differ in 
several significant ways to those in the Bakerloo Line Control Room. 
Although the DLR and the Bakerloo Line Control Rooms are both settings 
from which an urban transportation system is managed, the activities 
explored here raise some distinctive concerns regarding the sequential 
analysis of computer-related activities. In the study of the Bakerloo Line 
Control Room, the attention focused on the collaborative activities 
between controllers and information assistants. Each have distinct 
responsibilities, a distinction similar to that between Control Room 
Supervisors and Control Room Assistants in the DLR Control Room; 
controllers responsible for managing the traffic on the line and 
communicating with driver, information assistants for making 
announcements to passengers and communication with other staff. 
Hence, controllers and information assistants have different technologies 
available to them: controllers have touch-screen radio phones, on-screen 
timetables etc.; information assistants have CCTV monitors and 
passenger announcement systems. So, in their collaborative activities the 
controllers and information assistants do not necessarily have the same 
commonly available resources. Hence, they can be seen to engage in 
practices to make their activities visible, or hearable, to a colleague. For 
example, controllers may design their talk so it can be overheard, or read 
out train numbers when they are changing the running order of a train. 
The particular activities being performed on the technology may not be 
available to the information assistant. On occasions, the controller and 
information assistant may look at a common domain: a CCTV monitor or a 
large fixed display of the line, however the activities they can perform on 
these systems are distinctive. For the other systems, the configuration of 
the control room and the division of responsibilities make those details of 
the activities of co-participants are unavailable, the technology 
inaccessible to operate, or particular systems inappropriate to use. The 
collaboration between controllers and information assistants relies on 
interactional practices through which their activities are made available 
to others. It is, thus, apparent why such details of the operation of the 
systems, such as the commands being entered and the changes on the 
displays, are not of concern within the analysis. These are not necessarily 
available to the co-present participant. The resources accessible to the 
controller and information assistant are distinct and so are their 
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opportunities and responsibilities for operating the technologies that 
surround them. 
6.3 THE DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES: SCHEDULING TRAINS AND 
THE PROBLEMS ON THE LINE2 
At the beginning of each day the Automatic Train Scheduler (ATS) is reset 
and from then on the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) is meant to run to a 
preset schedule. It is this schedule which, by entering commands into the 
computer systems in front of them, the controllers alter repeatedly 
throughout their shifts. 
The Docklands Light Railway system is an adapted version of similar 
urban transportation systems found elsewhere in the world. It is meant to 
be an automated system, with driverless trains, and appears to be based 
on similar ones originally designed for Canadian cities. Apparently, 
however, these cities do not have the same features as the Docklands area 
of London. In particular, the DLR winds around both new developments 
and old areas of the city, combining overland, overhead and underground 
sections. The twists, turns and contours in the track are alleged to result 
in the computer system in each train frequently miscalculating the 
distance required to get the train from one station to the next. This 
results in trains missing the docking unit at each station. At the time of 
recording (May 1991), when the railway had been operating for nearly four 
years, the problems with docking and their `knock on' effects, were the 
principal reasons for controllers having to alter the schedule in the ATS. 
After a problem in getting the train to dock correctly, Control Room 
Supervisors (or `controllers') will typically turn off Automatic Train 
Operation (ATO), allowing the train driver to shunt backwards or 
forwards to the correct location (this mode being called `Emergency Shunt', 
or EMS) and then reset ATO. This operation causes delays not only to the 
train in question, but to others on the line behind it, requiring further 
changes to the schedule. These problems may also account, in part, for 
why controllers comment that the routes set by the ATS are less than 
optimal and in frequent need of alteration. To maintain a steady now of 
traffic along the lines of the DLR, controllers not only have to set 
2 Appendix A gives further background to the use of the systems considered in this 
Chapter and to the analyses presented. 
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particular routes manually for trains, but they also have to alter their 
eventual destinations. 
Apart from problems with the scheduling, train captains and other 
personnel can request changes to the service. Train captains may require 
a `nature break', or ask for an early `turn around' towards the end of a 
shift, engineers can ask for trains to be restricted from operating on 
portions of the track (`blocks') and managers may require that specific 
trains, or a particular number of trains, are put out on the track for 
strategic reasons. These varied reasons and requests for alteration place 
considerable demands on the two controllers, involving them in dealing 
with the resulting knock-on effects and further communication with other 
staff. Furthermore, alongside this work of altering the schedule they still 
have to manage the traffic on the line and deal with the various crises that 
emerge. 
To cope with these demands, the range of activities and responsibilities 
are divided between the controllers. At first glance, this appears to be 
quite straightforward and related to the location of the technology 
surrounding them. The controller on the left, for the purposes of this 
chapter identified as the `principal controller' (or Ci), operates the radio- 
phone system, as seen in the last chapter, and also usually schedules 
traffic on the main lines. The controller on the right, the `secondary 
controller (or Cii), usually operates the traffic in the depot (the OMC)3. In 
the control room the individuals who sit in the Ci position are referred to, 
by themselves and their colleagues, as the `Gods of the Line'. Despite 
tending to maintain their relative locations, this arrangement does not 
appear to be fixed and rigid, Ciis occasionally swap seats with the Ci and 
take calls. Moreover, there is some ambivalence to which controller 
performs which activities: the Ciis also schedule trains on the main line, 
and the Cis trains in the depot. The management of these responsibilities 
and activities are considered at length in the following sections of this 
chapter. 
Given the general distribution of activities between the controllers, it is 
normal for the two controllers to have different views of the line presented 
This is given the name, `Operations and Maintenance Centre' (hence the label 
OMC on the screens) and is located between the Poplar and All Saints stations. 
However, in their interactions the members of staff also call it the `depot' or 
identify it through the names of particular lines around the Centre. 
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on the screens in front of them. Thus ATS1, the screen in front of Ci, often 
displays a schematic map of the line (Figure 6.1) 
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Figure 6.1: The ATS1 display and a schematic diagram of what it 
presents. The ATS diagram transforms the geography of the line. The 
bottom most line is south of the two upper ones. The middle one goes to the 
Northeast and the upper into Central London (North West). The arrows to 
the left of the schematic diagram are meant to show the direction along 
which trains move along the relevant portion of track. 
ATS2, the screen in front of Cii, often displays the shunting yard 
(Figure 6.2). 
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Figure 6.2: ATS2 display of the depot and, on the right, a sketch of what it typically 
presents. 
In each display, above the diagram there is an area where general 
comments and warnings are presented. There is space available for 5 
lines of text, which either scrolls or is cleared by the controllers using a 
command key. Typical messages relate to Automatic Train Protection 
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(ATP) and manual blocking. When ATP is set on a train, the portion of 
track behind it is automatically blocked for use by another train. 
Controllers can also set blocks on portions of track so, for example, 
engineers can work there. Messages note when a train's route is 
scheduled to use one of these blocked portions of track. 
Below the map the controllers' typing is presented. This is entered 
against prompts such as `TRAIN AT' or ' PLATFORM'. These are 
displayed when the appropriate text is required, prompts and text 
appearing on a single line (see Figure 6.3). 
TR RIN RT ... 
TRRIN RT S.. 
TRAIN RT ST. 
TRRIN RT STR 
TRAIN AT STR PLATFORM 
EH IT LOCATION BOC SET MODE 
- 
EXIT LOCATION BOC SET MODE 1_ 
EXIT LOCATION BOC SET MODE 12_ 
Figure 6.3: Example Prompts and Commands. The controller's typing 
is shown in bold. In the first example, the abbreviation for Stratford (`STR') 
is typed. When it is completed the prompt `PLATFORM' appears. In the 
second example, after a location is specified the stretch of track is required, 
entered as a number. Station abbreviations are always three characters 
and platforms one. A portion of track is identified by a packet of three 
numbers, but these packets can be joined together to apply to longer 
portions of track. 
Although it is common for the ATS1 and ATS2 screens to present the 
main line and the OMC respectively, they can be used to give other views, 
for example, the points and signals in a particular area such as a station, a 
track where trains can cross over, or a complex intersection. The displays, 
therefore, present a configurable view of the operation of the service, 
which can be altered to fit the particular circumstances that controllers 
face. 
Although, the ATS system is complex and offers a great range of 
functionality, the most common activities performed on it by the 
controllers are altering the direction, mode and destination of trains. The 
commands which are entered into the ATS are passed to the docking unit 
at the appropriate platform. This means that in order to alter the route of 
a train the controller has to enter the command either whilst the train is 
docked at the appropriate station or before it arrives. The timing of the 
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commands is thus very important. It is therefore, usual to direct 
alterations to a station some way ahead of the relevant train, although of 
course, only once the previous train on the same line has departed from 
that station. Altering a route of a train in one of the four terminals (Tower 
Gateway, Stratford, Crossharbour and Island Gardens) or turning a train 
around tends to be done whilst the train is docked. 
The commands typed are mainly made up of track and station 
identifiers, each consisting of three character combinations. Station 
identifiers are the common abbreviations for each station found on most of 
the computer displays in the control room (see for example, Figure 6.1, 
above)4 and portions of track are identified by three number combinations. 
As both track section and station identifiers have three number or letter 
abbreviations, commands have quite a regular format. 5 
Commands for changing a route commence with a special function key 
to the right of keyboard, followed by several `packets' of three characters 
and finally completed by an `enter' key. 6 The first `packet' consists of the 
relevant station name, and the remainder are made up of one or more 
packets of numbers, identifying portions of track that specify the new 
route. The beginning of the second component (and thus, the completion of 
the first) is marked by a function key on the right hand side of the 
keyboard, and the entire command is completed with the `enter' key. So, 
for example, a controller may type `  STR  422 . J' to change the route of 
the train at Stratford to use the section of track `422', or may type `  CÄW 
  412 453 . J' to alter the route of the next train entering Canary Wharf to 
4 See Appendix A (Section A. 2) for a general overview of the DLR and a list of the 
abbreviations of the stations. 
5 To enter commands each controller has a conventional extended computer 
keyboard with a normal typewriter layout, a numeric keypad, one set of function 
keys along the top and another down the right hand side. These function keys 
allow the controllers to carry out such functions as changing which map is 
displayed, clearing the incoming messages that have been accumulating at the 
top of the screen (the keys on the top row) and commencing various command 
sequences (the keys on the right). 
6 In the transcripts the typing of function keys are indicated by'N', number keys by 
`OO', letter keys by Ä etc., `enter' by `. J', and other (and unidentified) keys by U. 
Keys that are struck with more force are underlined. Pauses between character 
presses are indicated by'. ', each of these marking approximately 0.1 seconds. 
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now use sections `412' followed by `453', as in the following examples taken 
from the data. 7 
(1) 42ii (10A) 
command change command initiator function completer 
Cii: ý . LD 
Ej 
. 
ý. 
LQQQ 
QQQ 
.. J 
train track 
identifier identifiers 
(Devons Road) 
(2) 13ii (1A) 
command change command 
initiator function completer 
Cii: ÄW.. U .. 000000 ... j LL 
train track 
identifier identifiers 
(Canary Wharf) 
A slight variation of these commands applies to the OMC. There 
locations, both starting and route parts, can be identified by numbers or 
by two letter abbreviations, commencing with a `D' or an `S' (for "Depot' or 
`Shed'). 
Changing the mode of the train, to change to and from ATO, for 
example, is very similar. The appropriate command key is pressed, then 
the station where the change is to commence and finally the track to 
which it applies. 
It is noticeable that the typing by controllers has an apparent 
consistency, both in the articulation of the activity, and to the weight with 
which keys are hit. Most commands consist of rapidly typed combinations 
of character or number keys, commenced, interspersed and completed with 
single key presses often hit with more force. There are other ways in 
which a `standard pattern' of typing is produced. The three character 
station and track codes can be heard as typed in `packets' not only because 
they are quickly typed together, but also because they are hit with 
equivalent weight. The function and completion keys ordinarily are typed 
with more force and sound louder. 
As with most computer systems the structure of the commands entered 
by the controllers is fixed by the design. However, there are a great many 
7 Because of the lack of clarity of the data, some characters typed into the system, 
particularly the specific numbers, are not transcribed. Appendix A (Section A. 3.1) 
outlines the approach taken for transcribing the typing of the controllers. 
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ways in which these commands could be articulated. Certainly, the layout 
of the keyboard contributes to the articulation produced. If only one hand 
is used to type, then it has to travel some distance from the character keys 
and the top function keys to the numbers, the side function keys and the 
`enter' key. The structure of the commands also contributes to the 
articulation of the typing. For example, routes consist only of sets of three 
numbers, so can be quickly typed by the right hand on the separate 
number keypad to the right of the keyboard. Station identifiers need to be 
typed on the main keyboard, often using both hands. However, with only 
a few stations, the abbreviations can be short and entered fairly rapidly. 
Both controllers, at times, enter commands into the ATS, either to the 
main line or to the depot. This appears to be achieved despite little 
explicit communication concerning the commands between the controllers. 
They rarely appear to ask one another to type in a command or correct a 
command made by their colleagues. Hence, the management of the work 
of scheduling, the division of labour between the participants, on the 
whole appears to be unproblematic. In the following sections, 
consideration is given to the ways in which the production of the ATS 
commands are organised, as part of the activities within the control room, 
and how these contribute to the management of responsibilities between 
the controllers. 
6.4 A PRACTICAL DIVISION OF LABOUR: RESOURCES FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CONTROL ROOM 
As mentioned in the last section, pairs of controllers tend to work with the 
two screens in front of them presenting different displays, typically ATS 1, 
in front of the principal controller (Ci), displaying the schematic view of 
the line, and ATS2, in front of the secondary controller (Cii), the depot. 
This reflects a practical division of labour between the two colleagues: Ci 
handling calls on the phone and controlling the main line, and Cii 
controlling traffic in the depot and communicating with the Control Room 
Assistants (CRAs) further along the desk. Therefore, when phone calls are 
taken by Ci concerning the depot, it is not unusual for Cii to then enter 
some command into the ATS. 
In the following instance, Ci is takes a call that concerns the depot. 
The controllers have the `standard' arrangement of displays in 
front of 
them. 
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(3) 9A 03: 19 (44) - transcript 1 
1 Ci: four seven? 
2 (1.5) 
3 E: four seven. (. ) Dee Pee (you are moving around) in the 4 depot tester QverT 
5 (1.5) 
6 Ci: Dee Pee to depot testerl yep- thats message received 
7 ma: tel (. ) proceed on green (aspects) on the (clear) 
8 signalL. 
9 (0.6) 
10 E: (thanks) for your helpT 
Although the actual reason for the call is unclear, it relates to a train 
in the depot: not only does the member of staff mention the `depot tester' 
(line 4) but also `DP' (line 3) is one of the locations in the depot where 
trains are `stabled' (see Figure 6.2). Ci hears this utterance as a request 
for an action and confirms it. 
Once Ci has confirmed the train movement from the location `Dee Pee' 
to the `depot tester', on the word `yep', Cii starts to type a command. 
(3) 9A 03: 19 (44) - transcript 2 
Ci: Dee Pee to depot tested yep thats message received ma: tel (. ) proceed 
Cii: 0.. U. O. O0 
Cii types a depot command. 8 The typing by Cii appears to be related to 
the talk on the phone between Ci and the remote party. 
Calls to the control room frequently require more than a simple 
confirmation from the controllers through talk. They may also require, for 
example, the controllers to change the mode of the train, to revise its route 
or to alter its destination. To accomplish all of these requires commands 
to be entered into the ATS. Either of the controllers can do this. However, 
the resources for taking an action are available to each in marginally 
different ways. The principal controller can hear the call through the 
handset as well as the loudspeaker, but, at the beginning and end of calls 
he has to, whilst holding the phone receiver with his left hand, manipulate 
the computerised phone system with his right. So, it appears that 
although the call is more accessible to Ci, on occasions it may be more 
appropriate for Cii to enter the command. One such occasion may be when 
the second controller is not otherwise engaged and has the appropriate 
display presented. 
The repetition of a request, or part of a request, by a controller can, 
therefore, serve a double duty (cf. Turner, 1976). It can confirm that the 
request has been heard and will be acted on to the remote party. It can 
8 This can be seen by the first part of the typed command being numbers. 
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also provide resources for a colleague to take the appropriate next action. 
In (3), Cii's typing begins just after the confirmation `Dee Pee to depot 
tester. '. This confirmation being an abbreviated version of the remote 
party's request, it displays that the relevant details concerning the 
starting and finishing point, and the direction, of a train movement have 
been heard. This is also just the information needed for the Cii to enter a 
command. 
In the following instance, another request comes in for a train 
movement within the depot. 
(4) 27iiCo - transcript 1 
1 Ci: three four::? 
2 (2.3) 
3 E: yeah three four: to (line one). (. ) 
4a route please from Dee Arr:. L down 
5 o: ver? 
6 (0.2) 
7 Ci: thats from Dee Arr: to Dee Ess: (. ) 
8 received. (Julie ) over? 
9 (0.2) 
can you give me 
to Dee Ess (0.2) 
thats-er (well) 
The nature of the request makes it hearable as concerning the depot, 
again because the particular locations given identify places within the 
OMC (i. e. DR and DS, in line 4). Following this request the primary 
controller (Ci) confirms the traffic movement. After Ci's confirmation 
(lines 7-8), Cii commences typing a command into the ATS. 
(4) 27iiCo - transcript 2 
ATS1 
Ci: Ess: -thats-er (well) received. 
L (Julie ) over? 
E: () over 
Cii: .. 
ý.. Q QQ.. ý 
ATS1 
kbd 
As this command is entered only using keys on the right hand side of 
the keyboard (the function keys for initiating commands and the number 
keys), it appears to be one directed at the depot. As in (3) the typing of Cii 
appears to be related to the talk between Ci and a remote party on the 
radio. Ci repeats particular details of the call providing resources for both 
the remote party and Cii. These details are relevant to the production of 
the command - the starting point (DR) and the end point 
(DS) of the 
movement. Although Cii starts typing only after Ci moves into closing the 
call, his activity before this appears to be related to the call. Just after Ci 
gives the confirmation, Cii turns away from looking at the display in front 
248 
of Ci and towards the one in front of his own position. As his glance 
arrives at the keyboard he starts typing. 
It appears then that the confirmation may provide resources for both 
remote and local colleagues. As mentioned in the previous chapter, there 
are various formal requirements for the talk on the phone: one of which is 
to confirm actions that are to be taken. These, however, can be adapted to 
the local circumstances, for the purposes of the controller and the possible 
circumstances of the remote party. These confirmations may also be 
relevant to others in the control room, particularly the second controller 
not on the phone. This would appear to be a conventional case of 
monitoring, Cii's listening in to the calls to hear what is relevant for 
themselves. This monitoring is not arbitrary with respect to the talk on 
the phone. In (3) and (4) the Ciis do not merely respond to a call being 
about the depot, but only commence a movement towards typing once it 
has been confirmed by the controller. 
In both cases the principal controller goes onto another activity. It 
appears that, although they confirm the changes on the phone, the 
principal controllers treat the second controllers' typing as adequate to 
deal with the matters on which they have been talking about on the 
phone. Hence, they are also sensitive to the activities of their colleagues. 
At the least, they see the typing as relating to their own talk. It may be 
that the timing of the conduct of the second controllers is relevant; that a 
turn towards the system and then the typing can be seen to be relevant 
because of its positioning vis-a-vis the talk. It may be that Cis also can 
utilise as resources the general features of the typing revealed in the last 
section. Though they may not be oriented to the screen of their colleague, 
they may monitor the gross features of the typing activity, not only the 
general area where they are typing, but what is hearable in the typing. 
Whatever the case, they treat their colleagues' activities as appropriate to 
the call: they can also be considered to be monitoring their colleagues' 
activities. In this sense, monitoring in the control room can thus be seen 
to be `mutual' (cf. Heath and Luff, 1992a). 
In both (3) and (4), a call comes in over the phone, and related 
activities are produced by both controllers: a confirmation by the principal 
controller and a typed command by the second controller. Calls to the 
control room frequently implicate such a'confirmation-command' package. 
In (3) and (4), each is produced by a different individual. This distribution 
of responsibilities is accomplished unproblematically. These activities are 
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accomplished by both hearing what is publicly available on the phone and 
talking appropriate next actions. They also are managed through both 
participants making use of the activities of the other: Ci relying on Cii's 
typing to be appropriate and even producing turns of talk to a remote 
party that, at least, can be heard to be relevant by a co-present colleague. 
In the following instance, Cii starts typing sometime after the 
confirmation by the controller. Indeed, his typing follows the remote 
party's final turn in the conversation (line 9). 
(5) 5Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
-º 9 
10 
11 
Ci: two ni: ne 
(") 
E: () 
(1.2) 
Ci: thats (a roger:: ) 
from you) over 
(1.5) 
E: () 
(0.2) 
(fully at greens when I get them 
((Cii starts typing)) 
((Ci puts phone down)) 
As in (3) and (4), the call appears to concern the depot, 9 but the precise 
nature of the reason for the call coming through the loudspeaker is 
unclear. Ci appears to orient to this, and perhaps also Cii's inactivity, 
and, as the remote party begins their reply (line 8), points to two places on 
the screen. Following this, Cii types a depot command (using the right 
hand function key and the right hand numeric keypad). 
9 The confirmation of a train route involving following `green specs' or `greens' 
tends to be directed to trains in the depot. 
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(5) 5Co - transcript 2 
5. la Ci Cii 5.2a Ci Cii 
Ci points to two 
places on ATS2 screen 
r-ý n 
ATS2 
III 
E: () 
Cii : ....: ....: ....: .... t. (O . 00000) . 000000....; ... 
kbd 
AT S2 
5.1b Ci Cii 5.2b Ci Cii 
Ci's gesture consists of two components and is quite extensive, the first 
being to the top of ATS2 (image 5.1), the second to the bottom right (image 
5.2). The length of the command, which continues beyond this fragment 
for another nine characters, is also quite extensive. The pointing and 
typing appear to be tightly related, the former specifying the nature of the 
command to be produced on the keyboard. 
As the gesture is produced, Cii glances down at the keyboard. He 
begins to type once Ci's second pointing has been completed. It may be 
that the gesture alone is sufficient to produce an appropriate keyboard 
command from Cii. However, the point does not touch the screen, and 
even though close, would not specify a complete and precise route. Indeed, 
whilst Ci is pointing to the second location Cii is looking down to the 
keyboard. It appears that the point is made with regard to the call, to 
make sense of the foregoing talk and to outline relevant details of the 
foregoing call for Cii to take further action. This Cii does, typing a 
command into the system immediately after Ci's gesture. Thus, in this 
case, Ci appears to orient both retrospectively to the hearing of the call for 
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Cii, and the potential problems in it, and prospectively for Cii to take an 
appropriate next action. Ci not only orients to the possibility for Cii to 
take next actions consequent on a call, but is also sensitive to the 
resources he utilises in order to produce these. 
In (3), (4) and (5) a phone call from a member of staff to the principal 
controller requires actions to be undertaken by control room personnel. In 
each case, the activity relates to the depot and requires both a 
confirmation and some change to be made to the system, and in each case 
Cii types into the ATS a command to move traffic in the depot. In (3) and 
(4), Cii appears to utilise resources in the talk between Ci and a member 
of staff. In (5) there are problems with the reception of the call, and Ci's 
pointing appears to be designed with respect to the practical problems 
faced by a co-present colleague. Hence, it appears that both participants 
are orienting to a practical division of labour, where it is relevant. Once a 
an activity which relates to the domain of Cii is confirmed, Cii types in an 
appropriate command into the system. Cis appear to orient to this 
division of responsibility: when a command is typed he (or she) goes onto 
another activity; when it is not they provide resources for the Cii to type 
an appropriate command. For a Cii's activity to be seen as relevant it has 
to be timed with regard to the Ci's activity. This may be by commencing to 
type or by moving into a position to begin typing. 
In each of these cases, the call requires a confirmation and a train 
alteration and these activities are distributed between the Ci and Cii 
respectively. However, these activities are not performed in isolation. For 
Cii to produce a relevant next action requires the skill of recovering the 
relevant details from the call in order to take that next action. It requires 
an active listening to the call, for what may be relevant. Moreover, it 
appears that Ci can contribute to this practice, designing not only gestures 
to help accomplish this listening, but also talk with a remote colleague to 
make the relevant details hearable. Cis are also sensitive to the activities 
of Ciis, taking account of when an apparent `next activity' is not 
forthcoming. Thus, in different ways the two controllers appear to be 
orienting to a distribution of activities and responsibilities between them. 
This division of labour between the two controllers may appear quite 
straightforward, and reflected by their selection of views on the screens in 
front of them. However, to accomplish appropriate actions requires work 
from both controllers, involving not only a sensitivity to the 
responsibilities of a colleague, but also to the particular circumstances 
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they are facing. Although the activities of both controllers can be 
considered in terms of monitoring their co-participant, this 
characterisation appears to neglect their engagement and active 
participation in the conduct of their colleagues. 
6.5 PRACTICES THROUGH WHICH CALLS ARE HEARD AS RELEVANT 
Despite the controllers' orientation to a division of responsibilities between 
them, it is noticeable from the materials that Cis do not always work on 
the main line and Ciis on the depot, and that often they do have other 
views of the system displayed in front of them. For example, in the next 
fragment, the controllers have their views the other way around: ATS 1 
has a view of the depot, and ATS2 the main line. As a call comes in from 
a remote party, Cii starts typing. 
(6) 10A 1: 00: 26 (43)- transcript 1 
5 Ci: transit base receivingl from transit one five go 
6 ahead over. L 
7 (0.5) 
8 RP: one fi: ve' ( try) and pick(ing) up at (route) one 
49 one (. ) six at (0.2) Poplar overT 
10 (0.7) 
11 Ci: much appreciated thanks ChasT (0.6) (nice to have 
12 you: ) 
13 (1.3) 
14 ((Ci puts phone down)) 
Cii's typing commences as the remote party completes the `reason for 
the call'. 
(6) 10A 1: 00: 26 (43)- - transcript 2 
6.1 C /Ci 6.2 Cii Ci 6.3 Cü/Ci 
rr 
Ci: ATS2 ATS1 PS ATS2 
RP: pick(ing) up at (route) one one (. ) six at--Poplar QverT----. -- 1 ... Cii. 
WES 
PS ATS2 L----J 
hands down to keyboard 
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body movement to PS, 
hand to mouse 
body movement 
to ATS2 
Indeed, she reorients from the phone system display, to the left of Ci, to 
the ATS2 screen in front of her just after the caller is giving the route 
number `one one (. ) six'. Ci also reorients to ATS2 at this point, and 
appears to be looking at Cii's screen as she types. As the reason for the 
call emerges he has been looking first towards ATS2, then ATS1 and then 
the phone system display. So, whilst the caller is giving the route number, 
Ci is turning towards the phone system, glancing at ATS 1 on the way. As 
part of this movement, his hand reaches towards the mouse which is used 
to operate the phone system, arriving as the caller utters `at'. This 
movement appears to prefigure a closing of the call. 10 However, Ci then 
suddenly moves back to the right, towards ATS2, and Cii moves her hands 
down to the keyboard to type. When the caller gives the location `Poplar' 
both controllers are looking at ATS2 and Cii is beginning to type. Some 
feature of the call appears to be consequential to this coordinated 
movement of both controllers: Ci arrests his movement towards the phone 
system and Cii begins to type. It is as if the route given in the call, `one 
one (. ) six' demands some action from the controllers. 
The command the Cii types is concerned with Westferry, the station 
next to Poplar if going East to Stratford (see Figure 6.4). 
WES LIM SHB BON 
TOG 
PDP 
OMC BLS DEB DOE 
STB 
000 
Figure 6.4 A sketch of the train movements considered in fragment 6. 
In line 5 it is stationary at Westferry (WES). It is on a route heading 
towards Stratford (STR) in the East. The caller is at Poplar (POP). 
10 As mentioned in Chapter 5, the phone system queues the calls coming in and the 
mouse is used to select further calls on the queue. As it both identifies the name 
of the callers and their trains, the phone system display can be used at the 
beginning of the call to locate the caller (in conjunction with the ATS display). It 
can also be used prospectively, to provide resources for making sense of calls 
about to be taken. The reorientations of Ci in (6) between the screens have the 
character of those considered in Chapter 5, of being utilised to make sense of an 
emerging incoming call. In this case ATS2 presents the display of the main 
line 
and can be used as a resource to locate trains related to the call. 
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Some time before the incoming call a train captain has reported a 
problem with his train and Ci commences a course of action to `stable' the 
vehicle in the depot (the OMC). As well as the failure of the train there 
also appear to be problems with the communication between the train 
captain of the failed train and the controller. When he reported the 
failure, his confirmation of the action he should take, itself a repetition of 
a statement by Ci, has to be repeated again. At one point in that call, Ci 
throws his phone down on the desk. The controller then commences a 
course of action to `stable' the vehicle in the depot. 
(6) l0A 57: 32 (43) - transcript 3 
Ci: on arrival Wes(t) Ferry report one three seven>set A: 
Tee Manual ( clear to) Poplar (0.2) once at 
Poplar ()0 eM Cee. Qver. 
About forty seconds before the call given in transcript 1a train can be 
seen to arrive at Westferry. 11 This remains there throughout the course of 
the call. It appears to be the target of Cii's command. Indeed, just 
following Ci putting down the handset of the phone (line 14), the train 
identifier moves along the track eastward (to the left on this part of the 
screen) towards Poplar. The timing of this movement, following its long 
stay at Westferry, the typing of a command directed at that station, and 
the subsequent departure of the train are consistent with its Eastward 
movement. It also appears to be consistent with the earlier instructions of 
Ci to the train captain to move the train towards Westferry then through 
to Poplar to the OMC. 
It also appears that the call may be related to this train. 12 Although 
the remote party's reason for the call is not completely clear, the initial 
turns of the call are rather distinctive: 
11 When a train docks at a station it is displayed on the ATS by the block 
representing the station changing colour to yellow. This can be visible from the 
video-recordings. Similarly, particular train movements can be seen. These are 
displayed by a white identifier for a train (its number and destination) proceeding 
along the track. Track sections which are blocked by the ATP follow the train's 
location. These can also be occasionally seen on the collected materials. 
12 Further resources for analysing the train movements on the line are given in 
Section A. 3.2. 
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(6) 10A 1: 00: 26 (43)- transcript 4 
45 Ci: transit base receivingj. from transit one five go 6 ahead over. 1 
7 (0.5) 
8 RP: one fi: veL ( try) and pick(ing) up at (route) one 9 one (. ) six at (0.2) Poplar QverT 
10 (0.7) 
-ý 11 Ci: much appreciated thanks ChasT (0.6) (nice to have 12 you: ) 
First, in the call sign `transit base receivingl from transit one five' the 
number of the recipient is given (line 5). Second, the remote party reports 
an action being undertaken that he is undertaking'( try) and pick(ing) 
up'. He also gives a location, not named but numbered (lines 8-9). This is 
treated unproblematically by Ci, who goes on immediately to move 
towards closing with `much appreciated thanks ChasT' (line 11). This 
closing turn is a third, distinctive feature of the fragment: the caller is 
named by Ci and `(nice to have you: )' is also unusual. These features 
reveal the call to be from a `mobile' CRS or a `transit'. These controllers 
travel around the system assisting where appropriate. They can listen in 
to the radio traffic and take actions accordingly. It may be that the 
`mobile' in (6) has heard the previous talk on the radio, particularly with 
respect to the radio communications and is intervening in the light of 
these. 13 
Hence, the remote party's talk on the radio can be heard as directly 
consequential to the participants in the control room. His utterance 
appears to provide the resources for the controllers to revise the system 
and set the train at Westferry moving. In this case, Cii is attending to the 
details of the call. It is not just that talk is monitored for matters of 
particular concern to a controller, say the depot or the main line, and once 
these are confirmed Cii can then enter the appropriate command into the 
system. The Cii has to attend to the details of the call: who is making it, 
what actions they are requesting or making. In (6) the call can be heard to 
be distinctive through the particular organisation of the talk and the 
nature of the turns that are produced. It may be that the call sign and 
13 Without clear radio communications it is unclear whether the train captain has 
heard the changes to the operation of the train. The controllers may then be 
holding the train until more robust contact can be made. The radios have 
batteries and these can run out. One solution is to get a new radio to the train 
captain. As the mobile controller appears to propose to pick the train up at 
Poplar, Cii's command may be to allow the train to proceed. It is unclear what 
access the train captain on the train at Westferry has to these actions. 
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even the voice of the remote party can be recognised by the participants in 
the control room, but his contribution has to be heard as relevant to the 
circumstances at hand: the particular happenings on the line. In (6) an 
activity at Poplar is heard to relate to a train at Westferry. This requires 
the talk on the radio to be heard in relation to the current state of the 
service. Once the mobile states where he will be picked up, Cii can enter 
the command into the system to start to move the train at Westferry. The 
typing of the command is tied to the talk by a remote participant to the 
call. 
However, characterising this accomplishment merely in terms of Cii 
overhearing the call between the other two controllers neglects how the 
activity is produced. Ci also marks the call as distinctive. From his first 
turn, he produces distinctive features that display an orientation to the 
nature of the call, not only for his co-interactant, but also his co-present 
colleague. These distinctive features may serve prospectively to mark 
how the upcoming call can be heard by a colleague. In this case the call is 
heard by Cii as relevant to her and implicative of some action to be taken. 
This hearing, then. is accomplished through the collaborative and 
interactional activities of other participants. Ci then goes on to another 
activity, Cii's typing of a command being seen to be appropriate and 
relevant. 
It may also be noted that Ci's typing could be considered to be 
coordinated with the talk on the phone. In this instance, and in (3) and 
(4), it appears to be tied to particular components of the talk; either a 
confirmation or specific route number. But it is not simply a coordination 
between typing and talk, but of activities concerned with the scheduling of 
traffic on the line. It is the particular command that appears to be 
appropriate and relevant to particularities in the talk. The talk has a 
sequential relevance, requiring particular actions to be taken, not only 
through talk (as in a confirmation or a denial to a request), but also 
through actions on the computer system. Through the actions of the 
participants the commands are produced and displayed to be appropriate 
and relevant, changes to the schedule are accomplished collaboratively. 
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6.6 THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TALK AND THE PRODUCTION 
OF COMMANDS 
From observations in the cases considered so far, it may appear that 
although they attend to each other, both controllers are primarily 
concerned with distinct activities: Ci with the phone and Cii with the ATS. 
It may also appear that the activities between the two controllers are 
rather loosely related, one participant listening in or watching the other. 
In this section, the activities of the controllers are considered in more 
detail; although they appear distinct they are tightly interweaved. In 
Section 6.6.1, the ways in which the principal controller engages in the 
activity of the second controller are examined. In Section 6.6.2, the ways 
in which the second controller attends to the activities of the principal 
controller are considered. These two domains of interest can both be 
considered in terms of one controller monitoring the other. However, in 
order to make sense of another's activity this has to be seen in relation to a 
broad set of resources available in the control room and emerging in the 
setting. 
In Section 6.6.3, the entry of commands are explored in relation to the 
ongoing activities of the participants. It appears that the talk between 
participants on the phone and the typing into the system can be tightly 
coordinated. The production of one relies on the production of the other. 
The accomplishment of a command even though entered by an individual 
is achieved through the collaborative activities of the participants. 
6.6.1 Engagement in Multiple Activities: Cis Monitoring Ciis 
In the preceding fragments, it may appear that second controllers' sole 
responsibility is the system ahead of them, and in order to take any action 
they have to wait for appropriate phone calls to arrive. However, they do 
have other responsibilities, for example, along with principal controllers 
they have to maintain a record of significant changes to the system and of 
any failures and delays. They also tend to talk with CRAs about problems 
of common interest, particularly concerning matters which may have a 
relevance to the crewing of trains. Similarly, Cis have other 
responsibilities. There is a wide a range of other staff who may need 
information or assistance from the controller concerning the running of 
the line. As the following fragment commences, Ci and Cii are engaged in 
apparently distinct activities, Ci is just completing a conversation with an 
engineer whilst Cii is answering a request from a CRA. On the 
CRA's 
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repeat of the request to Cii, Ci then goes on to take a conventional call 
from a train captain. 
(7) 1OA 03: 26 (42) - transcript 1 (simplified) 
8 CPA: how long are you keeping that A: Tee Pee train thereL 
9 Ci: " train 
10 base (to) train seven one: (0.1) go ahead over? 
11 (0.1) 
12 TC: ( Stratford West India Quay over) 
12 (0.4) 
14 Ci: Select emergency shunt<proceed forward in that 
15 mode<dock at Poplar routeboard two zero sevenT (0.2) 
Whilst Ci takes the call, Cii answers the CRA and then types some 
commands into the ATS. On completion of the call, Ci turns to her and 
says `°ehhm (0.2) I was going to sue: <let the one (one one) gooT' (lines 30- 
31). 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 2 (simplified) 
25 (0.2) 
26 Ci: (thats a rog) thank your (0.2) ( over) 
27 (1.7) 
28 ((Ci puts phone down) ) 
29 (2.3) 
30 Ci: °ehhm (0.2) I was gQing to say: <1et the one (one one) 
31 gQT (0.2) ( run through 
Cii then goes on to type in another command. Ci's utterance appears to 
be related to some aspect of Cii's prior activity. In the course of the phone 
call Cii types three commands. In order to investigate what Ci is 
attending to in the conduct of Ci, it is important to examine in more detail 
these particular commands and the state of the service at the time of the 
call. The first of these is typed when the train captain is giving a reason 
for the call. It is directed to Heron Quays (HEQ). 
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Ci Cii CRA 
(7) l0A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 3 (simplified) 
TC: ( Stratford West India Quay over) Cii: 1 
.HEO (0)QQQ QQO_I 
The second and third commands are typed during the train captain's 
confirmation and concern Devons Road. 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 4 (simplified) 
Cii: U .DER . U. . 
OQQ 2 QOQ 
.J 
Cii: U ... D .. ER.. U.. Q Cis CO) 
When the call commences there are only three trains on the Red Line 
between Canary Wharf and Stratford: the train that is just about to leave 
Stratford going south (the subject of CRA's talk), a train stuck at West 
India Quay going north (the subject of the call to Ci), and another train 
going north on the `delta' towards Poplar. 14 Figure 6.5 is a sketch of the 
state of the main line diagram when the call commences (line 9). 
Figure 6.5 The trains on the North of the Red Line at the beginning of the call in (7). 
Cii's first command to Heron Quays appears to be addressed to the 
train that will follow the one currently at West India Quay, 15 and the 
commands to Devons Road to the train just leaving Stratford. This is the 
train which the CRA asks Cii about (line 8). The CRA's question appears 
to be in the light of a conversation he is having on the phone. He then 
14 This is the complex area of tracks between Poplar, West India Quay and 
Westferry. It appears on the left of the ATS main line screen, in the rough shape 
ofa`D'. 
15 At the time of recording Canary Wharf station was not fully operational. This 
meant that frequent ATS commands were entered with respect to it, either 
addressed to CAW or the next stations along the line (WIQ and HEQ). Canary 
Wharf is also unusual on the DLR in having more than two tracks running 
through it. This means that there are alternative routes through the station. 
Other resources utilised to make sense of the happenings on the line are given in 
Appendix A (Section A. 3.2). 
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turns to Cii and asks `(how long are you going to keep that) A:: Tee Pee 
train (out)'. 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 5 (simplified) 
CRA ((on phone)): hang on a minute ma: tel 
(1.3) 
CRA ((to Cii)): (how long are you going to keep that) 
A:: Tee Pee train (out) 
(0.3) 
Cii: What? 
(0.1) 
CRA: how long are you keeping that A: Tee Pee train 
there. 
(0.2) 
Cii: there is a train (leaving ) (0.2) all the onesT 
(0.2) 
f CPA: (oh there is onel 
(0.5) 
CRA ((on phone)): () leaving Stratford nowT 
After 0.3 seconds Cii replies with `what? ', the CRA repeats, with a 
slight transformation, his request. Cii replies, pointing to the screen 
between them (ATS3), 16 as she utters `all the onesT`. The CRA moves 
closer to the screen, also pointing at it. He utters a statement like `(oh 
there is one. )' before returning to his phone call. The CRA's initial 
utterance appears to orient Cii to the issue being discussed in his phone 
call, she gives a response apparently adequate for the CRA to return to the 
call and reply to his interlocutor. Their pointing gestures and their talk 
both appear to be directed at a train in the Stratford area of the screen. 
Indeed, shortly after this utterance the train leaves Stratford (displayed 
on ATS2). In order to stable the train, say after some problem, it would be 
necessary to set the instructions at one of the stations before Poplar. As 
the train has left Stratford, Devons Road is a suitable candidate station. 
It also appears to be this train (`all the ones') which the Ci is referring 
to when he completes the call with `°ehhm (0.2) I was going to s: <let the 
one (one one) DoT' (lines 30-31). 
16 This screen, which appears to be only used as a display onto the system for the 
CRAs, is positioned at the end of the controllers' part of the console, to the right of 
Cii (and, thus, to the left of CRAi). It usually displays a view of the main line. 
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(7) 
28 
29 
30 Ci: 
31 
32 
10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 7 
((Ci puts phone down)) 
33 Cii. 
34 
35 Ci: 
36 
(2.3) 
°ehhm (0.2) I was going to sav: <let the one (one one) 
gQT (0.2) ( run through 
thirteen (0.2) (wi th these delays) 
there I it is) 
(here) (0.2) 
back into auto: 
Let that one run (. ) (I'd) put it 
As he says, `(I'd) put it back into auto: L' Cii begins to type, again this is 
to Devons Road. 
(7) l0A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 7 
Cii: 0; DER 
Ci: (here)--Let that one run (. ) (I'd) put it back into auto:. L 
Although he has been engaged with the engineer and then the call, Ci's 
suggestion appears to be related to the train in the discussion between Cii 
and the CRA and the one she has just altered. Therefore, it appears that 
whilst engaged in these other activities, Ci is also sensitive to the 
activities of Cii. Although Ci's utterance `°ehhm (0.2) I was going to 
sue: <let the one (one one) g oT' may be solely in the light of the 
conversation between the CRA and Cii, it appears to be designed with 
respect to the typing of the command, hence the turn being prefigured by 
`°ehhm (0.2) 1 was going to sue'. Therefore, Ci appears to have been 
attending to the details of Cii's activities; not only that she types 
commands, or even that she makes a change with respect to an enquiry by 
a colleague, but that she makes a particular change in the light of the 
present state of the service. Ci picks up from the stream of Cii's typing 
that she has made a change at Devons Road, and this relates to the train 
coming from Stratford. 
In (7), from early in the call Ci adopts an orientation where he can see 
both ATS displays and the consequences of Cii's typing. Hence, whilst he 
is engaged in one activity, the call, he can observe what is visible and 
public in another, the Cii's typing. However, making sense of the typing 
depends on it being recognised as part of a situated activity, particularly 
with regard to a particular train and a particular course of action. With 
respect to the case at hand, making sense of the course of the activity 
which Cii is engaged in relies on seeing her typing in relation to the 
happenings on the screen, to the state of the service and in the light of 
prior activities with others. 
-(which ones) thirteen (0.1) (Oh 
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6.6.2 Exploring the Scene for Practical Problems: Ciis Monitoring 
Cis 
During the call in (7) the typing of Cii does not appear to be directly 
related to the talk of Ci. It is related to Heron Quays and Devons Road 
stations whilst the remote party in the call is at West India Quay. 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 8 
10 Ci: train base (to) train seven one: (0.1) go ahead Qver? 
11 (0.1) 
12 TC: ( Stratford West India Quay over) 
12 (0.4) 
14 Ci: Select emergency shunt<proceed forward in that 
15 mode<dock at Poplar routeboard twQ zero sevenT (0.2) 
16 You have a confirmed route (0.3) (points blocked in 
17 favour) (. ) Once you are at Poplar two zerQ seven 
18 (0.4) resgj reselect A: Tee 0:: 1 (0.2) We will be 
19 turning your train at Bow Church Qver. 
20 (0.2) 
21 TC: () emergency shunt at routeboard two 
22 (O) seven at Poplar (0.2) ( reset (reselect) A: 
23 Tee 0: 1 (0.2) err (I then) confirm that you will be 
24 err: turning () Bow Church over 
25 (0.2) 
26 Ci: (thats a rog) thank your (0.2) ( over) 
27 (1.7) 
From Ci's reply, the train appears to have docking problems at West 
India Quay. The usual procedure would be to get the train captain to 
shunt the train to the next station (Poplar if he is going north on the Red 
Line, lines 14-15) and there set the train back into Automatic Train 
Operation (i. e. back to the schedule set by the ATS, lines 17-18). Ci also 
takes the opportunity to inform the driver that they will be turning the 
train around later at Bow Church, a station north of Poplar, just south of 
Stratford (lines 18-19). The train captain appears to repeat and confirm 
this information (lines 21-24). 
Whilst this call is underway, Cii is typing three commands. The first, 
during the train captain's initial report, being directed at Heron Quays. 
Following this, Cii successively glances between ATS2 and the phone 
system display, her hands resting on the edge of the keyboard. 
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(7) 1OA 03: 26 (42) - transcript 9 
ATS 
Ci: 
TC: Quay 
Cii: Q -i 
ATS2 
Cii ATS 
Select emergency shunt<proceed forward 
over---- 
PS ATS2 
Cii Ci 
PS AT S2 PS 
ill Cl Cii C1 (ill Ci 
After a look towards the phone system display, Cii returns to ATS2. 
Ci then begins to speak, and as he begins to talk Cii quickly glances 
between the two displays of the phone system and the ATS in front of her, 
looking at the phone system on another two occasions. 
It is as if, after being engaged with the CRA and the command to the 
train coming into Herons Quay, Cii is looking for resources with which to 
understand the call - the identity of the speaker and the location of the 
train. There are two trains to which the call could be related, the train at 
West India Quay and the one coming in to Poplar. If it is the second, then 
an action may be required fairly promptly. 
It is only once the gist of Ci's utterance is well underway that does Cii 
becomes less animated, and her hands move up from the keyboard, on 
which she then rests her chin. 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 10 
Ci: ATS 
Ci: forward in that mode<dock at Poplar routeboard two zero sevenT--- 
Cii: 
PS ATS2 
L 
hands up from keyboard 
The two screens would provide resources for locating the caller and 
the 
train. The phone system screen presents the number of the caller and 
the 
II- 
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Cii Ci Cii Ci 
set (i. e. train) he is on. The ATS displays where that set (or train) is. 
Moreover, as the turn emerges, the nature of the problem, its solution and 
its location becomes apparent; selecting emergency shunt at Poplar for a 
train at West India Quay does not demand an immediate action from the 
controllers. To make sense of a call requires hearing it relation to the 
happenings on the line (i. e. on the ATS screen). However, as mentioned in 
the last chapter, merely locating the train requires reading from both the 
phone system and the ATS screens. In (7), the train captain's reason for 
the call is unclear (line 12). It may be in the light of this, that Cii has to 
recover details from the screens to make sense of the call. 
Indeed, it may be in the light of Cii's agitations that Ci continues his 
instruction. 
(7) 10A 03: 26 (42) - transcript 10 
14 Ci: Select emergency shunt<proceed forward in that 
15 mode<dock at Poplar routeboard two zero sevenT (0.2) 
There are some slight perturbations in the turn `select emergency 
shunt<proceed forward in that mode<dock at Poplar routeboard two zero 
sevenT'. The talk is produced so that each component runs quickly into 
the next one. The components are each actions in a sequence for dealing 
with emergency shunts. Hence, Ci's reply appears to be read out as a list 
of standard components, the first three of these being the activities 
usually required in a shunting operation: selecting the mode ('Select 
emergency shun, moving in a given direction ('proceed forward in that 
mode'), to a given destination (`dock at Poplar'). As this instruction 
emerges, Cii's movements become less agitated, so that by the end of the 
second component she remains fixed on the phone system screen, and by 
the beginning of the third she moves her hands from the immediate 
vicinity of the keyboard whilst turning back to ATS2. The instruction 
provides resources with which to make sense of the train captain's call. It 
identifies the train as the stationary one at West India Quay which 
requires no immediate action. Indeed, commands to it can only be made 
once the train on the delta has passed through Poplar. As the location of 
the problem and the precise nature of the solution is produced, Cii's 
movements become less energetic. When the next turn of talk, the 
confirmation from the train captain emerges, she goes on to type her 
commands to Devons Road. 
In this instance it appears as if Cii is overseeing the local environment 
to make sense of the call, glancing at the various monitors around her that 
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would offer resources for identifying the nature of the call, the location of 
the problem, and thus, be potentially relevant for a next action consequent 
on the call. It also appears that Ci is sensitive to this, he appears to be 
`monitoring her monitoring'. Throughout the call he maintains an 
orientation where he can see both the happenings on the screen in front of 
him and on ATS2. Moreover, he can also view the ongoing activities of his 
colleague. It may be that Ci's utterance 'You have a confirmed route (0.3) 
(points blocked in favour. )' may be sensitive to concerns of Cii. Only once 
this is produced does Cii go on to type in the command to the train that 
has left Stratford (the `one one one'). 
Hence, whilst Ci is attending to Cii's activities (as revealed in this and 
the last section), Cii is also attending to Ci's activities. Attention is 
continually being paid to a colleague's activities even whilst being engaged 
in a distinct activity. The activities of Ci and Cii can easily be 
characterised as `mutual monitoring', `overhearing' and `overseeing'. Each 
carries out activities that are related to the ongoing talk either on the 
phone or in the control room in which they are not `direct' participants or 
recipients. Each controller also appears to be sensitive to the publicly and 
visibly accessible features of their colleague's work, they can see the 
screens the others can see and view the details of the identity of the phone 
caller, the movements of the trains and the results of their partners' 
typing. However, these activities are more than passive `overseeing', 
rather, a colleague's actions are made sense of with respect to an emerging 
context. The controllers have to read the screens to locate emerging 
problems, and these screens have to be read in the light of the recent 
history of the service and the ongoing occurrences in the control room. 
These monitoring practices are achievements, and critical to these are 
accomplished understandings of the happenings in the setting, both in the 
control room and outside. 
It is also unclear whether the `monitoring' activities of each participant 
can be considered equivalent. In the instances considered so far, the call 
demands, or requires, an action to be undertaken. The participants both 
orient to the possibility that Cii undertake this. So, the particular 
purposes with which Ciis attend to the calls may be distinct from those for 
Ci. Ciis attend to the activities of Ci in order to identify hearably 
consequential items; Cis attend to Ciis to provide them with resources 
with which to hear items as consequential. 
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6.6.3 The Collaborative Accomplishment of a Command 
In the following instance, in an incoming call the remote party requests a 
change to Automatic Train Protection at Crossharbour station. 
(8) 13Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
1 Ci: train base to train at five two:: T 
2 (3.3) 
3 RP: fi:: ve twos (check) five two: l request permission to (. ) 
4 change into A: Tee Pee (0.2) driver (0.3) (Ed) at 
5 Crosshar: bour: (0.4) over. 
6 (2.9) 
As the caller completes his turn, Cii begins to type in a command to 
Herons Quay. After typing in the first packet, he pauses. 
(8) 13Co - transcript 2 
TC: (Ed) at Crosshar: bour: ---- Qver. - 
Cii. 1 ...; H E D.... ".. 
At the time of the call there are several trains running on the area of 
track in question (the branch between the Delta and Island Gardens). 
These are shown schematically in Figure 6.6. 
ains when the call is made 
N /Q 
MUD 
The train in the call 
Figure 6.6: the location of trains as the call is being taken 
On the southbound (going right on the ATS screen) one train is 
between the Delta and Heron Quays, another is between Heron Quays and 
South Quay and a third is coming into Crossharbour. On the northbound 
(going left) one train is between Crossharbour and South Quay and 
another docked at the terminus, Island Gardens. Thus, there are five 
trains on the area of track related to the train in the call and the 
commands being typed. Through analysing the movements of these trains 
in some detail, it is possible to outline a likely interrelationship between 
the trains displayed on the screen and the activities undertaken by the 
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controllers. It appears that the caller is in the train moving north 
(between Crossharbour and South Quay at the beginning of the call). 17 
Ci does not go on to confirm the change, but rather asks the caller to 
`standby'. 
(8) 13Co - transcript 3 (simplified) 
6 (2.9) 
7 Ci: (I can see) if you could 
8 you in a mo:: 
9 (1.5) 
standby and let me get back to 
This request holds off any immediate reply, and also projects some 
forthcoming activity - it is not a denial, for example. There are a range of 
circumstances for which it would be relevant for call to be put on `standby'. 
But, it appears that this turn is related to Cii's ongoing typing. As Ci 
commences the utterance, Cii starts typing again. 
(8) 13Co - transcript 4 
ATS1 
Ci: (I can 
Cii: 
II 
see) if you could standby and let me get back to you in a mo:: -- UOOOOOO.. 
kbd 
Throughout this utterance, Ci continues to look at the screen in front of 
him, only turning away whilst he puts his hand over the receiver. He then 
continues to look towards ATS 1, only glancing away once he begin his 
efforts to return to the call. It appears that he is closely attending to Cii's 
activity of making a change to the main line. In the pause after the first 
packet of typing by Cii `H E Q. ', Ci begins his reply `(I can see) if you could 
standby and let me get back to you in a mo: '. This turn appears to be 
sensitive to the ongoing typing, the pause within it (of 0.7 seconds), and 
the demands of the call. Ci holds off replying to the train captain for 
nearly three seconds, until after the first packet is completed and a gap 
has emerged. 
When Ci begins his reply, this emerges neither as a straightforward 
confirmation nor an alternative action to be taken. Instead, the train 
captain is asked to wait. His utterance commences with what is hearable 
as `(I can see)', as if he is reporting to the train captain some ambivalence 
to the request. As he is uttering this, Cii restarts his typing, beginning to 
enter the route to be revised. Ci then continues with `if you could standby 
and let me get back to you in a mo:: '. This maintains the ambivalent 
17 See Appendix A to give a flavour of this analysis (Section A. 4). 
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nature of his response to the initial request, it is neither confirming the 
request nor suggesting whether the request will be confirmed or rejected. 
By projecting a further unspecified delay through `in a mo:: ', it does not 
even specify when such a reply would be likely. Interestingly, this turn of 
talk is coextensive with the typing of Cii, the route being completed on the 
word `mo:: '. 
These features appear to reveal ways in which Ci's talk is being shaped 
by the ongoing activities of Cii: not only the delay and then the 
continuation of the typing, but also the particular activity that the typing 
is accomplishing -a change to Herons Quay over a specified route. This is 
relevant to the train captain's request. The talk may also display to Cii 
this regard, the holding off of a reply until he has completed his typing. 
Even the `(I can see)' could project such a holding off, allowing Cii to 
continue. Cii then may also be designing his typing in the light of the 
activities of Ci, holding off the actual route component until the nature of 
Ci's talk is apparent. After all, `(I can see) if you', is hearably not the 
straightforward commencement of a confirmation to the request. 
It may be that Ci's initial pause is in the light of Cii's commencement of 
the command to Heron Quays and only when Cii pauses in the production 
of the command does he ask the caller to standby. Cii's pause may itself 
be a delay until a relevant confirmation is given. When this is not 
forthcoming and Ci's reply emerges, Cii then continues to type the route, 
Ci attending to the typing as it emerges. 
Once the typing is completed Ci turns back to the phone system and 
renews the connection to the caller. 
(8) 13Co - transcript 5 
9 (1.5) 
10 ((radio ring, phone system beep)) 
11 (2.3) 
12 Ci: fi: ve two, are you still receiving? 
13 (4.7) 
14 TC: () receiving over? 
15 (0.2) 
164 Ci: (that change is fine) thats affirmative when you 
17 arrive at Croaaharbour (0.3) (routeboard) one four three 
18 (0.4) you may set A: Tee Pee manual (0.2) and proceed 
19 (on your section and clear) (0.2) until further notice. 
I- 
The change is confirmed in the talk (lines 16-19). It appears that Cii's 
typing has accomplished the relevant change. Cii's command appears to 
be sequentially relevant to the talk. It is produced in the light of talk of 
the participants on the phone, and that talk continues once it is 
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accomplished. Ci through his return to the call displays the relevance of 
the Ci's command. 
Through these closely interrelated activities the two participants 
appear to be designing their activities with respect to both the call and 
their colleague's actions in the light of the call. The talk and the typing 
emerge from moment-to-moment, built in the light of their colleague's 
ongoing activities, even as a command is being produced and talk being 
uttered. As with previous instances the call requires both a confirmation 
and an action, or series of actions, from the controllers: the confirmation 
given through talk by Ci in the call, the next actions, in this case, through 
amendments to the system's running. As in those other instances, the 
nature of the action required appears to make it relevant for the second 
controller to undertake it. However, the accomplishment of this activity is 
shaped by the contributions of both controllers, emerging from moment-to- 
moment. 
The division of responsibilities between the controllers is not always 
clear and distinct, neither governed by formally or informally specified 
responsibilities nor even organised with regard to the technology most 
accessible to them. In numerous cases throughout the collected materials, 
Ciis enter commands related to activities not directly related to the views 
available to them. Nor is it the case that Ciis always make the commands 
when Cis are engaged on the phone. Cis can be frequently be seen to enter 
commands whilst they are taking calls from train captains, engineers and 
other members of staff. Rather, it appears that the activities demanded by 
the call are accomplished through a situated division of labour emerging 
from the circumstances at hand. This division of activities is 
interactionally managed from moment-to-moment. So, for example, in (8) 
the call requires a confirmation, and yet this confirmation is delayed until 
an appropriate activity has been carried out on the computer system. 
The 
call requires a command to be entered, which itself appears to 
be shaped 
in the light of the ongoing talk. 
Confirmations and other replies to calls can, as in the previous 
instances, inform the nature and timing of the subsequent commands to 
be entered by a colleague. It is also possible, as in (8), for the pacing of 
the 
command to shape the timing and nature of the confirmation. 
Therefore, 
the ordering of activities in the light of the call has to 
be managed from 
moment-to-moment through the resources at hand. These may 
be through 
the design and production of the talk, even though this may 
be addressed 
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to a remote party. They also may be through the timing and coordination 
of other activities, so that typing or bodily conduct, for example, can be 
seen by a colleague as related to their ongoing activities. 
In order to achieve such activities requires an active attention to the 
work of a colleague. Making sense of this work relies on an accomplished 
understanding of the current circumstances, including a situated viewing 
of the various resources available to the participants. In the control room, 
this rests on being able to see the relevance of particular occurrences 
happening both in the local domain and outside, through the technology 
available. Making sense of another's activities rests, in particular, on 
being able to read off the ATS screens what is relevant to an ongoing call. 
This is a practice required by both controllers, in order to locate a 
particular caller on the line, the nature of the circumstances they are 
facing and to shape a possible next action. This reading is facilitated by 
an awareness of the potential problems which may arise, the current state 
of the service, and through the activities of colleagues, the changes they 
are making to the system and requested to make. Therefore, the typing of 
an appropriate command at the relevant time may be tied into a complex 
web of activities, involving the continually changing displays of technology 
and the contributions of colleagues. These contributions may themselves 
be shaped prospectively with regard to the activity underway, as in Ci's 
utterance `(I can see) if you could standby and let me get back to you in a 
mo: '. Indeed, the talk on the phone, both from the remote parties and from 
the principal controller, is a critical resource on which the coordination 
and distribution of activities relies. 
6.7 MAINTAINING THE DIVISION OF LABOUR: AN EXPLICIT CASE OF 
COLLABORATION 
In the instances considered so far, it is perhaps noticeable that there is 
little explicit talk between the controllers about the calls. In (5), following 
a call, Ci points to two places on the screen, on which Cii then enters a 
command. This gesture appears to be made sense of in the light of the 
prior phone conversation and Cii requires no explicit talk to accomplish 
the command. In (7), a suggestion by Ci appears to display how closely he 
has been attending to the activities of his colleague. In other fragments, 
the participants' activities appear to be tightly interrelated, their smooth 
accomplished production appearing not to rely on explicit comments or 
instructions. The controllers then go straightforwardly on to another 
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activity, taking another call or issuing another command. Apparently any 
actions consequent on the call have been accomplished. However, this is 
not always the case. 
In this section, a more explicit case of collaboration is considered. In 
the following instance, Ci has just turned down a engineer's request for a 
train movement within the depot. He provides a reason for this denial 
(lines 10-13), and after the engineer's reply, suggests roughly when the 
train movement could be made (`if you would like to get back to me in half 
an hour', lines 18-19). As he is producing this, Cii utters `I'll do it now' 
(line 201) and starts typing. 
(9) 
Ci: (that sort thing) mate (. ) as soon as we ca:: n. (. ) 
(and actually) if you would like to get back to me 
in half an hour. just in ca: se r( ) 
over. 
(1.6) 
E: (okay mate ) 
(0.3) 
37Co - transcript 1 (simplified) 
Ci: impossible to say ma: te. (. ) As I say>we are 
investigating a suspect package at the moment (0.4) 
and also got a train captain who's lost his keys 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
4 20 Cii: 
21 (0.4) 
`I'll do it now:. 
Unlike previous fragments, the Cii explicitly notes to Ci, during a call, 
that he is to make a change consequent to the call. Indeed, it appears to 
transform the way Ci handles the call. After re-establishing contact (lines 
21-28), Ci asks the engineer to repeat his original reason for the call (the 
request to move a train, lines 30-31) and then confirms it (lines 36-37). 
(9) 37Co - transcript 2 (simplified) 
21 (0.4) 
22 Ci: Paul are you still receiving? 
23 (. ) 
24 E: 
25 (. ) 
26 Ci: Paul are you still receiving ma: te? 
27 (1.2) 
28 E: still receiving. 
29 (0.2) 
30 Ci: what was your request again? (0.2) four two seven 
to 
31 whe: re? 
32 (1.3) 
33 E: ( four two nine four two eight) back to Dee 
34 El1T 
35 
36 Ci: 
(0.3) 
yeas its being done now ma: te (0.3) we 
had a li(t)11 
37 (0.2) lull in whats happeningT (now you will 
38 probably move) 
39 (0.2) 
40 E: right cheers then 
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So, not only does Cii explicitly display to Ci that he is going to 
undertake the activity on the computer system, Ci has to return to the 
caller to confirm information concerning the call. It appears that either 
(or both) the Cii or the Ci is orienting to the Cii not having undertaken an 
appropriate action: Cii not having entered the appropriate command 
when it was relevant; or Cii not having overheard the original request 
and, despite his typing, not having entered the appropriate command. 
In (9) the typing by Cii appears to be timed in relation to his talk `I'll do 
it now' and is completed prior to Ci's request to the engineer. Yet, despite 
the `now' and the typing that immediately follows it, Ci does not appear to 
display that the Cii's typing is related. He goes on to ask for the engineer 
to repeat his specification of the change. On the other hand, Cii does not 
go on to continue typing during the call. It appears that his typing is 
adequate to accomplish the relevant next action on the system, and Ci 
some time later, in the talk to the engineer, he confirms `(now you will 
probably move)' (lines 37-8). 
Throughout the call Cii has the depot displayed on ATS2. However, 
during Ci's initial denial of the request from the engineer, Cii has been 
issuing commands to trains at Canary Wharf and Heron Quays which he 
completes just as Ci reports one of the problems on the line: `investigating 
a suspect package'. Cii then clears the screen of warning messages and on 
`half of `half an hour' brings up a report line displaying route information. 
(9) 37Co - transcript 3 
Ci: half an hour. just in ca: se () (1.2) 
Cii: I'll do it now - 
T 
gestures to 
screen & kbd 
Paul are you 
.... 
Ll J 
T 
commences 
command 
Cii accompanies his talk with a gesture pointing towards his own 
screen and keyboard (the keyboard of ATS2). The command he then types 
appears to be one directed at the depot (i. e. it is not a standard main 
line 
command), and given his talk, and subsequent talk, appears to address 
the problem in the call. Cii's intervention appears to be appropriately 
timed, occurring after Ci has stated to the caller that a rather 
long delay is 
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T 
displays route 
numbers 
required. Cii appears to type unproblematically the required command, 
completing it even before Ci has re-established contact with the caller. 
Given Cii's completion of the command, it is curious that Ci then goes 
on to request the details of the required train movement. Following his 
typing Cii continues to look at the display in front of him. He does not 
type anything else into the system for the duration of the call, or for some 
time following it. 
Although Cii does type during Ci's initial denial to the caller these can 
be hearably, and possibly visibly, recognised as being commands to the 
main line and unrelated to the call. 18 The initial typing then provides 
few resources from which to assess Cii's availability for action relating to 
the call at hand. Only once he has completed his command does Cii 
engage in activities that may be related to the call or the depot, clearing 
the warning messages (during the callers `(okay mate )', line 15) and 
bringing up a line of route numbers. Indeed, these commands appear to 
mark a juncture from the prior activities relating to changes that have to 
be made on the main line. Cii's utterance `I'll do it now', and his 
accompanying gesture, occur on the completion of `just in ca: se' by Ci. It is 
timely, coming just as Ci has informed the caller of a long potential delay 
before he can address the caller's problem again, an utterance that may 
even be preparatory to moving into closing the call. Just as Cii gestures to 
his keyboard, whilst uttering `I'll do it now', Ci pauses in the course of his 
talk until Cii's command is underway. His next turn is shaped in the light 
of this delay with `Paul are you still receiving ma: te? ' (line 26). 
Thus, Cii's gesture and command entry appear to mark a fairly 
noticeable juncture in the activities of the two colleagues, both occurring 
following a series of unrelated activities by Cii, and in the midst of call in 
which some effort has been expended to state why the command cannot be 
entered. Hence, it may be in the light of such a change of course of activity 
that Ci goes on to ask for a repeat of the details of the call. 
The subsequent talk, where Ci asks for and then gets confirmation for 
a request that has already been made, may then not be so much a failure 
on the part of Ci to recognise the current state of his colleague's activities, 
but more be designed for the circumstances of the caller. It helps provide 
an account for the dramatic change of circumstances, from not being even 
18 They have the familiar 1-3-1-3-3-1 key organisation and they utilise the 
alphabetic keyboard. 
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able to consider moving a train for half an hour to doing it almost 
immediately. Indeed Ci provides an account for this change of course to 
the caller: `yeas, its being done mate, we've got a little lull in whats 
happening mate' (lines 36-7). An utterance that, itself, displays that Ci 
has been following Cii's actions and their consequences. The remote caller 
is provided, at least in part, with a display of a coherent sequence of 
activities going on beyond the phone call to deal with his request. Also, by 
remaining oriented on ATS2 Ci can not only see the production of the 
command but the possible consequences on the train at the depot. 
In accomplishing the work on the phone, Cis have to attend to the 
requirements of both the remote recipients and their colleagues in the 
local domain. When their talk has consequences for both, this may be 
doubly problematic. In a domain where actions by colleagues can also 
transform the current circumstances for the caller, it requires particular 
sensitivity to maintain that all participants, whether recipients or 
overhearers, can make one's own activities intelligible. 
In the talk on the phone, Ci provides a detailed account of why a 
request from a remote party cannot be met. Such a denial might be 
considered as dispreferred, in conversation as well as in institutional talk 
(Maynard, 1992; Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1987). Hence, there may be 
sequential and interactional demands in the call for producing appropriate 
next turns of talk (cf. those of questions and summonses outlined in 
Chapter 5). In transforming a denial to an acceptance also requires 
interactional work; it too has to be accounted for. The intervention by Cii 
in (7) may allow for the traffic movement to take place, but it demands 
from Ci particular activities to be undertaken in the call. The use of the 
computer system by another can be seen to have an interactional 
consequence, an explicit intervention by Cii, requiring explicit talk about 
the activity by Ci. The intervention requires work from Ci to be 
undertaken in the call with the remote party, but the management of 
these activities can be accomplished by conventional conversational 
resources. 
At first glance, Cii's intervention could be characterised as 
`volunteering' to act. Certainly, `I'll do it now' displays an orientation to 
carry out some activity immediately. This turn, however, does not arise 
from `out of the blue'. It relies on Cii attending to the activities of Ci, and 
through the accomplishment of the command it is apparent that Cii does 
indeed have the resources for issuing the command. A characterisation of 
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Cii's utterance and actions as being volunteered neglects how it is 
immersed within the ongoing activity. It is produced through a subtle 
management of the resources available to the two controllers, including 
the phone call, the displays and the activities of their colleagues. 
Activities, including talk from remote participants, but also visual conduct 
and even computer commands can a sequential import, implicating 
particular next activities to be undertaken. 
In the DLR Control Room, both participants have access to a 
technology on which actions related to calls from remote parties can be 
accomplished. It would be hard to imagine a `formal' procedure that could 
fully specify ways in which the controllers operate the technology. Simple 
prescriptions `to be responsible for' a particular domain could be managed 
in a variety of ways. Complex and detailed specifications of the 
distribution of activities would ignore how the work could be flexibly 
managed. It is also unclear whether the work is managed `informally'. It 
would be rather strange to characterise the instances considered in this 
chapter as `negotiating' who does what. It is even difficult to identify 
simple actions as `volunteering'. Rather, the activities are interactionally 
managed through the resources that are publicly available. The activities, 
the typing, the visual conduct and, particularly the talk, are interrelated 
to each other, and seen by the participants to be tied to one another. From 
moment-to-moment the responsibilities and actions of each are shaped by 
and made sense of by their mutual actions. The solution to who does what 
in this complex environment is a situated accomplishment. 
6.8 DISCUSSION 
The constant flow of calls into the control room, the recurrent problems 
with the technology and the various contingencies that arise 
in the 
management of an urban transport system, makes considerable 
demands 
on the Control Room Supervisors on the Docklands Light 
Railway. In 
particular, it presents them with one continual problem: who 
does what. 
There are various rather gross solutions to this, for example, stipulating 
formally, and generally, the responsibilities for each controller, or 
informally dividing the work prior to each relevant action. However, it 
is 
unclear how any general division of responsibilities would assist with 
specific cases, particularly when these occur in quick succession 
involving 
related matters. The timing of activities, and the emergent nature 
of 
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activities which have to be undertaken, also make it difficult for 
controllers to inform each other explicitly, on each occasion, what they are, 
or what their colleague should be doing. 
Nevertheless, there does appear to be some orientation to different 
responsibilities. The controller on the left operates the phone system and 
is responsible for taking and making calls to the operators on the line, a 
critical resource for managing the service. The controller on the right will 
tend to talk to other staff in the control room, particularly Control Room 
Assistants. The controllers also tend to display different views of the line 
on the screens in front of them, reflecting different domains of interest, 
particularly the main line and the depot. However, controllers do alter 
what is displayed in front of them, do adopt different configurations of the 
displays between them and do type commands appropriate to what is 
displayed on the other's screen. Therefore, it cannot be relied upon that 
the organisation of the technology itself can be seen to manage, or display, 
the way work is distributed at any particular moment. Instead, the 
division of tasks and responsibilities between the controllers appears to be 
achieved from moment-to-moment in the light of the ongoing contributions 
of the two colleagues and tied to the emerging talk on the phone. 
The work undertaken by the two controllers is accomplished through a 
complex set of resources being considered in relation to one another. It is 
worth summarising some of the interrelationships between the activities 
of controllers (Ci and Cii), colleagues in the control room and the remote 
parties, and the artefacts (the screens and the computer systems) which 
have been revealed in the foregoing analysis. These could be glossed as 
follows: 
" in a broadcast phone call between Ci and a remote party a 
confirmation of a change to the service by Ci can be seen to require 
a command to the ATS to be undertaken by Cii, and that command 
is accomplished (fragments 3 and 4); 
" in a phone call between Ci and a remote party a confirmation by Ci 
may require an ATS command but the Cii's contribution appears to 
be a `noticeable absence', and is `repaired' by Ci (fragment 5); 
" in a phone call between Ci and a remote party, the talk of the 
remote party appears to implicate a relevant action to be 
undertaken on the ATS, a relevant command is entered by 
Cii 
(fragment 6); 
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" whilst engaged in another activity on the phone, Ci `monitors' a 
command being entered by Cii, makes sense of it in the light of the 
current service and prior talk between Cii and a CRA; Ci later 
`repairs' that command (fragment 7); 
" whilst Ci is engaged in talk on the phone, Cii `monitors' the screens 
available, apparently to make sense of the call; Ci appears to 
transform his talk in the light of Cii's activities, he appears to be 
`monitoring her monitoring' (fragment 7); 
" in a phone call between a remote party and Ci, Cii starts to type a 
related command; Ci appears to transform his talk on the phone in 
the light of the entry of the command (fragment 8); 
" in a phone call between a remote party and Ci, Cii starts to type a 
related command; Cii appears to transform his typing in the light of 
the talk on the phone (fragment 8); 
" in a phone call between a remote party and Ci, Cii explicitly states 
that he will undertake a related activity; this intervention is 
delicately managed and placed at a juncture in the conduct on the 
phone (fragment 9); 
" in a phone call between a remote party and Ci, Ci orients towards a 
domain of a possible next activity for Cii; Cii then states that he will 
carry out a related next activity (fragment 9); 
" in a phone call between a remote party and Ci, Cii states that he 
will carry out a related next activity; Ci appears to produce talk 
that is sensitive to both the intervention of Cii and the 
circumstances of the remote party (fragment 9). 
Through these glosses it is possible to see a complex web of interactions 
and activities, as examples: the talk of the remote party places 
requirements for the conduct of Ci (a next turn of talk) and for Cii (a 
command); the talk and visual conduct of Ci prefigures activities on the 
computer system by Cii; Cii's commands on the computer system are 
taken account of by Ci; and Ci transforms his call on the phone to the 
remote party in the light of the commands entered by Cii. The activities of 
the two controllers, the remote parties on the phone and, also others in the 
local setting, like the CRAs, are tightly interrelated. However, these 
interconnections not just coordinations between actions, the activities 
considered place differing demands on the potential next activities of a co- 
interactant or colleague. In some cases, a next may be unproblematically 
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accomplished, in others, it may be `noticeably absent' and then `repaired', 
and others the production of a next appears to require more delicate or 
sensitive management of the ongoing activity. The particular 
circumstances of the moment may contribute to this; what, for example, 
the consequence of the next activity has on the trajectory of action, 
whether a prior activity with another has to be repaired, refuted etc. 
Hence, these activities are interactionally managed. A turn of talk or a 
command may have implications for others, and these may require a next 
action, the accomplishment of which is produced and recognised 
unproblematically. However, the demands, implications and consequences 
are social commitments, they can be accomplished, repaired and made use 
of. An absence may also be accountable. 
In previous chapters a range of resources have been considered to 
account for the accomplishment of activities: including the common-sense 
understandings of actions and readings of interfaces, ways of conducting 
and improvising actions in order to achieve a practical purpose, the 
readings of a screen in relation to other artefacts and the talk and 
activities of another; and the production of activities and the displays of 
understanding accomplished through turns of talk. These are methods, 
common-sense, ordinary and practical ways of accomplishing activities on 
and through computer systems. In this chapter, by examining the talk, 
visual conduct and activities of a computer system in a setting where the 
participants in the activity are both co-present in the domain and remote, 
such methods appear to provide a foundation for accomplishing the work. 
The talk has to be managed from moment-to-moment on the phone, the 
talk has to made sense of with respect to the current state of the service 
and the circumstances of the remote party, made available partially on 
computer screens. The talk on the phone also can make sense of the 
changing happenings of the screens: a dynamic environment. The screens 
can be understood in the light of interactional accomplishments. 
Similarly, another's typing can be made sense of in the light of the talk in 
the phone calls. It can be seen as consequential or demanding further 
actions. A command on the computer system both appears to be produced 
in relation to a prior activity and recognised in the next as appropriate, by 
a co-participant. 
It would appear to be unsuitable to characterise the interrelationship 
between the commands entered into the computer and the ongoing phone 
conversation as a coordination between typing and talk. The controllers 
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do not just tie their activities into the movements of hand across the 
keyboard and the pressing of keys, but particular activities made to 
particular trains, given the state of the service, as in the `inappropriate' 
train command to stable a train coming from Stratford in (7). They also 
attend to the hearing of particulars of the talk as in (6), where the 
consequences of an utterance are made sense of in terms of who is making 
that utterance and what it implies for their own activities. Hence, the 
activities in the control room rely on more than a passive monitoring of 
another's activities or a mechanical coordination of actions. They are 
achieved through a sequential, sense making practices. 
Controllers have to actively make sense of the call in terms of the 
technologies and resources they have available to them, for example, what 
appears on the screens, the prior talk and activities of their colleagues and 
the routine ways of getting work done. A caller, for instance, has also to 
be identified and located, the reported problem assessed in the light of the 
state of the service and previous occurrences and next actions shaped in 
terms of this assessment. Throughout a phone call resources may emerge 
relevant for this work, for both controllers. The reading of the 
technologies then has to be accomplished from moment-to-moment in 
relation to the talk. The characterisation of activities in the DLR Control 
Room as `monitoring' may thus be problematic, suggesting a rather 
disengaged activity by the `monitor'. It may also be a rather 
individualistic conception of the work of the two controllers. As revealed 
in the instances above, Cis rely on, display an understanding of, and even 
appear to collaborate in the sense making practices of their colleagues. 
The activities of the two controllers are thoroughly and actively 
interrelated, even in the production of a single command or turn at talk. 
Examining the potential interrelationships between computer-based 
activities and the accomplishments of others being achieved in the local 
environment suggests a distinctive form of analysis to those developed 
within HCI. Although preliminary examination of the materials reveals a 
certain consistency to the organisation of typing, the `breaks' in keyboard 
activity do not appear to be merely related to the `individual' activities of 
the typist, or the time needed to `process' information on the display. 
Rather, the activity is often initiated, shaped and completed in the light of 
the ongoing activities of others. The production of a computer command, 
therefore, is not organised merely with respect to the travelling time of the 
hands, the motor skills, or the `cognitive processing' of the controller but to 
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other activities occurring in the local environment, namely the ongoing 
phone call between the principal controller and the remote party revealed 
through dynamic and continually changing happenings on the computer 
displays and the talk and visual conduct of a colleague. In this way, with 
regard to its interactional management, the production of computer-based 
activities is situated. 
Whereas, characterising the controllers' use of the ATS as an 
`interaction' with a computer unnecessarily delimits the conception of the 
activity, considering the work of the controllers as `collaboration' offers 
insufficient constraints. The analysis of the activities of the controllers 
reveals a complex web of practices, resources and contributions through 
which these are achieved. The commonly held distinction between the 
individual and the collaborative, paralleled by the domains of HCI and 
CSCW, would appear to be problematic. 19 Particular activities are 
accomplished by an individual typing on the keyboard, but these are 
achieved in relation to the ongoing activities of others. Individuals appear 
to monitor their colleagues, but this itself can be public and available to 
analysts. 
The analysis of the use of the ATS computer system in the DLR 
Control Room may be of some relevance to researchers in CSCW. On the 
whole, the controllers appear to manage the accomplishment of activities 
into a common computer system quite unproblematically. Indeed, they 
rarely have to utilise explicit resources and devices to manage the 
activities between them. Other activities can be accomplished in parallel, 
like the phone call, without being interrupted by explicit devices 
concerning who is to do what and when. Part of what constitutes the skill 
of being a controller in the DLR is assessing the current activities and 
producing a relevant next activity, or course of activities. It also relies on 
seeing others' activities in relation to one's own, whether they contribute 
to it, or can be utilised so that an activity can be jointly produced. The 
management of the activities is accomplished through the talk, activities 
and visual conduct on the system. These, themselves, display an 
understanding of the ongoing circumstances. It may, thus, be problematic 
to introduce devices and resources for the explicit management of 
collaborative activities in computer systems. These may unduly split the 
accomplishment of an activity from its management. They may interfere 
19 See also the studies of other control rooms, news agencies and dealing rooms 
(Heath, et al., 1994-5; Heath and Luff, 1996a; Heath, et al., 1995a). 
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with the production of the activities they are intended to support. Instead, 
it may be worth considering how to give access to the resources that 
individuals have available to them with respect to anothers' activities. In 
the DLR Control Room this is not only the displays in front of a colleague, 
but also access to the colleague's activities in relation to those displays, 
and seeing those activities in relation to activities of remote participants. 
This would require not only access to the resources others have access to, 
their activities and their activities in relation to those resources, but also 
ways of shaping one's access with regard to the ongoing activities of 
colleagues (cf. Heath, et al., 1995b). 
Within this complex web of resources and practices in the DLR Control 
Room, the talk on the phone between controller and remote party appears 
critical. It is a resource with which both controllers make sense of the 
operation of the service and the activities of their colleagues. It also 
provides a foundation for the management of the distribution of activities 
between the controllers. The talk is not merely a commonly heard 
information resource but places requirements and contributions on the 
participants, and implicates them in courses of unfolding activities. A 
turn of talk is a resource, in one sense, for the participants, but it is also a 
social action, placing moral demands on a hearer, demands that 
constitute, and are constituted by, its institutional and conventional 
setting. 
6.9 SUMMARY 
An incoming call to the control room can set up the relevance for a variety 
of actions from the controller, for example: a response; a confirmation of a 
change to the system; an actual alteration to the schedule, and operation 
of the service; and, potentially, a recording of any failures and delays 
consequent on the call. In the instances above, a variety of strategies have 
been adopted by the controllers to distribute these activities amongst 
them, but in each this has been achieved interactionally, with respect to 
the ongoing talk and visual conduct of the participants. The division of 
labour is interactionally managed. It is also tacitly accomplished. 
The foregoing analysis has also revealed how the production of 
commands into the ATS in the DLR Control Room is tied to the ongoing 
talk. It is through this talk, principally between the remote caller and the 
principal controller, that most requests are made, actions requested and 
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information passed between personnel on the system and the control 
room. It is also through this talk that Ciis make sense of the service and 
then produce relevant actions. Maintaining the transport system and 
managing the traffic relies on timely alterations being made. So, 
controllers not only have to identify who the caller is, but where they are, 
what station they will next arrive at, what station a change will then have 
to be made at and what consequences this will have for following traffic. 
It is then not surprising that Ciis are seen looking over to the phone 
system screen and at both screens of the ATS. Ciis look at the screens not 
only to make sense of the call, but also prospectively to take next actions. 
Close examination of the materials reveals that Ciis go on to type in 
commands that are related to the problem in the call. The typing is not 
only temporally coordinated with the talk, it is tied to the activities in 
which their colleagues are engaged. 
Furthermore, Cis also reveal through their activities that they orient to 
their local colleagues making relevant changes to the system related to 
their calls. It is not just that Ciis type during the call, or at appropriate 
places in the call, but that they type particular and relevant commands. 
Each participant is then reading off the screen and listening to the call 
and making sense of this retrospectively in the light of foregoing 
occurrences, and prospectively with regard to potential next actions, by 
themselves and their colleague. The division of labour then is 
interactionally managed and attended to. It is a problem for which the 
solution is improvised from moment-to-moment, for this call, with respect 
to the current resources at hand and the state of the service and in the 
light of the contributions of colleagues. 
This chapter has sought to explore some of the practices through which 
a computer system is used in a real-world environment. Through close 
analysis of the details of these activities it has been possible to reveal how 
closely interrelated this activity is to the activities of others. Commands 
entered into the system by another can be seen to be produced in relation 
to one's own activity. It is even possible for a command to be shaped in the 
light of an ongoing single turn of talk, and for that talk to be shaped by the 
ongoing typing. By tying one's own activity with another's in these, and 
other ways, it is both possible for a colleague retrospectively to see that a 
command is relevant to his own, and also, prospectively, to utilise the 
coordination to move into other collaborative activities. Such practices are 
tacit, and are accomplished by being non-intrusive. However, they reveal 
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how closely interrelated computer use is to the activities of others, 
particularly to talk. 
The use of the ATS system in the Docklands Control Room provides a 
rather distinctive focus for an analysis of collaborative activities. The 
ways in which it is used appears to parallel many capabilities envisaged in 
current developments of technology. But, the problems which might be 
imagined, and have indeed emerged in the use of prototype collaborative 
technologies, are not apparent. The management of the activity in 
relation to the computer is routinely accomplished implicitly and 
unproblematically. There do not appear to be conflicts concerning who 
does what and who is attending to which problem. Rather, the 
management of the activity is achieved through the accomplishment of the 
activities of controlling, scheduling and managing the service. This is 
made possible by the two controllers having access to each others' 
activities, and the ways in which they are engaged in those activities. The 
accomplishment of these activities also relies on interactional resources, 
the talk and visual conduct of the various participants. Hence, the various 
activities of controlling an urban transportation system, operating a 
complex computer system and managing with the activities of others rely 
on quite conventional, interactional methods and procedures. 
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Chapter 7 
Resources for 
Technological Design 
relationships between workplace 
studies and methods for system 
development 
So Taurus was to be the perfect, all-electronic, paperless system that 
would not just replace the British settlements system but would connect 
into other settlement systems around the world for international 
securities. Of course, as with so many other grand British technical 
visions, they could not get it to work... [M]any of the personal customers 
for whom it was supposed to be a great advance did not want it: they 
rather liked the idea of having share certificates to show what they had 
bought. 
Hamish McRae; The Independent 12/3/93. 
`The plain fact is that the system was meant to serve the needs of the 
brokers and jobbers of the Stock Exchange; and it didn't. It usually takes 
a professional working member of the exchange at least five years to learn 
how the Stock Exchange works, and I don't see why the analysts and 
programmers who make computer systems should expect to pick it up 
much more quickly. A system for a particular business can only be built 
by people who are experts in that business. Domain knowledge. I think 
it's called. That's what matters. ' 
Quotation from a stockbroker, cited in Jackson, 1995, p. 15. 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Because of their concern with the details of social activities, attention has 
recently been drawn towards the work of researchers undertaking 
ethnographic studies, particularly orientations drawing from 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis. It has been proposed that 
work in these areas might provide direct resources for design, or more 
indirect resources for novel methods and tools to support system 
development. This chapter explores these proposals in more detail, 
utilising the cases discussed in the previous chapters. 
In part, the interest in such approaches comes from shortcomings in 
traditional methods for design. Section 7.2 focuses on the recent interest 
in Requirements Engineering to address problems with system design and 
several novel proposals for enhancing techniques for eliciting the 
requirements for computer systems. Amongst these there has been a 
growing interest in the use of naturalistic studies for system design which 
have certain parallels to recent innovations in HCI and CSCW. Particular 
proposals from Brown and Duguid (1994) and by proponents of Activity 
Theory and Distributed Cognition are briefly considered. 
Section 7.3 considers the possibility that an ethnomethodological 
orientation to naturally-occurring activities utilising audio-visual 
materials may be relevant to the design process. These possibilities are 
discussed in the light of detailed examples drawn from the previous 
chapters. It would be strange if, having looked in detail at the uses of 
technology in several settings, nothing could be said concerning the design 
of those technologies. From the analysis of the moment-to-moment 
conduct of participants in a setting it does appear to be possible to suggest 
particular design options for software functionalities, hardware 
components or interfaces. These suggestions are discussed with respect to 
a range of potential resources for various activities in the design process: 
including the assessment of particular designs and deployments of 
technology (Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2), the design of particular technologies 
and generic systems (Sections 7.3.3 and 7.3.4); and support for the design 
and deployment process (Sections 7.3.5 and 7.3.6). Although the studies in 
this thesis were not intended to contribute to any particular design 
activity, they will be used to consider how a socio-interactional orientation 
to the analysis of naturalistic materials might contribute to the design 
process. The particular resources suggested by the studies outlined here 
are discussed in the light of other recent proposals drawing from 
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ethnographic observations and an ethnomethodological tradition (Section 
7.3.7). 
However, what may be more significant for the process of developing 
new technologies is a distinctive orientation towards the activities which 
the technology is being designed and deployed to support. The 
significance of the orientation may then not be so much with respect to 
particular design activities, but in how it can serve to provide resources for 
a reconceptualisation of some of the foundations to current methods and 
approaches within system design. Section 7.4 considers the conceptual 
relevancies of the orientation. It points to conceptions in HCI and CSCW 
that the studies in this thesis, and other related ones, render problematic. 
The analysis of naturally occurring social actions has been a long- 
standing concern of the social sciences, and recent discussions within 
ethnomethodology and conversation analysis have raised problems 
associated with the adequacy, warrant and relevance that can be 
attributed to the findings and results drawn from such studies (e. g. Lynch, 
1993). These concerns parallel those regarding the adequacy, warrant and 
relevance of observations made for design purposes. The discussion in 
Section 7.4 concludes by briefly considering the possible interrelationships 
between the requirements for the analytic foundations to the two distinct 
concerns of social scientists and system developers. It may be that the 
debate within the social sciences could contribute to a discussion about 
system design. 
7.2 BACKGROUND: METHODS FOR SYSTEM DESIGN 
Management were misguided or naive in believing that computer systems 
in themselves could bring about [such] changes in human practices. 
Experience in many different environments proves that computer systems 
cannot influence change in this way. They can only assist in the process 
and any attempt to force change through the introduction of a system 
with the characteristics of an operational "straight jacket" would be 
potentially doomed to failure. 
London Ambulance Service Inquiry Report (Page et al. 1993, p. 40) 
The computer system design process is typically conceived of in terms of a 
series of discrete, sequential phases. 1 Amongst the initial phases in these 
1A typical characterisation is in terms of the `waterfall model' where a 
design 
proceeds through the following activities: requirements specification; 
architectural design; detailed design; coding and unit testing; 
integration and 
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processes there is typically an activity identified as requirements capture, 
requirements analysis or requirements specification. These activities, 
with some other variants, have become the focus of a field within Software 
Engineering called Requirements Engineering. 
Researchers in the field of Requirements Engineering have tied some of 
the critical problems associated with computer system design to the early 
phases of design. So, possible reasons why systems which have been built 
do not meet the needs of users, are under-utilised or simply fail have been 
traced back to problems associated with the original identification of the 
requirements for the system (Jackson, 1995; Landauer, 1995; Norman, 
1988; Norman, 1993b; Page, et al., 1993). 2 Moreover, if problems are 
identified later in the design process with the requirements that have 
been specified they appear to be more costly to address (Boehm, 1976). 
Hence, there has been a growing interest in developing methods for 
eliciting the requirements of users. 
The techniques that have been proposed for Requirement Engineering 
draw from a variety of resources including cybernetics (Espejo, 1980), 
socio-technical systems (Mumford, 1983), critical social theory (Flood and 
Jackson, 1991), however, the approaches which have been derived from 
these do not appear to be that distinctive from methods adopted in other 
fields associated with system design. So, for example, researchers in 
Requirements Engineering have suggested the use of scenarios (Holbrook, 
1990), the analysis of users' tasks and goals (Bubenko, et al., 1994; 
Karakostas, 1990; Mittermeier, et al., 1990), open-ended or structured 
interviews with potential users (Loucopoulos and Karakostas, 1995), and 
the participation of users in the design process (Macaulay, 1994; Mumford, 
1983). These have parallels to other similar suggestions in HCI and 
testing; and operation and maintenance (from Dix, et al., 1993). There are a 
range of different characterisations of the various stages, and the model has been 
widely criticised in favour of more exotic and iterative processes (e. g. Boehm's 
1988, `spiral' model). It is unclear whether any of the stages are `followed' by 
practitioners in system design, however it may be that they are `oriented to' in 
some way (Button and Sharrock, 1996). In this chapter, the activities are only 
intended as a resource for considering the different ways in which various 
approaches can contribute to system development. 
2 See, as examples, the reports of the Taurus system for settlements in the London 
Stock Exchange and the dispatch system for the London Ambulance Service (e. g. 
Page at al. 1993, and, particularly, the citations given above). 
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system design (e. g. Bjerknes, et al., 1987; Carroll, 1990; Ehn, 1988; 
Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). 
However, there have also been proposals to draw from other resources 
from within the social sciences, particularly integrating ethnography 
(Goguen, 1994; Sommerville, et al., 1993) and naturalistic analysis (or 
naturalistic inquiry) into Requirements Engineering (Potts, 1997; Potts 
and Newstetter, 1997). These suggestions focus on the possibility of using 
observations of settings in the process of design, and hence appear to have 
much in common with proposals for work and studies undertaken within 
CSCW, where some fieldwork is performed prior to proposals for novel 
designs or analysis of workplace activities (Ackerman, 1996; Bellotti and 
Bly, 1996; Berlin and Jeffries, 1992; Moran, et al., 1996; Murray, 1993; 
Schwab, et al., 1992; Watts, et al., 1996). However, as Anderson (1994) 
and Button and King (1992) have suggested ethnography is more than just 
collecting together a set of observations and accounts, or `just hanging 
around'. An analytic orientation needs to be adopted in order provide a 
framework for an analysis. 
There have recently been several proposals for framing naturalistic 
analyses for design activities. So, for example, Brown and Duguid (1994) 
have suggested an approach to system design which rather than 
considering the `core' activities that individuals are involved in, explores 
the periphery, or the borderline, the properties of objects which surround 
the competent use of an artefact. So they note the ways in which the noise 
of using the keyboard may be critical to the use of a personal computer for 
other individuals in the setting. Thus, Brown and Duguid, propose a 
conceptual framework that begins to explore the details of the use of tools 
and technologies, and, in particular, the `communities of practice' through 
which they are achieved (cf. Lave and Wenger, 1991). Brown and Duguid 
argue that designers need to be sensitive to border and peripheral 
resources when developing innovative technologies. 
There have also been suggestions that Activity Theory, an orientation 
developed within Russian Psychology (Vygotsky, 1978), and Distributed 
Cognition, considered in Chapter 2, would provide frameworks for 
considering design of systems to support collaborative activities (Nardi, 
1996c; Rogers, 1992). 3 
3 See also suggestions made by Kuutti (1991) and Bannon and Bodker (1991). 
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So, as an example, Nardi (1996c), commenting on the Activity Theory's 
long tradition within Russian psychology, its strong `closeness in spirit' to 
Distributed Cognition and the possibility that the two developments might 
merge (p. 89), suggests it is an ideal resource from which to develop an 
understanding of the use of tools and technologies within HCI. However, 
the generality of Activity Theory's concerns, including skilled 
manipulations of objects, cognitive processes, the mind and consciousness, 
and social, cultural and historical factors may provide few constraints for 
an analysis with respect to design. With all these concerns it is perhaps 
not surprising that when implemented, despite the programmatics, the 
concern within some of those using Activity Theory for HCI is to maintain 
a focus on planful, intentional behaviour (Nardi, 1996c, p. 84). Similarly, 
Brown and Duguid's proposal for designers to take account of 
`communities of practice' and `the social' may be too vague to deploy for the 
purposes of practical system development. Moreover, the attempt to 
demarcate context with respect to a spatial metaphor (namely 'centre', 
'periphery' and 'border') suggests a rather conservative characterisation of 
context and the artefact (Heath, et al., 1995a). 
Although distinctive, the programmatics of Brown and Duguid, and 
certain proponents of the utilisation of Distributed Cognition4 and Activity 
Theory for design, appears to raise some difficulties. The `periphery', the 
`border', `distributed cognition' and `activities' prescribe objects of interest 
for the analysis. These may be useful heuristics for commencing an 
analysis, but they could either be seen as either prescribing a set of 
concerns a priori, and face similar criticisms to more conventional 
approaches such as task analysis, or could be considered too vague to 
assist with design activities. Despite the promise of these frameworks 
providing extensive and alternative resources for shaping fieldwork, it 
may be that the conceptions on which they rest may either be too 
restrictive or too similar to those utilised by the orientations they seek to 
replace. 
In the remainder of this chapter some alternative proposals for relating 
naturalistic studies to design are considered, utilising the analyses 
outlined in this thesis. Alongside other recent studies of workplace 
settings, an alternative analytic orientation has been adopted which may 
offer distinctive resources for system developers. Rather than 
begin with 
See the discussion of the proposals for an analysis of `Distributed Cognition' given 
in Chapter 2. 
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an elaborate conceptual specification, this research has undertaken 
extensive and careful field work, deliberately avoiding the development of 
stipulative characterisations of the domain of action. These workplace 
studies have addressed the in situ and emergent character of 
technologically mediated actions and activities, and have deliberately 
broken away from the static and limited conceptions of context and 
artefact that are found in more conventional forms of social and Cognitive 
Science (see, for example, Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Harper, et al., 1989; 
Heath and Luff, 1992a; Suchman, 1993c; Whalen, 1995a). 5 They have 
generated a substantial body of empirical findings concerning the 
'communities of practice' which underlie the production and coordination 
of technologically mediated social actions and activities. These workplace 
studies also suggest some novel ways of informing methods and 
approaches taken towards system design and development. 
7.3 NATURALISTIC STUDIES OF INTERACTIONAL ACTIVITIES: 
POTENTIAL RESOURCES FOR THE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
PROCESS 
What many of these workplace studies have in common is the utilisation 
of an analytic framework drawing upon an ethnomethodological 
orientation to their domains of study (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). Amongst these 
studies several have utilised audio-visual materials providing the 
resources for subjecting naturally-occurring activities to repeated and 
detailed scrutiny. 
So, for example Goodwin and Goodwin (1996) explore the 
accomplishment of activities in an airport control room: the ways talk, 
such as instructions, are produced and made sense of within viewings of 
the local domain. The audio-visual materials make available to analysts 
social actions which are visible to participants. The materials can also be 
subjected to detailed scrutiny. For example, Whalen's (1995b) analysis 
considers the interrelationship between talk and the use of a system for 
computer aided dispatch, revealing the practices through which the typing 
Other workplace studies drawing from this orientation, that are related to the use 
of technology, include: Ackroyd, et al., (1992); Button and Sharrock 
(1994); 
Harper and Sellen (1995); Heath, et al., (1993); Heath, et al. (1995a); Hughes, et 
al., (1994); Hughes, et al., (1988); Rouncefield, et al., (1994); Whalen, 
(1995b); and 
Zimmerman (1992). 
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of particular commands is organised with respect to the interaction 
between caller and dispatcher, and vice versa. 
Though exploring the interactional production of social activities, the 
analysis of both Goodwin and Goodwin and Whalen are not completely 
divorced from system development issues. The Goodwins' analysis is one 
component of the Workplace Project undertaken to explore the nature of 
collaborative work by Xerox Corporation, and Whalen's studies have 
provided for a discussion of the deployment of expert systems for 
dispatchers (Whalen, 1995a). 6 It is perhaps understandable why research 
into the organisation of interactions in complex settings would be relevant 
to large corporations developing new technologies, particularly within 
telecommunications. However, these studies, with others by Luff et al. 
(1994), and Heath and Hindmarsh (1995) may have a broader relevance to 
the system design community. They are the foundations of an 
interactional analysis of the use of artefacts: analysis that is made 
possible through the use of video-based materials. When the artefact is a 
computer system, such an analysis could contribute to an understanding 
of the nature of human-computer interaction and collaborative work. 
When the artefact is a system or a paper document that is considered 
archaic, then detailed analyses of the practices could be relevant to the 
design of alternatives (cf. Luff, et al., 1992). 
The potential that audio-visual materials provide is to unpick the ways 
in which activities are made relevant to others and produced with respect 
to others (cf. Garfinkel, 1967). From detailed examination of the 
materials, attention can be paid to the different ways in which individuals 
participate in these artefact-centred activities or coordinate these 
activities with those of their colleagues. Though primarily focused on the 
audio-visual materials, these studies also make use of ethnographic 
materials, providing resources that are not directly available in the data, 
with regard to the skills underpinning the activity and organisational 
demands, for example. The fieldwork can both inform the analysis of the 
audio-visual materials and also its progress can be informed by it. 
Therefore, the utilisation of video-based materials and fieldwork, coupled 
with an interactional and ethnomethodological orientation to the analysis, 
6 Whalen's research was also sponsored by US West Advanced Technologies, a 
regional telecommunications company in the United States. It suggests some 
implications for designers of expert systems for call takers. It also can be 
considered as a detailed analysis of `users' of the telecommunications network. 
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offers the potential for a powerful approach useful for a variety of purposes 
within system design. As mentioned above, together these resources do 
not provide a method for system design, requirements analysis or 
technology deployment, but do suggest some contributions such an 
orientation could offer for system development. 
In the following sections the potential contributions of an analytic 
orientation towards interactional materials is considered in terms of the 
resources it offers for six activities, or purposes, related to design. These 
are the resources for: 
" assessing particular interfaces 
" assessing deployed technologies 
" the design of particular technologies 
" the design of generic technologies 
" deploying of technologies 
" supporting the design process 
These resources will be illustrated with examples from the foregoing 
chapters in the thesis. Although none of these studies were undertaken 
for any particular purpose related to the development of a technology, the 
specific examples may, however, serve to provide some grounding to the 
discussion. 
7.3.1 Resources for the Assessment of Particular Interfaces 
Although the evaluation of interfaces through the use of audio-visual 
materials within system design is not novel, these assessments are 
typically organised with respect to specific analytic orientations, 
particularly experimental psychology and Cognitive Science. Even with 
the constraints that these orientations provide, researchers still face 
difficulties in managing materials without either introducing premature 
categorisation (e. g. Olson, 1990) or losing the detail of how the recorded 
activity is accomplished. It may be that an alternative analytic 
orientation could be utilised for considering how activities are 
accomplished through screen-based activities, one that does not unduly 
circumscribe an analysis. By the examination of audio-visual materials 
coupled with appropriate transcription notations it may be possible to 
subject materials concerning the use of computer systems to repeated 
scrutiny. 
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The analysis of the uses of menus within the PowerPoint application in 
Chapter 3 revealed how menus on an Apple Macintosh are utilised as a 
resource for innovation and improvisation. The analysis of data may also 
suggest what appear to be problems with the design of the application. 
For example, when considering `straddles', the shift between two adjacent 
menus, it appears that these often related to particular troubles users are 
having in the course of on ongoing activity. So, when users straddled 
between the Style and the Text menu, the File and the Edit menu and the 
File and the Apple menu, they appear to be having difficulty finding font 
sizes and font styles, creating new slides and finding help. The reason for 
this may be the location of these compared to other Macintosh 
applications. There is no `Font' menu, so the Style and Text menus appear 
to be `possible candidates' for changing the style of text. Getting help and 
changing slides are very general operations, so they may be expected to be 
available on one of the menus towards the left of the title bar, but it is 
unclear which one. This points to a general problem for designers of 
applications on the Macintosh; how to keep menus consistent across 
applications and maintain their consistency within the particular 
application. '? 
The analysis of menu use reveals the ease with which many menus 
can be viewed one after another, facilitating finding solutions to existing 
problems, general browsing of the system's capabilities, discovering 
properties of various objects on the screen and also suggesting possible 
next actions. However, there are disadvantages. The very ease of use, 
coupled with the necessity for menu items to be general and 
understandable in many contexts, can draw users into digressions and 
involve them in diversionary courses of activities. 
By the detailed analysis of particular instances of interaction with the 
interface, troubles that users have with the system became apparent. 
However, it may not be so straightforward to ascribe to generic behaviours 
an analysis that the user is having trouble. There are cases where users 
repetitively carry out an operation, like opening a menu, or pause for a 
long time without taking an action on the interface. In a more 
quantitative analysis measures might be given concerning such 
`problematic' behaviours. There are also cases, even in an experiment, 
It is interesting to note that in version 3 of the PowerPoint application the 
distinction between Style and Text has been avoided by the removal of the Style 
menu, and an additional Slide menu contains the item for creating new slides. 
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where such actions could not be viewed as troublesome, and where a pause 
and a repeated activity form one part in a skilled course of activity. 
Moreover, it would be hard to catalogue all such cases of unreasonable or 
problematic (or reasonable and trouble free) behaviour. Being able to 
characterise activities as problematic or unproblematic rests on an 
analysis of tacit and common-sense resources in understanding the 
interface and carrying out activities on the system. Quantitative analyses 
of the speed of selecting items or the number of menu visits where items 
are not selected is not the only means of assessing an interface. A more 
naturalistic analysis supported by video-recordings may be a useful 
resource for presenting findings to designers, making apparent particular 
occasions of apparent troubles, as well as providing resources for 
warranting an analysis of these behaviours as troubles. 
Studies of screen-based activities in naturalistic settings can also 
reveal the ways in which particular systems are utilised. So, for example, 
in Chapters 5 and 6, the uses of the phone system and the Automatic 
Train Scheduler System (ATS) were considered. Observations drawn from 
the audio-visual materials reveal that both controllers systematically look 
between the phone system and the scheduler system displays. These 
reorientations by the participants in the initial turns appeared to 
surround the problematic nature of making and taking calls through the 
radio phone system. In order to make sense of an incoming call, for 
example, a controller may need to locate the relevant train in the call and 
the possible circumstances facing the train captain. For this, both the 
train number and the train position is required: the train number of the 
caller is displayed on the phone system screen, the train position on the 
ATS. Controllers need to see one in the light of the other. From these 
observations possible changes to the design of the interfaces to these 
systems could be considered (see Section 7.3.3). 
From the analyses of naturally occurring activities surrounding the use 
of computer systems it is possible to suggest potential problems with the 
design of current interfaces. Even without a stipulative characterisation 
of behaviour, as goals, plans or errors, it may be possible to provide an 
analysis that reveals features of the screen-based activities of users. The 
use of naturally occurring materials could provide an alternative or 
supplementary way of assessing interfaces to computer systems. 
Furthermore, the audio-visual materials themselves may be of use to 
make it possible to verify potential analyses. The materials can be 
295 
publicly viewed or passed to colleagues and other researchers, to question 
or provide support for an analysis. Moreover, the materials can provide a 
grounding for analyses and accounts of screen-based activities, at least in 
suggesting where care needs to be taken concerning how these analyses 
are warranted. 
7.3.2 Resources for the Assessment of Deployed Technologies 
By utilising video-based materials, implications regarding the more 
general aspects of using technologies in a setting can be suggested. For 
example, in Chapter 5 even with a technology that appears to be as 
constrained as the telephone system in the Docklands Light Railway, the 
analysis reveals particular transformations to the opening of phone 
conversations through the computer-supported radio phone system. There 
is an asymmetry to the resources available to the two participants, both in 
what they have available to them and the actions they can perform on the 
system. Practices appear to have emerged, including the subtle pacing of 
the calls and the use of particular features of talk to manage these 
resources, but it could be possible to consider ways of supporting the 
participants in this critical activity on the transportation system. 
For example, the participants appear to undertake various activities in 
the opening of the call to secure a reason for the call. It appears that it is 
problematic to distinguish at the outset of a call between incoming and 
outgoing calls, something that is typically set in line by picking up the 
phone in ordinary telephone conversations. In the radio phone 
conversations on the DLR a summons is accomplished through the 
discrete ring of the phone and a call sign. The reason for the call has to be 
managed through the accomplishment of the first participant's two turns 
of talk. It is unlikely that the designers of the technology envisaged this to 
be a consequence of the design of their computer-supported radio phone 
system. 
The resources that are available to the two parties in the call are 
asymmetric. The remote party has little access to the circumstances of the 
controller, whilst the controller has various displays which provide 
resources for prospectively giving a sense of possible reasons for a call, 
including diagrams of the main line, CCTV screens and the phone system 
display. However, the access the controllers have to the remote party 
access is limited. There is a potential for the delay between requesting a 
call and that call being made which can be substantial. In that period the 
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local circumstances of the remote party may be transformed. The 
controller has few resources to assess this. The organisation of the 
opening of the phone call, particularly its pacing, appears to be in the light 
of these contingencies. 
It is possible to envisage ways of attending to these asymmetries. The 
remote party, for example, could be provided with other resources 
concerning the call. These could either supplement, or provide an 
alternative, to listening into the broadcasts from the control room, an 
activity that can interfere with dealing with train passengers. It may also 
be possible to either design or, at least, outline some requirements for 
ways in which it is more straightforward to determine who is calling who. 
Even with some minor alterations the controller could be provided with 
some explicit way of marking whether the call is being initiated or 
returned. This could be presented either visually or audibly to the remote 
participant. 
A focus on the collaborative and interactional production of activities 
can identify potential areas where a novel development would be relevant, 
and where resources are lacking in a current deployment. It can also 
identify critical features in the organisation of work where particular 
trade-offs, given the current deployment of technology, have to be 
considered prior to a novel development being implemented. For example, 
in the DLR Control Room the loudspeaker appears to be a mundane 
technology which is critical for the collaboration between the controllers, 
providing a simple means of making available what is going on in the 
phone calls. Indeed, when it is inadvertently turned off, there is a 
noticeable disruption the controllers' work. In particular, the controllers 
appear to be particularly sensitive to the background noise and the other 
happenings in the control room. This is not only the case for the second 
controller, but also for the principal controller who can also hear the talk 
on the phone. 
It may be that the loudspeaker offers additional resources to the phone 
handset for the principal controller, at least it makes apparent what is 
available to others in the room, that which may be a foundation for future 
collaboration with others. As well as reducing the times when the 
loudspeaker has to be turned off, 8 one possibility would be to provide 
8 The conversations between controllers and train captains are tape-recorded. 
For 
some reason, the actual operation of removing the tapes takes several minutes, 
whilst they are `transcribed'. This is a regular disruption to the activities of 
the 
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headphones. However, this would both limit who had access to the calls 
within the control room and constrain what those who had headphones 
could hear in the local environment. As with many potential 
developments, one focus of attention within the design has to be the ways 
in which different forms of participation within the control room can be 
supported, ranging from allowing controllers to coordinate their activities 
with one another, through to the possibility of occasional visitors getting 
some sense of the state of the service. This may be provided through 
straightforward means, through a loudspeaker, for example, or through 
more novel technologies such as large public display or by advanced 
systems to support collaborative work. The analysis of activities in the 
control room reveals that trade-offs may be required when considering 
developments in the environment: making information more explicit could 
mean that it becomes more intrusive to the activities of others, making 
information private could remove an essential resource for collaboration. 
One focus of workplace studies is on the ways artefacts are utilised 
within the local setting. Audio and visual materials can provide a 
resource that reveals the tacit and interactional practices on which the use 
of these artefacts rely. Although such analyses may not directly suggest 
alternative deployments and designs, they can locate areas of relevance for 
designers. These relevancies need not arise just from the concerns of the 
analysts. The audio-visual materials and the ways they are subjected to 
scrutiny can provide a warrant for the relevance of particular features in 
the conduct. What is relevant for the conduct of the activities in a setting 
may at least provide a guide to what is relevant for the design and 
deployment of technologies. 
7.3.3 Particular Resources for the Design of Technologies 
The analysis of the settings in this thesis, and the foregoing brief 
considerations of technologies and deployments in those domains, appear 
to suggest some alternative ways in which the technologies could be 
developed. In particular, the studies reveal issues of relevance to systems 
to support collaborative activities, whether these activities are co-present 
or geographically dispersed. To illustrate these some issues related to 
controllers. In the data there is a brief period of confusion when the recording of 
an earlier operation is played back through the loudspeaker, without warning, by 
the person responsible for the tape recordings. 
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design will be considered in relation to the activities within the Docklands 
Light Railway Control Room and the architectural practice, respectively. 
In the DLR Control Room the two controllers utilise the displays in front 
of them not only as a resource for their own activities, such as typing 
commands to the scheduler, but also for making sense of the activities of 
their colleagues, for example regarding the talk on the phone. It could be 
argued that this support could be made more explicit, that, for example, 
more information is given on a colleague's screen with regards to another's 
ongoing activity. Given that the relevant information is available 
electronically, there may be simple ways of providing an explicit link 
between the call and the location from where it is being made. This could 
involve, perhaps, displaying the train number on the phone system screen 
or indicating the train involved in the call on the ATS screen, by some 
form of highlighting. The latter may facilitate the work of the second 
controller, who at present has a potentially limited view of the phone 
system operated by the other controller. A single interface could be 
envisaged, integrating the capabilities of both devices in one display. 
Alternatively, the interface to the system could be redesigned 
completely; moving to a more direct form of input, a graphical user 
interface (GUI) for commands, a touch screen or even to a large 
configurable shared display. These possibilities could be integrated into 
one system and each offers some advantages. 
A graphical user interface, with some form of direct manipulation, 
would provide users with a means of identifying for the other, in the 
course of making a command, the object of their work -a particular train 
or a section of track. Similarly, a touch screen could provide additional 
resources for a colleague to achieve a sense of an individual's activities, for 
example a point could locate the general area of the service to which a 
controller is attending. A large configurable display available to both 
controllers would allow even greater access to each other's activities, not 
only would it be possible to see the general domain of another's activity 
but the actual object of a command. Such a configuration would also make 
shifts between distinct activities more apparent, say when moving from 
controlling a section of the main line to the shunting yard. It could also 
allow for an more flexible division of labour, with it being easier to 
manipulate objects in a colleague's domain, to change the view to make 
such changes or to make the activities apparent to a neighbour. 
Configurable displays, where windows can be sized, shaped and moved 
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around the screen could, of course, also be organised to reproduce the ways 
the two individual ATS screens are used at present. This would be 
essential, given the delicate way in which the production of activities is 
managed at present. 
The scheduler system could also be better integrated with other 
technologies. For a phone call, for example, a controller may have to view 
two or three screens, use a keyboard to one system, a mouse to another 
and the phone handset and keypad. Also, within the controller's reach are 
other screens, other keyboards, emergency displays, switches and other 
types of phones. Some of these devices have specialised uses, and 
providing them in separate locales may support not only controllers in 
their management of routine work, but also others, when critical events, 
like a loss of power supply, happen. However, for some of the technology, 
particularly the phone system, the distribution of activities between 
several devices can make their accomplishment problematic. The phone 
system has a display, a keyboard (occasionally used), a phone keypad, a 
phone handset and a mouse. Actions like `re-calling' or `hanging up' can be 
distributed across these devices. By reconsidering the hardware of the 
technology, it may be possible to bring some of these functions together on 
one or two devices. For example, in other control rooms there are touch 
screen telephones to support such work (Heath and Luff, 1992a). These 
bring together the activities involved in making and taking calls onto only 
two devices: the handset and the display. 
Any redesign of the technology should at least take account of the ways 
in which the collaborative activities are currently accomplished. Care 
would have to be taken if activities which are only partly visible at present 
are transformed so that they become explicit and intrusive. Moreover, if 
it is relevant for objects to be available for others on the display, they have 
to be visible at the critical times. It would be problematic if, for example, 
a window has unavailable because it was being altered or a hand 
operating a touch screen blocks an item from view. 
The possibility of integrating capabilities, either in hardware or 
software, could be expressed in terms of what is called in software 
engineering, user requirements. Indeed, considering the making and 
taking of calls it may be possible to derive some quite specific technical 
and functional requirements for a new system to support the work. These 
could relate, for example, to the ways such activities could be performed 
using a conventional computer system with the minimum use of devices or 
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operations on the system. The materials collected could also provide a 
resource when considering the ways the technology could be integrated. If 
such a strategy for collecting requirements was followed, care would be 
required concerning the collaborative practices surrounding the operation 
of the system. So, for example, in both Chapters 5 and 6 it was suggested 
that a reorientation by the principal controller towards a particular 
technology, particularly the phone system and ATS screens, provided 
resources for the second controller to make sense of their activities. 
Integrating all capabilities onto one device may make such discrimination 
more difficult for others. However, there do appear to be ways in which 
the use of the technology could be made more straightforward, whilst 
maintaining the resources relied on by others, even by simply linking the 
information provided on each system. 
From the initial observations of the work and activities of architects in 
Chapter 4, it is also possible to draw some implications for the designers of 
systems to support collaborative activities, whether these are to be 
accomplished in through a distributed technology or one sited in a 
particular location. For example, the analysis appears to have particular 
relevance to developers of CSCW systems aimed at supporting such 
activities as `shared drawing'. At present, there is considerable interest in 
designing particular distributed capabilities, like shared whiteboards, 
where objects can be drawn and manipulated by several individuals 
working on different computer terminals. These individuals may be co- 
present, i. e. located in the same physical space (like in the early Colab 
system, Stefik, et al., 1987), or they may be geographically dispersed (e. g. 
the ROCOCO system, Scrivener, et al., 1993). Such systems require 
complex synchronisation of activities, so that, for example, the application 
can manage, or control, two individuals changing what appears to 
be one 
particular object at the same time. However, the capabilities these screen- 
based tools offer are still limited, particularly with respect to the 
availability and visibility of the actions of colleagues, Hence, several 
researchers have begun to incorporate video into shared drawing systems, 
either by merely providing extra video monitors (e. g. Bly and 
Minneman, 
1990; Harper and Carter 1994), or by developing sophisticated mixtures of 
video and electronic images through, for example, half-silvered mirrors 
and projectors (Ishii, 1990; Ishii, et al., 1993; Ishii and 
Kobayashi, 1992; 
Ishii, et al., 1992; Tang and Minneman, 1991a; Tang and 
Minneman, 
1991b). It is hoped that by seeing the other participant, particularly their 
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gaze, it will be possible to assess the locale they are concerned with on the 
drawing, rather than merely the area where their screen cursor is placed. 
The observations of the collaborative work between architects, not only 
reveal how it is achieved and managed through talk, but also, as in the 
DLR Control Room, how sensitive participants are to the orientation, and 
changes in orientation, of a colleague. The emphasis on a word like `there' 
is made sense of in relation to the orientation of a colleague to a particular 
domain, as well as to the features within that domain. Providing all these 
resources allows for a coordinated movement into a common domain and 
for colleagues to `see for themselves' a particular object and its 
consequences for further action. It is unclear whether a video image of the 
face of a colleague whilst one is drawing, whether it appears on a separate 
display or through the monitor, provides similar resources. What appears 
to be required is access to the shifting orientation of a colleague. For this, 
access to the other has to be variable, so that, for example, a pointing 
gesture can be seen in relation to the other throughout its production. 
Being available on a different screen or being projected onto a workspace 
separates the `gesture' from the activity of a co-participant. The 
separation of domains also renders problematic the coordination of one's 
own activity with another's. Participants appear to require resources 
where they can be sensitive to another's activity, where a co-participant's 
conduct can be `seen but unnoticed', but where such activities can be 
utilised to move into different forms of collaborative activity. A more 
complex configuration of technology which is more dynamic and sensitive 
to the activity at hand may be required, for example using more images of 
the other and greater control of the focus of those images (cf. Gayer, et al., 
1993; Gayer, et al., 1995). 
However, the use of the CAD system in relation to the use of paper 
plans may suggest some more straightforward matters to consider. For 
example, in Chapter 4 detailed analysis of one fragment of activity reveals 
potential problems with presenting the plans on the screen for co-present 
collaborative activities. There appears to be considerable work involved in 
securing another's gaze on the screen. This may not only be because the 
electronic screen is physically smaller than the paper plan and the details 
more finely drawn. The orientation of the screen can cause problems in 
seeing what is presented on the display, and the speed of the system 
in 
drawing complex images can also make identifying what is being 
discussed problematic. It is therefore not surprising that the paper plans 
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are utilised so often when architects discuss changes to the drawings, even 
though these may be out-of-date. Their size, orientation and stability 
provide useful resources for in situ collaboration. Hence, developments in 
display technologies which utilise large screens and projected images often 
at orientations aligned with the desk, might not just be utilised for 
activities when participants are making presentations to large audiences 
or are geographically dispersed (e. g. Elrod, et al., 1992; Tang and 
Minneman, 1991a), but when they are co-present and engaged in more 
mundane, everyday activities in the course of their work-9 
In both the architectural practice and the DLR Control Room a range of 
resources appeared to be required in order to achieve `collaborative' 
activities'. Even a point to a screen had to be understood with respect to 
the talk on the phone between a remote party and a colleague, the state of 
the service and the prior activities of colleagues. Considering how 
personnel make apparent the details of their work to others reveals 
complexities in these activities glossed in current technological design. 
For example, cursors on the screen are utilised within current computer 
systems to provide a resource for individuals to identify where a particular 
action will take place. It has been common to consider such devices as 
`pointers', and when shared systems are developed it is assumed that such 
pointers could do the work of `pointing': making relevant to others a 
particular detail on the screen, the location where activity is to take place 
and even who is to perform that activity. 
9 It should be noted that just by having screens the size of the paper plans and 
placed flat or tilted may not provide the resources offered by the paper for co- 
present collaborative activities. There are some capabilities for which some 
software or interface solution could be envisaged, such as being able to see parts 
of two drawings at a time and to be able to vary the amount of each drawing 
which is visible at any moment (cf. flipping over the corner of one page to see 
parts of another). However, the physical appearance of marks on a screen and 
the properties of glass make it problematic for others to get a sense of the details 
of what is being presented on the screen. The case where one architect 
`points 
out' a precise location on a paper plan to a colleague may serve as an example. 
Not only does a glass screen add a small distance to the object, so the relationship 
between the point and its object may be seen differently by a co-participant 
viewing it at an angle, but also the glass can transform the nature of the object. 
Projected displays reduce this problem, but at present require special lighting 
conditions. 
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The materials in Chapters 4 and 6 reveal how complex it may be to 
accomplish such work. Getting another to orient towards an object 
requires more than just a `point' to the screen; the gesture has to be 
designed with respect to the orientation and conduct of the colleague. It 
also has to be made sense of with respect to the emerging talk and visual 
conduct. A pointing, then, has to be coordinated with other activities and 
can make apparent not only what is relevant, but how it is relevant and 
the practical consequences for a co-participant. The activity is immersed 
within a socio-interactional context, even when it is accomplished through 
the use of device on the computer screen. The shape of the activity, its 
relationship to the object on the screen, to talk and visual conduct all 
feature in its design and achievement. In CSCW systems, whether for 
distributed or for co-present users, rather than merely increasing the 
number of fixed pointers to match the number of users, the approach 
utilised in most current shared systems (e. g. Bier, et al., 1992), it may be 
worth investigating more innovative possibilities, for example, providing 
more access to the conduct of the other (cf. Gayer et al. 1993) and allowing 
users to design and shape their pointings dynamically and temporally (cf 
the devices for pointing in 3-dimensional space of Ware and Baxter, 1989). 
Just from the initial observations in the previous chapters emerges a 
much richer sense of collaboration than that adopted by current designers 
of CSCW technologies. Rather than individuals merely requiring common 
views of each other or of an object, studies of workplaces imply a more 
varied set of computational resources for collaboration; ones where 
participants can have variable forms of access to each other, to electronic 
and paper documents (Heath, et al., 1995b). Observations suggest the 
range of resources required to produce and render intelligible such 
mundane activities as `pointing out' an object on the screen. In particular, 
they reveal the importance of interactional activities to the 
accomplishment of collaborative work. The importance of talk and visual 
conduct may imply relevant places for specific technological investigations, 
both in enhancing the resources of current systems used in the work 
settings, and for the design of more general innovative systems. 
7.3.4 Generic Resources for the Design of Technologies 
The preceding review of potential design implications has outlined a range 
of possibilities for the development of technologies. These suggestions 
include remarks on the ways in which current systems are used, 
for 
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example, the problems that users have with a particular application, the 
tacit and common-sense practices individuals utilise to perform screen- 
based activities and the collaborative activities that shape and are shaped 
by use of the technology. From these remarks it has also been possible to 
make some tentative suggestions concerning improvements to the 
technology, relocating information between displays or adding capabilities 
to existing devices, for example. It is also possible to suggest some more 
radical alternative technologies, including the use of large displays and 
novel pointing devices. These particular suggestions remain tentative and 
their implementation would depend on a more thoroughgoing analysis 
accomplished for the purpose of design. There are also some generic 
design concerns arising from the studies. 
The analyses have focused on the collaborative accomplishment of 
activities and on revealing those practices which are seen, but may not be 
explicitly noticed by the participants. The exploration of the interactional 
accomplishment of tasks in settings such as architectural practices and 
control rooms suggest various ways in which participants engage in and 
coordinate their activities. This in turn points to ways in which 
technology may need to fit with those interactional practices. These could 
be summarised as follows: 
" the resources individuals require are thoroughly related to their 
ongoing activities and the activities of colleagues. Thus, the 
technology should not only provide ways of offering information 
suitable for a individual's particular circumstances, but also 
information regarding another's activity. 
For example, when considering the architectural practice, a 
colleague's alterations to a plan are made sense of relation to the 
colleague's orientation and ongoing activities. Similarly, in the DLR 
Control Room a pointing at two places on the line is only seen as 
relevant with respect to the ongoing scheduling activities. 
" the information offered by the technology may not be of the same 
order for different individuals. Some participants may require 
access to complex informational resources, others may only require 
broader features to be available. Therefore, when designing 
collaborative technology, it may not be necessary or desirable to 
provide a common system for each individual in a domain. Others 
may require asymmetrical resources which could be provided 
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through quite different means, by cruder displays or by audio, for 
example. 
The requirements of the parties to the phone call in the DLR are 
quite different. Although each could be provided with more access to 
the activities of the other, it may not be possible, desirable or relevant 
to consider similar resources being supplied to each. 
" the information required may change with respect to an ongoing 
activity. Individuals may need to shift between different activities 
and different forms of collaboration. Therefore, the technology may 
either have to be flexible and tailorable enough to support shifts 
between individual and collaborative uses or offer sufficient 
resources for these to be available together. 
In discussions between architects, particularly with regard to the 
large paper plans, the co-participants can shift easily between 
activities where they are oriented towards distinct domains to ones 
where they focus on the same object. Even in the course of particular 
discussions about specific problems it may not be necessary or 
desirable for colleagues to remain focused on a common object. 
Similarly, the collaborative practices of controllers in the DLR 
Control Room rely on them shifting easily between phone system, 
scheduler system and other locales. 
" the access to another's domain has to be tied to their ongoing 
activities. It may not be sufficient to provide an individual merely 
with access to the information that is available to a co-participant 
at a particular time. This information may need to be seen in 
relation to a previous history of actions and a trajectory of 
prospective activities. 
For example, in the DLR Control Room a second controller can make 
sense of the state of the service displayed on the computer screens 
with respect to the ongoing phone calls between a colleague and a 
remote party over the loudspeaker. 
" the use of the system relies on common-sense and tacit practices. 
Users bring with them resources for utilising and making sense of 
technology, providing for the intelligibility of text on the screen, a 
course of action on a system and the talk of co-participants. In the 
development of the technology designers need to take account of the 
everyday (and professional) skills and activities of participants in 
the domain. 
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The reading of a menu and the transition along a menu title relies 
on common-sense understandings of the options presented and also 
practical reasoning concerning potential courses of action. A 
movement around a building on a CAD screen relies on an 
understanding of the building and tying the activity into the 
capabilities of the system. Accomplishing activities through the 
computer-supported radio phone system of the DLR relies on 
displayed and recognised understandings revealed through the talk 
of a co-participant. Reading items off the screen in the control room 
is achieved by continually making sense of the interactional 
activities of a colleague, not only their talk, but also their visual 
conduct, their gestures and orientation. These practices rely on a 
foundation not particular to the domain, but on commonly available 
and acquired socio- interactional resources. 
So, the technology has to be commensurate with a complex of activities 
which may be transformed in their course, and which may be 
accomplished by various individuals at different times and locales. The 
field of CSCW is one area where such technological support has been 
considered. Early collaborative systems focused on supporting common 
views to information sources, whether the participants were located in the 
same domain (Stefik, et al., 1987), or were geographically dispersed (Bly 
and Minneman, 1990; Olson, et al., 1992; Scrivener, et al., 1992). It soon 
became apparent that there were a range of problems associated with the 
design of such systems. If users were only allowed to have a common view 
(so called WYSIWIS) then support had to be provided to change the view. 
It was unclear how this capability would be presented. Control of the 
views could be given to specified individuals, but this was considered too 
constraining. It could be more generally available, to all users, but this 
could lead to difficulties, particularly when trying to maintain a common 
view of an object on the screen, and with similar `shared facilities' being 
available, like shared pointers, to so-called `cursor wars' (Stefik, et al., 
1986; Tatar, et al., 1991). 
One possible way of addressing this problem is to assign, or allow for 
the dynamic assignment of, roles and responsibilities where individuals 
have different participant statuses which, at least for a time, are fixed 
(Greenberg, 1991). With these statuses would come the possibility of 
different propensities to use and manipulate the system. However, 
providing additional mechanisms again reduces the flexibility of the 
307 
system and requires individuals to engage in explicit actions to manage 
the system rather than perform the activities at hand. There may be 
further ways of supporting real-time collaborative activities by 
considering, for example, crude glosses for the ways in which individuals 
can make use of differing forms of participation and also shift between 
these. These glosses could lead to a different way of considering the 
technological support that could be made available. 
For example, if we consider that collaborative activities are achieved 
through different forms of participation, both with others and within 
activities, it may be possible to outline, for a design activity, the different 
participation statuses of individuals. This initial exercise could have 
certain parallels to the analysis of `footings', participation statuses and 
production formats by Goffman (1981a) and its subsequent extension by 
Levinson (1988). A series of participation statuses and production formats 
could be outlined and differing support considered for each. As simple 
examples, technological support could be provided for the cases of focused 
collaboration and also for non-ratified participation, such as monitoring 
(Jirotka, et al., 1991). In the latter case, consideration could be given to 
the technology making obvious key components in another's activities, 
such as boundaries in activities, marking the commencement and 
completion of actions. 
The case of scheduling the Docklands Light Railway can suggest how 
this could be designed in an interface so that general activities and 
boundaries are apparent, but not intrusive to the ongoing activity of 
others. It appears that controllers are sensitive to the typing of commands 
by their colleagues. Such sensitivity could be further supported by 
marking command completions and boundaries aurally, with minimum 
changes in tone for a key completion or by patterning the keystroke design 
so that different commands had different `sound shapes'. They could also 
be marked visually, with minimum alterations in the appearance on a 
colleague's display, perhaps by just marking when an activity is being 
undertaken by another on a particular object. As these suggestions make 
apparent, the possibilities need not be technologically sophisticated, 
however, they do require some consistency to the design of such mundane 
interface issues as command formats. Although `consistency' is a common 
concern of HCI design for `personal' interfaces, it is rarely considered in 
terms of how these devices are used in natural settings, particularly with 
regard to the activities of others (cf. Greatbatch, et al., 1993). So, although 
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some technological possibilities may not require radical changes in 
hardware or innovations in software, they may need some reconsideration 
of current design principles. 
As well as exploring participation status, the production format of an 
activity could be considered, examining for example, the differing 
requirements for composing an action and presenting that action to others. 
However, although these considerations deriving from Goffman may be a 
useful starting point, it would also be important to take account of the 
ways activities are produced sequentially. So, after commencing with a 
consideration of rather crude participation statuses and production 
formats, attention could then be paid to how support for these can be 
provided simultaneously and to the transitions between them. This may 
require a more general consideration of the domain in which the activity is 
accomplished. For example, one resource that is tied to the emergence of 
more focused forms of collaboration is changes in bodily orientation and 
the monitoring of these by colleagues. Quite crude technologies support 
these shifts when participants are co-present, either by providing the 
individuals with mobilitylO or by making documents which are mobile, 
accessible electronically (by real-time scanning of paper documents, for 
example, Weilner, 1992). Mobile technologies, of quite different kinds, 
therefore, may provide support more flexible transitions between different 
forms of participation. 
It may also be that distributed technologies could also support more 
flexible shifts in orientation between different kinds co-participation by 
providing variable access to a remote colleague in relation to their activity 
(Gayer, et al., 1995; Heath, et al., 1995b). However, participants do not 
merely rely on the visual conduct of their colleagues to monitor their 
orientation, the talk also helps establish a common domain of activity. It 
may be that shifts in orientation are also made apparent through changes 
in the tonal contour of the talk. Hence, consideration may need to be 
10 For example, the `whisper chair' of Ichigawa, et al., (1995). 
This prototype 
technology ties the control of video-audio access between colleagues to the chairs 
of the users. To provide for different forms of participation within a meeting 
the 
`whisper chair' is activated by the motion of the sitter. This was only 
experimental and no assessment of the exercise was given. 
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given not only into how changes in the visual access can be made apparent 
to others, but also in how audio support can be made more variable. 11 
The studies in this thesis not only provide a set of resources for 
reconsidering the design of specific technologies for particular domains, 
but can suggest possible generic directions for system design. A growing 
corpus of studies, of which those in this thesis form a part, have begun to 
reveal aspects of the use of technology in a variety of domains (Greatbatch, 
et al., 1993; Heath, et al., 1994-5; Heath, et al., 1995a). These studies 
reveal aspects of collaborative work that appear generic, including: the 
interactional production and coordinated articulation of tasks; forms of 
participation in tasks, the use of visual boundaries in activities, the public 
and the private nature of activities, and the complex interweaving of talk, 
visual conduct and the use of artefacts. These rely on ordinary, common- 
sense and interactional competencies. 
Although it is useful to draw out these features, if the details (and 
specifics) of the analysis are not to be lost, it is important that they are 
seen as embedded within particular cases. Such practices constitute and 
are constituted by the (professional) competencies of individuals in the 
setting: the architects do not merely view a shared domain of objects, but 
collaborate over drawings of buildings, the controllers on the DLR do not 
just coordinate typing with talk but are involved in the collaborative 
scheduling and managing of a transportation service. These cases need to 
be seen in terms of the purposes for which they were engaged: a study of 
collaborative work or an assessment of a particular technology etc. before 
other potential implications, say for changes in technological support are 
considered. However, with these provisos, it is possible that maintaining 
a set of cases which preserve, to some extent, each of the settings' 
particularity, may be a starting point for other applied and practical 
analyses. They may, for example, allow for flexibility, revealing the 
organisational relevance of particular design options and provide a 
warrant (or at least a link) between various assertions, comments or 
recommendations, and a more systematic and rigorous analysis. 
The use 
of audio-visual materials may thus provide a straightforward resource 
for 
linking design considerations to particular occasions of conduct. 
11 Devices may be provided by the spatial projection of sounds, by using 
directional 
microphones and stereo presentation, for example. 
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7.3.5 Resources for the Deployment of Technologies 
Although it appears to be of marginal concern of system designers, the 
deployment of technology is sensitive to the organisational demands of 
participants in a setting. Accounts regularly report the problems that 
participants face when technology is deployed in a setting (e. g. Landauer, 
1995; Neumann, 1995; Norman, 1988; Norman, 1993b; Page, et al., 1993; 
Wiener, 1993). It may be that workplace studies could provide resources 
prior to a technology being deployed, highlighting potential areas of 
concern, where particular training and skills may be required and also 
suggesting various features of the work which may be consequential to the 
deployment, for example. Such issues are addressed by practitioners of 
participant design (Bjerknes, et al., 1987; Ehn, 1988), but it may be that 
the analysis of audio-visual materials could supplement these activities. 
For example, consideration of the phone system in the DLR Control 
Room in Chapter 5 not only reveals how the conversations through it are 
an essential resource for the management of the line and the handling of 
crises and emergencies, but that the accomplishment of these 
conversations rely on socio-interactional practices. This appears to be the 
case in a range of similar domains involving talk with remote participants 
over various kinds of phone systems (e. g. Goodwin, 1996; Heath and Luff, 
1992a; Whalen, 1995b). Computerised and other kinds of 
telecommunications support are provided in all these domains for the 
participants to make and take calls. It would appear that analysis of the 
accomplishment of talk in such domains could be a useful resource for not 
only the design of new technologies to support conversations with remote 
parties, but also their deployment. For example, in yet another domain 
where a computer-supported phone system is being deployed, that 
considered in Chapter 2, Gray et al. (1993) suggest ways in which the talk 
between the participants could be transformed to fit with the operation of 
the system. Studies of social interaction could suggest what are some of 
the sequential implications of automating greetings or getting a call 
operator to say to a caller `In the future, if you provide your name first 
when making a collect call, it will speed your call' (Gray, et al., 1993, 
p. 290). 12 
12 Gray et al. (1993) times this utterance as taking around 3 seconds, ignoring the 
time involved in dealing with the likely response of a caller faced by the moral 
commitment to reply to this suggestion. 
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When considering such a new technology it would be essential, for 
example, to investigate the possible relationship between a transformation 
of the technology and the organisation, timing and pacing of the phone 
calls. Chapter 5 outlined how these are tightly interwoven. It may be that 
the organisation of the phone call may suggest places when and where 
other information could be made available. There may be a potential to 
exploit long gaps and repetitions, tied to the operation of the phone 
system, for the provision of information on other displays. But it would 
also be necessary to consider how changing the resources available to one 
of the participants may change the work that has to be accomplished in 
the opening of the phone call. Altering who speaks first, what information 
they have regarding the other party and, even, the sounds and noises 
available can transform the nature of interactional activities accomplished 
in call, turn-by-turn. This requires a consideration of the social 
accomplishments and demands of the turns of talk in a conversation. 
Such an analysis would also have to be undertaken of the demands and 
requirements of other parties, not just the `user' of the computer-supported 
system. In the DLR case, this would require an examination of the 
activities of other participants, particularly of train captains, to 
investigate how additional resources could fit with their current activities. 
It would also require a consideration of the consequences on the activities 
of others not directly involved in the operation of the phone system, for 
example, others in the control room. Transforming the technology may 
also transform the resources available for collaboration. 
Analysis of the detailed in situ accomplishment of activities can have 
implications other than those for possible technological designs. They 
could suggest some of the consequences of organising talk in various ways, 
for example, of the particular requirements demanded and produced by 
`formal' components. It may also be that studies of social interaction could 
provide resources for the training of participants. In the DLR case, the 
resources could inform the training of controllers and train captains with 
respect to their practices through the phone system. 13 
Moreover, the analysis of workplace activities could provide resources 
for those considering changes to the division of responsibilities between 
participants, for example those of the CRSs, CRAs and CRMs in the DLR 
13 In a similar way to that of the analysis of interactional conduct of general 
practitioners using a computer system informs the practical training of doctors in 
their use of technologies within consultations (Greatbatch, et al., 1995). 
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Control Room. On both DLR and on London Underground, there are 
numerous proposals for reorganising these responsibilities with respect to 
who is concerned with strategic management, information dissemination, 
how many individuals are required to perform some activities, etc. A 
consideration of the work of the controllers in Chapter 6 reveals how their 
`public' activities, their collaborative activities on the phone and the ATS, 
are resources for other individuals in the control room. Transforming the 
responsibilities of the controllers, or the number of controllers, would 
transform a tacit resource which others rely on. 
Hence, naturalistic analyses may not just have implications for the 
design and assessment of technology, but could provide resources for the 
deployment of systems. This could be by undertaking particular case 
studies in the domain in question. It may be also that the growing corpus 
of studies of workplaces, coupled with analyses of the accomplishments of 
related social activities, may provide additional resources for those 
concerned with deploying systems. These could at least provide some 
background to the issues that may be consequential for the introduction of 
a new technology, for example how activities are collaboratively 
accomplished and how an individual's activities may relate to those of 
colleagues. The corpus then could provide ways for framing a more 
circumscribed study in the relevant domain. 
7.3.6 Resources for Supporting the Design Process 
It has been suggested that one problem that is likely to arise from utilising 
naturalistic studies for design activities is how to provide better ways for 
designers and ethnographers to communicate with one other, particularly 
as each come from different disciplines and have different purposes. For 
example, one practical approach would be for designers and ethnographers 
to collaborate over a piece of fieldwork, for example, by ethnographers 
'debriefing' designers about a particular setting (Randall, et al., 1994) or 
by designers setting out the questions they need answering. It may also 
be possible to identify a variety of different 'uses' of ethnographic 
materials at various stages in the design process. For example, early 
in 
the process fieldwork can inform designers about a particular domain, and 
later it could be utilised to evaluate various design decisions 
(Hughes, et 
al., 1994). The materials gathered from a fieldwork exercise may also 
be 
structured so that tools could be developed to assist analysts 
in the 
drawing up of a requirements specification. These materials may outline 
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particular aspects of the work revealed through an ethnographic study, 
the layout of the domain, the roles of participants or 'workflows', for 
example (Hughes, et al., 1995). 
By focusing on the problems of communication it is also possible to 
suggest the potential for tools to support fieldworkers and methods for 
shaping the analysis of observational materials (Hughes, et al., 1995). For 
example, sophisticated tools could be used to map out local work settings, 
annotating these with transcripts and notes and in outlining flows and 
relationships between activities (Twidale, et al., 1993). These suggestions 
often parallel the development of practical methods for design drawn from 
other traditions (cf. Maclean, et al., 1989). There may be problems, 
however, in utilising such tools given the analytic orientation of the 
ethnographic studies they are intended to support. 14 The rich insights of 
these studies have been attributed to their focus on the sense-making 
practices of members revealed through the observation of members' 
accomplishments in particular domains. This is in contrast to other 
orientations which bring to the analysis a priori categories, prescriptions 
and stipulations which pre-specify what can be considered relevant for an 
analysis. It is unclear how any method, tool or technique developed 
through an ethnomethodological orientation could be developed that did 
not contain some means of prescribing the particular features of a setting 
to be relevant. Even quite general techniques like asking designers to 
formulate a set of questions to frame an analysis, providing tools for 
mapping out the spatial organisation of a domain, and techniques for 
examining workflows, may constrain what may be revealed by an 
ethnographic study. Such tools may provide useful resources for social 
science researchers from an ethnomethodological tradition, however they 
may be less useful for practitioners aiming to undertake an analysis for 
the purposes of design. They may be used as stipulations for particular 
circumscriptions of the analysis. Unfortunately, these tools may draw 
attention away from the details of how naturalistic activities are achieved 
in the workplace, neglecting the tacit, coordinated and emergent nature of 
the production of activities. 
14 One problem that is faced by Design Rationale (Maclean et al. 1993), for example, 
is that it does not distinguish between different activities which can be 
characterised as `design' and the range of activities for which general tools and 
techniques for `design' may be put. 
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Although tools which support graphical presentations of a setting and 
of workflows could make apparent to designers appropriate features of an 
analysis, their use would have to ensure that they do not highlight 
particular aspects of workplace activities; presenting activities as flows of 
individual tasks, or the context of a work setting in terms of a physical 
space, for example. It may be that the suggestions for tools and 
techniques to support ethnographic studies may point to more general 
difficulties with the ways in which studies of workplace activities may be 
presented, it being hard to conceive of graphical and schematic 
representations which preserve the details and richness of the original 
analysis. It may be also hard to envisage how plans of rooms annotated 
with copious fieldnotes could be made sense of and utilised by designers. 
As with other design tools, these capabilities may impede rather than 
facilitate the work of programmers and system designers, or, in order for 
them to be of use, they may be utilised for quite different practical 
purposes. 15 
Audio-visual materials may provide a resource for making materials 
related to particular cases available, for more than a single purpose and a 
single audience, whilst maintaining attention on the detailed nature of the 
conduct. Audio-visual materials make possible presentations, alongside 
other relevant material to other analysts and can be a resource for others 
involved in the design process. They can be utilised for insights into a 
domain, to draw out requirements for a innovative technology, to provide a 
resource for a design activity, for assessing a system, or to contribute to a 
deployment strategy. Video provides a particularly rich resource to offer 
others in the design process with access to a setting. The videos and the 
supporting analysis can be seen as a resource for envisioning new systems, 
both particular and general. They could form the basis of an alternative 
to, or a valuable and animated extension of, such design processes as 
scenarios, storyboards and walkthroughs (Carroll, 1990; Lewis, 1990; 
15 See Button and Sharrock's (1994,1996) analysis of the use of a CASE 
methodology and a requirements representation tool for the practical purposes of 
software engineering. Button and Sharrock's studies of software engineers 
suggest another way in which an ethnomethodologically-informed study might 
contribute to the practices of systems developers. Through an analysis of the 
practices of software engineers and programmers it may be possible to derive 
direct outcomes such as suggestions for tools that would support their everyday 
accomplishments, and methods that would be sensitive to the practical 
contingencies facing designers and implementors. 
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Yourdon, 1989); the materials providing a warrant, or at least a link back 
to the requirements, and the settings of possible use. 
Analysis of the details of technology use can contribute to the 
assessment of a technology, revealing tacit features which may not be 
obvious to designers, or explicated by users. Video-based materials could 
thus be useful when considering an alteration to a system, an upgrade or 
improvement to an interface, input or output devices, or a replacement for 
an entire system. They can be a powerful resource for suggesting some of 
the difficulties encountered in using a technology, but also can reveal the 
ways in which current technologies and artefacts fit smoothly into working 
practices. The audio-visual materials can also be relevant when deploying 
a technology, from minor contributions such as the orientation and 
placement of technology through to the implications of likely changes to 
responsibilities, demands on users and training. 
Video is the critical feature of these contributions. It can provide for 
systematic, rigorous and detailed analysis of naturally occurring activities, 
warrantable analysis tied to the activities of participants and some access 
to particular domains for a wide variety of design purposes. Of course, it 
could provide for more, for example the video materials could provide a 
resource for analysis from a range of orientations: including simple task 
analysis, Cognitive Scientific approaches, and no doubt Distributed 
Cognition, Activity Theory, and the orientation suggested by Brown and 
Duguid. This is viewing the contribution of video as solely providing a 
supplementary resource for design activities. More important is the 
contribution the video makes possible to the nature of analysis that can be 
undertaken, not just showing behavioural features of conduct, but also 
revealing the detailed organisation of naturally occurring activities as the 
practical accomplishments of participants. An interactional framework 
provides resources with which to warrant an analysis and warrant its 
relevance through the participants' own contributions. This suggests a 
way of providing some rigour, and making systematic, the problematic 
activity of analysing ethnographic materials. 
7.3.7 Discussion: Naturalistic Analysis and Design Considerations 
By attending to the details of activities revealed in recordings of naturally- 
occurring activities it is possible to draw out implications for the 
assessment of particular interfaces, systems and deployments of 
technologies. From the analyses it is also possible to raise issues that may 
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of concern for design. Revealing the nature of the practices of participants 
in a setting suggest some features that, at least, designers should be 
sensitive to. By considering several of these studies, including the four 
cases in this thesis, some more general issues emerge that seem to have 
resonances with the concerns of developers of novel technologies. Indeed, 
recent technological reports draw on related studies referring to such 
issues as `peripheral monitoring', `shadowing', `fluid transitions between 
forms of working' and `mutual awareness' with respect to technologies as 
diverse as virtual reality environments, shared groupware systems, and 
toolkits for system design (Benford, et al., 1996; Bowers, et al., 1996; 
Dourish, 1996; Gutwin, et al., 1996). 
Despite this technical work there have been criticisms of the ways in 
which practitioners of workplace studies consider the relationship between 
the studies and design. For example, Plowman et al. (1995) point to the 
vagueness in their formulation in terms of `insights', `suggestions' and 
`options'. However, this criticism appears to belie the variety of purposes 
to which workplace studies have contributed. They have not just aimed to 
produce some implications for general designs, but, for example, have been 
part of collaborative exercise between social scientists and designers, 
either to develop particular prototype systems (e. g. Bentley, et al., 1991; 
Heath, et al., 1995b) or to contribute to the general design process of large 
corporations (e. g. Bowers and Button, 1995; Harper, forthcoming; 
Suchman, forthcoming). It may be that what Plowman et al. require are 
more explicit links between the analysis and the design exercises in 
question. 16 However, workplace studies themselves point to the danger of 
making such assertions. For example, Button and Sharrock (1994,1996) 
reveal how the development of technology itself emerges through the 
management of a range of organisational and local contingencies. Thus, it 
would be problematic for analysts to assert a causal relationship between 
an analysis and an ensuing technology. For similar reasons, there is a 
reluctance to proffer simple generic guidelines, procedures and methods. 
Such resources would have to be used contingently, given the demands of 
16 However, what is perhaps strange about their critique is that Plowman et al. do 
not question how the design implications are derived from workplace studies, but 
criticise the authors for being drawn into making such statements, and because of 
this design implications are framed in a tentative way. Despite mentioning cases 
where specific design recommendations have been drawn from workplace studies, 
Plowman et al. use the general framings as a resource to summarise the general 
problems of moving from the workplace studies to `technical', design implications. 
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the system development setting. This is not to say that there is no 
interest from analysts about the possible technological implications of 
their work. However, there is a great deal of caution in asserting 
unwarrantable claims from the analysis. 
As Plowman et al. do state, workplace studies offer the potential for 
uncovering the details of in situ work practices, by revealing, for example, 
the tacit accomplishments and routine achievements of participants. 
Revealing practices oriented to by participants, that are produced and 
recognised with respect to the activities of others, provides a warrant for 
the relevance of an activity not only for the participants themselves, but 
also for analysts. These routine and everyday accomplishments could then 
provide a substantive resource for a design exercise, whether this is 
utilised to suggest particular requirements for a technology, specific 
features in the design of an interface, or guidance for the deployment of a 
computer system. So, for example, the tacit practices surrounding the use 
of paper architectural plans might suggest requirements for a technology 
aimed at replacing them. Or, the ways in which the use of current 
technologies can be improvised and shaped from moment-to-moment in 
relation to a range of contingencies may provide useful guidance when 
new technologies are about to be deployed. 
There are substantive implications for design activities that can be 
drawn from the analyses outlined in this thesis and from a range of other 
studies that explore the detailed accomplishment of activities in workplace 
settings. It is possible also to draw out implications from such studies for 
the design of a variety of generic technologies, for example, in terms of the 
ways in which the use of conventional technologies are articulated to 
facilitate collaboration; to suggest the nature of activities that might be 
supported by future systems. In addition to those mentioned in the 
previous sections, researchers have outlined the consequences for the 
design of systems to support cooperative work (e. g. Bentley, et al., 1992; 
Heath and Luff, 1992a); and the resources provided by audio-visual 
connections (Heath, et al., 1995b), HyperText systems (Harper and Sellen, 
1995), workflow technologies (Bowers and Button, 1995; Suchman, 1993a) 
and mobile devices (Luff, 1994). Although these implications tend to be 
preliminary remarks and suggestions concerning the capabilities which 
such technologies could offer, several experimental or prototype systems 
have emerged leading from these studies, and others form part of longer 
term technological design exercises (such as those carried out within Xerox 
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and Rank Xerox Research Laboratories). Workplace studies, then, would 
appear to have a wide range of specific and general consequences for the 
system design process. 
However, it may not be these proposals that have the most significance 
for system design activities. The consideration of the details of particular 
cases may provide more substantial resources for considering the 
development of tools and techniques for the detailed accomplishment of 
activities, rather than, say, broad aims such as supporting collaboration 
and cooperation. Hence, the importance of workplace studies may be in 
providing an accessible corpus of studies of social action, in developing a 
framework for conceptualising the activities revealed in such materials, 
and offering analyses of the detailed ways in which activities are 
accomplished in natural settings. 
7.4 CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCIES 
In outlining some of the shortcomings of current efforts of using 
ethnographies for design, Anderson (1994) (and Button and King, 1992) 
suggests that this rests on a misunderstanding concerning the nature of 
ethnographic studies. Ethnographies are more than just fieldwork (or 
`hanging around'), but are undertaken within a particular analytic 
orientation. Anderson continues by suggesting that what designers may 
indeed require is just fieldwork, observing the happenings in particular 
domains. Indeed, there are now numerous cases within CSCW where 
fieldwork observations are reported (e. g. Ackerman, 1996; Bellotti and Bly, 
1996; Berlin and Jeffries, 1992; Moran, et al., 1996; Murray, 1993; 
Schwab, et al., 1992; Watts, et al., 1996). However, even within a design 
exercise some warrant is required for the observations being made. 
Furthermore, it may be preferable if the observations were not made in 
accordance with categories and stipulations prescribed before the analysis 
was undertaken, whether these are broad such as `gender', `power' and 
`social norms;, or narrow, a `plan', a `goal' or `negotiation'. These 
requirements are actually requirements of social science analyses and as 
such parallel earlier debates about formalising knowledge, social 
behaviour, categorisation and relevance (cf. Garfinkel, 1967; Heath and 
Luff, 1992c; Weber, 1947). Ethnomethodology is a radical response to 
these problems. A focus on social actors' situated, practical 
accomplishments through interaction is inherent in this programme. 
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Nardi (1996c) criticises what she calls `situated action' approaches as 
being too specific, only being relevant to the particular domains under 
scrutiny. Her criticism reveals continuing problems with an 
understanding of these orientations, not only by those interested in HCI 
and CSCW, but also within social science. `Situated action' is either 
associated with `in context' or `unplanned' activities or contingent (and 
almost irrational) actions. 17 By understanding the programme in this 
way. cognitive models can be extended and seen to deal with changes in 
plans, goals and tasks. Activities are merely being considered as more 
dynamic and variable. However, this understanding misses the emergent, 
collaborative and, most importantly, the interactional nature of situated 
action. Social actions are continually shaping and developing the context 
in which they are understood and produced, and they are also shaped by 
it; activities and interaction are thoroughly interweaved. 
Other approaches, even those radical suggestions by Brown and 
Duguid and proponents of Distributed Cognition have impoverished 
conceptions of the social and context: context being conceived spatially or 
ecologically, social action as either a combination of individual capabilities 
or a vague amalgam of the cultural with the individual. These distinctions 
do not just rest on socio-theoretical concerns, or part of the long-time 
debate between psychology and sociology, but also on different 
orientations within sociology. Taking ethnomethodological insights 
seriously would involve a rethinking of many of the conceptual 
underpinnings of approaches for HCI and CSCW, and to other areas of 
Computer Science where there is a need to develop systems applicable to 
users and organisations (i. e. requirements, domain and systems analysis). 
Proponents of approaches such as Distributed Cognition and Activity 
Theory recognise that such a respecification of concepts is required, and 
that the conceptions of `task', for example, in task analysis and in most 
cognitive approaches to HCI constrains both the analysis of human- 
computer interaction and the development of new methods for design 
(Hutchins and Klausen, 1996; Nardi, 1996a; Norman, 1993b). Moreover, it 
has been proposed by psychologists that communicative activities should 
also be considered more in terms of social actions (Clark, 1996a; Clark, 
1996b), artefacts should be considered as supporting activities that are 
`external' to the individual (Hutchins and Klausen, 1996; Norman, 1991) 
17 See also the debates in the Cognitive Science Journal (Vera and Simon, 1993a) 
concerning Suchman's (1987) `Plans and Situated Action'. 
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and there are important tasks that are peripheral to an individuals' main 
area of concern (Brown and Duguid, 1994). However, these extensions to 
the social are conservative, maintaining a conception of communication 
largely in terms of fixed meanings passed in messages and where the 
context of activities is largely considered in terms of the physical location 
of the participants. 
The analyses in this thesis, with others drawing from an 
ethnomethodological orientation and conversation analysis, suggest 
possible shortcomings in the conceptions of human conduct that either 
explicitly or implicitly infuse current design methodologies. For example, 
the analysis of Greatbatch et al. reveals the limitations of current 
conceptions of `consistency' within interface design (Greatbatch, et al., 
1993). An interface needs to be consistent not only with respect to an 
individual's activities, but also with respect to the activities of others who 
are not direct `users' of the system. As another example, `workflows' may 
constrain the ways individuals can accomplish next activities, and fixed 
categories of information and activities may ignore the contingent ways by 
which participants can utilise descriptions and specifications (Bowers and 
Button, 1995; Suchman, 1993a). 
More generally, these studies suggest a potential for a more radical 
shift in the conception of tasks and activities in HCI tasks, one where 
activities are transformed from moment-to-moment through the 
interactions of various participants, shaping and shaped by those 
contributions (cf. Luff, et al., 1992). This would suggest a conception of 
activities that is more dynamic, more flexible and more open to the 
contributions of others. Such a conception of task also transforms the way 
the use of space, the use of artefacts and communication is conceived. 
Movements in a setting, the location of individuals, the use of objects or 
utterances between a pair of participants might then be considered 
in 
terms of an ongoing activity or a web of interactional activities. 
Thus, a 
reconsideration of the conception of task can lead to a respecification of a 
range of allied conceptions, including those which are general, such as 
`space', `artefacts' and `communication' and those which are more 
particular to system use and design, such as the nature of 
`interaction' 
within human-computer interaction, the varied uses of 
`information' in 
system specification, and the capabilities of `objects' 
in system design. It 
also, makes problematic the distinction between the 
`individual' and the 
`collaborative', the `shared' and the `group' within groupware and CSCW. 
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Rethinking these conceptions may suggest ways in which some 
methodological resources for system design could be developed. Initially, 
these may be in terms of some crude heuristics for such things as 
guidelines for requirements analysis, suggesting ways of rethinking 
commonly held assumptions concerning particular domains. For example, 
it may be possible to outline, in a convenient manner, an encouragement 
for designers to reconsider what appear to be `individual' tasks; to 
investigate how the accomplishment of an activity may be accessible, 
viewed or monitored by another and how an activity may be designed in 
such a way. It may then be worth considering how the `public' nature is 
managed within the local domain, to outline the challenges and 
constraints that designers of a new technology would have, at least, to 
consider within the design process. 
The relevance to system analysts and designers of respecifying tasks 
and activities might be more apparent if a novel example of an activity not 
considered in any detail in the previous chapters is taken. So, if, within 
the Docklands Light Railway, a technology was being considered for 
supporting, or replacing, the reports of failures and delays, an activity 
carried out on paper forms. The system analysts would need to take 
account of whether the apparently individual activity of writing the report 
is, at the time it is written, relevant to others in the control room. This 
may require observation of the activity and analysis of audio-visual 
materials to investigate how the activity was shaped by others. This 
might involve examining the ways that contributions to phone calls by 
others are shaped with regard to the future writing of the report by 
another, or how the individual organises from moment-to-moment the 
writing of the report in the light of the ongoing activities of others (like a 
controller's activities on the phone). When considering a novel technology 
it would be possible to investigate, at least in a preliminary fashion, 
whether there were any obvious ways in which the technology might 
impact on these public activities. It may transform, for example, the ways 
in which the resources for report writing were made available by a 
controller (i. e. how failures are made apparent by the controller, seen to 
be 
relevant by the report writer, and also how that seeing is itself recognised 
by the controller). The choice of technology may also have an impact on 
the ways in which the report writing is publicly produced. 
Such 
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considerations would rely on an understanding of the sequential 
production of the activities within the domain. 18 
This is quite a different analysis of a domain to that currently proposed 
in task analysis techniques. A consideration is given to the resources 
through which activities are produced in concert with those of others, with 
regard to the purposes of other participants and also how they inform, or 
shape, another's activities. This renders problematic the conception of a 
task or an individual activity. This problematising itself, however, can be 
a resource for analysis. It would be strange if through adopting an 
analytic conception that calls into question the unproblematic use of a 
priori categorisations and stipulations, an alternative set of 
categorisations and stipulations were proposed, which were just more 
precise, open or flexible. Rather, studies of the detailed accomplishments 
of naturally occurring activities drawing on an ethnomethodological 
orientation focus analytic attention on the particularities of the methods 
through which members render intelligible social actions. Hence, it is on 
the detail of these methods, not the prior conceptualisation of the conduct 
on which the analytic attention should focus (cf. Lynch, 1993). 
Proposing guidelines for system designers, even if these are provisional 
and couched with various provisos, rests on the employment of particular 
conceptions of activities and also imply methods which may have to be 
employed. However, some suggestions on how to provide some practical 
assistance can be given to designers (Heath and Luff, 1992b; Jirotka, et 
al., 1995). Although more general and extensive utilisation of such an 
orientation for design remains to be undertaken, these proposals at least 
suggest alternative forms of support for design activities. Though not 
18 See a related analysis of the activities of financial dealers (Jirotka, et al., 1993), 
where an analysis of collaborative tasks, making use of audio-visual materials, 
contributed to a significant reconsideration of the design of a technology for deal 
recording. The proposed technology, a voice recognition system, rested on 
particular assumptions concerning the activities involved in dealing and 
recording deals. Analysis of video-recordings of this domain suggests how these 
assumptions were misconceived, and shows the considerable problems the 
technology would have to overcome. As in the case considered here, a 
respecification of the problem can refocus the nature of the technology proposed. 
For example, if supporting the real-time recording activity and on co-present 
collaborative work could suggest a focus of technologies used in the setting. 
Mobile technologies and their integration with other `shared' or `public' devices 
may be a useful place to consider such recording work (cf. Luff, 1992). 
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being constrained to using the results of experiments on individual users, 
or modelling the cognitive behaviour of users, or utilising pre-determined 
formulations for analyses, naturalistic analyses can nevertheless provide 
some resources that can be robust. Their rigorous nature is not achieved 
through being able to fit the analyses to some pre-defined model and 
enumerating behaviour in terms of some constrained categorisations 
stipulated by the analysts, but through the analyses being displayed as 
being relevant to both the analysts and the participants. 
This is not to say that an analytic framework for utilising ethnographic 
and audio-visual materials for the purposes of design can be developed 
merely by drawing from current research developed from an 
ethnomethodological or conversation analytic orientation. Despite various 
recent contributions from several researchers, the analysis of artefact- 
based activities remains problematic (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; 
Greatbatch, et al., 1993; Heath and Luff, 1992a; Whalen, 1992). It is 
unclear whether the displayed understandings revealed through the 
sequential nature of talk can be so strongly asserted when analysing non- 
verbal activities. It is also unclear whether it is relevant or appropriate 
for the analysis of workplace activities to aim to uncover a set of generic 
practices of the same order suggested by early conversation analysts 
concerning the organisation of talk (Atkinson and Heritage, 1984). In a 
cogent critique of such work in conversation analysis, Lynch, following 
Garfinkel, has suggested that this programme misses the just this, the 
just that, the haeccities (or earlier the quiddity) of the very activities 
which are under scrutiny (Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; Lynch, 1993). 
These make up the unique quality of activities accomplished in natural 
settings. By attempting to uncover a broader set of generalities of talk 
and related activities, conversation analysts, and to some extent 
interaction analysts, will neglect in their analysis the unique qualities 
through which naturally occurring activities are produced and rendered 
intelligible - Garfinkel's `unique adequacy requirement' (Garfinkel and 
Wieder, 1992). Lynch further outlines some of misunderstandings 
concerning the `application' of ethnomethodological studies of work (and 
with conversation analysis). Principally these consider that 
ethnomethodology is an observational science, with findings which are 
general and applied, and which can be separable from the domains in 
question. From his critiques he goes on to propose a post-analytic 
programme for ethnomethodology to return to some of the original insights 
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of Garfinkel (particularly with regard to Garfinkel's (1967) breaching 
experiments. 19 These criticisms may also be of concern for those seeking 
to provide some generalisable advice, policies or guidelines for designers. 
Maintaining a strong foundation within an ethnomethodological tradition 
whilst seeking to also be relevant to designers would, according to Lynch's 
thesis, be impossible. Thus, as with employing a strict conversation 
analytic conception of the sequential, some of the ethnomethodological (or 
certainly post-analytic ethnomethodological) concerns may have to be 
foregone if these other purposes are to be attended to. 
However, Lynch's critique may still have some import for naturalistic 
analysis for design. It points to the importance of a case-based approach. 
Materials drawn from a corpus of settings provides for analyses, even if 
these are principally ethnographic, that have to be grounded within the 
production of accomplishments within the domain. These may have to be 
understood with the assistance of additional ethnographic resources. It 
may be that more extensive fieldwork has to be undertaken, but it is 
apparent that audio-visual materials need not only be a resource for such 
ethnographic work, but also can assist with shaping the organisation and 
focus of fieldwork. As yet it is unclear whether post-analytic 
ethnomethodological studies will be of interest to social scientists, indeed 
Lynch and Garfinkel express both scepticism and antagonism over 
whether such studies can contribute to academic concerns in general. 
However, they do suggest that such analyses may bring back to the 
domains findings of relevance and interest. Unpicking the tacit, common- 
sense practices of scientists and mathematicians, for example, may be 
appropriate and relevant to scientists and mathematicians. There are 
various purposes for which such analyses could be put, for education and 
training, for example. Workplace studies then may then resonate more 
19 So, Lynch and Bogen state, in comparison to conversation analysis: 
Our descriptive language is ordinary, and, as such, it bears 
countless implications that we cannot help to specify or control. 
Our descriptions are assailable, defeasible accounts, uncommitted 
to any analytical model of conversational pragmatics or 
communicative ethics. Our ethnomethodological approach is 
therefore postanalytic in the sense that we presume that, and 
selectively describe how, the sources of intelligible action and 
defensible judgement are not contained within even the most 
elaborate system of prescriptions and specifications. 
(Lynch and Bogen, 1996, p. 287) 
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with recent concerns expressed by ethnomethodologists than other 
analyses which have developed from conversation analysis. 20 
Indeed, a rigorous examination of naturally occurring social activities 
would appear to offer a way of beginning to unpick the `just thisness' of 
activities in natural settings, suggesting at least where more extensive 
observation, even participant observation is required. The focus also 
would seem to be an extension of the concerns of Sacks into exploring 
natural activities in their domains of occurrence (Sacks, 1963; Sacks, 
1992). In a different way workplace studies which draw from a socio- 
interactional orientation are seeking to break apart and unravel the 
machinery of social action. 
These debates also have a relevance for the more mundane work of 
those concerned in the various activities involved in the design of new 
technologies. For in order to reveal the requirements for a technology, to 
design a tool appropriate for a particular activity, to assess the utility of a 
built system, to plan the introduction of system and even, more generally, 
to understand how technology is utilised to accomplish everyday activities, 
attention has to be paid to the details of the accomplishment of activities 
within the domain. Current methods, and the conceptions that underpin 
them, offer limited resources to assist with such design related activities. 
The activities of interest are social and collaborative, and so it would 
appear to be relevant that social science may contribute to rethinking 
methods and approaches within the system development process. In the 
use and design of computer systems it is particularly apparent that the 
activities surrounding these artefacts are ongoing, improvised and 
emergent. By examining their use in a variety of contexts it has been 
possible to show how these computer-related activities are thoroughly 
interwoven within the interactions between participants collaborating in 
different ways within work settings. 
Although it has been suggested that focusing on the achievements of 
participants unduly constrains the novel possibilities of technology, close 
attention to how these are accomplished reveals how rich and complex 
workplace activities are. It may not be so straightforward to assert that 
only conservative technologies will emerge, or be required, from such 
20 For example, the programme of work exploring institutional talk drawing 
from 
conversation analysis has been recently critiqued as itself relying on stipulative 
and a priori categorisations, particularly of organisational identities (Francis and 
Hester, 1996). See also discussion by Watson (1994). 
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analyses. It may be that in order to support the activities accomplished in 
and through interaction requires radical developments in technology, for 
example in their capabilities to provide variable visual access to another, 
mobility within a setting and public resources. However, exploring 
innovative design activities and processes requires methodological and 
conceptual developments. It may be that the contribution of social 
scientists may be more relevant here. Several such developments have 
already been proposed within the fields of CSCW and HCI, but in some 
ways the focus of these fields, on the individual and the collaborative, pre- 
specifies their concerns. The analyses presented in this thesis do not fit 
comfortably within either field, being explicitly addressed to the 
collaborative and the individual, towards `shared technologies' and screen- 
based activities. 
It may be there are other audiences for which workplace studies are 
relevant, for example, software engineering, or more specifically 
Requirements Analysis. Here, the distinctions between the individual and 
the collaborative are of less importance, given the practical concerns of the 
fields, and the critical need is for methods and approaches for uncovering 
how activities are accomplished in everyday settings. Workplace studies 
could thus inform the conceptual foundations to the field, as well as 
informing practical methodologies and approaches towards design. 
7.5 SUMMARY 
The previous chapters have been concerned with various configurations of 
technologies in several settings, including software applications on 
personal workstations, for transparencies and architectural drawing, a 
system to support the making and taking of phone calls between personnel 
and a technology for several individuals to view and change the running of 
trains on an urban transportation system. Attention has focused on 
differing aspects of these technologies: the use of menus to accomplish a 
quasi-naturalistic task; the production of working drawings; the 
interaction on the phone system when mediated by the technology; and 
the activities of controllers collaboratively using a system. Thus, the 
studies can be seen to relate to a range of concerns both within HCI and 
CSCW. 
From the observations in the settings it is possible to draw various 
implications for the design of systems in these domains. The variation in 
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the settings means that these consequences are of quite different kinds, 
from notes on the particular advantages and disadvantages of a specific 
system through to considerations of potential extensions and alternatives. 
These include offering suggestions for alterations to the interface, for 
different configurations of functionality and additional areas where 
technological support may be possible. 
Of course, the nature of these studies, the fact that they were not 
carried out as part of any particular design process, means that the 
implications can only be preliminary and provisional. In order to develop 
a system, even a prototype, extensive further analysis, specification and 
design activities would be required. These would need to relate to the 
practical purposes of design. Nevertheless, a brief exploration of some 
specific implications provides a foundation for a consideration of the 
relationship between naturalistic studies of the workplace and design. 
In particular, what appears important, both for the analysis and for the 
purposes of design is to provide some warrant for the observations being 
made. Casual observation of the workplace or just `hanging around' is not 
satisfactory. Several ways of framing analyses of naturally occurring 
activities have been suggested. It appears that whilst some of these, like 
Distributed Cognition and Activity Theory, take seriously the need to 
examine the social conduct of participants they still rely on critical 
specifications of activity drawn from psychology and maintain a conception 
of the mental and cognitive processes of individuals. An alternative 
programme has emerged that draws from a particular social scientific 
orientation: ethnomethodology. Studies drawing on this framework focus 
on the practical accomplishment of social actions, and recently, particular 
interest has been paid to the possibility of utilising such studies for design. 
These attempts have raised a set of concerns not only related to the 
practical purposes of communicating between the individuals involved in 
such projects, but also regarding the transformations necessary to make 
studies of social actions appropriate to designers and in warranting 
analyses for design. 
In this chapter, various resources have been outlined which may be 
relevant to different design activities. These resources emerge from the 
analysis of naturally occurring activities through the use of audio-visual 
materials and fieldwork. Such materials make possible an analysis that 
explores the sequential organisation of social action, and allow for a 
detailed examination of the accomplishment of particular activities 
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through talk, visual conduct and the use of artefacts. The analyses in the 
previous chapters have drawn on this framework to reveal some of the 
ways in which technologies are utilised in natural settings. In this 
chapter, these analyses have been used to illustrate potential implications 
for design. It appears that certain substantive implications can be drawn, 
relating to the ways in which particular technologies have been deployed, 
possible designs for alternatives and more general suggestions for 
developments in system design. However, the more significant challenges 
implied by such an approach may be those regarding the conceptual and 
methodological underpinnings of fields like HCI, CSCW and Requirements 
Analysis, fields which seek to examine the use of technologies in order to 
develop better and more appropriate technologies. Studies, such as the 
ones outlined here, suggest resources with which to reconsider how 
activities are currently conceived in these fields, and also how activities on 
and through technologies are accomplished. They suggest a different way 
of considering human-computer interaction, computer-supported 
collaborative work and user centred system design. 
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Chapter 8 
The Social Organisation 
of Human-Computer 
Interaction 
a brief discussion of experiences and 
possible directions for future work 
There is no stability in this world. Who is to say what meaning there is in 
anything? Who is to tell the flight of a word? It is a balloon that sails 
over the tree-tops. To speak of knowledge is futile. All is experiment and 
adventure. We are forever mixing ourselves with unknown quantities. 
What is to come? I know not. 
Virginia Woolf, The Waves, 1931, p. 88. Penguin. 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter concludes the thesis with a few remarks about how the 
reported studies were undertaken and some possible areas which may be 
worthy of future research. In carrying out these studies a variety of 
materials have been utilised, including both ethnographic observations 
and audio-visual materials. The use of audio-visual recordings, in 
particular, raises critical issues not only with respect to how the data are 
collected, but also how they are analysed and presented. Section 8.2 
briefly discusses some of these problems and practical solutions that have 
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been adopted throughout the course of the research in order to address 
them. Inevitably, various alternative directions for analysis could have 
been taken and further work could have been carried out if more time was 
available. Section 8.3 outlines some of the issues which it may be 
interesting to consider given the materials that have been collected. It 
also summarises some other possible areas of future research, in relation 
to the analysis of artefact-centred activities and the practical 
consequences of such studies for the design process. 
8.2 EXPERIENCES IN THE USE OF AUDIO-VISUAL MATERIALS FOR THE 
ANALYSIS OF HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 
8.2.1 Data Collection 
One problem which arises when collecting audio-visual materials of 
screen-based activities is how to gather data that not only reveals the 
details of the activities on the screen, but also makes available for analysis 
the orientation and participation of the individuals in the setting. In all 
the settings considered in this thesis two cameras were used, one focused 
on the computer system and another on the local environment 
surrounding it. Using two cameras immediately sets up two problems: 
what camera angles to adopt and whether to mix the recordings. 
In each of the settings different solutions to the positioning problem 
were adopted, taken with respect to the demands of the particular domain. 
So, for the analysis of the PowerPoint application in Chapter 3, one 
camera was focused, over-the-shoulder, on the screen, whilst the other was 
positioned to the side, allowing access to the orientation of the user in 
relation to what was being carried out on the computer. In the 
architectural practice, reported in Chapter 4, a camera angle was adopted 
which was also over-the-shoulder, on the screen-based activities of the 
architects. The actual position of this camera was changed as different 
architects in the office became the focus of the data collection. The other 
camera angle varied throughout the study. Initially it was a wide-angle 
view of the drawing office, so that the particular architects being focused 
on by the other camera would always be in view. For the remainder of the 
data collection the second camera focused on one particular architect, and 
was positioned at an angle (front-on) where his activities on the computer 
could be seen in relation to his activities on other artefacts in the local 
environment. This view centred principally on his drawing board on 
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which the architect's paper plans were placed. In the DLR Control Room, 
examined in Chapters 5 and 6, one faced the direction of the principal 
controller's position and the technologies surrounding it. The other 
camera was more broadly focused, recording not only the principal and the 
secondary controller, but also the activities at the other end of the console 
where the CRAs were seated. 1 
The various angles that were adopted in these studies not only reveal 
the constraints of the different settings such as where cameras could be 
positioned, where potential obstructions to views were likely to be, and the 
position of the technologies, but also give an indication of the range of 
problems faced when trying to collect materials recording screen-based 
activities. It is difficult to select an angle that facilitates the analysis of 
activities with respect to the screen whilst not constraining the type of 
materials collected. 
If too broad a focus is adopted then the resolution will not be fine 
enough to allow for a detailed analysis of the happenings on the screen. 
When collecting the data, it may not always be apparent what screens 
should be the focus of attention. In the DLR Control Room, for example, 
there were four screens surrounding the principal controller, three of 
which were displays to systems that were continually of use. Because of 
the orientations of the various screens, no single camera position could 
provide for all these to be available. 
If too narrow a focus is selected, say just on the screen, then the other 
angle has to provide for a sense of the individual's activity on the 
computer, such as whether the mouse is being used or where the user is 
looking. This can preclude using the second camera for a more general 
shot including other participants in the domain. This is one reason why in 
the DLR Control Room a close focus on the screen was not adopted. 
Therefore, in each of the settings various choices had to made that 
would provide materials of adequate quality, where the cameras were not 
obtrusive and which provided a significant set of resources for analysis. 
This, inevitably involved some compromises. 
Note that in none of the settings was video output taken directly from the 
computer monitors. On the computer systems analysed this was either not 
technically feasible, was considered to be too intrusive to set up, or would be 
potentially dangerous. 
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A possible way of improving the quality of materials would be to use 
more cameras. However, even with two cameras there were difficulties 
analysing one tape in relation to another. With two sets of recordings the 
materials can either be viewed one after each other or mixed into a single 
image; the mixing being done either the recording takes place or after. 
For the PowerPoint exercise (and for some of the data collected in the 
architecture practice) a recording was made which mixed the images at 
the time of collection. This did not preclude the need for two tapes, 
however. The detail required in the analysis still meant that a separate 
tape was necessary for the recordings of the screen. The mixed recording 
then offered few advantages for detailed analysis over the recordings from 
individual cameras. Even though there were problems in coordinating the 
analyses from the different tapes, in the remainder of the data collection 
activities the recordings were taken from two individual cameras. This 
also simplified the data collection activity. It may be worth noting that 
using even more cameras would have further exacerbated these problems. 
8.2.2 Data Analysis 
The choice of whether to collect mixed or multiple images involves other 
trade-offs. Not only can mixing recordings at source require a, 
transformation (or a restriction) to the shape of the image being gathered, 
it involves a pre-specification of the organisation of the images to be 
collected, which may inhibit later analysis. Using multiple images, on the 
other hand, can inhibit the continuity of the analysis, requiring frequent 
shifts in focus between the recordings. 2 
The recordings were made on analogue tapes and analysed on 
conventional video players. In the course of the studies undertaken here 
technical improvements were made in the quality of the recordings. 3 It 
2 It can be useful to `time code' tapes before recording takes place, but as well as 
being a time-consuming activity the coding of tapes does not assist with the 
difficulties in locating items recorded in a sequential manner, or with the need to 
switch between viewings of different tapes. (At the time of data collection the 
only accurate way of time-coding video-tapes was in a separate process before 
recording. `Time-coding' is not the same as recording the time on the tape. ) 
The initial recordings were made on VHS tapes using a Panasonic M1 camera, in 
one case using a (Sony) high resolution camera, and the later materials were 
collected using the higher quality 8mm format (Sony TR45 and TR55 
camcorders). Since the data have been collected, 118 devices are more widely 
available which offer even better resolution. 
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may be that the recent availability of digital video cameras could not only 
support the collection of materials of better quality, but could also assist 
with some of the problems outlined above. For example, digital cameras 
could provide materials which, though recording at a broader focus, could 
also allow for the later analysis of details. This could be achieved through 
the use of software packages which allow for the manipulation of moving 
images in digital form. Although packages like Avid VideoShop and Adobe 
Premiere4 were used within the course of this research, they were not 
utilised extensively for analysis, the quality, particularly of the audio, not 
being of suitable quality. 5 However the availability of such tools does 
suggest some potential ways of analysing materials in the future; these 
packages, for example, allow a great degree of control of the video image. 
It may also be possible to devise ways of tying the playback of two video 
streams together, so that materials gathered from two cameras can be 
viewed in parallel, on a very large computer display or through multiple 
video monitors. 
For supporting the analysis undertaken here several technical options 
were considered; for remotely controlling a video player from a computer 
and for recording the materials on write-only storage media. The former 
was too slow (the response time being greater than a tenth of a second) 
and the use of the latter did not fit with the ways video data are typically 
edited and analysed. For example, the analysis of materials usually 
proceeds iteratively, an initial collection of fragments either being refined 
or leading to another sweep of the corpus. It may be thus not worthwhile 
to make a non-erasable copy of fragments which are no longer relevant for 
analysis, particularly if use of the format is expensive or time-consuming. 
Copying all the materials onto the medium may make use of the corpus of 
recordings more manageable, but the scale of the exercise may make this 
infeasible. 6 
4 Trademarks of Avid Technology Inc. and Adobe Systems Inc. respectively. 
5 It may appear strange that the audio quality is poor, but the focus of the 
technologies appears to be on presenting and playing back moving images. 
Hence, there are frequently `breaks' in the playback of sound whilst the images 
are being presented on screen. Even the loudspeakers provided on, and available 
for, conventional computer systems appear to be of poor quality. 
6 Since the initial trials of this technology took place, CD-ROMs have become 
cheaper and CD-ROM recorders more widely available. If the practical and 
financial issues can be mitigated, independent of the medium of storage, digital 
collections of audio-visual materials would greatly assist with identifying and 
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As outlined in the appendix the analysis of the details of dynamic on- 
screen materials can be problematic. Partly this is due to the nature of 
the materials collected and the issues that have been discussed regarding 
data collection. However, by adopting some innovatory techniques 
relevant materials for an analysis can be revealed. Video can provide a 
valuable resource for gathering ethnographic background to a setting. For 
example, video materials can provide resources for considering the natural 
history of events under scrutiny; tracking particular activities, for 
example. Moreover, they provide details of activities which would be 
difficult to gather through other means, for example in the materials 
concerning the moment-to-moment running of a transportation service 
video gave simultaneous access to the location of the trains and their 
movements, the happenings on the phones and the use of artefacts in the 
control room. In the work reported here, for the analysis of the materials 
the resources that have been utilised are those which appear to be of 
relevance to the participants through their production of talk and visual 
conduct, and by the displays of the analysis of that conduct by others. 
However, the concern for exploring visual conduct of participants requires 
that the strict demands for analysing talk-in-interaction have to be 
relaxed (cf. Schegloff, 1992a). Nevertheless, in the analyses reported a 
continuing concern has been not to introduce objects into the analysis for 
which only a weak warrant can be asserted for their relevance.? Use of 
video materials may provide for ways of not only exploring the 
requirements for a systematic warranting of fieldwork observations 
(Schegloff, 1992a), but also for investigating the demands of the `unique 
adequacy' requirement (see Chapter 7 and Garfinkel and Wieder, 1992; 
Lynch, 1993). 
In the collection of materials for analysis, other kinds of data were 
utilised. These materials included various documents including the 
manuals for the computer applications, and the software applications 
themselves. They also involved informal interviews with relevant 
participants in the setting and others, including managers and personnel, 
locating fragments within a corpus, particularly when the analyst needs to return 
to the original corpus. 
For example, pointing and gestures have been seen in terms of their iconic or 
emblematic qualities (cf. Morris et al. 1979). Providing a stronger warrant for 
such assertions would require access to how co-participants displayed an 
understanding of the gesture, for example, in their next actions. In other words, 
the analysis is warranted with respect to the interactional domain of the activity. 
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situated in other locations. In one case, within the study outlined in 
Chapter 3, a verbal protocol was also collected after the exercise from one 
of the users examining the video-recordings just gathered of his own 
behaviour. This provided the user with an opportunity to produce a post 
hoc analysis of the materials available on the screen - his own conduct. 
As, in the original recordings, the user also `volunteered' a verbal account, 
of some of his own activities, his post hoc analysis appeared to be more an 
analysis of this talk. Except for being a particular exotic resource for 
analysis, it was hard to see how to make use of this material. 
8.2.3 Data Presentation 
In the foregoing chapters attempts have been made to present details of 
instances taken from the video-recordings of the settings. These have 
utilised transcription notations developed for the analysis of talk by 
Jefferson (1972), for the analysis of visual conduct (Goodwin, 1981; Heath, 
1986) and those specifically designed for the materials under investigation 
(for screen-based activities, in Chapters 3 and 4, and for command entry, 
in Chapter 6). Furthermore, in the course of the analysis various 
notations and shorthand were used to provide some sense of the data. 
These included using diagrams for mapping out the movements across the 
menus or through the screen displays, for Chapter 3 and 4, various 
schema for unpicking the organisation of talk on the radio for Chapter 5, 
and maps of the line and diagrams of keystrokes for Chapter 6. For 
presenting the analyses, sketches of displays and `frame-grabs' from the 
recordings have been utilised to give a flavour of the conduct in the 
materials. 8 The presentation of these materials has been developed from 
earlier work reporting the analysis of audio-visual materials (cf. Goodwin 
and Goodwin, 1992; Goodwin and Goodwin, 1996; Heath and Luff, 1996a). 
Although the constraints of presenting materials in a static form means 
that the nature of the visual conduct, and also the talk, is lost, an attempt 
has been made at giving a sense of the significant and delicate, aspects of 
the behaviour revealed in the materials. This has required some editing of 
the materials and the presentation of series of multiple images. 
8 Clips were `grabbed' from the video-tape onto an Apple Macintosh using either 
Avid VideoShop or Adobe Premiere. Then, particular still images were 'copied' 
into Adobe Photoshop where various transformations were made relating to the 
resolution, contrast, edges, lighting variations and shape of the image. The final 
image could then be copied to a conventional word-processing package (in this 
case Microsoft Word). 
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Fragments taken from the data have been digitised and then individual 
images have been transformed so that they are clearer when they are 
presented on paper. 9 No systematic way has yet emerged for presenting 
such `frame-grabs' alongside an analysis. For this thesis, a case-by-case 
consideration was given to whether such presentation was necessary, and 
how that presentation could be organised. Typically, when considering 
visual conduct, mapped horizontally along the page, the images proceeded 
from left to right and when alongside transcripts of talk the images were 
laid out down the page. A series of images were usually required to give a 
sense of the movements outlined in the analysis. However, exceptions 
were necessary. The requirements of particular analyses suggested other 
layouts, for example, when a further single image was required, or when 
diagrams of screen displays were desirable. It was also necessary, at 
times, to provide images from another camera angle, additional close-up 
details of a particular area of the image, or just the close-up details 
themselves. 
From these initial attempts and earlier work on similar materials 
(Heath and Luff, 1996a), it seems that a more systematic investigation of 
ways of presenting such materials is required, particularly how delicate 
features of conduct can be presented alongside a more general view of the 
local environment in which that conduct takes place. It is also apparent 
that there are particular requirements for the skills necessary to use the 
image manipulation package and limitations to the technological resources 
available. Further study may be useful for considering the requirements 
of technologies to support the presentation of video materials. It may also 
be interesting to investigate the skills of others who have to deal, in their 
everyday work, with similar materials, for example, individuals involved 
in video, photographic images and high quality document production. 
Such an analysis may suggest resources that could be utilised for 
presenting not only static images, but also more animated materials. 
9 Typical transformations involve sharpening the images, changing the contrast, 
brightness and lightening variations and close-ups of particular areas of the 
image. Adobe Photoshop (Adobe Systems Inc. ) provides the resources for making 
these transformations. 
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8.3 FUTURE WORK 
As mentioned, the concerns relating to the collection, analysis and 
presentation of materials raise in themselves future topics of study. The 
studies in this thesis, and others utilising audio-visual materials in 
concert with ethnographic materials, suggest some other requirements for 
tools, techniques and methods for video collection, analysis and 
presentation. Not only could recent developments in multimedia 
presentation software and hardware devices provide some useful 
resources, but more specific systems could be developed to support the 
activities that surround the use of audio-visual materials. For example, 
there are needs for more systematic ways of tying fieldnotes to the 
recordings when collecting audio-visual data (cf. Lamming, 1991), for 
accessing a large corpus of materials, indexing particular fragments, 
relating the fragments to the original sources, analysing the details of 
fragments and presenting the materials. Although some of these 
requirements are specific to the analytic orientation adopted in this thesis, 
it may be that more generic capabilities may be relevant for qualitative 
analysis in the social sciences, for requirements analysis (cf. Hughes, et 
al., 1995) or for the presentation of animated materials, in general. 
Such tools may be relevant when considering the ways that workplace 
studies themselves may be deployed within the design process (cf. 
Anderson, forthcoming). From such studies it may be possible to derive 
methods, guidelines of heuristics for the practical design-related activities 
of developers. There is an understandable reluctance on behalf of social 
scientists to suggest such resources. 10 Indeed, it may be that more 
practical experience is required before suggestions can be made. Several 
ethnographic studies have been utilised for the purposes of developing 
prototypes (Bentley, et al., 1991; Heath, et al., 1995b; Luff, 1994), but it 
would be fruitful to investigate, in a more systematic and extensive 
fashion, the warrants behind the observations made and the links to 
particular designs. It may be that audio-visual materials would 
be a 
useful resource for this. Similarly, with respect to the deployment of new 
10 See, in particular the discussion in Chapter 7 in relation to 
Button and Sharrock's 
(1994,1996) analysis of software engineering. However, even straightforward 
guides to using video recording equipment 
for analysis and background to ways 
for examining such materials are unavailable 
for designers and others interested 
in undertaking such research (cf. 
Goodwin, 1992a; Heath and Luff, 1992c; 
Jirotka, et al., 1995). 
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technologies, a particular case study could be examined where use was 
made of audio-visual materials before and after a technology was deployed 
(cf. Greatbatch, et al., 1992). Areas to investigate could include: the extent 
to which the details revealed in the analysis are required for design 
activities, where generic or specific case materials are useful, and how the 
findings of the study could be presented for different audiences. 
In all the domains considered it is inevitable that the materials provide 
resources for other analyses to be undertaken, or the analyses to be 
extended. In the data on screen-based activities other foci on different 
kinds of screen-based objects and devices could be explored, including 
graphic objects and the ways particular items are manipulated. In the 
architectural practice the accomplishment of the activities with respect to 
other organisational constraints, such as the demands of others outside 
the practice, and the structural and aesthetic demands of constructing a 
`working' design could be considered (cf. Cuff, 1992). The materials of the 
Docklands Light Railway Control Room could provide for a more detailed 
analysis of the coordination of activities on the phone system with other 
activities, an examination of the collaborative activities between Control 
Room Supervisors and others in the control room, and more detailed 
consideration of the interrelationships between happenings on the line 
and the screen-based activities of the participants. 
However, it may be more fruitful to gather materials in a domain 
where the screen-based data provide for a development in the forms of 
analysis from those carried out here. In the analyses in this thesis, due to 
the nature of the domains, the on-screen materials have been principally 
concerned with graphical objects. Not only have the textual items 
presented on the screen often not been available for analysis, but their 
relevance has not been apparent through the conduct of the participants. 
It may be that analysis of a setting where text is a critical resource for the 
ongoing activity may provide a particularly fruitful domain for the 
analysis of screen-based activities. 11 Environments where participants 
have to read and manipulate on-screen texts within a collaborative setting 
may be particularly rich in providing materials where not only the 
dynamic affordances of the computer system, but also the nature of the 
objects on the screen, offer resources for analysis. There may be other 
domains where rich naturally-occurring resources, including fieldnotes, 
11 See the recent analysis of activities in news rooms (Heath, et al., 1995a). 
However, even here the collection of on-screen materials has been problematic. 
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documentary materials and audio-visual recordings relating to the use of 
computers could be gathered. These could provide for the possibility of 
extending further an analytic orientation which subjects the details of 
activities to close scrutiny whilst also aiming to reveal the particular 
unique quality of activities in the settings under consideration. 
8.4 SUMMARY 
In undertaking the studies outlined in this thesis various directions of 
research have had to be neglected. Even with the materials available 
there are other domains of interest which could be explored. Moreover, 
the studies also suggest other settings where the analysis of the in situ 
production of human-computer interactions could be extended. 
The foregoing remarks have also outlined some of the difficulties in 
gathering audio-visual materials in natural settings, subjecting these to 
analysis and then presenting the outcomes. Although it appears that 
particular technologies could support such activities, either those which 
are available or ones which could be specified, it is apparent that such 
innovations would have to proceed alongside the development of the 
analytic approach. The studies in this thesis, with some others, are 
preliminary attempts at examining the nature of artefact use in naturally 
occurring settings. The exact trajectory of this programme of research is, 
as yet, unclear. It would be useful if technological and methodological 
support for such activities is sensitive to the ways in which these are 
accomplished at present, and to the demands of the users. It would be 
unfortunate if any technological and methodological initiatives in this 
domain suffered the fate of many of the technologies and procedural 
recommendations examined by workplace studies. Hence, the 
requirements have to be revealed by consideration of the activities of the 
practitioners of workplace studies. In other words, what may be required 
is a systematic analysis of the practices of those engaged in video 
collection, video analysis and presentation, the resources they utilise and 
how they manipulate the artefacts around them. Although an 
examination of the conduct of social scientists by social scientists may 
seem rather circular, particularly as it appears to require analysis of the 
particular kind undertaken by the individuals to be studied, it may 
be an 
essential pre-requisite for enhancing the support for workplace studies. 
There are other resources that can be utilised, however. In 
following 
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Harvey Sacks' and Garfinkel's programme it may be useful to explore 
domains where members face similar issues as part of their everyday 
concerns (Garfinkel, 1967; Sacks, 1992). As mentioned in this chapter, a 
useful exercise may then be to consider those other domains where the 
collection, analysis and presentation of audio-visual materials is a matter 
of everyday concern. 
In summary, detailed studies of the uses of technology also appear to 
suggest some requirements for novel ways of supporting such studies. The 
analytic approach adopted in this research, the ways it has been 
undertaken, the resources used and how the analyses have been presented 
have revealed some possibilities for these innovations. These innovations 
may be technological or methodological. The remarks in this brief chapter 
not only have suggested further activities which could be undertaken with 
respect to extending the study of technologies-in-use, but also some ways 
in which these studies could be supported. 
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Appendix A 
Methodological 
Background 
analytic concerns in the examination 
of naturally-occurring screen-based 
activities 
A. 1 INTRODUCTION 
This appendix is intended as a background resource to Chapters 5 and 6, 
particularly with respect to the analysis of the uses of the Automatic Train 
Scheduler System (ATS) in the latter chapter. The complexity of the 
materials in the analysis of the ATS requires that some simplification is 
required in the accounts of the activities in the control room. It may be 
that also some further background is needed for making sense of 
particular occurrences in the fragments. For example, the analysis of the 
conduct of the controllers relies on an understanding of the geography of 
the line, the state of the service at particular times, and the activities they 
are undertaking on the ATS. From the audio-visual materials some of 
these resources are not readily available, particularly the details of the 
appearance of the typing on the screen. The controllers attend to the 
particular location of trains and the conduct of their colleagues, so it is 
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important for the analysis to have some understanding of these details. It 
would be impossible, given the continuous flow of activities within the 
control room, to capture this wealth of detail in field notes. Although some 
notes were taken of the general incidents occurring on the lines, such as 
bomb scares, alarms, passenger disputes etc., further work was necessary 
with respect to the collected audio-visual materials so that further details 
in the materials could be recovered. 
Section A. 3 outlines a way of tracking the keystrokes of the controllers. 
Although it is impossible to see from the video-tapes the characters of the 
commands being entered, it is possible to see the hand movements and the 
rough location of the keys which are pressed. By mapping out the various 
possibilities of station identifiers (17 in all) on the keyboard, it is possible, 
for commands to stations, to propose candidate stations to which the 
commands apply. Details of this analysis are given in Section A. 3.1. 
It is possible to see some of the happenings on the screen, particularly 
train movements on some of the displays. By coupling this with a hearing 
of the phone conversations one can provide a provisional account of 
relevant train movements at the time of the call. The types of resources 
relied on in this analysis are outlined in Section A. 3.2. 
Together these two types of analysis are utilised as background to the 
study of the collaborative uses of the ATS in Chapter 6. Due to the quality 
of the materials these analyses tend to be provisional and tentative. 
However, by exploring alternative accounts of train movements and 
happenings on the line a clearer picture of the state of the service at 
particular times can emerge. A flavour of the background analyses to the 
train movements is given by examining one of the fragments considered in 
Chapter 6 (Section A. 4). 
To follow the analyses of conduct it is useful to provide some further 
broader background to the Docklands Light Railway to that given in 
Chapters 5 and 6. Section A. 5 gives an abbreviated glossary of terms 
used in the fragments. The section that follows (Section A. 2) gives a brief 
overview of the line, its geography and the way it is presented on the ATS 
screens, including a summary of the abbreviations to station identifiers 
used in the commands and on the screens. 
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A. 2 THE DOCKLANDS LIGHT RAILWAY 
The Docklands Light Railway was opened in August 1987. It runs in the 
Docklands area of the East of London connected to the London 
Underground network at Tower Gateway, and later Bank, stations in the 
west, and to the British Rail network at Stratford in the North. One 
particularly distinctive feature of the DLR is the trains. Unlike the 
London Underground or the national rail network, the trains are not 
driven or `operated'. Instead, they are automatically controlled by a 
computerised system that, when a train is docked at a station, supplies it 
with the distance (in terms of the number of wheel turns) it needs to travel 
to the next station. However, although trains do not need continual 
operation, a Train Captain (TC) rides on every train who is responsible for 
checking tickets, dealing with `revenue disputes', assisting passengers, 
and the like. The Train Captain also drives the train when the system 
fails. The Light Railway consists of two lines: the `Red Line' running from 
Island Gardens in the south to Stratford in the north; and the `Green Line' 
running from Crossharbour to Tower Gateway (and later to the Bank) in 
the west (see figure A. 1). 
344 
Stratford 
STR 
Church 
ms Road 
DER 
4%, AII Saints 
Tower Gateway 
Limehouse 
LIM Poplar TOG ",.... ..... ý ............... o.... ..... *.. 4 
POP 
0*0 Shadwell 6 Westferry "". ý 
00 SHA WES "". 
040 West India Quay 0 WIQ 
Bank 
BAN Canary Wharf 
CAW 
Heron Quays 
Key HEQ 
"......., Green Line 
. 
South Quay 
SOQ 
Red Line 
. 
mass ma ss Extension 
Crossharbour 
CRO 
Mudchute 
MUD 
Island Gardens 
ISG 
Figure A. 1: The Docklands Light Railway 
The automatic operation of the trains makes it possible for a computer 
system, called the Automatic Train Scheduler (ATS), to control the 
running times and running order of the trains. Furthermore, it also 
allows for a system to generate automatic passenger information 
concerning the destination of a particular train and its estimated arrival 
time. Therefore, the straightforward nature of the line, and the automatic 
operation of the trains, scheduling and generation of passenger 
information, would appear to suggest that few control room staff are 
required. Indeed, it would seem that this was one of the original aims of 
the managers, systems designers or implementors, who conceived of the 
line being controlled by just one individual. This controller would be 
responsible for monitoring the power supply, operating the service, 
reacting to alarms, making additional announcements and dealing 
contingencies, crises and emergencies arising from TCs and passengers. 
However, at the time of data collection (May 1991). during the day 
there were six staff permanently located in the control room at Poplar: two 
Control Room Supervisors (CRSs) responsible for the power supply, taking 
345 
and making phone calls to TCs and scheduling the service; two Control 
Room Assistants (CRAs) responsible for passenger information, the TCs' 
rosters and the provision of radio telephones; an Electrical Works Co- 
ordinator (EWC) monitoring technical problems on the trains; and the 
Control Room Manager (CRM) responsible for the `strategic' operation of 
the service. Chapters 5 and 6 outline some of the ways in which the 
collaboration between these staff is accomplished. Chapter 5 focuses on 
the activities in the phone conversation between the principal Control 
Room Supervisor and the Train Captains. Chapter 6 explores the 
interrelationships between the activities of the principal and secondary 
Control Room Supervisors and the remote parties in the phone call. For 
the latter, an analysis of the activities on the ATS system is undertaken. 
The ATS displays the line in a compressed form so that it fits on a 
computer screen more easily (see, for example, the sketch of the diagram 
of the main line, figure A. 2). 
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Figure A. 2 A sketch of the ATS display of the main line. The arrows indicate 
direction of travel 
On the ATS screen the stations are identified by abbreviations. These 
are given in Table A. 1. 
ALS All Saints 
BAN Bank 
BOC Bow Church 
CAW Canary Wharf 
CRO Crossharbour 
DER Devons Road 
Table A. 1 
HEQ Heron Quays SOQ 
ISG Island Gardens STR 
LIM Limehouse TOG 
MUD Mudchute WES 
POP Poplar WIQ 
SHA Shadwell 
The abbreviations of stations on the DLR 
South Quay 
Stratford 
Tower Gateway 
Westferry 
West India Quay 
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A. 3 PROBLEMS AND TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS IN THE ANALYSIS OF COMMAND ENTRIES INTO THE ATS 
Even with two cameras it is impossible to gather adequate resources in 
the DLR Control Room to make sense of all activities associated with the 
talk and visual conduct of the relevant participants and the details of the 
activity on the computer systems. With one of the cameras focused on the 
console as a whole (including the CRAs and the CCTV monitors), the other 
was required to focus on the principal controllers and the technology 
which surrounded them, particularly the ATS system. This angle provides 
a view of the principal controller the screen and the keyboard, but not the 
details on the screen. 1 Train movements can be seen on the screen, either 
as the section of track changing colour, a station being highlighted as the 
train docks, or as moving train (or set) numbers. However, the commands 
which are typed can only be seen as small blocks as the typing emerges on 
the screen. The next section (Section A. 3,1) suggests how it may still be 
possible to recover some of the details of what commands are being typed 
in by the controllers. 
Section A. 3.2 addresses a different problem. From viewing the screen 
at any moment it is difficult to get a sense of train movements. Even 
when a change is seen to happen it is often as a `disappearance'. A train 
leaving a station, for example, is marked by the station changing back to 
its normal colour. So, to get a sense of the train movements a natural 
history of relevant events on the line has to be reconstructed. Section 
A. 3.2 outlines some of the resources for this work. 
A. 3.1 Keystroke Tracking 
At the time of recording there were 17 stations operating on the DLR, or 
more accurately 17 stations that commands could be sent to. The format 
of the commands means that it is possible to examine the hand 
movements of the controllers when commands to stations are being 
entered. Although neither number sequences nor commands to the 
shunting yard can be easily distinguished, most of the abbreviations for 
stations have distinctive contours. To assist with a provisional analysis of 
The positioning of the cameras was also influenced by the demands of the setting. 
It was critical that the cameras did not impede the participants. A more detailed 
focus was tried, but this camera position could have blocked the controllers' 
access to the system controlling the power supply to the line. 
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these commands the contours are divided into six groups based on the 
general direction of hand movement: left-left, right-right, right-left 
(inside), right-left (outside) and close patterns. The close patterns group 
largely overlaps with the others, but assists with distinguishing quick 
typing at close proximity. 
The work then consists of distinguishing from which group the 
particular command belongs and which member it most resembles. In 
most cases particular abbreviations can be identified by either the starting 
or the ending point of the command (its row or column on the keyboard). 
The distance of hand travel provides another resource for identifying 
commands, so does whether the hands end at a point beyond which they 
started (outside). Breaking apart the problem in this way leaves only a 
few abbreviations which are difficult to distinguish, notably between the 
commands to Stratford (STR) and Devons Road (DER) stations. 
The following diagrams give a sense of the different hand movements 
in each of the groups (Figure A. 3). 
HEQ 
11 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
q e u i o p [ ] 
a s d f g h k I ' 
z x c v b n m 
- - I F 1 T 
MUD 
left - left 
DER ISG POP 
11 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
q w io [ ] 1 
S h 
z c n m ! 
CAW BAN LIM 
left - right 
WIQ TOG 
Ii I 2I 3 I4 5I 6 7 I8 9I 0 I. k I 
q o P [ 1 
a J k I ' 
: xc v b n m ! 
SHA SOQ 
' 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
g w e r ' o p [ ] 
1 1 ; ' 
z x c v b n m ! 
CRO 
right - right 
RTR 
11 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
g w e r it y u ' 0l P I(I ]I { 
ss 
lkoi 
vr l ir ' 
I zx c b n m . ! 
ALS BOC 
right - left (inside) 
WES DER ppp 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 4 
qw rt y u i o p [ ] 1 
s h j 
z c v b n m ! 
STR CAW LIM 
right - left (outside) close patterns 
Figure A. 3 The typing patterns of the commands 
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A. 3.2 Train Following 
As train movements are displayed by discrete changes to the ATS display, 
these too can be difficult to distinguish in the materials. However, some 
sense of the movement of the trains can be arrived at from following the 
occurrences in the radio phone conversations. The geographical distances 
on the DLR are quite short so attending to the happenings in the 
recordings surrounding a particular fragment, at most half an hour either 
way, can reveal some relevant resources for making sense of the train 
movements visible on the screen. Typical resources are: 
" incoming calls stating the present location or direction of any train, 
or the location where a future alteration is required; 
" outgoing calls stating the location or direction of any train, or a 
location when an alteration is going to be made; 
" special identifiers, such as `mobile' or `driver Ed'; 
" the talk between CRSs, CRAs and other staff in the control room 
concerning happenings on the track, such as driver training ('driver 
education'); 
" commands having to be made to a station prior to a train arriving at 
it, and after a previous train has departed; 
" the `lack' of any other command being made by the controllers in the 
time before a train arrives at a station, when an appropriate 
alteration is required; 
" the typical time taken to travel between stations; and 
" ... a similar set of resources 
happening following a call. These can be 
utilised to make speculations about prior train movements. 
Thus, from the audio-visual materials some ethnographic background 
is recovered concerning the details of the happenings on the line. These 
happenings, however, only have a provisional nature. 
A. 4 EXAMPLE ANALYSIS 
To give a flavour of the ways in which these analyses are brought 
together, the instance considered in fragment 8, Chapter 6 is considered. 
Just after the remote party's reason for the call, Cii types a command 
to Herons Quay (a `left - left' command): 
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(8) 13Co - transcript A. 1 
1 Ci: train base to train at five two:: T 2 (3.3) 
3 RP: fi:: ve two. L (check) five two:. I, request permission to (. ) 4 change into A: Tee Pee (0.2) driver (0.3) (Ed) at 5 Crosshar: bour: (0.4) over. 
Cii: 
.1...; H E Q.... ".. 
The call continues and when Ci confirms the change, Cii types in two 
more commands - one to Canary Wharf (CAW) and one to Mudchute 
(MUD). These are shown on the line below the talk they co-occur with. 
(8) 13Co - transcript A. 2 
7 Ci: (I can see) if you could standby and let me get back to 
8 you in a mo:: 
9 (1.5) 
10 ((radio ring), phone system beep)) 
11 (2.3) 
12 Ci: fi: ve two, are you still receiving? 
13 (4.7) 
14 TC: () receiving over? 
15 (0.2) 
16 Ci: (that change is fine) thats affirmative when you 
17 arrive at Crosaharbour (0.3) (routeboard) one four three 
Cii: 
,JCq 
yy 
18 (0.4) you may set A: Tee Pee manual (0.2) and proceed 
Cii: 0 OO OO OO O OO OO 
19 (on your section and clear) (0.2) until further notice. L 
Cii: .1.. M lJ D 
20 (err driver finish your test back to you ) (0.5) 
Cii:  OO OO . OO O OO 21 over. 
22 (2.3) 
Furthermore, following the call, just after the phone is put down, Cii 
types another command into the system. This time for Crossharbour. 
Throughout the call, and for a long duration following it, Ci does not type 
any commands to the ATS. He goes on to take another call. It appears 
that one or more of the commands typed by Cii could be related to the 
incoming call. 
The state of the service is, at the time of call, shown schematically in 
figure A. 4 (adapted from Figure 6.6. in Chapter 6). 
Figure A. 4 the location of trains as the call is being taken 
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The trains when the call is made 
There are five trains running on the area of track in question (the 
branch between the Delta and Island Gardens, ISG). 
On the southbound (going right on the ATS screen) one train is 
between the Delta and Heron Quays, another is between Heron Quays and 
South Quay and a third is coming into Crossharbour. On the northbound 
(going left) one train is between Crossharbour and South Quay and 
another docked at the terminus, Island Gardens. 
Examination of the ATS 1 display reveals that during the course of 
activities occurring around the initial request from the train captain, three 
trains dock at stations. These are revealed by the colour of the station 
changing to yellow on the screen. Two trains dock on the southbound, one 
at Crossharbour (line 10), and one at South Quay (line 12). One docks on 
the northbound (line 6). However, none of these appear to be the train 
which is being asked to `standby'. 
The nature of the subsequent instruction `when you arrive at 
Crossharbour' (lines 16-17) appears to exclude the train at Crossharbour 
going south. As the other trains on the southbound section of the track 
are also beyond Heron Quays, the command to HEQ can only apply to the 
train coming into Canary Wharf or the train going northbound and 
entering South Quay. The train at Island Gardens is excluded as it would 
follow the northbound train through Herons Quay. 
Sometime prior to the call, another caller on `five two' has announced 
that her train is to be used for testing trainee train captains. Some nine 
minutes after, from the same call-sign ('five two'), a report is made that 
the train has arrived at Island Gardens. Just before this report a train is 
indeed seen on ATS2 to dock at Island Gardens. This train, now moving 
northbound appears to be the one in the call, the one for `driver ed' (or 
driver education). 
The subsequent commands, commencing on lines 17 and 19, appear to 
be directed to the train coming into Canary Wharf going south (possibly to 
provide a route through one of the three lines through the station) and the 
train just arrived at Crossharbour going south (possibly also to prepare for 
the train to enter Island Gardens). The command to Canary Wharf 
coming after a Herons Quay command would appear to suggest that the 
HEQ command is for a different train i. e. the train going north. There is 
also nothing to suggest in the calls that there are any problems going 
south between Herons Quay and South Quay. Therefore, the command to 
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Herons Quay appears to be made to the train moving northbound, the one 
in the call. 
A command to the Heron Quays station could both change the route 
and mode of the next train going south. If the train in question is part of a 
driver testing exercise then part of this is likely to require changing the 
mode of the train (so that the operators can `drive' the train). 
Hence, it appears that the incoming call between the remote party and 
Ci, and the command by Cii are closely related. The talk relates to a train 
doing driver testing going north, having left Island Gardens. The 
command is made to a station in front of it (possibly to change it to the 
requested mode) 
A. 5 GLOSSARY 
ATM (Automatic Ticket Machine) There are at least two automatic 
ticket machines at each DLR station. A control system for 
the ticket machines called the Automatic Ticket Machine 
Controller is located at the back of the control room and 
usually displays which machines are working at the present 
moment. 
ATO (Automatic Train Operation) The normal operation of the train 
(i. e. not under driver control and with ATP set). 
ATP (Automated Train Protection) A system that prevents the trains 
getting too close to each other, it is organised with respect to 
the movement of the preceding train. 
ATS (Automatic Train Scheduler) The computer system that 
automatically schedules and routes the trains. 
block An action that stops two trains using the same part of the 
track. Blocks are shown in orange on the ATS display. The 
signal system used at the time of recording by the DLR sets 
signals centrally. Blocks can prevent trains running on a 
section of track, so that, for example, engineering work can be 
carried out. The ATP system also blocks a section of track 
following a train. 
BTP (British Transport Police) The police who patrol on British 
transport systems. 
CRA (Control Room Assistant) The control room staff responsible 
primarily for making announcements to passengers. 
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CRM (Control Room Manager) The manager of the control room 
who usually sits on a desk behind the CRSs and CRAs, 
responsible for strategic management with respect to such 
issues as the reliability of the service, the number of trains 
running and the types of trains running. 
CRS (Control Room Supervisor) The individuals responsible for the 
general, moment-to-moment operation of line. 
Delta The complex junction between Westferry, West India Quay 
and Poplar. So called because it is D-shaped. 
Emergency Shunt (EMS) A mode of the train set by the train 
captain that gives the train captain control of the train. 
When in emergency shunt, ATP is not working and speed is 
restricted to 20 kph. The train can go in either direction. 
EWC (Electrical Works Coordinator) EWCs are responsible for the 
supervision of technical problems with the trains. 
F and D (Failures and Delays) A fault and delay log that has to be 
maintained by the CRS on a form. Any delay over 3 minutes 
should be logged. 
mobile The 'third' CRS who is responsible for travelling around the 
line and dealing with problems, such as disputes and bomb 
scares, where they occur. 
mushroom A red, mushroomed-shaped switch that cuts off the power to 
parts of the line. There is also one in the train for stopping in 
emergencies. 
OMC (Operations and Maintenance Centre)The depot where trains are 
stored, tested and maintained. It is located between Poplar 
and All Saints stations. 
routeboard A sign by the side of the track giving the number of the 
section of track. Used to give train captain's precise locations 
and directions. These numbers also appear on some of the 
detailed ATS displays. 
set number The number of any service given to the train by the ATS. 
TC (Train Captain) The individual responsible for the train. TCs can 
drive the trains when there is a fault. Their normal 
responsibilities are concerned with dealing with passengers 
and checking tickets. 
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